Personalized political communication in the era of media abundance: a comparative study of practices in the United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria by Ijere, Thomas Chukwuma
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Ijere, Thomas Chukwuma (2020) Personalized political communication in the era
of  media  abundance:  a  comparative  study  of  practices  in  the  United  States,  United
Kingdom and Nigeria. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link:
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/47870/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users
to access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on
NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies
of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes
without  prior  permission  or  charge,  provided  the  authors,  title  and  full  bibliographic
details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The
content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is
available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
                        
 
 
   Personalized Political Communication 
   in the era of Media Abundance: A 
   Comparative Study of Practices in the 
   United States, United Kingdom and 
                           Nigeria 
 
                Thomas Chukwuma Ijere 
    A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
        the requirement for the award for the 
        degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the 
     University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
 
      Research undertaken in the Faculty of 
          Arts, Design and Social Sciences 
 
 
                     September 2020                                                        
1 
 




This thesis is a multi-method qualitative comparative study of modern campaign practices in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria. Designed to contribute to the gap in knowledge on 
the technological dimension and features of modern electioneering, the thesis focuses on the 
2008 and 2012 Obama campaigns as a technologically innovative exemplar to explore changes 
and emerging practices in campaigning across three democracies. 
 
Findings indicate that in the two advanced democracies, campaigning has entered a historically 
new era where data driven practices and new technology now form the ingredients and 
infrastructure for voter identification, mobilization, persuasion and de-mobilization. 
 
Three key contributions are notable in the thesis. First, the comparative methodological design 
of the study allowed for a typology that captures the technological state and dimension (s) of 
modern campaign practices to be developed. This way, the work builds comparative theory and 
rescues the field from comparative knowledge stagnation on the technological features of 
modern campaigns.  
 
Second, using empirical evidence from the three case studies, the thesis contributes to theory 
by reducing and strengthening the explanatory scope of Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) 
Americanization and modernization theses respectively.  
 
Third, the thesis also adds contemporary understanding to the dynamics of contextual factors 
and conditions that shape innovation and the uptake of technologically innovative approach (es) 
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          1: Introduction and Background to the Study 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the impact of new technology on contemporary practices 
in political communication. The aim is to comparatively identify and define the technological 
dimensions of modern campaigns in order to inform an empirical typological mapping of 
contemporary techniques, registers and practices that complement missing ingredients in 
Swanson and Mancini’s 1996 ‘modern model of campaigning’. Thus, the historical point of 
departure and take off point of analysis is Barack Obama’s campaign of 2008 and 2012-which 
the bulk of recent empirical research reference as an exemplar in advancing and usage of data 
driven and technologically innovative campaign practices. 
In the literature on political communication-defined as ’the role of communication in the political 
process’ (Chaffe, 1975:15); the ‘interactive process concerning the transmission of information 
among politicians, the news and the public’ (Norris, 2004:1); and the ‘forms of communication 
undertaken by politicians and other political actors for purpose of achieving specific objectives’ 
(McNair, 2011:4) or ‘the means and practices whereby the communication of politics takes 
place’ (Negrine, 2008:1), a vast number of analysis suggest that technology is altering 
techniques in contemporary campaigns with technologically innovative practices found in other 
sectors now dominating elections in most advanced democracies like the United States (Ewen, 
2001; Lees-Marshment, 2004, 2012; Davies, 2013; Newman, 2016). 
Campaigns they argue now rely on ‘state of the art’ technology and recent time technological 
advancement in designing political marketing, voter identification and persuasion (Johnson, 
2017, Newman, 2016) with an emerging new model that is data driven, technology intensive, 
digitally enabled and personalized (see Earl and Kimport, 2011; Nielsen, 2011; 2012; Issenberg, 
2013; Balwin-Philippi, 2015; Kreiss, 2016). Entman and Usher (2018) are of the view that 
technology or what they call ‘new digitally enabled pump-valve’s (i.e. ‘platforms, analytics, 
algorithms, ideological media, and rogue actors’) now serve as flow channels for contemporary 
political communication, leading to the ‘decline in the fortunes and authority of institutional 
journalism’ (ibid). 
Historically, approaches and conditions for political mobilization rested on region, group interest 
and other attributes like education, occupation, income, sex, age etc. that the voter possess 
(Campbell et al., 1964; Sigler and Getz, 1972). Thus, socio-economic and geodemographic 
factors constituted the basis for understanding voter behavior, segmentation and mobilization 
(Johnson, 2016). Today however, technologically enabled strategies now form part of the 
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growing tools that political parties, and candidates deploy for these functions (Howard, 2005; 
Kriess, 2012; Nielsen, 2012). Abse (2013), Rogers (2013), and Johnson (2016) argue for 
example, that in today’s age of media abundance, information for voter segmentation, 
mobilization and persuasion is now data driven, more behaviorally focus and powered by 
intelligence from high tech machine learning, predictive modelling, data mining and social 
network people profiling. Thus, in the contemporary electoral landscape of most advanced 
democracies, traditional structures, social variables and groupings that played central role in 
classical models of campaigning are no longer relied on for voter mobilization and persuasion 
(Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 2006). As Nielsen (2009), Van Aelst et al. (2011) and Holtz-Bacha et al. 
(2014) argue, under the modern electoral environment, mediated campaign communication and 
political organizing or canvassing have all increasingly become personalized. Thus, both 
‘people’ and ‘media matter’ for targeting as campaigns rely on technological infrastructure and 
‘data mining to pin-point individual voters for contact’ (Nielsen, 2009). Although, studied mostly 
as a ‘multidimensional phenomenon’ (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014), the concept of personalization 
describes ‘a general process in which individual political actors become more prominent at the 
expense of parties and other political groups’ (Pedersen, 2017). 
That said, while these studies paint a picture of the technological state of contemporary political 
communication, a gap still exist in comparative literature on the cross-contextual patterns of 
manifestation of the technologically enhanced model of campaigning described above, and to 
date, studies mostly explore single-case, with no attempt at a cross-case comparative mapping 
of the features, characteristics and elements of the emerging campaign model described in this 
literature. For example, in the literature on presidential campaigns in the United States, while 
recent scholarship point to the uptake of innovative new practices in campaigning incentivized 
by new media and new technology in shaping contemporary campaign infrastructure and 
methods of electoral context and contest, there is no clear characteristic definition of what these 
practices and methods represent (see Kreiss, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Issenberg, 2013; Nickerson 
and Rogers, 2014; Johnson, 2016; Kress, 2016; Johnson, 2017). 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, even though the longstanding ‘native British history of 
campaigning’ (Scammell, 1995:293), continues to surface in modern elections, scholars also 
suggest that new media technology, digitization and data driven insight is causing and inspiring 
shifts in political advertising, voter identification, targeting and mobilization (see Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015;  Moore and Ramsay, 2015; Anstead 2017). However, like the American strand 
of literature, except for Anstead (2017) who offers a lens for understanding ‘the data-based 
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campaign techniques being used by UK parties’, there is also scanty characteristic definition of 
the manifestation and features of these emerging practices in British electoral context and contest. 
Furthermore, in Nigeria, while recent research also suggest that new media technology and 
digitization is changing and reshaping the structure, methods and face of contemporary 
electioneering, there is failure in detailing what such change represent in specific terms and 
characteristics (see Easton et al., 2014; Okeke et al., 2016; Dunu, 2018; Williams and Jideonwo, 
2018). Taken together, this gap in comparative literature is what this thesis address and Nigeria 
is particularly important because of the paucity of research in Africa. Thus, from the standpoint of 
comparative theory building, the thesis comparative approach rescues the field from comparative 
knowledge stagnation on the cross-contextual dimensions of technological features of modern 
campaigns in ways that complement Swanson and Mancini’s modern model framework. Bridging 
this gap across the three countries as the thesis sets out to do reinforces ‘the unique contribution 
that comparative scholarship can make to political communication analysis’ (Blumler, 2015:430). 
‘Second, all comparative enquiries so far have dealt with advanced Western democracies. While 
it is true that Hallin and Mancini (2012) have sought to project their typology ‘beyond the Western 
world’, however, even such an effort is open to a charge of cultural imperialism. In the end, calls 
to de-Westernize media studies can be answered only by non-Westernizers’ (ibid). 
 
          1.1: Research Question 
As earlier mentioned, the aim of this study is to shed light on the impact of new technology on 
political communication using the Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012 as a point of departure. 
Thus, the research is guided by one main question: i.e. whether the Obama model is to date 
the most advance-i.e. in terms of its technological component? In answering this question, 
the thesis explores the technological features and characteristics of the campaign and the 
extent to which those features and characteristics have been used, applied, or deployed in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom by finding ’patterns of similarity or difference in the empirical 
materials collected (Babour, 2008:217). To do this, the study applies detailed qualitative 
comparative case study method to observe and explain patterns of manifestation of the Obama 
model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, and patterns of data driven innovation in the 2016 
Trump campaign and how such manifestation and innovation can be theoretically explained, 
using Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) Americanization and modernization theses are guiding 
theoretical frameworks respectively. Thus, the three case studies provide empirical materials for 
a typological mapping of practices and for testing the Americanization and modernization 
18 
 
theories, with results used to make ‘inferences on how best to modify’ both theories regarding 
how to explain convergence and advancement in practices (George and Bennet, 2005:6). In 
methodological sense, the strength of this work lies in its comparative case study approach 
used usually to theorize typologies, test theories and reveal context (ibid). 
That said, although, the Obama campaign may not take all credit for the uptake of technology in 
US election, since candidates like Bob Dole-President Bill Clinton’s Republican challenger is 
known to have lunched the first campaign website on October 6, 1996 during the presidential 
debate, with Governor Howard Dean then front runner for the Democratic Presidential 
nomination in 2003/2004 also using technology to support electoral practices in domains like 
fundraising, voter identification and mobilization (see Halperin and Harris, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Kriess (2016) and Johnson (2016) argue that those initial first steps were 
popularized in the 2008/2012 Obama campaigns with more sophisticated data driven and 
technologically savvy campaigning. Thus, by focusing on the use, manifestation and 
deployment of the Obama model-(i.e. define in chapter two as a sixteen element campaign 
model comprising-(1) political and technology consultants, (2) big data and single database, (3) 
predictive modelling, (4) data mining and microtargeting, (5) web 2.0:digital and social media, 
(6) digital fundraising and small donors, (7) air war-political advertising, (8) ground game, (9) 
political opinion polling, (10) branding image and message, (11) negative campaigning, (12) 
campaign and feedback strategy, (13) campaign and interaction strategy, (14) speed and 
consistency of campaign communication, (15) campaign games, and (16) the permanent 
campaign) in Nigeria and Britain and incidence or evidence of data driven and technologically 
innovative practices in the 2016 Trump campaign that deviates from Obama’s, it is hoped that 
space and time insight on the technological features, register (s) and practices of modern 
campaigns will be identified, explained and defined. 
That said, even though the findings are case specific and based on materials collected on each 
case study, the thesis comparative methodological design provides both the imperative and 
empirical background for a cross-case operationalization of the Obama model and a typological 
mapping of the technological dimension (s) and features of modern campaigns from the four 
cases. Findings also provide material for a cross-case commentary on Americanization, 
commentary and expansion of the explanatory scope of modernization and an explanation of 
the prevailing contextual conditions that inspire innovation in the US and dissimilarity in the 
uptake of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
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          1.2: Research Objectives 
The focus of the analysis in this thesis is the 2008 and 2012 Barack Obama campaign. 
Specifically, the campaign dubbed hereafter as the Obama model is used as a comparative 
framework for exploring the gap in Swanson and Mancini ‘modern model of campaigning’ -i.e. 
regarding the technological dimension (s) of modern campaign. In the literature, America is 
often regarded as a major influence in cutting edge electioneering innovation ( Semetko, et al. 
1991; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004; Maarek, 2011), and a good amount of recent empirical work on 
technologically innovative campaign practices point to the Obama campaign as a stand-out 
exemplar in this regard (Harfoush, 2009; Hendrick and Denton, 2010; Issenberg, 2012b; 
Nielsen, 2012; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Axelrod, 2015; Kriess, 2016; Newman, 2016).  
For instance, Alter (2013) refers to the Obama model as the ‘first campaign of the digital age’. 
Scholars outline for example how the campaign used new technologies-big data, predictive 
modelling, microtargeting, experiment-informed programs, personalized campaigns messages 
delivered via smartphones, social media- free YouTube advertising, text messaging and emails, 
MySpace and Facebook to moved campaigning further away from traditional methods reliant on 
socio-economic and geo-demographic segmentation to more data driven, digitally enabled and 
personalized forms (see Hendricks, 2010; Nielsen, 2012; Bimber, 2014; Kreiss, 2015; Kriess, 
2016; Mullen, forthcoming). Drawing from this literature, this thesis deploys the Obama model 
as an analytical framework and comparative explanatory starting point for producing an 
empirical register of technological practices that now inform political communication in selected 
democracies (i.e. United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria). Three research objectives were 
identified to guide the study: 
• First, to test and establish the use, manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
• Second, to explore the theoretical explanation for the manifestation and deployment of 
the Obama model in the case studies and the contextual conditions that shape its uptake 
or dissimilarity. 
• Third, to investigate any use of innovative technological and data driven practices in the 
2016 Trump campaign that may differ from the Obama model and the theoretical 
explanation for such innovation and country incentive for uptake. 
Thus, this work focuses principally on the technological dimension or practices of modern 
campaigning, the theoretical explanation for the emergence of such practices in the US and 
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their manifestation in the United Kingdom and Nigeria and the contextual factors or conditions 
that shape their emergence in the US and uptake in Nigeria and the United Kingdom 
respectively. In the first objective, the Obama model is used as an exemplar to comparatively 
explore and reveal the sequence and form (s) of technologically innovative practices now 
appearing and manifesting in recent campaign in the United Kingdom and Nigeria. Both 
countries 2015 General Elections provide the empirical context for the analysis. This way, the 
study provides a cross-contextual picture of the technological state of modern election 
campaign that updates and complement Swanson and Mancini’s modern model. 
In the second objective-i.e. theoretical, considering that the Obama campaign is American, 
Americanization is questioned regarding whether it provides ‘suitable theoretical description’ for 
the emergence and convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. At 
the second theoretical level, following investigations and debate across both sides of the 
Atlantic regarding the use of psychometrics/psychographics in the 2016 presidential election 
campaign of Donald Trump, the campaign is used to investigate and explain innovation or 
modernization in data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices in recent US 
political communication landscape. This way, the thesis contributes to the debate on the use of 
psychometrics/psychographics in the 2016 Trump campaign by uncovering further evidence of 
innovation and advances theoretical understanding of modernization as an explanation of such 
campaign innovation. At both theoretical levels, specific focus here is on testing the 
Americanization and modernization theses (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) purely in terms of their 
technological dimensions and not the broader processes identified by their framework. Thus, the 
objective here is to provide an expanded contemporary theoretical update to the explanatory 
scope of Americanization and modernization. Lastly, with a research design that is conscious of 
contextual differences, the work seeks to reveal and add to the understanding of contextual 
dynamics that shape convergence in campaign, particularly, convergence of the Obama model 
in Nigeria and the United Kingdom and US specific incentive (s) for innovation. 
Now, regarding technology, recent discourse in the literature suggest that technology has grown 
and continue to grow as a social network, political forum, marketplace, entertainment source, 
and contemporary society molding tool (Brockman, 2011). Changes in social, political, and 
economic patterns of the world, global communication and information infrastructure, power 
configuration, as well as structure and composition of contemporary public sphere have equally 
been ascribed to technological change and advancement (see Bimber, 2003; Tuten, 2008; 
Harrington, 2009; Johnson and Wetmore, 2009; Papacharissi, 2009; Mullen, 2013; Howard, 
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2015). However, much of the literature on the impact of technology on democracy and society 
speculate about its advantage and disadvantage and is a subject of increasing scholarly debate.  
The debate and the huge body of work that exist raises two strands of literature. On one hand, 
cyber-optimist scholars such as Baber (1998), Castells (2001), Kidd (2003), Benkler (2006), 
Bennett and Manheim (2006), Chadwick (2006), Bennett and Iyengar (2008), Dahlgren (2009) 
and Anduiza et al. (2012) perceive the global technological infrastructure change as 
transformative, networked and revolutionary in diffusing social ideas, opening new participatory 
spaces and democratizing  communication. On the other hand, cyber-pessimist scholars like 
Steve et al. (1999), Nye (2007), Fenton (2010), Curran et al. (2012), McChesney (2013), 
Freedman (2014) and Fuchs (2014) argue that the new technological era is capitalist, 
monitoring, controlling and erodes individual and citizen’s privacy.  
On the role of technology as a tool for transforming society Taylor (2014:7) asserts that 
’technology alone will not deliver the cultural transformation we have been waiting for’, instead, 
we need to first ’understand and then address the underlying social and economic forces that 
shape it’. Although Taylor acknowledges that internet technology is driving some great 
inventions, a ’real cultural democracy’ for her ’means more than everyone with an internet 
connection having the ability to edit entries on Wikipedia or leave indignant comments’. Taylor’s 
view in terms of the democratic credentials and potentials of internet technology is that the idea 
of a level technological playing field is an illusion as they are only very few gate keepers that 
provide access to information. As she argues, to foster and propagate a democratic culture in 
the digital age requires that ’supporting creative work’ is ’not because it is vital, but because it is 
important’, serves needs as well as desires, and ensures ‘marginalized people are given not just 
a chance to speak but to be heard’. As Benedikt and Osborne (2013) note, technological 
progress as good as it is for society is threatening the future of work by shifting the composition 
of employment as non-routine cognitive and manual task are now affected by advances in 
machine learning and other subfields of artificial intelligence. In everyday work place 
environment for example, Eadicicco (2015) and Dutton et al. (2017) are of the view that 
technologies like mobile phones even though they can increase efficiency, also undermine 
productivity through distraction and interruptions and can create pressure on personal lives and 
leisure because of their ability to erode the boundary between work and home.  
Challenging the techno-solutionist idea, Morozov (2013) also agree with Taylor that 
technological advancement is not the one stop solution to all the challenges that contemporary 
society faces. However, Morozov does not reject technological effectiveness and the increasing 
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rise of network structures in organizations and society. Similarly, Greenfield (2015) argue that 
some technological tools often celebrated for their participatory potential like social networking 
sites could impact humans and ’worsen communication skills and reduce interpersonal empathy.’ 
(p.256). Curran, Fenton, and Freedman (2012) while also tempering with the techno-optimistic 
and uncritical account of the impact of technology are of the view that even though new 
technologies have ’energized activism’, it ‘has not revitalized democracy’ (p.17). Curran (2012) 
also express pessimism about technology’s power to change society. In his view, the debate on 
the impact of technology on society is not what technology and technological advancement can 
do, but rather what economic power will permit regarding the use and application of technology. 
For Fenton (2010) the optimism and wide held view that internet technology has the capacity 
and will generate a public sphere that can function independently from existing political and 
economic power is contestable. As Bimber (2003:39) notes, while new technology can enhance 
the ’public sphere’, it can also ‘degrade’ it and the ’state of citizens’ civic engagement’. Thus, 
Papacharissi, (2009:14) argue that since online public spaces are not immune to 
commercialization, they usually transit from public to commercial spaces and in the process 
’compromise their democratizing potential’, such that they ‘provide a public space’ and do not 
‘inevitably enable a public sphere’. Broadly, de la Cruz and Lin (2016) describe these two 
theoretical camps on the relationship between technology and society as either technological 
determinism or social determinism (see de la Cruz and Lin, 2016). 
These theoretical differences and conflicting debates notwithstanding, scholars like Howard 
(2010) Newman (2016) and Kreiss (2016) argue that technology and the falling cost of 
producing and distributing information in the digital age is driving changes in the political realm 
of contemporary society. Although, they are critical voices like Wilhelm (2000), Fuchs (2008), 
Chris and Olsen (2011), Islas (2015), Noble (2018) and Benjamin (2019) who argue that 
technology is a space for ideological reproduction and authoritarian engineering, maintenance 
of existing capitalist structure and society’s political power status quo, reinforcement of racism 
and discrimination and fragmentation of the public. 
That said, even though much of the literature above is critical of the democratic credentials and 
potentials of technology, scholars have equally developed a body of empirical work that shows 
how politics is increasingly embedded in emerging technology. For example, Latour (2005), 
Paul (1996), Earl and Schussman (2008), and Gracia-Castanon et al. (2012) argue that even 
though its agency is dissimulated, technology is politics by other means and a tool with agency 
that manufacture actions in structured ways, thus making it a new venue for the ‘same old 
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human compunction’ of ‘politics’. For Chadwick (2012:39) internet technology is today ‘the most 
significant enabler of political innovation since the emergence of mass democracy’. Scholars 
also point to digital applications and commercial platforms as forming part of the invisible 
technological context for the conduct of social and political life, civic engagement and political 
agency (see Castells, 2011; Curran, 2011;  Bimber et al., 2012; Esser and Stromback, 2014; 
Howard, 2015; Kreiss, 2015). 
On the dynamics of technology and change in Africa, even though gaps still exist when 
compared to the global north, Mavhunga (2017:2) is of the view that continental policy making 
bodies like the African Union see ‘science, technology, and innovation as the centerpiece of 
modernity’. Mutsvairo and Karam (2018:6) also suggest that although history point to a 
complicated pattern for the continent owing to its ‘colonial legacy, diverse religious and social 
cultures’, technology is beginning to take the ‘lead as focal point of political and economic 
development’. Taken together, while this literature speaks of changes that technology is 
inspiring, the debate offers compelling need for a continuous rigorous analysis of the impact of 
technology on society and democracy both from a communication and democratic participation 
perspectives as this work attempts to do. 
Furthermore, communication scholarship has also witness progressive theorization following 
technological changes and developments in the media arena. Although, the importance of 
communication and rhetoric date back to its role in Ancient Greek Democracy with the 
Aristotelian, Socratic and Stoic traditions (see Solmsen, 1941; Triadafilos, 1999; Mehdi, 2015), 
Lasswell (1927) and the Chicago School of Sociology’s ‘direct, undifferentiated and powerful 
effect theoretical models’ (Delia, 1987:21), and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet challenge of 
the powerful effect model-i.e. in-The People’s Choice (1948) (see Benoit and Holbert, 2010) and 
the two theories or theoretical offspring of their study, (i.e.) the limited-effect model-the idea that 
the media had little impact on public opinion, and the two-step flow theory (which held that 
political information in the media is consumed largely by opinion leaders who act as mediators 
between the media and the public), dominated the field for several decades (ibid).  
However, in ways that differ from Lazarsfeld and colleagues, the theoretical hegemony that 
these sets of theories exerted as explanatory lenses of the role of the press in elections was 
countered by other theories like (a) agenda setting-explained as a ‘process of salience transfer 
where the frequency of discussion of a subject in the media and the public’s perception of its 
importance is positively related’ (McCombs and Shaw, 1972); (b) priming-a theory that explains 
‘preceding stimulus or event of how we react to some subsequent stimulus’ (Roskos-Ewoldsen 
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et al., 2002:97); and (c) framing (i.e.) a theory that lay claim to ‘schemata of interpretation’ 
(Goffman, 1974:20) or ‘a central idea that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events’ (see 
Gamson and Modigliani, 1987:143). Gilardi et al. (2020) argue that technology and digital 
platforms seem to have reshaped these traditional theories by reducing ‘the gatekeeping power 
of traditional media’ and expanding ‘the number, capacity and type’ of agenda setting actors.  
That said, scholars have also pointed to a host of other factors that can account for change in 
the political realm. They include factors like the decline of mass parties and the weakening of 
party loyalties (Johnson, 2016; Negrine, 2008); the fragmentation of identities and emphasis on 
identity and lifestyle politics (Layotard, 1979); modernization (Vaudagna ,1991; Xifra, 2011); and 
path dependence tendencies of technological diffusion (Page, 2006; Paul, 2007; Cortada, 2012; 
Epstein, 2013; Issenberg, 2013; Nikerson and Rogers, 2014; Kriess, 2016). 
According to Bryant and Miron (2007), 21st century new electronic media environment is both 
the incentive for these practices and new theoretical problems and expansion that have 
accompanied several spheres in the field. As Nielsen (2013) argue, the range of ‘analytic 
constructs’ in the literature like Hallin and Mancini’ (2004), Picard and Rossi (2012) media 
system/market; Adoni et al. (2006), Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), Pfetsch (2004), Pfetsch and 
Esser (2012) and Voltmer (2008, 2012a) political communication/systems/cultures and 
subcultures; Swanson and Mancini (1996) modern model; Kim (2012) communication culture as 
well as Benson (2005) and Hanitzsch (2007) journalistic culture and journalist field are all 
incentivized by the new and changing technological environment. However, as Nielsen (2013) 
observe, these analytic constructs while guiding research focused more on ‘industry structures’ 
across national boundaries rather than ‘practices’, ‘values’, ‘content’ and form’. 
In another tradition in the literature, scholars have equally chosen a number of concepts like 
’professionalization’ (Holtz-Bacha, 2002; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002); ‘specialization’ (Maarek, 
2016), ‘personalization’ (Rhat and Sheafer, 2007); ‘entertainization’ (Van Zoonen, 2005); 
‘transformation’ (Negrine, 2008) and hybridity (Chadwick, 2013) to advance scholarly 
understanding of changing practices that have accompanied technological and societal change. 
Similarly, research has also offered a historical reconnaissance of changes in political 
communication from the standpoint of periodization. Insight includes for example-Farell, 
Kolodny and Mevic’s (2001) pre-modern, modern and post-modern model; Swanson and 
Mancini’s (1996) modern model of campaigning and Seymour-Ure’s (1996) age of media 
abundance. Others include: Blumler and Kavanagh’s (1999) third age; Norris’s (2002) modern 
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and post-modern form; Gibson and Rommele’s (2001) modern or professional campaign; Wring 
(1996), Norris et al. (1999), and Norris (2000) pre-modern, modern and post-modern eras.  
In the periodization, a pre-modern era dates back from the nineteenth century through to the 
Second World War (Lilleker and Jackson, 2011), and signifies an era where dominant practices 
includes a partisan press, reliance on local volunteers, face-to-face meetings and public events 
guided by geo-demographic consideration and practices (Norris et al. 1999). A modern era 
signified and dominated by television (Kavanagh, 1995); and a post-modern era ushered in by 
the 1990s and epitomized by the fragmentation of television (i.e. the expansion of terrestrial and 
satellite television stations), a less partisan national press aimed at maintaining market share 
and the introduction of ICTs that has enabled targeted communication (Norris et al., 1999; 
Lilleker and Jackson, 2011). 
That said, while the bulk of these studies across the various subfields highlighted above point to 
continuous shifts in practices and the media and technological environment, studies in political 
communication tend to focus more on periodization or epochal changes, except for Swanson 
and Mancini’s (1996) ‘modern model of campaigning’ that offers a more basic characteristic 
recognizance of modern campaigns comprising five broad features (i.e. personalization of 
politics, reliance on technical experts and professional advisers, detachment of political parties 
from citizens, development of autonomous structures of communication, and casting citizens in 
the role of spectators) ( see p.14-17). However, as seminal as the ‘modern model of 
campaigning’ is, they failed to detail what it constitutes in terms of the key political 
communication technologies and techniques that were available and utilized in 1996. In sum, 
despite the large body of work that now describes changes in electioneering and the media and 
technological environment, the technological ingredients of modern campaigns are scarcely 
defined. Similarly, even though vast amount of research now exist that describes modern 
electioneering in the age of media abundance, answers remain limited from a comparative 
perspective on the technological components, dimension (s), features, practices and 
characteristics of such campaigns.  
Thus, in contrast to this literature this study considers the technological dimension (s) and 
ingredients of modern campaign from a comparative standpoint. Specifically, the thesis argues 
that technology and technological change are driving changes in political communication in the 
US and elsewhere (i.e. Nigeria and United Kingdom). This perspective and argument are based 
on emerging literature on contemporary campaign practices. As earlier stated, the unanswered 
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questions that remain regarding the key political communication technologies, techniques and 
practices now in use across some democracies makes this work an important research agenda. 
Thus, this work is a step in that direction. Indeed, by identifying technology as the growing 
ingredient in contemporary campaign and the missing component in Swanson and Mancini’s 
modern model of campaigning, this thesis addresses the gap in the literature by going beyond 
their characteristic description of modern campaign to develop a comparative account of the 
technological dimension and features of contemporary electioneering using the Obama model 
as an analytical framework. This way, the thesis seeks to strengthen the key weakness of their 
modern model campaign framework and to contribute to the literature on comparative political 
communication by providing empirical data on Nigeria and the United Kingdom that helps define 
the technological features and state of modern electioneering. In this regard, Nigeria provides a 
unique perspective of an emerging democracy in the global south in ways that Africanizes the 
field. For example, in the context of contemporary changes in the information communication 
technology and media environment, and given the dearth of political communication research in 
the African continent, evidence that emerged in Nigeria captures the means and ways in which 
political parties and actors in Africa disseminate political messages in modern election 
campaign. Thus, the Nigerian case study provides empirical grounds for rethinking practices 
and theory-i.e. the register of the range of practices of contemporary political communication 
and Americanization as explanation for convergence of such practices in emerging democracies 
in the global south. 
          1.3: Organization of the Thesis 
As an introductory synopsis, this first chapter has presented the research background, research 
objectives and research question. However, it is important to also highlight key focus of each 
chapter in the thesis for clarity in reading. Generally, the thesis is organized in eight chapters. In 
chapter two, the thesis sets out the comparative analytical framework for the study (i.e. the 
Obama model). Using the constant comparative method of reading the literature, the chapter 
sets the stage with a sixteen-element framework that exemplifies recent technological 
innovation in modern campaign as a building block for exploring the technological dimension of 
modern election campaign in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. The methodological intention of 
this chapter is that the possibility of finding similar practices in Nigeria and the United Kingdom 
will inform a cross-case typological mapping of the technological dimension and features of 
contemporary campaigning. Chapter three explores the theoretical approaches for 
understanding change in political communication. Specifically, the chapter focuses on 
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conceptual debate on Americanization and modernization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) and 
unpacks the theoretical insight of both theses, and their role, relevance and value as guiding 
explanatory framework for the study. Although in this discussion, the chapter sketches brief 
explanations of concepts like modernism, modernity, postmodernism, globalization and 
glocalization as alternative theoretical perspectives and lenses for explaining change in social 
theory. 
Chapter four outlines the methodology of the study. The chapter includes ontological and 
epistemological debate and research stance, an explanation of the comparative goal of the 
study, justification for case selection and the theoretical and methodological benefits of the 
design, methods of data collection and analysis and limitations of the study. Chapter five, six 
and seven are results of findings. In chapter five, evidence of the use, manifestation and 
deployment of the Obama model in the 2015 presidential election campaign in Nigeria is 
presented. Drawing from empirical evidence that emerged, the chapter also engages the 
theoretical and methodological approaches of the study for an explanation of convergence in 
the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and unpack country specific factors that 
account for dissimilarity in practices. As such, the chapter contributes to the first two research 
objectives above. Chapter six repeats this process and follows the sequence in chapter five 
using evidence from the 2015 British election. In chapter seven, evidence and result of 
innovation or advancement in technologically enabled and data driven campaign practices in the 
2016 Trump campaign is presented. This chapter basically address the third research objective 
by presenting evidence of innovative technological practices deployed in the 2016 Trump 
campaign, the theoretical explanation for such innovation and incentive for uptake. Although, 
there is no evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, the chapter also 
highlight the role of the Kremlin and pattern of new ‘active measures’ in the 2016 US 
presidential election.  
Chapter eight is a presentation of lessons from the three case studies. Specifically, the chapter 
distills and highlight the cross-case manifestation of the Obama model. This way, similarities 
and differences in the use, manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in Nigeria and 
the United Kingdom is presented alongside evidence of data driven technological innovation in 
the 2016 Trump campaign in ways that allow for a typology of the technological dimension and 
state of modern campaigning to be developed. In doing this, the chapter produces a cross-
contextual evidence and picture of the technological dimension and features of modern 
campaign that complements Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) modern model of campaigning. The 
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chapter also provide a cross-case commentary on Americanization and modernization theories 
and highlight contextual factors that limit and impede convergence of the Obama model in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom as well as US specific contextual incentive (s) for the uptake 
and deployment of data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices in America. 
Lastly, the chapter concludes by highlighting the limits of the Obama model and areas of 
opportunity for further research. 
That said, as an introduction, this chapter has provided a background and stated the purpose of 
the study as well as the structure of the thesis. The chapter that follows sets out details of the 
sixteen elements of the Obama model-i.e. the analytical comparative framework and starting 



















          2: Literature Review: The Obama Campaign of 2008 and 2012 
          2.1: Introduction 
This chapter lays the foundation for the comparative approach of this study by setting out a 
sixteen-element framework of the Obama model as an analytical framework for the thesis. 
Drawn from empirical literature on the campaign, the sixteen-element framework exemplifies 
recent technologically innovative practices in campaigning and will serve as basic parameter for 
comparing and exploring the technological dimension of modern election campaign in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria. As a comparative study, the methodological 
intention is that evidence from Nigeria and the United Kingdom will provide empirical grounds 
for operationalizing the model and for mapping common patterns of technological practices in 
contemporary electioneering-a contribution that this thesis make. 
          2:2: Obama Model: Starting Point for a New Analytical-Comparative 
Framework 
Studying change is inherently comparative and the first principle in any study of change should 
begin with selecting or identifying some relevant baseline from which comparison of either the 
state of affairs in one country vs another country or period can be examined (Chaffe and Chu, 
1992; Rosengren et al., 1992). Thus, this work situates technological changes in the realm of 
political communication as exemplified in the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaign as baseline for 
exploring changing practices and dimensions of modern campaign.  
As highlighted in the previous chapter, even though they are conflicting debates between cyber-
optimist and pessimist scholars on the transformative power of technology, scholars suggest 
that in America, technology is reshaping US electoral landscape by altering longstanding 
traditional structures that played central role in classical models of voter understanding, 
mobilization, field canvassing and political advertising etc. (see Nielsen, 2012; Issenberg, 2013; 
Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Kriess, 2016). Thus, guided by the constant comparative method, 
this section sets out the technological exemplars of these practices as deployed in the 
2008/2012 Obama campaign as a baseline for comparing practices in the 2015 elections in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom.  
Although, Obama’s election was indeed a product of many factors (see appendix I). However, 
through the constant comparative method, technological patterns and practices of the campaign 
are identified from the literature (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Dey, 2004; Barbour, 2008). 
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Whilst much of the literature relating to the constant comparative method assumes that codes 
are used, however, this is not necessarily the case. In deploying the method here, a thorough 
literature review that involved constantly comparing evidence from empirical and technical 
literature and insider accounts on the campaign was relied on to identify technologically 
innovative categories of the campaign.  
That said, on the basis for signposting the Obama campaign as a historic technologically 
innovative exemplar, this review follows Epstein (2018:7) identification of four political 
communication orders in American politics-i.e. The Elite Political Communication Order-a phase 
dominated by print media (newspapers). The Mass Political Communication Order-driven by 
technological advancement in printing and changes in US postal system. The Broadcast 
Political Communication Order-led by the advent of radio and television and the Information 
Political Communication Order-inspired by internet and digital media. According to Davies et al. 
(2009) and Hamilton and Tolbert (2012:6) this fourth order of internet technology and related 
tools have dramatically altered the campaign for national political office in the United States ’as 
America has quickly become a nation of digital citizens residing in a digital public sphere’. Thus, 
as an election campaign that falls within the scope of the fourth order (i.e. the Information 
Political Communication Order) (Epstein, 2018) the focus here is on the strand of literature 
exemplified by the Obama campaign. 
Thus, as a building block for exploring, understanding and defining the technological dimension 
and state of modern election campaign, the methodological expectation is that the possibility of 
finding similar patterns, practices and elements of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United 
Kingdom will inform a cross-case and cross-contextual operationalization and typological 
mapping of the technological characteristics of contemporary campaign-a missing feature and 
gap in contemporary comparative political communication literature. As a comparative study, a 
cross-case synthesis and pattern matching of evidence from the two case studies with the 
sixteen predicted elements below can conceptually offer empirical grounds for validating the 
Obama model in ways that builds comparative theory. This way, what is missing in 
contemporary comparative political communication literature to date-i.e. a tested comparative 
theory of practices of the Obama model in other democracies is provided. 
          2.2.1: Obama Model: Key Features and Elements 
        ‘While Hilary Clinton and John McCain set out to run the last campaign over again, Barack 
Obama forged ahead and ran the first campaign of the twenty-first century’.  
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                                                                                                         Garrett M. Graff (2009) 
        The ‘Analytics Department is looking for ‘predictive modelling/data mining specialists to join 
the campaign’s multi-disciplinary team of statisticians which will use predictive modelling to 
anticipate the behavior of the electorate. ‘We will analyze millions of interactions a day, learning 
from terabytes of historical data, running thousands of experiments, to inform campaign strategy 
and critical decisions’’ (quoted in Peggy, 2012). 
The Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012 has attracted a huge amount of academic interest and 
the two quotes above suggest why. Among other things, the campaign is hailed as unique for its 
use of new technologies in creating ’unparalleled opportunities for interaction and information 
acquisition, helping to make 2008 a water shed year’ (Panagopoulos, 2012, p.3). As McKenna 
and Han (2015) observe, Obama campaigns can be referred to as ’extreme case’ or ’crucial 
case’ in the history of contemporary campaign for its creativity and ability in ’blending new and 
old organizing tactics in a modern era’. According to Johnson (2017:14), in modern American 
history, the Obama campaign represent the ’smoothest, best-run, strategically savvy and 
ground-breaking in its use of technology and online communication’. 
 Although historically, the use of digital technology during campaign is traceable to the 1990s, 
when a culture of innovative campaigning began to rise in the US, even though limited internet 
penetration meant less attention was given to the evolving model (Bimber and Davies, 2003). 
By the 2000 and 2004 electoral cycles, the role of technology in US political communication 
increased, with growing intersection of old media, new media and campaigning (Halperin and 
Harris, 2006; Johnson, 2016). According to Johnson (2016:2) ’what was new and creative in 
2000 was surpassed in 2004, what was exciting and unique in 2008 has been improved upon in 
2016’ as we witness the continuous influence of social media, data mining technologies and 
’dark money’ in campaigning (ibid).  
The rise in political spending by non-profit organizations incentivized by the country’s 
institutional and legal political finance landscape-i.e. Supreme Court’s verdict in Citizens United 
v. Federal Electoral Commission have made huge ‘dark money’ investments possible (Kristy, 
2012). As a concept, dark money is used to describe money that come from ’politically active 
non-profit organizations that can receive unlimited donations from corporations, individuals, and 
unions but are not required to disclose who the donors are’ (Couch et al., 2016:6). 
The possibility of such huge campaign finance mobilization means that candidates and parties 
can invest in tools and strategies for electoral success (Hunt, 2011; Hendricks and Schill, 2014; 
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Newman, 2016). According to Plouffe (2009:4) such investment in the Obama campaign made 
technology the ’core from day one and only grew in importance’. As Plouffe note, the 
campaign’s ’unique mixture of idealism and pragmatism’ focused on technology as a tool for 
recruiting what he calls ’new buyers’, for social networking and for creating new online 
fundraising models (ibid). Balz and Johnson (2009) also reveal how Obama himself 
acknowledged the role of technology in his campaign when he was quoted as president-elect to 
have said ’the way that internet served our campaign in unprecedented ways’ is one way he 
would tell the story of the 2008 election.  
According to Hendricks and Denton (2010), through technology, ’the Obama campaign 
organized over one hundred and fifty thousand events, created more than thirty-five thousand 
groups, had over 1.5 million accounts, and raised over $600 million from three million donors’. 
The campaign utilized YouTube for free ads with campaign materials watched on earned media 
totalling over 14.5 million hours-a cost of over $47 million were that to be on broadcast 
television (ibid). As they argue, ’without question, Obama established a precedent of how future 
contenders for the White House must communicate with the electorate, especially a 
technologically savvy electorate’ (p.14). 
Empirical literature on the campaign also echo this narrative and point to the campaign as the 
most technologically savvy to date (see Nielsen, 2012; Issenberg, 2013; Bimber, 2014; 
Johnson, 2008, 2016; Kreiss, 2016; Newman, 2016). Issenberg (2013) for instance, affirms that 
the Obama campaign was a standard for its innovative use of social media and new technology. 
For Newman (2016), the campaign strategically stepped away from traditional socio-
demographic categorization of voters by using data analytics to ’carefully define segments of 
voters’ (p.3). Offering a structured reconnaissance of the campaign, Mullen (unpublished) 
outline fifteen key elements he argued can be associated with the Obama campaign model (see 
Table 2.1).  




Established but revised 
techniques and 
technologies  




Use of political consultants 
– individuals and agencies 
 
Opinion polling – use of 
new technologies (e.g. 
social media data mining) 
Development of a 
centralized, integrated and 
dynamic database, plus a 
range of apps and tools, 
accessible in real-time via 
the internet and available to 
activists and volunteers as 
well as campaign staff 
Use of the internet and 
social media (e.g. blogs, 
Facebook, Twitter, emails, 
texts, websites, etc.) to 
disseminate campaign 
messages and user-
generated content, organize 
activists and volunteers, 
and raise funds 
Air war – informed by big 
data mining, political 
modelling and micro-
targeting (i.e. Optimizer tool) 
Development of Facebook 
Are You In? app and 
Targeted Sharing tool, plus 
the exploitation of the 
Facebook EdgeRank 
algorithm to distribute 
campaign messages 
 
Development of brand and 
narrative to inform 
campaign strategy 
Ground war – use of army 
of volunteers who undertake 
tasks and have access to 
data that was previously 
reserved for campaign staff 
and activists  





 – used for campaign 
message 
  
dissemination, canvassing,  
 





Intense and fast-paced style 
of electioneering 
Gamification – deployed in 
a more systematic way and 
on a larger scale than 
before 
Development of a more 
dynamic and responsive 
style of electioneering via 
the use of Experiment-
Informed Programs (i.e. 
randomized controlled 
experiments plus political 
modelling) 
Digital fundraising and small 
donations 
  
Negative campaigning and 
the exploitation of wedge 
issues 
  
Permanent campaign   
Source: Mullen (unpublished) 
 
 
For Mullen, the effective synthesis of what he calls ’the new techniques, the revised and the old’ 
produced a campaign model that is pioneering (p.21). Similarly, Newman (2016:28) discusses 
the Obama campaign under what he calls the ’Strategic Triad’ of Microtargeting, Big Data and 
Social Media and identifies seven sets of electioneering tactics associated with the campaign-
(i.e. advertising, polling, marketing research, branding, positioning, data base technologies and 
crisis management) he argues represent the paradigm shift introduced by the Obama campaign 







Figure 2.1: A Strategic Triad: Shifts in the Obama campaign 
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Source: Newman (2016) The Marketing Revolution in Politics: What Recent U.S Presidential Campaigns 
can Teach US About Effective Marketing. 
That said, although, Mullen and Newman’s method for setting out their characteristics of the 
Obama model is not clearly stated, below, I build on their work to distil sixteen elements 
associated with the campaign. As earlier stated, these elements will guide cross-case 
comparison of practices in the case studies. 
1. Political and Technology Consultants  
Historically, the first recorded form of campaign consulting and electioneering advice is 
traceable to the Roman empire when Quintus Tullius (102-43 BCE) wrote a campaign manual 
for the electoral benefit of his elder brother Marcus Tullius Cicero (Cicero and Freeman, 2012 
cited in Johnson, 2017). 
In the United States, the 1930s-i.e. Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter family consulting firm in 
California was the first set of campaign advisers (Johnson, 2017). However, between the 1930 
and 60s, the role of these ‘king makers’ ‘president makers’ and ‘spin doctors’ had increase-
following the weakening of political parties and party loyalties, the increasing role of voter 
surveys during elections and the rise of new communication platforms etc. (Negrine, 2008; 
Johnson, 2017:47). Sabato (1981) also point to the growth of ’image politics’ and new 
techniques for winning elections such as direct mails, political polling and spot advertising as 
factors that contributed to the rise of political consultants in the United States. 
In modern elections, the business of political consultancy has evolved and transited into a highly 
skilled profession with actors assembled from many fields (Johnson, 2001). Adoption of new 
technologies have fueled the increase of new entrants of consultants into the political market 
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place-with website specialist, digital advertising strategist, big data and microtargeting 
technicians, online fundraising, polling, messaging and social media specialists now an integral 
part of campaign and political Party structure (Bohne et al. 2009; Johnson, 2000, 2015, 2017).  
In America, recent presidential elections point to a rising role for political consultants. However, 
from Bill Clinton’s James Carville, to President Bush’s Karl Rove and President Reagan and 
George HW Bush Lee Atwater, no other presidential campaign has exemplified the importance 
of assembling a technically and professionally diverse team of political and technology 
consultants like Barack Obama (Paul, 2012). Apart from known traditional political consultants, 
team Obama inspired the entrance of many individuals with background in technology-data and 
computer science (Miller, 2014). According to Sifry (2011b) and Miller (2014) these new 
entrants were assembled by team Obama to do ‘excellent voter science’, in ways that have 
created a new consulting culture in political communication where investment in predictive 
modelers and data scientist is now key. 
For instance, apart from Jim Messina, David Axelrod and David Plouffe-the well-known and 
established political consultants who were instrumental to Obama’s campaign successes, the 
campaign equally assembled an extraordinary team of experts-120 engineers, programmers, 
mathematicians, statisticians and data mining specialist (Ahonen, 2012a; Axelrod, 2015; 
Plouffe, 2009). Furthermore, the campaign built a grass-roots neighborhood team, research 
team, media team and analytics team, comprising names like Harper Reed-chief technology 
officer; Joe Rospars-chief digital strategist; Teddy Goff-digital director; Julianna Smoot-
fundraising; Larry Grisolano and Eric Smith-media and advertising, and Dan Wagner with his 
fifty person analytics staff (Johnson, 2017; Siegel, 2013). The campaign also established 
contact with high-power chief executives-Steve Jobs of Apple, Steven Spielberg of DreamWorks 
Marketing Studios, Anna Wintour of Vogue as well as Eric Schmidt of Google for ideas (ibid). 
The Obama campaign also embarked on a mobilization of academics in what Issenberg (2013) 
referred to as ‘Fight Club’ a group of ‘29 psychologist, economist and law professors dedicated 
to sending democrats to congress and electing a Democrat president’. The assemblage of these 
consultants seemed to have inspired the technological and data driven techniques for voter 
identification and mobilization deployed by the campaign (2012 Obama Campaign Legacy 
Report, 2013).  
Historically, this seem to deviate from longstanding practice where consultants in most cases 
start off ‘their carriers working on campaign staffs, for elected officials, or for a political party’ 
(Johnson, 2017:2). Now, whether such patterns of diverse assemblage and recruitment of 
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political communication and technology consultants is happening in other democracies is what 
is missing in the wider literature and this thesis will attempt to address this gap with evidence 
from Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
2. Big Data and the Single Database 
The potential of largescale data made possible by the increasing datafication of human life, 
identities, activities and relationships have been praised in many sectors (see Boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Lane et al. 2014; Mayer-Schonbenger and Cukier, 2014). The bulk of the big 
data literature celebrate its potential- with big data optimist (Smolan and Erwitt, 2012; Pentland, 
2014; Mayer-Schonbenger and Cukier, 2014) arguing that it has capacity to improve decision 
making, service delivery and innovation in many sectors. Critics on the other hand question its 
methodology, processing, monopolistic nature and the privacy and ethical challenges 
associated with its use (Crawford, 2014).  
Nevertheless, the combination of statistical logic and big data and its potential in predicting what 
people do, want and will consume has increased its attractiveness to marketers, producers and 
politicians (Mayer-Schonbenger and Cukier, 2014; Harper, 2016). Advances in cloud computing 
and the development of data warehouses are some of the major enablers of these practices 
(Dutton et al., 2017). Similarly, space and distance compressing technologies-global positioning 
system (GPS), the personalization of mobile services, as well as context-aware and location-
based services are also incentivizing these practices (ibid). 
As a concept, Boyd and Crawford (2012) define big data as ‘a cultural, technological, and 
scholarly phenomenon that rests on the interplay of: (1) Technology: maximizing computational 
power and algorithmic accuracy to gather, analyze, link and compare large data sets. (2) 
Analysis: drawing on large data sets to identify patterns in order to make economic, social, 
technical, and legal claims. (3) Mythology: the widespread belief that large data sets offer a 
higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously 
impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy’.  
In recent times, however, a common view is that big data approaches are a product of the 
world’s current technological capacities and data produced in volumes, variety and velocity, 
driven by economic, political and cultural forces and deployed in vast array of sectors (Crawford 
et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2016). According to Wu et al, at the heart of big data is data mining or 
‘machine learning’-an automated process of pattern recognition in data, with the objective of 
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seeking business intelligence that enables decision makers to make right decisions based on 
prediction.  
Although, they are critical perspectives of the methodology like Eubanks (2014) and Faucher 
(2018:6) who perceive the rise of big data as ‘informatics of domination’ and a ‘new spectacle of 
digital capitalism and a channel for accumulating online social capital’-i.e. ‘resources derived 
through social relation/connections and acquired/mobilized by social actors’. Thus, ethical and 
privacy concerns that the methodology generate has continue to incentivize debate in the US 
and globally (Maytom, 2017; Stewart, 2017).  
Nevertheless, from the point of view of campaigning, advances in big data technologies and 
techniques-data mining and analytics contributed to the insight team Obama relied on 
(Issenberg, 2013; Kriess, 2016). As Isenberg and Kreiss show, before now, managing and 
making sense of the vast amount of data gathered by political parties and candidates about 
voters have been a major challenge during campaigns.  
However, in 2008, the campaign recorded success in this regard with their data bank weapon 
code-name Project Houdini-a get-out-the-vote system (Gallagher, 2012). With Project Houdini 
team Obama reached over 21.8 million voters; recorded contact made with voters-through mails 
sent, phone calls, traditional home mailings, social media and door-to-door visits (Ahonen, 
2012a). Using the campaign’s Voter Activation Network (VAN) and its VoteBuilder interface 
component, they kept an identifiable data bank of contact with every individual they had been in 
touch with during the campaign by assigning them a seven-digit code (Issenberg, 2012). 
VoteBuilder also powered an internet driven interface between campaign field staff and provided 
the campaign team with information that assisted canvassing, voter registration, fundraising and 
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts (ibid).  
Although they were challenges with managing the data collected, with the platform crashing on 
Election Day, due to the overwhelming data and traffic (Ahonen, 2012b; Gallagher, 2012). 
However, drawing from the experience of the mini failures of 2008, the campaign built Project 
Narwhal- in 2012, one of their most celebrated successes-a program that served as a single 
data bank, merging all the data (demographics, voting histories, census data, credit cards, 
magazine/ TV subscriptions and viewing etc.) from the various digital, field, off and online as 
well as financial sources once in separate repositories into one single database (Gallagher, 
2012; Issenberg, 2012, 2013; Mullen, unpublished; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Kreiss, 2016).  
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Narwhal also had other components like DreamCatcher-used for targeting of messages; 
Dashboard-for field workers data input and download; the Call Tool-used for targeted calls; 
Vertica-the main data base; Ushahidi-election fraud related reporting platform; Optimizer-the TV 
ad targeting system, Taargus-the social media tool that includes a Facebook Blaster, a Twitter 
Blaster and QuickDonate-campaign sms fundraising and donation platform (Ahonen, 2012a) 
According to Ahonen, Narwhal is the biggest most powerful election-related voter database and 
vote support system ever made. With data covering over 175 million voters, it powered the 
campaign’s simulation strategies and tested messages, learning from data about what would 
work best for the campaign (ibid). 
According to Kreiss (2016:132) this technological and data infrastructure was developed as a 
product of the investment of the Democratic Party in the areas that define contemporary 
electioneering, with the innovation inspired by what Kriess call ‘party network processes’ that 
unfold over time and staffers who cross field from the technology and other industries into 
politics and organizations that emerge after campaigns (ibid). 
For the campaign, Narwhal made it possible to integrate existing and incoming data into a single 
system-linking ‘once completely separate repositories of information to create voter specific 
profiles’ that ‘fused the multiple identities of the engaged citizen-the online activist, the offline 
voter, the donor, the volunteer, etc.’ (Issenberg, 2013). This creativity enabled the campaign to 
establish a single database with ‘terabytes of information’, ’integrating all aspects of fundraising, 
social networking, and activism from MyBarackObama.com-something never done before in 
presidential campaigns’ (Johnson, 2016). With the data, the campaign developed what Hersh 
(2015:213) refers to as The Perceived Voter Model-a model where campaign formed predictions 
about how to ‘interact with the electorate based on an understanding of the data that campaign 
used to perceive voters’ characteristics’. For example, they predicted how likely a voter is to be 
a supporter, how likely he is to show up at the polls and how likely is he persuadable. In Hersh’s 
account, such prediction enabled the campaign to ‘determine the right message to use and the 
right voters to engage’ (ibid). 
According to Gallagher (2012) the central data platform included apps like Dreamcatcher-a tool 
developed to ‘microtarget voters based on sentiments within text’ and Dashboard-the ‘virtual 
field office’ app that helped volunteers in the field get information, communicate and collaborate. 
This tech infrastructure apart from feeding the campaign’s web presence, fed the analytics 
department of the campaign. Using Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) principles, the 
campaign built an architecture that allowed for all their apps to connect together and share one 
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common data store’ (ibid). According to Gallagher (2012) the campaign team ‘relied on 
Amazon’s MySQL-Relational Data Base Service (RDS)’; ‘snapshot capability of RDS that 
allowed images of database to be dumped into Single Storage Service (S3) without having to 
run backups’. 
As a data integration element of the campaign, Narwhal’s development according to Gallagher 
was two phased-an API team that developed app interfaces required and the integration team 
in-charge of connecting the data streams from vendor applications-using programs that run off 
Amazon’s Simple Queue Service (SQS) to pull all campaign related data-NPG VAN, Blue State 
Digital applications, polling data from data providers, emails data and many more, while 
processing them in real time. This plethora of data combination with data from voting histories, 
consumer database, shopping and television viewing history of the electorate, the Vertica 
database and the VAN database facilitated campaign analytics (Gallagher, 2012; Kriess, 2016).   
In using this data platform, access was given to both campaign staff, activist and volunteers and 
the information gleaned from it made ‘ground game’ for the campaign more effective (Issenberg, 
2013). Furthermore, artificial intelligence derived from the central database equally informed 
campaign advertising (Newman, 2016a). Taken together, a central big data repository and apps 
deployed for harnessing and processing campaign information knitted the Obama campaign 
together, making decision making during the campaign a function of measurable data (ibid). 
According to Sifry (2011a) through the campaign’s use of data, the various departments of the 
campaign-the political, finance and field operations all talked to each other in real time with data 
‘flowing back and forth and informing the actions of each other’. 
That said, while this new campaign infrastructure seem to differ from how US political parties 
managed data and understood voters in the past (Issenberg, 2013, Kreiss, 2016), there is no 
comparative commentary as to whether such data based and technologically driven campaign 
infrastructure is now in use or in its development stage in other democracies. This thesis 
attempts to address this gap. 
3. Predictive Modelling 
                  No other presidential campaign (besides Obama’s) has relied so heavily on the 
science of analytics, using information to predict voting patterns. Election Day may have 
changed the game. 
                                                                                           Parsons and Hennessy (2012) 
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According the Siegel (2013) the earliest effort at predicting behaviour dates back to World War II 
when Norbert Weiner tried to predict the behavior of German airplane pilots in 1940-with the 
goal of shooting them down. In recent times, the rise of big data is making predictive analytics 
an embedded part of contemporary society (ibid). As Balicki et al. (2015) notes, big data driven 
artificial intelligence and algorithms is increasingly making it possible to understand human 
behavior. The literature on social psychology and personality also indicate that ‘big social data’ 
(Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014) and social media language (Park et al., 2014) offer 
‘unprecedented insights into population-wide patterns and detailed characteristics’ of individuals 
political attitudes (Park et al., 2014), and personality (Adali and Golbeck, 2014). 
Thus, enabled by developments in machine learning, it is now possible to accurately measure 
an individual’s personality along the big-five factor model of personality (i.e. Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism) in ways that open 
opportunities for improved product and service delivery, targeted online marketing and people 
centered manipulation (Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014; Youyou et al., 2015). However, questions 
are on the increase regarding the ethical and privacy implication of these approaches and the 
need to find a balance between the opportunities and dangers.  
That said, the supply of these quantitative, algorithmic, predictive analytics is fast gaining 
foothold in sectors like banking, marketing and e-commerce etc. In politics, the Obama’s 
campaign team incorporated this trend into campaigning (Nickerson and Rogers, 2014). For 
example, the consequence of the campaign data platform (i.e. Project Narwhal) enabled team 
Obama to produce artificial intelligence with clearer perception of voters that moved the 
campaign away from demographic targeting of past campaigns (Rogers, 2013; Hersh, 2015). 
As Kreiss (2016) show, the individual voter’s data on Project Narwhal made this approach 
possible by enhancing the construction of predictive models on individuals based on their 
likelihood to support, turn out to vote, and be persuaded. Led by Rayid Ghani chief data 
scientist of the 2012 presidential campaign and over 50 other analytics experts, this approach 
changed the process of voter identification-through its tech-driven-data crunching and mining 
approach, and broke new ground by applying predictive modelling to deliver action oriented 
insight and to ‘drive millions of per-voter campaign decisions’ (Siegel, 2013). Johnson (2016) 
suggest that such predictive behavioral clusters and segmentation of voters drove television and 
online ad, flyers, door knock- door-to-door canvassing and who to call. 
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According to Issenberg (2013), Nickerson and Rogers (2014), Rogers (2014) and Kriess (2016) 
the predictive analytics result were in three categories-behavior scores, support scores, and 
responsiveness scores. For behavior scores, data was used to calculate the probability that 
citizens will engage in particular forms of political activity including voting, donations, 
volunteering and rally attendance. Support scores predicted the political preference of citizens 
so that in the real world of budget constraints campaign only contact a subset of citizens (ibid). 
In the responsiveness scores, randomized field experiments were used to predict how citizens 
would respond to campaign outreach to ensure efficient, supporters prone targeted 
campaigning, while citizens predicted to be unresponsive can be avoided by the campaign. 
In terms of campaigning, the worth of the predictive modelling is in the fact that they were used 
for door-to-door canvassing, phone calls, as well as television advertising, online ads and social 
media outreach (Isssenberg, 2013; Kriess, 2016; Nielsen, 2012; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014). 
Siegel (2013) suggest that this calculated form of voter understanding guided the campaign’s 
political marketing and advertising strategies, as well as field canvassing, taking volunteers to 
location and houses within highly dominated Republican neighborhoods, thereby, changing in a 
unique way the standard protocols of past elections. 
Historically, this approach deviates from how political parties understood voters in the past, 
where socio-economic and geodemographic factors constituted the basis for voter 
understanding and mobilization (Johnson, 2016). Thus, in comparative sense, this thesis 
attempts to provide answers regarding whether there is an incorporation of this approach of 
predictive modelling in recent election campaign in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
4. Data Mining and Microtargeting  
As an approach, data mining involves the use of technological advances to gather information, 
identify relationships, patterns and characteristics about a set of individuals through machine 
learning, predictive modelling and analytics with the aim of personalization of messages or what 
is referred to as microtargeting (Becky, 2008; Newman, 2016b; Owen, 2013). Also called micro-
niche, microtargeting is a technique that involves mining an individual’s personal data and 
devising directed messages that appeal to that individual and communicating such message on 
their preferred channel (Owen, 2013; Rouse, 2013; Wyloge, 2012; Kruikemeimer et al., 2016). 
Behavioral media researchers (Poiesz and Robben, 1996) agree that messages and adverts 
are more effective when placed before audience that are interested in them. Thus, the aim of 
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customer directed message-customization or microtargeting is to ensure that advertising 
becomes on the basis of preference (Newman, 2016a). 
To produce the artificial intelligence needed for microtargeting, microtargeters harnesses 
multiple consumer data point variables ranging from kind of car, magazine subscription, 
shopping history, donation to charity, size and kind of house, ethnicity, income, family size, 
marital status, drivers licence etc. from ‘data houses’ and then crunch it for microtargeting 
purposes (Wyloge, 2012). A combination of these sets of data and more can provide useful 
insight about individual preferences and aid person centered decision making (ibid). 
One of the techniques used to derive microtargeting intelligence is data mining (Murray and 
Scime, 2010). As an analysis technology, it uses specific algorithms to extract intelligence from 
large data sets (ibid). As a process, it involves both human and software resources and the 
inductive analysis of data to find previously unknown patterns of relationship in a data set 
(Hofmann and Tierney, 2003; Scime and Murray, 2007). By identifying relationships and 
enabling classification as well as association in data, data mining algorithms drive explanation 
and prediction and have a long history in marketing (Murray and Scime, 2010; Osie-Bryson, 
2004).  
In recent times, this technique has become part of political Parties tool for campaigning and is 
powering the personalization and individualization of campaign messages-television ads, 
volunteer or activist knock on the doors, messaging, emails, fundraising messages as well as 
online advertising (Abse, 2013; Issenberg, 2013; Kriess, 2016; Wyloge, 2012; Newman, 2016a).  
According to Issenberg, ‘microtargeting’ is now the maxim of successful campaigns. First tried in 
2004 by Republican strategist Karl Rove through the Voter Vault platform developed during 
George W. Bush presidential campaign, it was modified and used in 2008 by the Obama 
campaign team through the Voter Builder database and advanced in 2012 with Project Narwhal 
(Issenberg, 2013; Johnson, 2016; Wyloge, 2012). According to Sifry (2011a) microtargeting was 
one of the important developments introduced by the Obama campaign. Commentators on the 
2012 elections like Abse (2013) are the view that data driven microtargeting helped Obama 
raised millions of dollars and millions of votes. 
In deploying microtargeting, the campaign used its integrated big data app called ‘optimizer’ 
project that assign scores to voters who they had identified through artificial intelligence as 
sympathetic to the campaign. Armed with this information, the campaign used focused emails 
and text messages to reach particular group of voters and gained insight that informed 
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placement of campaign ads (Cruz, 2012; Owen, 2013; Newman, 2016a). This approach was 
also used to develop messages, attract and recruit volunteers and raise campaign finance as 
they match messages with a set of individuals on the basis of support for Obama and the 
likelihood to vote (Fouhy, 2012; Issenberg, 2013). 
Relying on the voter behavior intelligence gathered from Project Narwhal, the campaign was 
able to strategically direct campaign staff, activist and volunteers to contact these individuals 
with voter tested messages, direct mails, TV/ online ads, door-to-door canvassing and by 
telephone, making targeted messages one of the successes of the Obama campaign 
(Issenberg, 2013, Lloyd, 2012; Newman, 2016b).  
Incentivized by new technology, Obama campaign signal a significantly new and different 
approach compared to how political campaigns contacted voters in past US elections 
(Issenberg, 2013; Johnson, 2016; Wyloge, 2012). Thus, considering that there is little or nothing 
about this in contemporary comparative political communication literature, this thesis intends to 
shed more light regarding whether there is a combination of data mining and microtargeting 
techniques in recent election campaign in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.  
5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media 
According to Corbett and Edwards (2018) Web 2.0 ’encompasses the various segments of 
social media such as blogs, social networking sites (SNSs) (e.g. Facebook), microblogging tools 
(e.g. Twitter), content communities (e.g. YouTube), team websites, forums and bulletin boards’. 
In Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) view, these new media technologies represent the fastest and 
rapidly expanding platforms for information sharing and propagation. As Jensen et al., (2012:5) 
observe, its expansion has increased the ‘repertoire of modes and channels of political 
participation, communication and information’ that facilitates the ‘creation and diffusion of 
political messages as well as political recruitment’. For example, Facebook-user’s life and 
messaging, Twitter’s-short messages, Instagram-pictures and Pinterest etc. are now popular 
platforms for sharing and accessing news, understanding social behaviors and civic 
participation (Baranuik, 2016; Corbett and Edwards, 2018).  
Ragnedda and Ruiu (2017) suggest that the attractiveness of these platforms to politicians is in 
their potential for ‘enlarging social network’ and ‘increasing people visibility’. Kruikemeimer et al. 
(2016) are of the view that for campaigns, these tools are incentivizing online advertising and 
targeting through user’s demographic profiles that enable precision messaging and the 
activation of voters’ persuasion knowledge. Chadwick (2012) and Lilleker et al. (2015) also 
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assert that with these social networking tools, political parties can build ‘network environments’ 
and new forms of community that opens the door of politics ‘beyond formal party membership’. 
For example, while radio and television took close to four decades to reach 50 million users, 
Facebook managed to reach one hundred million users in less than nine months and today 
boast of over one billion registered users with over 823 million daily visits (Ramalingan and 
Chinnaiah, 2017). A good number of other social networking sites-Twitter, Google+, Myspace, 
Instagram, Tumblr, Foursquare, Linkedln also harbor its own share of millions of accounts and 
profiles (see Leeson, 2016). Although, social media accounts have the possibility of being 
automated and fake, the rise of these digital media platforms is enveloping populations at very 
fast rates and redefining interaction and communication among large population, with impact in 
‘peoples social capital, civic and political participation behaviors (Baranuik, 2016; Humero et al. 
2012; Laleh, 2010; Leeson, 2016). However, there is also debate as to whether these platforms 
are incentivizing or threatening political participation and discourse (Farrar-Myers and Vaughn, 
2016). 
Nevertheless, evidence from recent electioneering shows that political parties and campaigns 
have not been left out in adapting to the changing technology and communication environment 
(Bimber, 2014; Johnson, 2016). Barack Obama’s campaign of 2008 and 2012 provides a good 
illustration of the use of digital media for political purpose (Germany, 2009; Stromer-Galley, 
2014, Kriess, 2016). According to Issenberg (2013) the Obama campaign is particularly 
‘celebrated for its use of social media and smartphones in the political process’. 
Johnson (2016) is of the view, that the campaign ‘made history by integrating online technology 
and presidential campaigning as never before’, spending over $100 million on a plethora of 
networking tools-i.e. Mybarackobama.com, BarackTV, YouTube (with over 20 million watching 
the Obama Channel), Facebook (with over 2.3million friends in 2008 and 32.3 million in 2012), 
MySpace (800,000), Google+, Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr, Twitter, blogs,‘robo-calls’  to 
reached supporters, mostly millennials, and to create an online community (Garrett, 2008; 
Talbot, 2008; Graff, 2009; Sifry, 2012; Kriess, 2016). The creativity of the campaign was more 
evident in the networking effect of these tools as those who signed up to MyBO could form their 
groups and communities, set fundraising plans, volunteer and host events. Thus, re-engineering 
the principle of the two-step flow (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Katz, 
1957). By deploying the supporters multiplying power of social networking tools, Obama by 
Election Day knew over 7 million supporters, held online town hall meetings via Twitter (‘The 
Ask Me Anything ‘AMA online engagement through reddit.com, with such platforms and 
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meetings used to: (a) point voters to where to register and vote; (b) teach supporters how build  
a national grassroots infrastructure. Taken together, over 75, 000 of such offline campaign 
events were hosted, with 4,000 Unite for Change house parties held to persuade 
neighborhoods, Clinton supporters and undecided voters (Fineman, 2008; Stelter, 2008; 
Newman, 2016a). 
Furthermore, through social media integration with a number of apps, the campaign inspired 
highly personalized forms of communication through email, online ads and text messages to 
targeted population (Gallagher, 2012; Issenberg, 2012, 2013; Sifry, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 
2014). Now, considering the trans-national nature of social networking sites and the 
phenomenal changes they inspired as channels of communication and campaigning as 
exemplified by the Obama campaign, this thesis seek to address the gap in the literature 
regarding how these tools are serving political parties and campaigns in Nigeria and the United 
Kingdom. Here, Nigeria is particularly important because of the paucity of research. 
6. Digital Fundraising and Small Donors 
Money has continued to play an increasingly important role in elections as political parties, 
political action committees (PACs) and trade unions struggle to influence elections by 
contributing towards their preferred candidates (Corrado and Corbett, 2009; Johnson, 2016). In 
the US, efforts to raise more campaign funds have followed the rising cost of elections. For 
example, only $426 million was contributed in 1996, $800 million in 2004, $1.8 billion in 2008 
and $2 billion in 2012 (Johnson, 2016). However, the landscape of political financing changed 
significantly in 2008 as the Obama campaign broke new grounds in fundraising by moving away 
from traditional fat cat contributors (ibid). The success story is attributed in part, to the way 
campaign team deployed internet tools first used by Howard Dean in 2004 for fundraising. Thus, 
the campaign was able to reshape the world of fundraising in the US while relying on data 
driven insight from Project Narwhal (Ahonen, 2012a).  
According to Corrado and Corbett (2009), Obama’s 2008 campaign signaled the demise of 
public funding as a major source of campaign money. With Obama opting out from the $84 
million election fund public grant, he went on to raise over $400 million in primary campaign 
dollars alone-a sum greater than the total amount accrued by all ten Democratic contenders in 
2004 and exceeded the money raised by Hillary Clinton by more than $200 million (ibid). 
Furthermore, after receiving the general elections donation of mid-October, Obama had raked in 
over $643 million-40 percent of the $1.6 billion total funds raised by all major party contenders in 
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the 2008 primary and general election campaign, with the bulk of it coming from the campaign’s 
online donors (Luo, 2007; Johnson, 2016). Although, the campaign showed strength in 
attracting large donors, the overriding story of campaign financing in 2008 was small donors 
who formed the majority of Obama’s donor list. For example, in 2008, the Obama campaign 
raised over $500 million digitally with over 53 percent of that coming from small donors who had 
donated less than $200. In 2012 the campaign raised over $690 million digitally, with over 29 
percent coming from small donors who had donated $200 or less (Corrado and Corbett, 2009; 
Corrado, 2014; Johnson, 2016). 
According to Green (2008), Mosk (2008) and Corrado and Corbett (2009) the small donor online 
fundraising platform was designed around Obama’s MyBarackObama.com campaign website, 
where the campaign took advantage of the potential the internet and social network tools 
offered to make giving to the campaign ‘nothing short of an online phenomena’. With perfectly 
designed click and donate platform on the BarackObama.com website, users easily donated, 
and signed up for a subscription kind donation program that allowed them to regularly donate 
with credit cards on a monthly basis until they reach the contribution limit legally allowed. 
Website users were also able to establish their own fundraising page where they can encourage 
friends to contribute to the campaign while they watch their personal ‘fundraising thermometers’ 
online rise. In this unique and creative way, ‘an online fundraising psychology’ was created by 
the campaign that facilitated small group and individual networks who fundraise for the 
campaign (Corrado and Corbett, 2009). 
That said, although Americans have always donated to campaigns, ‘with the share of adult’ 
Americans who ‘donated directly to candidates doubling since 1992’ (Hughes, 2017). However, 
it is the technological dimension of the political finance mobilization of the Obama campaign that 
differ from past patterns. Thus, this thesis intends to add to the literature, whether such small 
donors and mediated approach to campaign donation and campaign finance mobilization are 
also a feature of recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
7. Air War: Political Advertising 
Political advertising, ‘polispot’ (Diamond and Bates, 1992) or ‘infomercials’ (West 1993)-the 
presentation of candidates, political parties and issues to the electorate in the media have a 
place of great importance in American campaigns and electioneering (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 
1995; Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 2006; Berger, 2011). Air wars represent such politically motivated 
advertising on television that extend far beyond the debates between candidates during an 
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electoral cycle (Niall, 2012). Although, new technologies (digital media, computers, smart 
phones and tablets etc.) are changing the media and advertising landscape, traditional media 
advertising still offer spots for various forms of identification ads, argument ads, attack and 
negative ads as well as positive ads as political parties and candidates attempt to influence the 
electorate’s ‘mind industry’ (Enzensberger, 1974; Kern, 1989; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995). 
Historically, the first television political advertising in the US is credited to Dwight D. Eisenhower 
presidential campaign in 1952 (West, 1993). In recent elections, television advertising has 
remained an influential channel for the purchase and dissemination of political information 
across the broad spectrum of US election campaign, with increasing spending that seem to 
double in every new election cycle (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 2006; Johnson, 2016; Kaid, 2006). In 
both elections for example, Obama campaign spent over $293 million on television advertising 
in 2008 and $404 million in 2012 (Fenn, 2009; Johnson, 2016). Arteton and Greener (2009) and 
Fenn (2009) suggest that Obama campaign advertised on selected television channels, 
outspending his main challenger. The campaign also deployed digital advertising, out-emailing, 
out-blogging, out-tweeting and out-YouTubing his challenger (Niall, 2012).  
Furthermore, by the 2012 election cycle, data driven advances in voter understanding 
incentivized by Project Narwhal led to more narrowcasted advertising as the campaign targeted 
specific messages on specific platforms based on voters’ characteristics (Germany, 2014). 
Insight and artificial intelligence from Project Narwhal were also used to inform television ad 
placement, calls, emails and text messages (Ahonen, 2012a). The campaign also deployed 
targeted ad buying using specific terms related to Obama, like ‘Obama singing’, ‘Obama 
birthday’ with expectation that those who searched for these terms online would make the 
adverts go viral (Newman, 2016a). 
That said, while political advertising is not new in US elections, it is the data enabled pin-point 
style of advertising in the Obama campaign that makes it different from the past. Thus, in the 
context of comparative political communication literature, this thesis seeks to enhance 
understanding regarding whether such campaign advertising that deviates from longstanding 
traditional approaches is now in use for electioneering in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.  
8. Ground Game   
Our campaign was not hatched in the halls of Washington; it began in the backyards of Des 
Moines and the living rooms of Concord and the front porches of Charleston……. . It drew 
strength from the young people who rejected the myth of their generation’s apathy, who left their 
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homes and their families for jobs that offered little pay and less sleep. It drew strength from the 
not-so-young people who braved the bitter cold and scorching heat to knock on the doors of 
perfect strangers, and from the millions of Americans who volunteered and organized, and 
proved that more than two centuries later, a government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people has not perished from the earth. This is your victory. Barack Obama, November 4, 
2008, Grant Park, Chicago (quoted in McKenna and Han, 2015). 
Ground game or ground wars involves people-centered, contact-based personalized political 
communication during campaigns (Nielsen, 2012). It reflects electioneering tactics deployed to 
return campaigns to what Jil Lawrence (Cited in Joe, 2004) refers to as the-person-to-person-
approach.  This approach to vote seeking is incentivized by suggestions that personal contact 
during campaigns, and door-to-door canvassing can get out votes (Green and Gerber, 2008). 
Although person-to-person approach to vote canvassing through campaign staff, volunteers, 
and activist have long been part of American campaigns. However, recent advances in data 
mining and predictive analytics have inspired the introduction of personalization and 
narrowcasting in ground game campaign efforts (Nielsen, 2012). Guided by voter based artificial 
intelligence extracted from Project Narwhal and other integrated apps (i.e. Vertica, 
Dreamcatcher, Facebook), the Obama campaign was able to make target based contact with 
voters-totalling over 126 million door-to-door visit in 2012 and telephone calls based on the 
individual’s models constructed from data (Issenberg, 2013; Semiatin, 2016). Through a 
programme called Airwolf, the campaign also identified postal voters and kept contact with them 
via emails in a unique marriage of ‘the online and offline world’ (ibid).  
In an era of weakening political loyalties and rising apolitical populations, the campaign also 
achieved something extraordinary with the assemblage of over 2.2 million activists and 
volunteers in 2012-with more than 30, 000 of those leading neighborhood teams that organized 
and mobilized communities (McKenna and Han, 2015). Through the campaign’s Voter 
Activation Network (VAN), these army of volunteers had access to a list and printout of voters 
name, addresses, basic demographics and checklist as well as an app containing a checklist of 
specific data to gather from every door-knock which they fed back to the campaign (Nielsen, 
2012). The country-wide organizational structure and grassroots army mostly concentrated in 
battleground states was powered by over 700 field offices nationally in 2008 compared to the 
Republicans 400 (Masket, 2009) and 649 to the Republican 261 in 2012 (Corrado, 2014). 
Ahohen (2012b) is of the view that the Obama’s campaign ground game army succeeded in 
visiting over 7 million Narwhal targeted homes before Election Day.  
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Central to the recruitment of the millennials who volunteered for the campaign and facilitated the 
interactive success of the field canvassers and the cave-i.e. campaign headquarters was 
MyBarackObama.com website that drove constant exchange and update of information and 
data. The disciplined ground game tactics of identifying and mobilizing supporters, holding them 
in line, and turning them out on election day led to 92% of the vote Obama received in 2008 
(Rove, 2012a). According to Mullen (forthcoming) ‘for all the technological sophistication of the 
Obama Model’ in 2008 and 2012, the ground war army is a demonstration that there was no 
substitute for actual people who organize campaigns, knock doors and make telephone calls’. 
That said, while canvassing itself is not entirely new in US elections, the data driven human 
agents led-‘door-to-door campaigning’ and canvassing of the Obama campaign differ from the 
1950s when targeted canvassing was ‘on the basis of printed voter files’ and ‘precincts captains’ 
knowledge ‘about their turf’ (Nielsen, 2009). Thus, from a comparative perspective, this thesis 
will address the gap in the literature regarding how and whether such patterns of data led 
canvassing are emerging in Nigeria and the UK. 
9. Political Opinion Polling 
Historically, agenda shaping political opinion assessment in the United States started in the 
1930s (Herbst, 1993; Kavanagh, 1995). However, as a campaign tactic, its institutional 
development and deployment is traceable to Kennedy’s presidential campaign of 1960 when 
changes in the political, journalistic and campaign research scenes as well as the rise of 
advertising agencies in political campaign became dominant (Kelly, 1960; Cantril, 1995). During 
the primary context to win the Democratic nomination in 1960 for example, 50 polls were 
conducted and another 27 during the general election campaign by the Kennedy’s team (Jacobs 
and Shapiro, 1995).  
Today, this campaign tactic has endured as most campaign now rely on opinion research via 
telephone surveys, online polling, and short automated telephone surveys to inform them about 
what the electorate think (Johnson, 2016).  Their potency in understanding voters, forecasting 
electoral outcomes and the design of campaign strategy have increased their attractiveness 
(Braun, 2012). Hersh (2015) is of the view that perception of voters in recent elections is no 
longer a merely vague idea, but electronically detailed-with constituents within a jurisdiction 
properly profiled and described.  
For the Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012, access to new technology and techniques-apps 
and social media, meant they had new tools that enabled more automated polling approaches-
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robo-polls, quickie telephone surveys, online polling, and even do-it-yourself surveys, thus 
moving away from traditional polling methods (Johnson, 2016).  
Now, considering that very little or nothing is known albeit comparatively, regarding whether 
such shifts from traditional political opinion polling to automation is taking place in other 
democracies, this thesis will rely on recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom to 
provide evidence that will seek to address this gap. 
10. Branding, Image and Message 
The marketing and advertising literature acknowledge that branding, image and message have 
potential for impact (Lee-Marshment, 2009; Darrel and Vincent, 2011; Lilleker, 2015; Scammell, 
2015). Similarly, the literature also suggest that image, message and brand management are 
also key in marketing as they combine to play an important and critical role in customer decision 
making and choices (see Newman, 2016a).  
However, like brands, political office seekers now attempt to also make such brand-like 
connection through their personality, character, policy position (s) and message (s) in order to 
bond with the electorate (Temple, 2013). Experts agree that a candidate’s political image-policy 
position, personality, character, and affiliation to voters and opinion leaders can all be shaped 
and developed. As Newman (2016a) argue, this understanding is incentivizing image 
management of politicians and their parties in contemporary campaign, following arguments that 
consumer-based marketing strategies can influence voter behavior.  
In 2008 and 2012 the Obama campaign developed a unique brand and image using 
strategically coordinated slogans, logos and colours with clear message to create a unified 
campaign (Newman, 2016a). Again, taking advantage of social networking technologies, mobile 
applications, and non-traditional media, the campaign used interviews, focus groups, surveys, 
and experiment informed programs to understand both the most effective campaign message 
and medium of delivery (Issenberg, 2013; Newman, 2013). According to Hersh (2015:170), the 
‘differentiated messages with which the Obama campaign experimented had slight variations in 
language and subject lines, designed to gauge how to pique people’s interest and inspire them 
to either open an e-mail or make donation. 
In terms of image, Obama was presented as a unifier both in 2008 and 2012, while his 
campaign labelled John McCain as ‘Mcsame’ (Newman, 2016a).  In other words, Obama 
campaign branded Senator McCain as a cloned president Bush who will continue the failed 
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policy path of the Republican Party (Kenski et al, 2010: 27). Although, the campaign struggled 
to find an appealing message in 2012 largely because of the various policy positions Obama 
had chosen during his first term. Nevertheless, the campaign slogan of ‘Change We Can 
Believe In’, ‘Yes We Can’ in 2008 and ‘Leadership We Can Believe In’, and ‘Forward’ in 2012 
generated attachment and loyalty in similar ways as company marketing products (Newman, 
2016a). According to Newman a ‘strong brand, image, and strong message’-Hope and Change’ 
provided very resonating rallying points for voters.  Taken together, consistency in message, 
brand and image was reasonably effective for the Obama campaign and a contributory factor to 
the campaign’s success (Ahonen, 2012b). 
However, from the standpoint of comparative literature, whether such consistently coordinated 
branding, image and technologically enhanced message testing is featuring in election 
campaign in other countries remain largely unknown. Thus, this thesis attempts to address this 
gap using recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as case studies. 
11. Negative Campaigning 
The use of negative advertising and controversial issues is now commonplace in electioneering 
campaign (West, 2009; Geer, 2012; Nai and Walter, 2015). This trend stem from the believe 
that negative ads impact on the electorate emotions and overall electoral outcome 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; West, 2009; Iyengar, 2011; Wadok, 2015). Since the 1964 
Daisy ad aired by the Lyndon Johnson campaign for example, negative advertising has 
continued to be incentivized by the media because of the coverage they receive (Geer, 2012). 
Obama’s campaign of 2008 and 2012 did not ignore this campaign tactic (Langley, and Holmes, 
2008; Lee and Murray, 2012).  
For example, the Wesleyan University Media Project that surveys presidential advertising in the 
US indicated that Obama ran more negative ads in September and November (Wesleyan Media 
Project, 2012). Kessler (2012) estimates that over 245,000 of such ads were aired between July 
and Election Day in 2012.  Rove (2012b) suggest that in contrast to the positive message of 
hope and optimism that guided the campaign in 2008, Obama got ‘down and dirty’ with negative 
campaign that targeted Romney’s character, wealth and business ethics. For example, Romney 
was attacked for ’shipping US jobs overseas’, for ’false filing to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’, and for having a ’Swiss Bank account’ as well as offshore investment funds (ibid). 
Obama’s team TV ads also painted Romney as a ’corporate raider nasty guy you wouldn’t trust 
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to run the economy’ (Ahonen, 2012b). According to Rove (2012b) such negative attacks allowed 
President Obama to talk less about the bad state of the country’s economy. 
That said, although from the US perspective, negative campaigning is a longstanding campaign 
tactic (Geer, 2012). However, this thesis intends to offer a comparative view of the pattern (s) of 
deployment of this element in recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom-a gap in 
recent literature. 
12. Campaign and Feedback Strategy  
Although the American voter have opportunity to elect their president every four years, low voter 
turnout means campaigns need to design interventions to get-out-the-vote (Green et al. 2003). 
Thus, under rising and increasing voter apathy, the need to devise mediated strategies to get 
voters out on Election Day have increasingly become important (Imai, 2005; Johnson, 2016). 
However, drawing from the understanding that face-to-face canvassing and personal 
communication can be more effective in mobilizing voter turnout (Gerber and Green, 2000; 
Green and Gerber, 2008; Costa and Shang, 2015), the Obama campaign deployed experiment 
revolutions in partnership with the Analytics Institute to performed randomized trials and 
Experiment-Informed Programs (EIPs) that enabled them gauge the impact of campaign ads 
and messages in real time (Issenberg, 2012b). According Issenberg, this method ‘combines 
recent exciting developments in electioneering’: ‘randomized’ and ‘controlled experiments able 
to isolate cause and effect in political activity and microtargeting statistical models’ able to 
calculate ‘the probability a voter will hold a particular view based on hundreds of variables’. As a 
campaign strategy and get-out-the-vote-technique, the approach gives the vote mobilization 
effort an empirical mindedness such that campaign ground troops can be more precise in 
making contacts and in producing mediated feedback to the campaign headquarters. As Nielsen 
(2009) suggest, this approach runs on data insight, generates data and move campaigning 
away from over-reliance on ‘precincts captains’-i.e. individuals’ knowledge’. 
That said, using a comparative lens, this study intends to examine whether such data led 
mediated approach to field feedback in campaigning is also happening in Nigeria and the UK.   
13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy 
Historically, top-down campaign approaches tend to dominate electioneering strategies 
(Negrine, 2008; Johnson, 2017). However, the Obama campaign showed creativity in 2008 and 
2012 by creating an expansive community-like interactive campaign-where affiliate 
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organizations, the Democratic Party, activist, volunteers and ground game troops interacted 
conveniently and consistently, sharing data and information effectively for voter mobilization, 
fundraising and get-out-the-vote efforts through the use of social networking sites and new 
technologies (Germany, 2009; Nielsen, 2012; McKenna and Han, 2015; Johnson, 2016). 
According to Johnson (2016: 28) ‘with the enormous opportunities’ created by ‘online 
communication’, ‘a new’ bottom-up model of campaigning that fosters and encourage ‘citizen 
input’ seem to be appearing. 
For example, the Obama campaign social networking hub MyBarackObama.com facilitated the 
interactive approach-giving sympathizers and supporters, activist and volunteers the opportunity 
to organize meetings and neighborhood events, fund raise, invite friends into their network and 
expand the campaign network by giving volunteers access to campaign information, data base 
and training kits (Talbot, 2008; Graff, 2009). According to Scola (2012) and Kreiss (2016) 
‘approximately 20 million’ of such meetings were held before the 2012 election, with technology 
and data driving more sophistication than the 2008 campaign. Scola (2012), Sifry (2012) and 
Ahonen (2012a) found that through applications like the Call Tool and Dashboard, field 
campaign team leaders had more control and access to data on the basis of their responsibility 
and were able to organize over 358,00 events and had direct dialogue with supporters totaling 
over 150 million by Election Day. 
That said, considering the trans-national nature of digital communication technologies and the 
dearth of comparative commentary on patterns of campaign interaction in modern elections, this 
thesis will also address the gap in the literature regarding whether such bottom-up model and 
style of campaigning in also emerging in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
14. Speed and Consistency of Campaign Communication 
The impact of the age of media abundance (Seymour-Ure, 1996)-multiple communication 
channels powered by new technologies and round the clock media environment in the third age 
(Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) runs through the activities of political parties in democratic 
contest (Bimber, 2003; Chadwick, 2006). Today, a good number of political actors have 
embraced these shifts in the mechanisms for the delivery of political messages (Dahlgren, 2009; 
Anduiza et al, 2012). According to Johnson (2016), under this new environment, new media has 
led to the speeding up of political campaign in the past two decades, as the ’fifteen-minute and 
thirty-minute television newscast’ and ‘morning, noon, 6:00 p.m and 11:00 p.m time slots’ 
vanishes. Johnson is of the view that as the ‘proliferation of 24/7 news cycle’ continue to surge, 
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‘politicking’ during electioneering campaign have equally taken a 24/7 dimension. Thus, with the 
possibility of 24hrs negative attacks, campaigns have developed mechanisms for immediate 
response online, offline and on television. For example, in taking advantage of the multifaceted 
media environment, the Obama campaign hosted websites like ‘Fight the Smears’ which 
countered and corrected falsehood about Obama and ‘asked viewers to report viral smear 
campaign and named names of those responsible’ (ibid). This, way the campaign fought against 
smear and negative campaign instantly (Johnson, 2009). 
That said, from a comparative perspective, this thesis intends to add to comparative literature 
regarding whether the changing media environment is also inspiring speed and consistency of 
campaign communication in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
15. Campaign Games 
There is a growing trend in the use of games to inspire behavior, learning and political 
engagement (Mccormick, 2011; Foxman and Forelle, 2014). Referred to as gamification in the 
literature, it entails utilizing ‘game rewards’ as triggers to potentially influence and inspire 
behavior through task designed games (Basulto, 2011; McGonigal, 2011; Track, 2013). In 2008 
and 2012, the Obama campaign deployed game related approaches to build an enticing 
relationship with the electorate (Newman, 2016). For example, for fundraising, the campaign 
designed a gamified fundraising psychology that used online ‘fundraising thermometers’ to 
measure and reward achievement (Corrado and Corbett, 2009). Similarly, gamified precincts 
and State-based competitions were also used for activist and volunteers to drive mobilization. 
For example, through campaign’s app like Call Tool, Identity and Dashboard, volunteers and 
activist get-out-the-vote efforts were published on the ‘leadersboard’ in a way that gamified their 
effort and encouraged friendly competition (Gallagher, 2012). To get supporters out to the 
polling station, the campaign deployed a unique ‘voter turnout gimmick’, ‘by sending out a 'voter 
report card' where each Obama-friendly registered voter's recent voting behavior was given a 
'school grade' and compared to the neighborhood average’. This strategy showed how good a 
voter you have been compared to your neighbour, thus, ‘in effect’, gamifying ‘the election 
turnout’ (Ahonen, 2012). 
That said, as a new campaign tactic, this thesis intends to show whether such gamified 
approach to campaigning is also emerging in elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as a 
way of addressing the gap in comparative literature. 
16. The Permanent Campaign: Campaigning for Office and Campaigning in Office 
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According to Ornstein and Mann (2000), Elmer et al. (2012) and Doherty (2013b), the dividing 
line between campaigning and governing has grown increasingly blurred as electoral politics 
techniques move into the political cycle of governance. Referred to in the literature as the 
permanent campaign (Blumenthal, 1980), it is a ’hyper-partisan, insider-driven political game’ 
that combines ‘image making and strategic calculation that turns government into a perpetual 
campaign and strategic calculation that remakes government into an instrument designed to 
sustain an elected official’s popularity’ (Blumenthal, 1980; Elmer et al. 2012). In his work, Sidney 
Blumenthal described how United States politics has moved from periodic elections to the 
‘permanent campaign’. According to Heclo (2000) this change has turned elected officials from 
navigators-steering the ship of state to warriors-who seek to ‘defeat and destroy their enemies’ 
since their eye is always on the next election.  
Henninger (2012) suggest that Obama’s eight years was not just a presidency, but a ‘political 
corporation providing political product’ with a clear trademark of the ‘permanent campaign’ 
displayed first in the Change.gov transition website that sort the views of supporters and the 
disproportionate travel to key electoral states (Scherer, 2009; Doherty, 2013a). Doherty is of the 
view that in keeping the permanent campaign machine alive, battleground states become the 
disproportionate destination when a president travels from the White House. He cites Obama as 
an example, of the first commander in chief in the last 32 years to visit all of the presidential 
battleground states during his first year in office-a permanent campaign manifestation (ibid).  
Furthermore, the transformation of the ‘Obama for America’ campaign platform to ‘Organizing 
for America’-a ‘political group that mobilize supporters and dismiss critics represent another 
display of the permanent campaign that aimed to build a ‘governance organizing model’ (Rove, 
2009; Melber, 2010). According to Issenberg (2013) Organizing for America also became a 
platform for testing citizens’ response to some of Obama’s policies as team Obama kept their 
campaign permanent. In Trish (2009) view, Organizing for America (OFA) was a well-
coordinated campaign institutionalization effort directed at ‘altering the basic framework of 
Democratic Party organizational politics, including the fundamental relationship between the 
president, the party and campaign volunteers’. It was according to Trish a President’s structure 
to sustain an electoral movement beyond an election season and an effort to enlist the 
campaign’s ‘ground war army’ (Nielsen, 2012) ‘in the business of governing’ (ibid). 
Built on the movement and momentum that made Obama’s campaign a success and launched 
before Obama’s inauguration, Organizing for America (OFA) relied on an email list and the 
BarackObama.com web address and staff in almost every state to drive the President’s 
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governance agenda (Trish, 2009). Supervised by David Plouffe Obama’s campaign manager 
and Mitch Stewart its director, OFA’s first activity was a State-wide ‘listening tour’ to connect 
with campaign’s ground war army as well as ‘county party leaders’ to solicit their views on the 
issues to prioritize (Ibid). According to Trish, OFA also made impact in the March 2009 budget 
debate by asking volunteers to contact ‘members of congress directly in order to convey popular 
support for the president’. Furthermore, in a bid to influence decisions in Washington, OFA 
volunteers were asked to ‘stand with Sotomayor’, when justice Sonia Sotomayor was penciled 
for confirmation at the Supreme Court. Again, in asserting itself as a policy formulation pressure 
group, OFA campaign’s effort were also visible during the health care reform debates as 
volunteers were asked to write letters to members of Congress and to collect and post ‘health 
insurance horror stories’ online (ibid). According to Trish, OFA was an elaborate attempt to 
import campaign structures ‘as a tool for governing’, to push a President’s policy initiatives and 
the framing of public policy.  
That said, from the standpoint of the comparative goals of this work, this thesis intends to 
examine whether patterns or incidence of the permanent campaign are also actively manifesting 
in recent Nigerian and British elections. 
In conclusion, the sixteen elements of the Obama model discussed above captures a 
technological dimension and picture of campaigning that indicate a shift in how a modern 
campaign operated for voter mobilization under the new communication, media and 
technological environment. Nevertheless, as Johnson (2016:29) observe, these slick and fancy 
‘online tools’ notwithstanding, candidate charisma, excitement and authenticity is still required in 
modern campaign. That said, as a research project, an exploration of whether the elements 
above represent and are now an attraction and standard of emulation for political parties in 
other democracies is an important step in operationalizing and mapping the technological 
dimension (s) and practices of modern campaign and campaigning. Furthermore, a cross-case 
and cross-contextual testing of the manifestation of the elements above is also important for 
advancing contemporary comparative political communication literature. 
          2.3: Conclusion  
As the analytical take-off point for this thesis, this chapter has set out the key elements of the 
Obama model as a comparative framework that will guide analysis in the case studies. Agreed, 
the sixteen elements above may not be exhaustive, nevertheless, this characterization is an 
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evaluative specification of the kinds of technologically enhanced political communication 
practices that emerged out of the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaign as indicated in the literature. 
Comparatively speaking, this is necessary, since, the principal research question of this study is 
to explore whether the Obama campaign is today the most advance-i.e. in terms of the 
technological component of the campaign, and whether the model have been exported to other 
democracies (i.e. Nigeria and the UK). Thus, to answer the question, it was necessary to first 
work out a clear characterization of what the campaign or model exactly consist of, in order to 
come up with a framework to answer the central research question. 
Thus, in setting out the sixteen elements of the Obama model above, the chapter followed a 
constant comparative method of reading the literature to identify ‘patterns of similarity or 
difference’ (Barbour, 2008:217). The methodological and theoretical aim is that elements of the 
model will serve as a set of basis parameters for comparing recent electioneering practices in 
the two case studies (i.e. Nigeria and the United Kingdom) as well as the 2016 Trump 
campaign. Thus, these elements provide lines of comparison, or what Nimmo and Swanson 
(1990:34) and Gideon (1995) refers to as ‘pattern variables’ or ‘empirical categories’ ‘closely 
associated with empirical reality’ to enable both comparison and theory testing. This first step in 
the thesis is necessary for a cross-case discovery of the technological dimension (s) and state 
of modern campaign and a theoretical explanation of the emergence and convergence of these 
practices and elements in the United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria respectively. 
To test theory, the thesis draws on Swanson and Mancini’s Americanization theory to explore 
whether the border-crossing manifestation of the technological components of the elements 
above can be explained as Americanization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). To explore change 
in the 2016 Trump campaign, the thesis also draws on their modernization theory as a guiding 
lens for discovering and explaining any technologically innovative data driven practice (s) in the 
2016 Trump campaign that may differ from Obama’s. 
 As theoretical frameworks, both theories will guide explanation of the emergence of innovation 
and convergence in modern campaign. Under an increasingly trans-nationalized media and 
technology environment, this theoretical exploration seeks to enhance understanding of how 
components of technologically innovative campaign practices emerge and converge and how to 
account for differences and similarities and the role of context. In the next chapter, the 




                                  3: Theoretical Framework   
 
          3.1: Introduction 
This chapter unpack the theoretical insight of Americanization and Modernization (Swanson and 
Mancini, 1996) and the role, relevance and value of both theories as guiding explanatory 
framework for this thesis. However, first, the chapter highlights the theoretical and conceptual 
debate on both theories. 
          3.2: Americanization: Conceptualization, Debate and Critique  
According to Aronovici (1921) the first and earliest conception of ‘Americanization is a post war 
creation, birthed out of the need for a new and stronger national consciousness’ in the United 
States. As Aronovici notes, the real task for early Americanization or Americanizers implied 
the ’weaving of national and racial characters of the alien into the fabric of American civilization’. 
For historians like Kuisel (2000:511) the concept signifies the ’spread of consumerism and mass 
culture via America as part of a global interconnectedness’. In contemporary analogy, scholars 
like Ritzer (2006) perceive the term as cultural imperialism, even though Kuisel (2000) contend 
that we discard the cultural imperialist interpretation and look at the concept historically in terms 
of its merit in helping us understand the ’market, advertising and political leverage that America 
has enjoyed’. 
For Fehrenbach and Poiger (2000), Americanization can be defined as the ‘transfer of goods 
and symbols from the United States to other countries’ and how ‘societies abroad have taken up 
and, in the process transformed these influences’ (p.xiv). However, Berghahn (2010:122) is of 
the view that in a ’multi-polar state’ and a weakened America, it has become 
increasingly ’difficult to discern where the new developments in economic and technological 
innovations now instantly circulating the globe originate’. In international relations, multipolarity 
describes a world where more than two countries exert similar level of socio-cultural, economic 
and military influence on the world stage (Varisco, 2013). Thus, the ’one-way Atlantic lane’ or 
absolute US hegemony that make claim of practices running from the West to East is now 
contestable because of mutuality in global cultural flows (ibid). 
In Elteren (2006:351) view, Americanization is the ’real or purported influence of one or more 
forms of Americanism on some social entity, material object or cultural practice’. Although 
Elteren rejects a ’simple equation of Americanization’ that fails to account for ’local reworking’ of 
suppose recipients, he points to the concept as a ’process in which economic, technological, 
political, social, cultural and/or socio-psychological influences emanating from America or 
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Americans impinge on values, norms, belief systems, mentalities, habits, rules, technologies, 
practices, institutions and behaviors of non-Americans’. For Elteren, these influences are 
conveyed by the importation into foreign contexts ’products, models or exemplars, images, 
ideas, values, ideals, technologies, practices, and behaviours originating from, or at least 
closely associated with America or Americans’. This perspective is however questioned by 
Frenkel and Shenhav (2003) for its failure in identifying ’a cross-national spread’ of innovation. 
In furthering the debate towards a more acceptable perspective of Americanization that moves 
away from the cultural imperialist viewpoint, Elteren identifies four approaches. In the first, 
Americanization is seen as ’assimilation’ or domestication in local setting of American 
innovation. Here, the cultural exchange that takes place is not of ’transmission or 
transformation’ but a negotiated exchange ’among equals’-where non-Americans ’pick and 
choose what they want from America’s innovation and convert those to something that fit their 
context. In the second perspective, a poststructuralist view is adopted that rejects 
Americanization as cultural dominance and the idea of a ’stable identity of any culture’, instead 
emphasis is on the ’fluidity’, bi-or multidirectional’ nature of cultural products. In the third 
perspective, Elteren’s view is that the spread of cultural products across varied contexts is not 
the exclusive preserve of America and her influence but a function of an increasingly globalizing 
world that incentivize the transnational flow of ideas even though America remains an actor. In 
the fourth perspective, Americanization is perceived in behavioral terms, where focus is on the 
extent to which American innovation has brought changes in behavior and identity in other 
context, in terms of what ’constitute success and a good life’, even though empirical 
measurement of this kind of Americanization is problematic (ibid). 
Nevertheless, in communication scholarship, a significant amount of literature point to American 
inspired models as inspiration for practices in other countries. In this regard, Swanson and 
Mancini (1996) have had a sustained theoretical contribution to how we can examine and 
explain changes in political communication. Their idea of ‘Americanization’, which hinges on the 
fact that it is practices first developed in the US that become benchmark for other liberal 
democracies through adoption has survived long debates. The central idea of the thesis is that 
change (s) in political communication is an outcome of the transfer of practices and influence 
from the US to other countries. Specifically, the thesis holds that ‘campaigning in democracies 
around the world is becoming more and more Americanized as candidates, political parties and 
news media takes cues from their counterparts in the United States’ (p.4).  
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However, in a strong critique of the thesis, Nielsen and Kuhn (2014:4) argue that ‘American 
forms of political communication are not, have never been and probably will never be the global 
standard’. Thus, Plasser and Plasser (2002:250) prefers the concept of ‘hybridization’ (i.e. a 
shopping of practices that produce a hybrid model) as explanation for transformation in political 
communication. For Negrine, the problem with the idea of ‘Americanization’ is that context 
limits ’full Americanization’. As Negrine argue, ‘professionalization’ explores better the 
transformation of political communication, since it ‘suggests that there are common pools of 
knowledge about political communication from which all participants can draw’ (p.152). In 
Negrine’s words, ‘whilst Americanization as an idea is a pointer to practices that have been 
transferred across borders, something else (i.e. ‘professionalization-an improvement of 
practices by political actors to suit modern period’ points to the circumstances or conditions that 
make it possible for those practices to become established elsewhere’ (p.153-156). 
Expanding on the Americanization thesis, Hallin and Mancini (2004) are of the view that it 
explains the ’manifestation of the deepest trend of homogenization or a significant degree of 
convergence of world media towards forms that first evolved in the United States’. As Swanson 
and Mancini (1996:5-6) puts it, Americanization explains ‘particular types and elements of 
election campaign and professional activities connected with those that were first developed in 
the United States’. Thus, growing similarity and convergence in electioneering practices is 
accounted for as a by-product of American innovation, where American style is seen as ‘cutting 
edge’ (see Esser and Pfetsch, 2004; Maarek, 2011; Semetko et al., 1991). 
However, when we speak about Americanization of political communication, Plasser (2000) is of 
the view that we ask for example, if the concept can be define based only on the fact that 
external communication and marketing experts are enlisted from the US. In his view, 
deconstructing the concept identifies two competing perspectives. First, is what Plasser calls the 
‘diffusion, directional one-way convergence’ theoretical viewpoint, where key characteristics and 
features of political communication in other countries become similar with US evolved practices. 
In this sense, Americanization is the adoption of US inspired practices by political actors in other 
democracies.  
Nevertheless, Plasser (2000) also show that consultants from other countries like Britain are 
equally having impact in the exchange of political communication practices that we can also 
speak for instance of ‘West Europeanization’. Thus, scholars like Neilsen (2013) are doubtful if 
the concept is well suited to capture developments in existing media systems. As Lilleker et al. 
(2017) observe, it is rather the wave of modernization, evident also in information technology 
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and communication infrastructure that has been the incentive for the adoption of new forms of 
political communication. 
Plasser as well as Negrine (2008) also identify another theoretical perspective-where change is 
seen as a consequence of continuous and ongoing changes in structural, political and media 
spheres of society. In this sense, change or convergence in campaign and electioneering 
practices is conceived as part of a modernization process driven in part by technological, socio-
economic and political developments common in many societies. From this theoretical point of 
view, similarities in political communication practices is a consequence of increasing 
‘fragmentation of the public sphere’ and internal change (s) in a country (Plasser, 2000).  
Nevertheless, this is not contesting that the US have been at the heart of cutting-edge 
innovation in political communication practices. The point being made for example by Plasser 
(2000) is that the diffusion of US inspired practices ’is not a linear process resulting in uniform 
standardization’ across media centred democracies. Plasser admonishes instead, that we 
speak about the ‘shopping model’ as description for the adoption of certain US inspired 
practices by other countries, who do so to fit peculiar national context. 
In lending their voice to the debate, Norris (2004) argue that rather than explaining convergence 
in trends across countries as Americanization, it seems more appropriate to ‘understand this 
process as an import-export shopping model with campaigners borrowing whatever techniques 
are believed to work.. Negrine and Pathanapossolous (1996) also argue that the ‘transfer’ of 
political communication practices takes place in ‘a world that has become increasingly 
internationalised’. Thus, attention need not necessarily be on ‘transfer of practices from one 
country to another’, but on what they call ‘broader patterns of practices being adopted from a 
variety of sources and common pool of resources to meet domestic needs’. As Cunliffe (1974) 
(cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996) argue, evidence of ‘a two-way traffic in fads, 
reforms, inventions and theories shared between the United States and Europe’ exist that show 
the manner in which practices flow across the globe today. For example, there is evidence that 
the Clinton campaign of 1992 used campaign advisers from the Labour Party in the United 
Kingdom. In this sense, Negrine and Pathanapossolous are of the view that attributing the rise 
and use of campaign practices in other countries to a single source undermines the nature 
and ’complexity of the modern world’ and its’ interconnectedness (ibid).  
That said, even though the Americanization thesis lays claim to a ‘one-way flow’ (Negrine and 
Pathanapossolous, 1996), with Negrine (2008) and other scholars questioning its 
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appropriateness, emerging innovation in contemporary American campaign embolden such 
narrative today. In this sense, the Obama model as set out in chapter two stand as an exemplar.  
Thus, considering that the Obama model is an American construct, and all four political parties 
in our case studies had hired American political communication consultants in their 2015 
campaigns, the Americanization thesis is deployed in this thesis as a guide for explaining 
whether the use and manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the UK can be ascribed 
to such American influence. Here, the objective as highlighted in the introduction is on testing 
the Americanization thesis purely in terms of its technological dimension and questioning the 
thesis regarding whether it provides ‘suitable theoretical description’ for the emergence and 
convergence of the Obama model in the two case studies. This way, apart from operationalizing 
the Obama model with evidence from Nigeria and the UK, the study can provide contemporary 
theoretical update to the explanatory scope of Americanization. 
However, in doing this, there is informed caution factored into the methodology, in order not to 
assume that the same incentives, consequences and intensity in practices apply in the case 
studies, since context differ. Thus, as an objective, the research design is such that it will enable 
the revelation of contextual conditions and dynamics that may shape dissimilarity or 
convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This way, the study can 
account for any contextual factor that may condition the application and manifestation of the 
Obama model in the case studies. 
          3.3: Modernization 
The basic question of what modernization entails permeate many disciplines. Advocates and 
opponents of the term have all inspired debates that span decades. This section briefly 
highlights such conceptualization and debate. As a way of capturing the vast theorization of 
social change in the literature, the section also delves into the discourse around modernization, 
modernity and post-modernism, globalization and glocalization as further explanations for 
change in social theory. This way, the section unearths the concept’s theoretical value in this 
study. 
          3.4: Modernization: Conceptualization, Debate and Critique 
The intellectual roots of modernization date back to the 1950s when theorist and scholars 
attempted to map, prescribe and predict a development path for newly independent countries of 
the global South (Moore, 1979). Its classical conception for example, suggest a transformation 
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of these states from their supposedly ‘traditional’ forms into those that are ‘characteristically 
prosperous, politically stable’, in resemblance of Western countries (ibid). According to Deutsch 
(1961) cited in (Eisenstadt, 2010) classical modernization theory is an ‘understanding of society’ 
that represent a move away from ‘older and closed institutional frameworks’ to the development 
of ‘new structural features and formations’ that inspire growth and ‘social mobilization’.  
In economic sense, the term has been framed in the ‘language and concepts of many 
discipline’, but all carrying the same promise that: ‘all nations however poor were able, with the 
implementation of correct politics to achieve a modern standard of living by following exactly the 
same path as that pioneered by western nations’ (McKay, 2008:56). For example, scholars like 
Rostow (1960) proposed five stages to modernity: the traditional society; the pre-take-off-
society; take-off; the road to maturity; and the mass consumption society. This trajectory for 
Rostow, can be a path that economies of the global south can follow to modernize. 
Nevertheless, this view is contested by scholars like Evans (1995) who account for alternative 
path to development or modernization in East Asia citing ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state as 
the key to progress. 
In the development debate, the modernization theory has also come under attack from other 
directions. The most prominent being the ‘dependency school’ who challenged the ‘trickle down’ 
modernization prescription for peripheral states. In what is sometimes referred to as very strong 
position, they argue that the wealth of the North is because of the poverty of the South. Put 
differently, the poverty of the South is what made the North rich. In their critique, dependency 
school scholars-Andre Gunder Frank (1969), Samir Amin (1974; 1976) and Walter Rodney 
(1972) attribute the underdevelopment of the global South to the historical evolution of highly 
unequal intentional capitalist system. For them, it is the intentional exploitation of the ‘peripheral 
countries’ by the ‘centre nations’ that renders attempts by the periphery to be self-reliant difficult. 
          3.5: Modernization as Explanation for Social Change 
The debate about modernization encompasses many dimensions. At another level, it is also 
used as an explanatory concept for understanding change at various levels of society. 
Conceptualized as a ‘series of change’ (Clar and Pinilla, 2011) the concept they argue can 
equally be explained as path dependence, where an ‘idea’, ‘sector’ or ‘option’ is conceived to 
have greater benefits that it in-turn inspire an improvement of such idea, ‘sector’ or ‘option’(ibid). 
According to Pierson (2000), this perspective has been used to understand the ‘sources of 
political stability, collective activity in politics and change in institutions’. Conceived as 
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increasing returns, Sewell (1996:262) (cited in Pierson, 2000) defines this process as the 
possibility that past occurrence will ‘affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
occurring at a latter point in time’. According to Pierson, innovation is ‘self-reinforcing’ and has 
‘positive feedback’ and increasing returns from such innovation act usually as the source of path 
dependence. In Pierson’s view, increasing returns or what he calls ‘relative benefit’ of the 
current innovation or activity increases move towards ‘that path’. Thus, path dependence 
arguments can be used to explain ‘sources’ and ‘patterns’ of social outcomes and change, since 
they produce what Collier and Collier (1991:31) (cited in Pierson, 2000) call ‘mechanism of 
reproduction’. 
Expanding this perspective, Arthur (1994) used examples in modern technology to explain how 
‘increasing returns’ (a situation where increasing benefits accrue to a product or service as more 
people acquire it) and ‘path dependence’ (events in the early stages of a phenomenon’s 
development) inspires their adoption and further development as more experience about them 
is gained. According to Pierson (2000) in politics or ‘political life’, four features will be evident in 
settings where increasing returns or path dependence processes are at work. First is what he 
calls multiple equilibria-a ‘set of critical conditions conducive to increasing returns’. Second, is 
contingency-that is, ‘relative small events, that occur at the right moment with large and 
enduring consequences’. Third is a ‘critical role for timing and sequencing’-where the timing and 
sequence of the occurrence of the event matter. Fourth is what Pierson calls inertia-where 
‘positive feedback leads to a single equilibrium’. This setting according to Pierson reinforces the 
importance of ‘historical causes’ (Ikenberry, 1994) (cited in Pierson, 2000) and has ‘fundamental 
theoretical’ implication in political theorizing. Thus, for Pierson, ’increasing returns arguments’ 
hold relevance in ’understanding politics as they are in other areas of social science’.  
In more recent research, Kreiss (2016) adopts a historical approach and uses the Obama 
campaign as an example, as he cites path dependence as a framework for explaining change 
and innovation in contemporary campaigning. As Kreiss writes, ‘circulation of staffers to other 
sites in party politics after elections and the founding of political consultancies and other 
organizations’…are ‘mechanism through which the knowledge, practices, and technologies 
forged on campaigns diffuse to other sites and in turn give rise to future campaigns’ (p.12). 
According to Kreiss, ‘party networks and campaigns that are able to generate field crossing from 
technology and other industries into politics give rise to innovations’ (ibid). Thus, in Kreiss’s 
view, changes in ‘campaigns are in large part the outcome of party network processes that 
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unfold over time, including the work of people and organizations that build infrastructure, staffers 
who cross fields and organizations that emerge after campaigns’ (p.18). 
As an explanation for social change, modernization has also remained useful in explaining 
changes in political communication. For example, Vaudagna (1991) and Xifra (2011) are of the 
view that the concept captures better, the general changes that lie at the root of new 
electioneering techniques. Their view is that the changes experienced in political communication 
techniques represent changes that affect society in general. Maarek (2016) also argue that 
‘modernization’ and concepts like ‘professionalization’ and ‘specialization’ can also help in 
explaining the global evolution and convergence of political communication. Espien (2011) 
however prefers the concept of path dependence as explanation for political change since it 
explains how ‘elements unite to disrupt the status quo and create transformational change’ 
(p.6). According to Epstein, path dependence ‘suggest that change occurs over time largely 
through incremental adjustment guided by the series of changes that have taken place 
stretching back through time’ (p.5-6). 
For Esser and Stromback (2012:314) modernization as explanation for change in political 
communication ’acknowledges’ that ’over-time changes in practices are due to external 
influences’, even though conditioned by the ’institutional and cultural environment’ in which they 
occur. Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1996) and Vliegenthart (2012) outline the 
consequences of modernization to include among other things-de-ideologicalization of 
traditional political parties, high voter apathy, decrease in party membership and the rise of 
catchall political parties. That said, even though there is vast amount of literature on the 
consequence of modernization on society, focus here is on political communication. 
In political communication, other proponents like Swanson and Mancini (1996:6) conceive the 
term as a more ‘general and fundamental process of change that… leads to the adoption’ of 
new practices. They attribute innovation in electioneering to ‘transformations in the social 
structure and form of democracy in countries where the innovation’ takes place. These 
‘transformation’ they argue are ‘part of the modernization process’, since the more advance or 
modernize a country is, ‘the more likely we…find innovations in campaigning being adopted and 
adapted’ (ibid).  
However, in explaining such changes, Negrine (2008) suggest that it is important to consider the 
modernization of political parties themselves. In Negrine’s view, transformation in electioneering 
practices can be interpreted as ‘a consequence of the changing form of political parties 
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themselves’-a ‘consequence of a changed socio-political environment’ (p.68). As political parties 
transform from mass-membership to cartel parties (i.e. those whose politics and goals are ‘more 
self-referential’ and professional (Mair, 1988) and catch-all parties (i.e. those that target to catch 
‘the entire electorate’ with resonating messages (Safran, 2009), they change in both structure 
and approach as they ‘sought to represent the interest of many constituencies rather than a 
traditional base of support (Negrine, 2008:56). Thus, the knock-on effect of modernization is 
such that political parties are a part (Thompson, 1990), even though ‘significant variations’ may 
exist when we explore specific countries (Negrine, 2008).Understood from this sense, Negrine 
and Pathanapossopoulos (1996) argue that the changes we see in campaign practices may 
’derive from the very nature of modernity, rather than some process linked to Americanization’.  
That said, although, as the debate above indicate, the literature and discourse on modernization 
encompass many dimensions. However, as a lens for exploring change in campaign practices 
in recent US political communication landscape, the objective in this thesis is to deploy the 
concept as a guiding explanatory framework for investigating and explaining innovation in data 
driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. Although, the theory serves as a guiding 
explanatory framework, the methodological intention is to advance its explanatory scope with 
evidence from the Trump campaign. 
The sections that follow turns to other concepts that also provide explanation for change in 
social theory. At various levels, concepts like modernism, modernity, postmodernism, 
globalization and glocalization have been used to explain societal change and proponents of 
these concepts relate them to certain explanation of change. Below, a brief explanation of these 
concepts is presently as alternative theoretical perspectives.  
          3.6: Modernism, Modernity and Postmodernism: The Contestation 
According to Aronowitz (1989) modernism and modernity ‘refer to similar but non-identical 
aspects of 20th century life’. While the former captures and explain change in ‘representation’ 
and ‘narratives’ that forms the ‘core’ of everyday life, the later explains the dominance of a 
‘pluralist political system’. Postmodernism on the other hand describes a shift in sensibilities and 
the deconstruction of grand narratives or what Aronowitz refers to as ‘master discourses’.  
Furthermore, in sketching out the postmodern turn, Bauman (1992) argues that changes in 
contemporary society and culture are new modes of thought, morality and politics that seek to 
respond to the new sociocultural and political conditions. For Bordoni (2016), modernity is 
unstable and provides a ‘temporary period of interregnum before a new regime arises’. This 
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suggest that there is always a transition between cultural-economic and socio-political regimes 
overtime. In Eisenstadt (2010) view, the best way to understand today’s world is for modernity to 
be conceived as a continuous process. Thus, instead of speaking of modernity, Eisenstadt 
speak about ‘multiple modernity’ since according to him, modernity does not have a natural end 
point. Eisenstadt view is that classical modernization, modernity and post-modernism can be 
said to have interwoven with ‘contemporary globalization process’. As he argues, globalization 
and the wave of new institutional and ideological trends are challenging ‘earlier modes of 
modernity. For Barzinji (2013), modernism is connected to modernization and modernity and its 
development is based on the two. As he writes, modernism is ‘a response to the sharp shifts 
molded by modernization and modernity’.  
          3.7: Globalization and Glocalization: A further explanation for change 
According to Chen and Ren (2016) the concept of globalization has gained more prominence in 
the literature and debate on contemporary social change far more than traditional perspective of 
modernization. For them, the words ’global’ and ’globality’ have been more often used to 
describe the changing cultural values in many societies than the words ’modern’ or ’modernity’. 
Thus, they suggest a rethinking of our understanding of modernity based on current changes in 
the global age. 
As Hoogvelt (1997) observe, the global age is one that implies a ‘world incline consciousness’ 
that differ from classical views of modernization that suggested as highlighted above, shift by 
non-Western societies from traditional cultures and structures to Western patterns. Chen and 
Ren (2016) opine that the global age is one where an interaction exist between the global and 
the local, implying that ‘some traditional values may persist or evolve in a path-dependent 
manner’. In this sense, globalization is not just the expansion of global capitalism (Roudometof, 
2016) and cultural imperialism or hegemony (Beck et al., 2003), but the ’particularization of 
universalism and the universalization of particularism’ (Robertson, 1992). This theorization 
moves the definition of globalization away from mere expansion of economic activities, trade 
and investment across national boundaries or greater economic interdependence of world 
economies. Thus, globalization can equally be conceived as ’tendencies of convergence by all 
countries towards similar political systems, lifestyles and even taste of entertainment’ (McKay, 
2008:69).  
Scholars that hold the view above, define globalization in terms of increase magnitude in global 
flows to a degree that bring almost all levels of human activity into an intertwine system (ibid). 
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Their view is that globalization represent a genuine social restructuring where human activity 
becomes operated in an ’interregional’ and ’intercontinental’ scale (Castells, 1996). In this 
globalized environment, proponents suggest that there is a diffusion of traditional powers of the 
nation-state and a shift of this power to international organizations and non-state actors 
(Swanson, 2004). Porter (2015) also suggest that another consequence of this globalized 
environment is the closure of territorial boundaries through digitally enabled deterritorization that 
has enhanced creation of network cities, virtual societies and a global village. Nevertheless, 
scholars like Hirst (1997) are of the view that global changes celebrated today in the form of 
globalization do not differ from the economic interconnectedness of 1890-1914. 
Furthermore, Robertson (1992; 1994), Ritzer (2006), Ritzer and Ritzer (2012), Roudometof 
(2016) and Chan and Lee (2017) speak also of ‘glocalization’ (i.e. the situation where the local 
becomes the global) (Ritzer and Ritzer, 2012). These scholars argue that in the global age, it is 
now almost impossible for anything to be purely local except there is a discontinuance of 
transnational and cross border interaction of global processes. As Roudometof (2016) argue, 
‘glocalization’ fits more as a concept for theorizing social change, since innovation, ideas and 
practices can easily spread like waves across the globe. According to Roudometof, viewed this 
way, we can point to ‘meso-temporal levels of change, without necessarily accepting the 
proposition of a total integration’.   
That said, from the standpoint of social theory, the sections above though brief, provide an 
understanding of the different theoretical approaches and perspectives for explaining social 
change. Such theorization can equally be drawn to explore and explain change in political 
communication in the global context. Applied as interpretive lenses for understanding media, 
communication or political communication change, the various theoretical perspectives above 
can account for the transformation of the field as well as changes in practices from national to 
transnational phenomena (Livingstone, 2012). As Beck (2000), Krotz (2007) and Thompson 
(1995) (cited in Livingstone, 2012) argue, media and communication infrastructure is deeply 
implicated in the entire process of globalization and is constitutive of modernity and 
modernization. The next section presents an expanded explanation of Americanization and 
modernization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) as theoretical framework for this thesis.  
          3.8: Americanization and Modernization: Working hypothesis for exploring 
contemporary Political Communication Convergence and Innovation 
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This section presents an elaborate clarification on the role and relevance of the Americanization 
and Modernization theses as theoretical frameworks for exploring convergence of the Obama 
model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom and the emergence of data driven innovation in the 
2016 Trump campaign. 
According to Canel and Voltmer (2014:8), globalization is driving ’transnational and transcultural 
developments’ in national arenas, as new flows of communication intersect in new spaces, with 
the internet as a major driving force’. As Levy (1965) argue, ’the structure and patterns’ of 
modernization or changes in society underpins or construct political development. Thus, as in 
the early 90s, when Swanson and Mancini (1996:2) argued that ’recent changes in election 
campaigning share common themes despite great differences’ in context, commentary from 
contemporary electioneering seem to echo same narrative. 
Negrine (2008), Kindra et al. (2013) and Wring et al. (2017:12) all argue that changes taking 
place permeate a number of sectors in the political life of ’long established democracies’ in ways 
that have reduced the role of political parties ’as channels for political communication’. Negrine 
argue for example that the depreciating role of political parties as channels of communication 
follows ’the age of the internet’ that has put internet technology at the ’centre stage in political 
communication’. That said, even though Negrine appreciates the change and continuing 
changes in the communication of politics, he is not convinced that there is an epochal distinction 
of what was and now is.  
Nevertheless, scholars like Anstead and Chadwick (2009), Davies et al. (2009) and Hamilton 
and Tolber (2012) are of the view that technology and the changing digital communication 
environment is playing many great roles in the American campaign environment. Similarly, 
Bimber (2003; 2014), Jorba et al. (2012), Van Aelst et al. (2012), Van Santen and Van Zoonen 
(2012), Kruikemeier (2013), Johnson (2016) and Kriess (2016) also point to technological 
development and change as inspiration for new patterns of political engagement and campaign 
practices. 
In advance democracies like the US, Nielsen (2012), Issenberg (2013), Kriess (2016) and 
Johnson (2016; 2017) argue that the changing technological environment is the incentive for 
emerging campaign practices that increasingly place less emphasis on socio-economic and 
geodemographic factors in campaign strategy. In emerging democracies of Africa, Mutsvairo 
and Karam (2018:17) and Ndlela (2020:13) also suggest that ‘technological advancement has 
become the focal point for political development’, with social networking sites and platforms 
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exerting ‘tremendous influence in the creation, dissemination and consumption of political 
content’. Thus, technology seem to be a critical factor in the contemporary political environment 
of both advanced and developing democracies. As Kline and Pinch (1996), observe, the role of 
technological innovation as a factor of change in society is noticeable. Thus, this thesis seeks 
specifically to test the Americanization and modernization thesis purely in terms of their 
technological dimensions. 
Against this background, this thesis is deploying the Americanization theory as a guiding 
theoretical lens for exploring and explaining the manifestation and deployment of the Obama 
model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. As a way of interrogating the thesis theoretical 
suitability for describing the manifestation and convergence of the Obama model in both 
countries as well as examining the role of American political communication experts in both 
elections. This is necessitated by the hiring of American consultants by the four campaign in our 
case studies (see methodology). Although, this work is testing the Americanization theory purely 
from a technological point of view, the theoretical benefit is that this will enable the clarification, 
modification, or amplification of Americanization as a theory for explaining convergence of 
contemporary campaign practices. 
On modernization, the focus is to deploy the theory as guide to investigating the emergence and 
use of innovative data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. In testing the 
‘modernization’ theory-i.e. what Swanson and Mancini (1996:8) define as ‘steadily increasing 
social complexity’ or ’the more general and fundamental process of change that…leads to 
adoption of these techniques in different national contexts’, this work seek to enhance 
explanation of this thesis on the basis of evidence of innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign.  
Furthermore, whilst their explanation of modernization as ’increasing functional differentiation 
within society’ where ’growing numbers of subsystems develop that become more and more 
specialized to satisfy the increasing demands of particular sectors of society and groups of 
citizens’ (Luhmann, 1975) (cited in Swanson and Mancini, 1996) speak broadly about change, it 
fails to account explicitly and clearly, what the modernizing source, origin, and inspiration of 
such change or changes are. Thus, the 2016 Trump campaign serves both as ‘an instrument of 
discovery’ (Molnar, 1967) and an empirical context for enhancing theoretical explanation. 
However, focus here is not necessarily on similarity or continuity between the Obama campaign 
and Trump’s, but on data driven change (s) and the specific sectoral incentive, origin and 
inspiration of such change. Nevertheless, where evidence that support similarity or continuity 
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between the Obama and Trump campaign emerge, such evidence will be highlighted in the 
analysis. 
That said, in terms of factors that make for divergence or dissimilarity, this thesis only discusses 
in line with the research design and methodological underpinning, the factors that emerge from 
empirical material collected. Thus, in this study, contextual factors that conditioned the adoption 
and manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom are first empirically 
based. In this regard, the Nigerian case bring up unique factors like ‘stomach infrastructure’ as 
explanation for dissimilarity in ways that Africanizes the field of political communication and the 
sub-field of comparative political communication. Recall that in their work-Politics, Media and 
Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovation in Electoral Campaigning and their 
Consequences, except for Argentina, Israel and Venezuela, the volume is purely Anglo-
American and Eurocentric. However, Hallin and Mancini did try to remedy their neglect of the 
global south by publishing a subsequent book in 2012 on media systems beyond the western 
world. The Nigerian case study particularly advances this effort.  
That said, in deploying the framework, the other processes discussed by Swanson and Mancini 
(e.g. features of their modern model-‘personalization of politics, scientification of politics, 
detachment of parties from citizens, autonomous structures of communication’) and factors that 
make for dissimilarity (i.e. ‘election system, the structure of party competition, regulation of 
campaigning, national political culture, and national media system’) (p.14-20) are beyond the 
scope and design of this thesis and not integral to the analysis. 
Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, they are also other theoretical accounts used to 
explain change in political communication. Prominent typologies include insights like Farell, 
Kolodny and Mevic’s (2001) pre-modern, modern and post-modern model. Seymour-Ure’s 
(1996) age of media abundance, Blumler and Kavanagh’s (1999) third age, Norris’s (2002) 
modern and post-modern form, Gibson and Rommele’s (2001) modern or professional 
campaign, Negrine (2008) and Holtz-Bacha’s (2002) professionalization classification etc. 
In this study, Swanson and Mancini’s Americanization and modernization theses suffices for two 
reasons. First, while the frameworks above tend to guide research on periodization, the focus of 
this study is on the technological dimension of contemporary political communication practices 
and how such practices emerge for example in the US and re-emerge in other context (i.e. 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom). Thus, Swanson and Mancini’s framework offer both a 
theoretical take-off point for examining campaign innovation and for explaining convergence of 
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the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Therefore, even though their model failed 
to account for the key political communication technologies and techniques that were available 
and utilized in 1996 (i.e. the year they published their book), both theories (i.e. Americanization 
and Modernization) offer explanatory lenses for analyzing convergence and innovation in 
modern campaign. 
Second, considering that this study takes a US election campaign (i.e. the Obama model) as a 
historical point of departure for understanding and explaining recent technological changes in 
political communication, Americanization suggest a relationship of the phenomena under study 
and theory (Hancke, 2009). As Bryman (1988) observe, qualitative research can follow 
theoretical logic, in terms of their generalizability of theoretical propositions, and can make a 
case the basis of theory. In this regard, such theoretical basis is not only because Obama model 
is American, but also because key staffers of the Obama campaign were hired by all four 
political parties in our case studies (see methodology).  
That said, while the role and value of both theories in this thesis is to guide explanation of 
convergence and innovation in the technological dimension and state of modern campaign, the 
hope is that empirical material will provide evidence to test both theories in ways that either 
reduce or expand their explanatory scope. This way, this study can do three things-i.e. (1) 
operationalize the Obama model with evidence from our case studies whether it account as the 
most advance to date, i.e. on the basis of its manifestation and application in Nigeria and the 
United Kingdom by finding ’patterns of similarity or difference within the data’ (Babour, 
2008:217); (2) test theory i.e. (2a) Americanization, with evidence from Nigeria and the UK-
regarding whether the theory is sufficient for explaining convergence of the Obama model, (2b) 
modernization-i.e. evidence of data driven innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign and how to 
explain the origin and source (s) of such innovation and (3) explain contextual incentive for the 
uptake of such innovation in the US and contextual condition (s) that account for dissimilarity or 
divergence in the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, the expectation is that from a comparative standpoint, this thesis will complement 
Swanson and Mancini’s framework by addressing the gap in terms of what constitutes the 
technological dimensions and features of modern campaign. Theoretically, it is expected that 
work will also bring renewed insight on how to explain convergence and innovation in the 
technological dimension of modern campaign. Contextually, the ’implicit’ (Esser and Hanitzsch, 
2012) or ’metatheoretical’ (Wirth and Kolb, 2004) design of the study (see methodology) will 
also enhance the revelation of country specific factors that will explain divergence. 
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          3.9: Conclusion  
This chapter has explained the role and value of Americanization and modernization theories as 
framework for guiding explanation of convergence and innovation in modern campaign. The 
chapter also highlighted the conceptual debate surrounding both theories as well as alternative 
concepts for explaining change in social theory. In deploying Swanson and Mancini’s theses, 
the hope is that they will enable a contemporary theoretical generalization across time and 
space that provides new insight for understanding political communication convergence and 
innovation. Furthermore, the optimism is that the framework and implicit design adopted in the 
study will guide the distinction and understanding of country specific factors that condition 
dissimilarity, convergence and innovation. The next chapter will explain the methodological 

























                                  4: Research Methodology 
 
          4.1: Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research design. As noted in chapter two, this thesis centres on the 
Obama model-i.e. whether it constitute to date the most advance form of political 
communication in the extent that it has been applied and appropriated in other democracies. 
Thus, this chapter sets out the ontological and epistemological consideration and the 
comparative goal of the thesis. The chapter also consist of justification for case selection and 
methods of data collection and analysis. 
          4.2: Ontological and Epistemological Consideration 
This thesis aligns with critical realist orientation where social reality forms the basis for the 
construction of knowledge and the interpretive philosophical notion that sees the world as 
socially made (Byrne, 2009b; Harvey, 200; Wedeen, 2010; Schwandt and Gates, 2013). In 
taking this research stance, the study does so from the methodological and theoretical 
standpoint to elucidate beyond a ‘specific instance’ the features and characteristics of an 
empirical case (i.e. the Obama Model) using selected cases studies (see Byrne, 2009a:1; 
Harvey, 2009). Frazer and Lacey (1994) support ontological and epistemological flexibility. 
Thus, research can possess a critical realist lens at ontological level, yet interpretivist at 
epistemological level. (see expanded discussion on ontology and epistemology in appendix II). 
That said, considering the theoretical imperative of the study (Brennen, 2013; O’Mahoney and 
Vincent, 2014); the methodological tools for data collection (semi-structured interviews, audio 
records, documents and newspapers) (King et al., 1996) and the fact that the study is ‘dealing 
with things that are both real and constructed’ (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014:155), with no 
intention of measurement, but a ‘thick’ qualitative ‘description’ of the object of analysis (Gray, 
2009:33), the research follows Crotty (1998) and Denzin and Ryan (2007) suggestion that a 
researcher’s world view, theoretical import and methodology should define research process. 
The sections below will describe this process and design. 
          4.3: Features of the Study’s Comparative Design 
This section offers a detailed explanation of the key features of the study’s comparative 
research design. First, it explains what the thesis is comparing and the principles that guided 
case selection. The section also highlights the theoretical and conceptual relevance of the 
method, as well as data sources and strategy for data analysis. 
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          4.3.1: The Comparative Goals of the Study 
In setting out the research strategy for this thesis, this section highlights why the comparative 
method is important for answering the research question. Thus, the remainder of this section 
defines the comparative goal of the study as a way of rationalizing why the comparative 
approach is preferred. 
That said, change being a problem of comparison over time, is inherently comparative (Chaffee 
and Chu, 1992). As a field and subject of empirical inquiry, epochal or progressive changes in 
world ‘media system, caused by changes in information technology and communication 
infrastructure and diffusion of news, belong to the driving force behind comparative research’ 
Pfetsch and Esser (2004:5). Gurevitch and Blumler (2004:327) and Chan (2017:252) point to 
‘the increasing homogenization of political communication across previously more diverse 
societies, polities and cultures’ and ‘advancement in ICTs’ as incentive for such scholarship. 
Furthermore, Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), Norris (2009) and Mancini and Hallin (2012) 
suggest that ‘globalization’ and increased global ‘circulation of cultural products’ and the need to 
counteract ‘naïve universalism’ and secure grounds for generalizations have contributed in 
inspiring comparative research in the field. Thus, under rapidly changing conditions and 
increasing ‘globalization of media markets’ (Voltmer, 2012b), Semetko and Scammell (2012) 
and Fletcher and Young (2012) suggest the need to reassess research priorities and a rethink 
of ‘theory and practice’. From the standpoint of theory and the need to define technological 
practices and registers of modern campaign, this research design is inspired by such thinking. 
Thus, using the Obama model set out in chapter two, focus is to ‘contextualize’ or 
‘decontextualize’  the model, by placing it outside of its original context in order to explain 
whether it is cross-contextually common or country distinctive (see Canel and Voltmer, 2014; 
Blumler, 2012; Mancini and Hallin, 2012). In doing this, the thesis seeks to examine whether 
elements of the model constitute the most advance to date in the extent that they manifest in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Considering the gap that exist in comparative literature on the 
technological registers of modern campaign, answering the research question this way provides 
empirical material for a cross-contextual definition of practices and for updating Swanson and 
Mancini ‘modern model of campaigning’. As some of the forebearers in the field have argued 
above, practices in the Obama model provide distinctive opportunity to test and update 
practices, theories and expand the boundaries of knowledge on the technological dimension 
and state of contemporary political communication. Thus, the sixteen elements are used to 
77 
 
comparatively interrogate and reveal the sequence of practices and innovation now appearing 
and manifesting in contemporary campaigns in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
Following from the above, a theoretical explanation for the manifestation and diffusion of the 
sixteen elements is explored within the context of the case studies. This second level seek to 
explain how elements of the Obama model come to surface and converge in Nigeria and the 
United Kingdom using Americanization as explanatory lens. At the second theoretical level, the 
2016 presidential election campaign of Donald Trump is also used to explore and explain 
innovation in data driven campaign practices in the US, as a way of advancing theoretical 
understanding of modernization. Here, focus is specifically on using empirical material to 
examine whether there is an advancement away from the data driven practices of the Obama 
model (see Blumler et al., 1992; Pfetsch and Esser, 2008. This way, Trump’s campaign 
contributes both to theory advancement and the update of practices that emerge in Nigeria and 
the United Kingdom. Emphasis on Trump’s campaign follows Rosengren et al., (1992) and 
Gerring (2007) who suggest that events (i.e. investigation on Cambridge Analytica and the 
Trump campaign across both sides of the Atlantic and the increasing conversation on the use of 
psychographics in the campaign) can serve as benchmark for comparison. In this sense, the 
Trump campaign instead of serving as a case for exploring continuity and change is used an 
instrument of discovery and theory advancement (see Molnar, 1967). 
Lastly, with a research design that methodological looked beyond the contextual factors 
identified in Swanson and Mancini’s framework, this thesis seeks to also explore contextual 
conditions that shaped the uptake and convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the 
United Kingdom. This way, as Gurevitch and Blumler, (2004) admonish, the study realizes 
the ’double value’ design of a comparative study and deepens explanation. To achieve this 
however, the thesis adopts Esser and Hanitzsch (2012) ‘implicit’ or Wirth and Kolb (2004) 
metatheoretical design, where no initial identification of contextual variables was done. Esser 
and Hanitzsch argue that the methodological value of this strategy is that it ‘facilitates the 
optimal adaptation of research question to theoretical background’, since an explanation of 
similarities and differences between cases can point to and enable the identification of 
contextual factors and conditions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
          4.3.2: Justification for Case Selection 
This section highlights guiding principles for selecting Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election, the 
2015 British General Election and the 2016 Trump’s campaign as case studies (see Appendix 1 
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for expanded discussion on principles of the comparative method and principles of comparative 
case study design). 
That said, case selection is usually the ‘first step in comparative study design’ (George and 
Bennette, 2005) and a ‘crucial ingredient in comparison’, since well-chosen cases allow for 
inferences to be made (Collier et al., 2004). However, historically, case selection has been the 
site of many longstanding critiques, and there is yet no methodological consensus regarding 
strategies for case selection-with the use of ‘numerous strategies’ (Colin, 2017), ’the different, 
but also the similar’ (Wang and Huang, 2017:94) accepted in one study. 
Drawing from the general principles of case study design highlighted in appendix 1, this thesis 
adopts some strategies in selecting Nigeria, the United Kingdom and Trump’s campaign as 
case studies. First, case selection follows Przeworski and Tuene’s principles-as the countries-
US, Nigeria and United Kingdom are alike in the important respect that they are democracies, 
thus meeting the most similar system design. Conversely however, they also meet the most 
different system design since the US and the UK are industrialized democracies with high levels 
of economic development, internet diffusion and democratic consolidation (Jensen et al., 2012) 
and Nigeria an emerging and developing democracy with widespread digital divide. In the civic 
culture (1963) Almond and Verba used similar principle to guide case selection. 
However, a point worthy of note is that in terms of democratic institutions and structure, Nigeria 
and the US are different from the UK. Whilst Nigeria and the US are decentralized, presidential 
democracies, the UK is a centralized parliamentary democracy. Thus, because of the countries 
institutional and developmental differences, their combination will be particularly useful in 
revealing how systemic differences shape political communication practices (Semetko et al., 
1991). By comparing the three countries (different but also similar), each case was used in the 
last chapter to highlight reasons for similarity and differences within the context of the Obama 
model (Ferree et al., 2002).  
Second, guided by research question and theory replication logic (Yin, 2014) and following Ellis 
(1973), Bryman (1988), Patton (1990), Rosengren et al. (1992), Conge (1996), Mason (1996) 
and Palys (2008), theoretically guided sampling logic for case selection was also deployed. 
Thus, cases selected exemplify a dimension of interest for the research in anticipation that they 
might enable theory testing. Here, the hiring of American political communication consultants-
referred in the literature as agents of Americanization by the four political parties in Nigeria and 
the United Kingdom reinforced this sampling notion (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). For example, 
79 
 
both the Conservative and Labour Parties hired Jim Messina and David Axelrod respectively 
(see The New York Time, May 27, 2014). In Nigeria, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) and 
All Progressive Congress (APC) also hired American consultants for their campaign (see Tukur, 
2014). Thus, case selection accounts for traces of Americanization (see Marcus, 1995). This 
approach also conforms with the principle of pragmatic concerns advanced by Moghadam 
(1995), O’Kane (1995) and Gerring (2007). Thus, case studies were constructed in part on the 
basis of theory, with cases representative, critical, typical and closely related to research 
question, and representing instances in which something similar might have happen in a 
different context (Hancke, 2009; Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012). 
Furthermore, Trump’s campaign, was selected as a critical case for its potential in providing 
‘rival explanations’ for theory-i.e. regarding how campaigns modernize or innovate in the US 
(Yin, 2014:129). This rational is grounded in the various investigations and inquiries regarding 
Cambridge Analytica’s tactics and role in the campaign. Thus, with such incidences lacking in 
Hilary Clinton’s campaign, the methodological reasoning is that an empirical analysis of Trump’s 
campaign can produce descriptive information that will be revelatory and important for theory. 
Thus, rather than an examination of similarity and continuity, Trump’s campaign is selected for 
its longitudinal potential in providing insight on change that can enable theory modification 
(Simons, 2009). Molnar (1967), Gerring (2007) and Seawright (2016) are respectively of the 
view that such ‘influential case’ or ‘deviant case’ selection can serve as ‘an instrument of 
discovery’ and a useful way of discovering new information. Thus, following Rosengren et al. 
(1992) recommendation and Gerring (2007) principle, events around Trump’s campaign guided 
its selection as benchmark for comparison. 
          4.3.3: Theoretical and Methodological benefits of the Research Design 
Generally, the conceptual and methodological advantage of comparative inquiry is that it 
expands research data base in ways that enable ’solid generalization’, clarification, modification, 
and amplification of theories (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990:6). 
Furthermore, with much of the scholarship in the field still reflecting an Anglo-American bias 
(Stromback and Kaid, 2008), the comparative case study design will rescue us from 
speculations and presumption regarding whether the Obama model is applicable elsewhere.  
Lastly, considering that the range of cases include Nigeria (an emerging democracy in the 
global south- with 46.1% internet penetration) (Internet Live Stats, 2016) and a region of the 
world missing in Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) initial country sample, the design provides 
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opportunity to test the extent, validity and applicability of Western-base theories/practices of 
political communication in a non-Western society and context. 
          4.4: Data and Methods 
This section presents data collected for the study. They include semi-structured interviews-to 
draw insight from key actors in the campaign; digitally harvested audio records of online 
interactions were members of the study’s sample participated in discussion on the object of the 
study; documents-as a lens for understanding context and practices; and newspapers-as 
instrument for an enhanced interpretation of events relating to the 2016 Trump campaign. Data 
triangulation ensures reliability of observations and results. 
          4.4.1: Interviews 
First, in conducting interviews, a purposive sample of key campaign actors in the three elections 
was drawn (see table 4.1-4.3). Journalist were included in the sample since without the cloak of 
party loyalty and party campaign secrets, they were more open about practices that had been 
deployed in the campaign. 
          4.4.2: Sampling Strategy 
Sampling strategy was purposive, with respondents identified based on their roles as individuals 
with privilege access to information that will be enriching to the study (Moser and Kalton, 1983; 
Hakim, 2012). Thus, the role played by these individuals during the campaign informed their 
selection. As key actors at various levels of the campaign with a common dimension of 
involvement, the assumption was that they possessed perspectives and knowledge regarding 
the object of analysis. The journalists were included for their personal investigative and 
journalistic work and engagement with the object of analysis. 
          4.4.3: Sample Recruitment 
As stated earlier, sampling for this study was purposive. In purposive sampling, the researcher 
chooses participants who fit the aims and objectives of the study and invite them either facially 
or digitally to participate (Eide, 2008; Harding, 2013). In recruiting participants for this study, 
social media particularly Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook were initially used to send out 
messages to solicit access. Through these channels, some responded positively and accepted 
to be interviewed. However, when investigation into the activities of Facebook and Cambridge 
81 
 
Analytica started in America and Britain respectively, some respondents declined to continue, 
while some stopped responding to messages. 
Furthermore, in Britain and the US, negotiating access was not without the challenges and 
constraints usually experienced by outsider observers. Cultural and racial positionality-i.e. 
researcher outsider status were disadvantageous for gaining access to the sample. This 
experience though disappointing, was not too strange. Johnson-Bailey (1999), Matthews and 
Ross (2014), and Boucher (2017) admonished that researchers consider racial, gender, class 
and cultural differences during their fieldwork. As Crean (2018) argue, such factors and the 
positionality of researchers influence both the research process and results their studies 
produce-with the dynamics of race, class, gender and culture affecting how a researcher 
penetrates the research or field site. Thus, from the reflection from field notes, cultural and racial 
barriers emerged as factors that had influenced access.  
Nevertheless, as data collection progressed amidst concern of participant recruitment in Britain 
and the US and data saturation, sampling became more opportunistic (Patton, 2002). This 
implies that I started looking out for expert commentators on the object of analysis. Through this 
process, four additional respondents were identified, contacted and interviewed. In Nigeria 
however, such challenges were minimal as cultural affinity made snowballing possible. For 
example, one participant pointed the researcher to industry gatekeepers whose work dovetails 
into the object of analysis passing their mobile telephone numbers. Across the three case 
studies, the entire process enabled the recruitment and interviewing of nineteen participants in 
Nigeria, four in Britain and seven in the US. Altogether, one interview was conducted face-to-
face in Nigeria, one in the US via Skype, another via Twitter, and the rest on telephone. 
Recourse to mediated interviews had been part of the pre-interview plan as a way of avoiding 
location and distance challenges (Novick, 2008; Mason and Inde, 2014; Oates, 2015; Merrison, 
2016; Corbett and Edwards, 2018). Taken together, the empirical and theoretical insight 
produced from the materials collected in all three case studies are worthy for making interpretive 
claims. 
          4.4.4: Research Participants 





Role and Characteristic of 
Respondent 
Insight 
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J1 Journalist-The Guardian Newspaper Consistent 
with R/O 




7. JOHN BOSCO  
AGBAKWURU 
J3 Journalist-Vanguard Newspaper Consistent 
with R/O  
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J8 Journalist-Premium Times Consistent 
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OYELERE 
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1. TOM BALDWIN                                                   L1 Former Labour Adviser and 
Director of Communications 
Compliant with R/O 
2. STEVE 
HOWELL                                        
L2 Labour Party Strategist/Jeremy 
Corbyn Adviser and Author of 
Game Changer 
Compliant with R/O 
3.  GREG BEALES                                                       
 
L2 Labour Party Director of 
Strategy 
Compliant with R/O 
4.  
TOM EDMONDS                                                               
C1 Conservative Party Creative 
Director/Digital Media
Specialist 
Compliant with R/O 
        Sampling: purposive                                                                  
Table 4.3: Case Study III: AMERICA 
S/N  Participant 
Name                                                                          
Assigned 
Codes





JOHNSON                                        
T1 Chief Strategist Ted Cruz for 
president  
Consistent with R/O 
2. ALEX CONANT                                                           T2 Former Communication Director 
Marco Rubio for president  
 
compliant with R/O 
3. DAVID  
CARROLL                            
T3  
Litigant with Cambridge Analytica 
compliant with R/O 
4. SCOTTIE NELL 
HUGHES                                  
T4  
Journalist and CNN News Host 
compliant with R/O 
5. CHRIS 
VICKERY 
T5 Director of Cyber Risk Research 
at UpGuard  
compliant with R/O 
6. GARRETT M. 
GRAFF 
T6 Journalist and Cybersecurity 
Director at Aspen 
compliant with R/O 
7. BRIAN EKDALE T8 Associate professor of digital 
cultures and global media at 
University of Iowa School of 
Journalism and Mass 
Communication 
compliant with R/O 
Sampling: purposive/opportunistic 
    4.4.5: Interview Research Questions 
The interview research questions below were drafted based on theoretical propositions i.e. the 
‘specific propositions to be investigated in the study’ (Wengraf, 2001:55). According to Wengraf, 
‘theory questions govern the production of the interview-questions’ (p.62). Thus, following 
Wengraf, interview research questions were based on the specific conception of knowledge that 
the study sort to present. Thus, in Nigeria and United Kingdom, interview research questions 
were designed to enabled the empirical identification of the application and manifestation of the 
Obama model, and to trace any semblance of Americanization as well as country specific 
factors that conditioned or influence the application of the Obama model. 
84 
 
In the Trump case, interview research questions were designed to guide the identification of any 
specific differences or uniqueness in data driven practice (s) deployed in order to provide 
empirical ingredients for showing advancement in practice, and the inspiration and origin of 
such innovative data driven campaign practice. This way, interview research questions for 
Trump’s campaign makes modernization the focus rather than a complete comparison with the 
Obama model (see table 4.4-4.6).  
Table 4.4: Case Study I: NIGERIA 
S/N                               INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What do you think was particularly unique about your/the campaign of 2015? 
2. Was there any general hiring interest for the campaign? Like any specific skill that 
was specially courted? How many digital/tech-related staff did your campaign hire? 
3. Can you tell me more about the role you and your team played during the campaign 
and how much you may have spent on technology and digital advertising/what did 
you observe about the hired consultants and experts 
4. How did you use technology/ tell me about your role and the innovation you 
inspired)/how do you think they used technology 
5. Can you give me any examples that are worthy of note? Do you think/Did big data, 
predictive modelling and microtargeting play any part? (similar questions on the 
other elements) 
6. Do you think/Did the Obama campaign any way influenced what your team and 
political party did during your campaign? 
7. How did that happen and what was the level of influence? 
8. What did you do differently from the Obama campaign? 
9. How did you/did they use social media? 
10. Were they any legal/regulatory constraints in trying to follow the Obama approach? 
Note: (1) To support empirical identification of the application of the Obama model in Nigeria (2) To trace 
any semblance of Americanization as well as (3) factors that may have influenced the application. 
Table 4.5: Case Study II: UNITED KINGDOM  
S/N                               INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What do you think was particularly unique about your/the campaign of 2015? 
2. Was there any general hiring interest for the campaign? Like any specific skill that 
was specially courted? How many digital/tech-related staff did your campaign hire? 
3. Can you tell me more about the role you and your team played during the campaign 
and how much you may have spent on technology and digital advertising/what did 
you observe about the hired consultants and experts 
4. How did you use technology/tell me about your role and the innovation you 
inspired)/how do you think they used technology 
5. Can you give me any examples that are worthy of note? Do you think/Did big data, 
predictive modelling and microtargeting play any part? (similar questions on the 
other elements) 
6. Do you think/Did the Obama campaign any way influenced what your team and 
political party did during your campaign? 
7. How did that happen and what was the level of influence? 
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8. What did you do differently from the Obama campaign? 
9. How did you/did they use social media? 
10. Were they any legal/regulatory constraints in trying to follow the Obama approach? 
Note: (1) To support empirical identification of the application of the Obama model in Nigeria (2) To trace 
any semblance of Americanization as well as (3) factors that may have influenced the application. 
Table 4.6: Case Study III: AMERICA  
S/N                                   INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Can you tell me what was particularly unique about the 2016 election from the 
standpoint of President Trump’s campaign? 
2. What would you say was the main innovation in the 2016 campaign and what would 
you attribute that to? 
3. Was there any role for big data and analytics during the campaign? How was this 
used and what do you think was the source of that innovation? 
4.  What was the data driven component of the 2016 campaign you may have found 
innovative 
5.  Do you think psychographic understanding of voters played any role? 
6.  Is they anything that strikes you about the campaign that you want to share 
including documents please? 
Note: To unearth any specific differences or uniqueness in the data driven techniques and their source.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
In furtherance of the use of interviews as instruments for data collection, questions in tables 4.4-
4.6 above served as method for generating research subject conversations with participants. 
The interpretation made from data generated from this sort of conversation (s) constitute the 
fundamentals of interview and interviewing (May,2001; Kvale,1996; Gadner,1954). Thus, 
interviews entail focused and purposeful conversation between two or more people, conducted 
face-to-face, online, over the phone or through mails to elicit people’s views (Gray, 2009; 
Brennen, 2013). According to Kvale (1983:174), the main purpose is ‘to gather descriptions of 
the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described 
phenomena’. 
The model employed in this thesis is semi-structured, even though Nunkoosing (2005) and 
Anyan (2013) are of the view that ‘transactional power dynamics in qualitative research 
interviewing’ makes ‘descriptions such as structured and semi-structured unsuitable’. However, 
the model enabled a deep probe and engagement with respondents and enhanced the 
acquisition of a rich and deep understanding of the object of analysis (Lilleker, 2003).  
To navigate the challenge of rapport that usually accompany elite interviews, I studied their 
basic aspects of life interest, activities, profession and organization to facilitate rapport (Fontana 
and Frey, 1994; Heyl, 2001; May, 2011). Thus, drawing from the background information 
gathered about respondents, interviews commenced with the ‘icebreaker’ questions as 
recommended by Liebling (1963) and Walters (1970). ‘Icebreaker’ questions help researchers 
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engage respondents about key aspects of their interest and profession to create an environment 
where questions are asked and answered non-judgementally (Brennen, 2013). This approach 
made it easy to set the tone for the conversations and extraction of respondent’s commitment 
(see Arksey and Knight, 1999). 
Furthermore, to ensure reliability and credibility of responses and check the possibility of 
exaggeration and excess public relations in comments provided by respondents, a careful 
triangulation of claims with data from audio materials, documents and newspapers was done to 
ensure credibility and trustworthiness. That said, considering that interview transcripts only 
‘represent raw descriptive data’, a detailed framework for analysis is presented in sections 4.8, 
4.8.1 and 4.8.2 (Sanna, 1999; Pope et al., 2000; Weston et al., 2001; Gibson and Brown, 2009; 
Turner, 2010). The next section is a discussion of audio materials as additional source of data 
for the study. 
          4.5: Digital Audio Records 
• Interviews conducted on the object of analysis with a member of the study’s sample 
• Conference presentations on the object of analysis delivered by a member of the study’s 
sample 
• Radio talk on the object of analysis with a member of the study’s sample 
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Sampling method: opportunistic  





































Sampling method: Snowballing  
Table 4.9: Case Study III: AMERICA  


























































AM5 Former campaign 

























Sampling method: Opportunistic 
As table 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 above indicate, the field-site for this study includes online public 
sphere, where ‘digital’ materials were collected (Hine, 2013). Archives of internet discussion 
offer a rich array of data for qualitative research (ibid). As Seale et al. (2010) argue, recorded or 
online discussion forum can give researchers access to the way people discuss an issue of 
interest. Thus, recorded audio discussion featuring a member or members of the study’s sample 
where the focus of discussion was the object of analysis was harvested. As Baym (2000) notes, 
the internet is today serving research and researchers as a field-site where online interactions 
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can sufficiently serve for explaining social phenomena. In this regard, the internet offered a field-
site where hard-to-reach members of the study’s sample were accessed using conversations in 
forums where the subject of the study was the focus of discussion.  
In harnessing this data, I listened and transcribed hours of interactions that happened in events 
and this yielded rich data. To fulfil ethical standards, discussants in the audio records who were 
among the study’s sample were informed about using these materials. However, none of them 
acknowledged the messages except Greg Beales (i.e. Labour Party Director of Strategy and 
Planning), who had initially pointed the researcher to some of the materials. Nevertheless, since 
the sites where audio records were found was not subject to any formal terms and conditions, it 
was not compulsory for consent to be sort. That said, triangulation was used to validate audio 
content to ensure reliability. The next section discusses documents collected.  
          4.6: Documents 
Table 4.10: Case Study I: NIGERIA 
S/N Origin/Source Major Focus Author Insight 




Analytica LLC and 
SCL Elections Ltd 
in Nigeria  
 
Julian Malins Q.C 
Linda Hudson 
Relevant 
2. Association of 
Communication Scholars 






















4. The Commonwealth Commonwealth 
Observer Group 































7. Independent National 






























10. Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy 






11. Yiaga Africa  Youth participation 
in Nigeria’s 2015 
General Elections 
 
Yiaga Africa Relevant 
12. Department of International 
Development  
Social Media for 
Election 
Communication 







13. The African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of 
Disputes  
2015 General 
Election Report  
The African Centre 














15. Independent National 
Electoral Commission  
Nigeria’s 2010 





16. Association of 
Communication Scholars 
















and Trust: A 







Philip N. Howard  
Relevant 
18. UK House of Commons  Brittany Kaiser: 
Written Testimony 
to the Fake News 
Inquiry 
 
UK House of 
Commons  
Relevant  
19. UK House of Commons Disinformation and 
Fake News: 
Interim report  
UK House of 
Commons 
Relevant 
Sampling method: Purposive 
Table 4.11: Case Study II: UNITED KINGDOM  
S/N Origin/Source Major Focus Author (s) Insight 
1. Information 
Commissioner’s Office 
The use of data 






2. Electoral Commission permissible 
funders and 



















Rules guiding the 






5. Electoral Commission Political party 
spending and 





6. Electoral Commission Commission 


















9. DEMOS for Information 
Commissioner’s Office 
Emerging trends 
on the use of 

















11. Conservative Party Review of 2015 
campaign and 
election outcome  
The Rt. Hon. the 




12. Martin Moore/Gordon 
Ramsay-King’s College 
London  
Media, press and 
political agenda 





13. Reuters Institute for the 
study of Journalism 
Social media and 
traditional media 
use in the 2015 
elections 
The Reuters 




14. Reuters Institute for the 
study of Journalism 
Report on 
campaign 
practices in the 
2010 elections 
The Reuters 




Sampling method: Purposive 
Table 4.12: Case Study III: AMERICA  
S/N Origin/Source Major Focus Author (s) Insight 
1. The Royal Court of 
Justice  
Litigation between 
John Green, Mark 
Newman and SCL 
Group Limited 
Royal Court of 
Justice 
Relevant  
2. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 









3. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sports Committee 
Brittany Kaiser 
written testimony 
to the fake news 
inquiry 
Brittany Kaiser Relevant 
4. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sports Committee 
Disinformation and 








5. US Senate Committee on 
Intelligence  
Dr. Emma L Briant 
written testimony 
to the Facebook 
inquiry 
Emma Briant Relevant 
 
6. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 








































11. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sports Committee 
Written evidence 
submitted by 
Aleksandr Kogan  
Aleksandr Kogan Relevant 
12. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sports Committee 
Christopher Wylie 
written response 









13. UK House of Commons 
Digital, Culture, Media 





14. US Federal Trade 
Commission 










15. U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission  
Facebook to Pay 
$100 Million for 
Misleading 
Investors About 
the Risks It Faced 










expertise and list 




17. Strategic Communication 













Report on the 
investigation into 
Russian 






19. Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence 
 
Report on the 
Assessment of 
Russian Activities 
and intentions in 
recent US 
Elections 







20. United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
 
Report on Putin’s 
assault on 
democracy and 






21. United States District 
Court  
 
Expert report on 
litigation between 






22. US Department of Justice 
 
Office of the 
Inspector General 







23. United States District 











24. United States Senate 
 
Hearing report on 
Russian 
interference in the 




Sampling method: Purposive 
Tables 4.10-4.12 above consist of additional empirical materials for triangulation of results and 
findings. Generally, document ‘comprise a range of research sources’ and their analysis is one 
way of generating data for exploring a given phenomenon in qualitative research (Scott, 1990; 
Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008; Yin, 2014). According to McCulloch (2004) and Gibson and Brown 
(2009:65), they can serve as critical empirical data for the investigation of society and social life 
and can ‘offer distinctive analytic possibilities of social worlds, lives and practices, particularly 
when combined with other data generation methods’. Hakim (2000), Webb et al. (2000) and Yin 
(2014) suggest that they can provide data for longitudinal studies, quasi-experimental designs 
and international comparisons such as this. 
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Thus, following Hakim (1983), Scott (1990) and Gibson and Brown (2009) an analytically filtered 
method was used to select documents according to their relevance to the research. The created 
categorization and schema above i.e. origin/source, major focus, authorship and the insight they 
produce guided how documents were accessed, classified and collected. This strategy also 
ensured a careful appraisal of their purpose, targeted audience, ownership, context, and content 
to avoid assuming the documents contained unmitigated truth (Yin, 2014). Scott (1990:27) 
refers to this approach to document sample construction ‘as one which is theoretically and 
empirically meaningful’.  
Furthermore, to ensure quality of evidence produced, I drew from Scott (1990:6-8) four criteria 
of authenticity- i.e. testing the genuineness and unquestionable origin of evidence emanating 
from them; Credibility-questioning how free of error and distortion they are, representativeness- 
ensuring evidence from them is ‘typical of its kind’ and meaning-verifying the extent to which the 
evidence from the document is ‘clear and comprehensible’. The next section discusses 
newspapers as the final data collection method for this thesis. 
          4.7: Newspapers  
Table 4.13: Case Study III: AMERICA  
























































































































be guilty of 


















is a scandal of 






















































Tim Adams March. 
24, 2018 
Facebook’s 




















the big data 
era 
Relevant 




me it would 






























































































report on fake 
news 
David Pegg Feb. 18, 
2019 
Facebook’s 




































over when it 




















22. The Guardian 
 












Sampling method: Purposive/online snowballing. 
As a way of strengthening evidence on the Trump case, UK based newspapers-i.e. The 
Guardian and its yearlong investigation on activities relating to the campaign-i.e. Cambridge 
Analytica and Facebook investigations codename-Guardian Files constituted another source of 
data. Following theoretical purposive sampling (Emmel, 2013), articles were selected for the 
depth of investigation on the object of analysis. Thus, sampling was made easy by the 
Cambridge Analytica Files-a compendium of investigative articles published by the Guardian 
capturing actors and practices in the 2016 Trump campaign and CA/Facebook’s role. 
A search period of June 2015 to March 2020 was used in order to cover the heightened 
coverage of the subject. The search and sampling string identified articles that contained 
Strategic Communications Laboratories/SCL Group, Cambridge Analytica, 
Psychometrics/Psychographics, Project Alomo, The RNC and Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential 
campaign. Methodologically, this logic of sampling is shaped by the research objective and 
theoretical imperative of the case.  
That said, Baur and Lahusen (2005), Silverman (2007), Baumgarten and Grauel (2018) and 
Davidson et al. (2019) suggest that as ‘process-generated data’ and ‘actors in their own right in 
the arena for public discourse’, newspapers can serve as data, since as naturally occurring, 
they report historical or emerging events and facts that may not be generated through 
interviews. Triangulated with the interviews, audio records and documents in what Davidson et 
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al. (2019) call ‘big qual’, the newspapers enhanced ‘thematic mapping’ and interpretation of 
evidence from the other data sources.   
Although, as a source of data, newspapers are usually criticized for their tendency to reflect 
political bias and values (Kang and Park, 2018). However, as a way of addressing such bias, 
focus was more on British based newspapers, since contextual positionality insulated them from 
the partisan pressures of their US counterpart.  
Taken together, the pool of data above enhanced the interpretive claims and generalization that 
emerge from the study. Such triangulation of data is to ensure that the various data sources 
validate, support and confirm each other. The next section discusses decisions that shaped 
data analysis and interpretation.  
          4.8: Reflection on Data Analysis 
Empirical research is usually ripe with decisions made by researchers, and transparent 
documentation of such decisions is essential (Greckhamer et al., 2018). This section captures 
decisions made and analytic constructs that guided transcription and data analysis (see Bailey, 
2008).  
          4.8.1: Transcription: Steps Taken 
According to Lapadat and Lindsay (1999) and Poland (1995), transcription is theory laden- such 
that ‘choices that researchers make about transcription enact the theories they hold’. Mischler, 
(1991:261), Kvale (1996:166) Lapadat and Lindsay (1999:74) also suggest that transcription 
‘begins with research purpose’ and reflect researcher’s ‘theoretical assumptions and rhetorical 
purposes’, which is all part of ‘a critical step in the social production of scientific knowledge’. 
In transcribing interviews, transcription was guided by the methodological assumptions and 
theoretical underpinnings of the study (see Lapadat, 2000). Following Ochs (1979; 1999:44) 
transcription reflected ‘theoretical goals’ and methodological ambition of the thesis. Thus, a 
denaturalised approach that focused on parts relevant to research question was adopted (see 
Cameron, 2001; Meuser and Nagel (2009). 
Table 4.14:  Illustrative structure for transcription of interviews 
1. Name of Voice Capturing initials of respondent  
2. Characteristic of respondent Role and relevance to the study 
3. Interview question (s) Questions asked  
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4. Text Transcribed text 
5. Review of text with interview notes For trustworthiness  
6. Identification of text capturing elements of 
the model 
Imposing operationalized model on 
the data 
7. Identification of text capturing elements 
theoretical interest 
Finding evidence for theoretical 
arguments  
8. Cross-interview analysis Finding patterns across all interviews 
 Source: own elaboration  
          4.8.2: Framework for Data Analysis: Methodological and Theoretical 
Underpinnings 
Representation of the four data sources in this study is an interpretive process and this requires 
a framework for analyzing the data. Thus, theory, research objectives and methodological 
underpinnings formed the basis for which content of interview transcripts, audio records, 
documents and newspapers were utilized (see Bailey, 2008; Elizabeth et al. 2014). This way, 
data used from empirical materials significantly reflect underlying assumptions about what count 
as data that can address the research question (Kvale, 2011). Thus, an analytic structure was 
imposed on the data to develop ‘filters and ‘descriptive codes’ comprising methodological 
ambitions and theory (Saldana, 2009:7; Cooper, 2009:245) (see table 4.15 and 4.16). 
































































case study I & II 
and converge in 
case study I & II 
the Obama 
model both as 
an exhaustive 













in case study I 
& II 
Big data and 
single database 
As above  As above As above As above 
Predictive 
modelling 
    
Data Mining and 
Microtargeting 
    
Web 2.0 Digital 
and Social 
Media 




    
Air War: Political 
Advertising 
    
Ground Game     
Political Opinion 
Polling 
    
Branding Image 
and Message 
    
Negative 
Campaigning 















    
Campaign 
Games 
    
The permanent 
Campaign 
All As above All As above All As above All As above 
Source: Own Elaboration-Structure integral to research objectives, theoretical assumptions and 
methodological underpinning. 
Table 4.16: Illustrative structure for data analysis in case study III 
Modernization: 
Looking beyond 
Obama Model data 
driven practices  
Step 1:  
Deviant case analysis 
and identification of 
advancement/innovation 
in data driven practices 
(i.e. modernization) 
Step 2: 





















Emphasis on tracing the 
origin and source of such 
innovation  
Step 2:  
Explaining the 
implication of such 
origin and source for 
theory and theory 
advancement  
 
Source: Own Elaboration-Structure integral to research objectives, theoretical assumption and 
methodological underpinning.  
The structure and analytic framework in table 4.15 and 4.16 above, and a deep reflection on 
data created summative attribute of data collected (see Saldana, 2009). MacQueen et al. 
(2008), Namey at al. (2008:141) and Wick (2012) refers to this approach as structural coding-
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i.e., where conceptual phrase (s) act as a label that enables analysis to ‘quickly access data 
likely to be relevant’ from the data set. 
However, in analyzing data collected for the Trump campaign, emphasis was specifically on 
variations in data driven practices and the implication for theory. This way, analysis is not on 
similarities and differences between the Obama model and Trump’s, but to facilitate the 
identification of variations in data driven tactics and practices that can aid the development of a 
theoretical explanation (see Emigh 1997). Therefore, focus is on empirical evidence that support 
understanding of how the Trump campaign deviates from existing theoretical explanation of 
campaign innovation and modernization. 
That said, as a way of tidying up empirical materials collected, deviant case analysis was also 
imposed on data so that evidence that run counter to the Obama model is ‘incorporated into the 
research findings’ (Wick, 2012). The use of WhatApps in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election 
campaign was identified this way. 
Lastly, in analyzing newspapers, relational analysis (Lagerberg, 1975; Osgood, 1959)-i.e. 
identifying relevant statements about the object of analysis was used. This way, analysis 
connects the message in the newspapers with evidence from interviews, audio records and 
documents (Grbich, 2007). In this sense, analysis is used to divide text, so that only paragraphs 
or sentences that highlight events, activities and actors related to the object of analysis is 
evaluated (Osgood, 1959) (see table 4.17). 
Table 4.17: Illustrative guide for analyzing newspapers 
Step 1 Guiding question/analytic intension: What 
are the key components of Trump’s 
campaign as reported in the newspapers? 
Focus: method, actors and data driven 
practices 
Step 2  Identification of section of text that provide 
insight to step 1 above and the three areas 
of analytics focus (i.e. innovative data 
driven practices, origin/source of such 
innovation and contextual incentives 
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Step 3 Confirmation of text by cross-comparing 
with evidence from interview, audio records 
and documents. 
Source: Own elaboration 
Taken together, the framework and strategy above is embedded in the study’s objectives and 
methodological and theoretical underpinning (Bohm, 2004). However, to ensure rigour, validity 
and reliability of analysis, triangulation-a constant comparison of interviews with audio records 
and documents as well as attention to deviant elements contrary to the Obama model 
established consistency in the analysis (Burnard et al., 2008; Lynn, 2014; Patton and Cocham, 
2002). Such consistency follows Wolff (2004) who argue that it is methodologically reasonable 
for practices that guided interpretation of text to correspond with those used in the interpretation 
of verbal interactions. This way, a rigorous methodologically triangulated door opens for data-to-
data explanation of the manifestation of the Obama model in the case studies. 
That said, in identifying contextual factors and conditions that influenced the application and 
manifestation of the Obama model from the empirical material, an iterative thematic approach 
was deployed to draw out the most prominent themes through repeated reading of the structural 
coding section on context (Wengraf, 2001). The relevance of this approach for identifying 
contextual factors that influenced the application and manifestation of the Obama model hinge 
on the fact that it enabled areas of agreement over themes that represent a contextual condition 
to be easily noted (ibid). Nowell et al. (2017) argue that such thematic approach is important 
since it helps in both the identification and reporting of themes found in the data set. This way, 
the study fulfils its methodological underpinning by ensuring that contextual factors that 
influence the application of the Obama model emerged solely from empirical data (see Tobin 
and Begley, 2004; Braun and Clarke, 2006; Barbour, 2014). 
 In conclusion, data triangulation and a constant and consistent reflection on the study’s 
theoretical and methodological considerations ensured depth of clarity in the transcription 
process, rigour in the analyses and data presentation. At ontological and epistemological level, 
this process conforms both to the critical realist and interpretivist lens (see appendix 1 for an 






          4.9: Limitations of the Study 
Eide and Allen (2005) agree that conducting research across diverse cultures and context is a 
challenge for qualitative researchers. Boyd (2008) also observe that pursing people online and 
between media is usually problematic for recruiting participants. Thus, the problem of online 
recruitment account as one of the challenges of this study. 
Secondly, operating from three field sites-i.e. in Nigeria as an insider, and as an outsider in the 
United Kingdom and America, meant that the politics of location (Gilbert, 1994), and cultural 
barriers (Crean, 2018; Eide and Allen, 2005) led to divided focus that would have made one 
country more expansive. 
Thirdly, considering that campaign case studies took place in 2015 and 2016 respectively, they 
may have been the tendency that the research lost the recentness component in data collection 
that would have enriched responses. In Nigeria for example, performance of the president who 
was a candidate in the election at the time may have had influence.  
Nevertheless, these limitations did not diminish the validity of findings, since triangulation and a 
rigorous and systematic data analysis process was conducted. 
 
          4.10: Conclusion 
This chapter sets out components of the study’s research design by providing a rationale for the 
comparative approach of the thesis, justification for cases selected and steps for data analysis.  
In summary, the design seeks to achieve three things-first, to test the manifestation of the 
Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as a way of operationalizing and illuminating 
the model. Second, to re-demonstrate theory-i.e. regarding how elements of the model come to 
emerge, manifest and converge in Nigeria and the UK as well as evidence of data driven 
innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign. Thirdly, to reveal albeit empirically, context specific 
factors that influenced or conditioned the manifestation and application of the Obama model in 
Nigeria and the UK as well as contextual incentive for innovation in US political communication 
landscape. In the preceding chapters, these three outputs encapsulate the value of this 
comparative work (see Collier, 1993; Stake, 1995). In the next chapter, data presentation and 
discussion of findings on the Nigerian case study is presented through interpretation and 




                                         5: Case Study I  
          5.1: Introduction 
This chapter offers a description of the application of the Obama model in the 2015 presidential 
election in Nigeria. In doing this, the chapter sets in motion empirical resources for a cross-case 
typological mapping of the technological dimensions of modern campaign. Thus, firstly, the 
chapter describes manifestation and presence of elements of the Obama model as well as any 
dimension of variations among the instances of the elements. Secondly, guided by theoretical 
framework, i.e. Americanization, empirical material is used with a critical realist lens to refine 
theory by identifying alternative explanation for the emergence and convergence of the Obama 
model in Nigeria. Thirdly, in line with methodological underpinning, contextual factors that bear 
influence on the application of the Obama model are discussed in the last section. This section 
clarifies the empirical view on the application of elements of the model by empirically pointing to 
socio-political and institutional features and conditions in the country and how such factors 
influence and affect the application of innovative campaign practices like the Obama model. 
          5.2: Manifestation of the Obama Model 
Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election campaign was dominated by many issues (see Appendix III 
for the socio-political and economic context of the campaign). However, the focus here is on the 
application of the Obama model by the two major political parties-i.e. the Peoples’ Democratic 
Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC). As highlighted in the methodology, the 
two political parties serve a specific theoretical purpose and have been selected in part because 
they represent instances in which something similar might have happen. 
Table 5.1: 2015 Presidential Election Result: Candidates and Political Parties 
S/N Candidate/Nomine
e 






1. Allagoa Chinedu Arabamhen Mary Peoples Party 
of Nigeria  
PPN 24,475 
2. Ambrose Albert Owuru Haruna Shaba Hope Party HOPE 7,435 








5. Comfort Oluremi 
Sonaiya 
Seidu Bobboi KOWA Party KOWA 13,076 
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10. Martin Onovo Ibrahim Mohammed National 
Conscience 
Party  
NCP 24,455  
 






12. Rufus Salawu Akuchie Cliff Alliance for 
Democracy 
AD 30,673 














    844,519 
Tot
al 









    67,422,005 
43.65% 
Source: INEC 2015 
 
As stated above, in presenting evidence of the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria, 
analytic focus is on how or not candidates-Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari and 
their respective political parties respectively engaged, applied or adopted elements of the 
Obama model in 2015. 
That said, in comparison to other democratic regions of the world, Africa’s emerging 
democracies like Nigeria lack a long history of competitive elections to draw from for a 
historically grounded within case analysis (see Bleck and van de Walle, 2019). Nevertheless, to 
ensure contextual richness, the analysis is embedded in the reading of Africa’s-election related 
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existing literature on electoral competition and new media. Thus, even though the focus is 
exclusively on evidence, with analysis providing vivid description of the dynamics of the 
manifestation of the Obama model, it does so within the context of existing literature. Therefore, 
discussion of findings is presented below as an explanation of elements applied or adopted as 
well as any evidence of deviant elements that emerged from the empirical material collected. 
Such consideration of deviant elements in the analysis offers tools for both the exhaustive use 
of empirical material collected and an analytic lens for discovering elements or practices that 
differ from the Obama model and unique to the Nigerian context (Hanson, 2017; Wicks, 2012).  
However, following Miles et al. (2014) and for purpose of enhanced clarity, a meta data of 
empirical material collected is presented in tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 as a way of contextualizing 
findings and validating interpretive claims. From the point of view of ethical standard and 
anonymity, labels are given to respondents and where quotes are used, G represents 
respondents from Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign, B-for Buhari’s campaign, J-for journalist and 
industry gatekeepers and ANG for audio records collected. Documents collected were only 
assigned serial numbers for ease identification. 
Table 5.2:  Interviews conducted 














Muhammadu Buhari’s campaign 
B1 
B2 




































Refer to table 4.1 for participant incidentals. 
Table 5.3: Audio records  








                         
                          Relevant 
 
Refer to table 4.7 for participant incidentals. 
Table 5.4: Documents  
Total number of 
Documents Collected  
                Insight 
 
        1- 23 
(see methodology) 
                  
                 Relevant  
 
Refer to table 4.10 for title and source. 
          5.2.1: Summary of Findings and Deviant Element 
As earlier highlighted, this chapter present dynamics of the manifestation of the Obama model 
in Nigeria. From a comparative perspective, the analysis provides empirical foundation for a 
typological mapping of the technological dimension (s) and state of modern campaigns. Thus, in 
what follows, discussion of findings is distilled from the meta data above. Table 5.5 is a 
summary of findings of the application of the Obama model by both political parties. 
113 
 














1. Political and Technology 
Consultants 
Local and foreign 
consultants hired to 
brand the candidate, 
manage public 




consultants hired to 
offer technical 
support-lobby, 
media and publicity 
services. 
 














enabled by focus 
groups, polls and 
interviews. 
 
3. Predictive Modelling Unused element  Unused element  
















5. Web 2.0 Digital and Social 
Media 
Digital and social 
media networks used 
for persuasion, voter 
mobilisation, targeted 
advertising and 
election monitoring  























7. Air War: Political 
Advertising 
Television, social 







profile advertising  
 




who through social 
media had access 





neighbour campaign  
the party’s street 
and neighbourhood 
campaigning  



















11. Negative Campaigning Negative 
campaigning/hate 
speeches framed 
along ethnic lines, 











12. Campaign Feedback 
Strategy 
Less experimental 
and more reliant on 
social media for 
response/interaction 
and engagement of 
voters 
Less experimental 
but a bit empirical in 
its use of interviews, 
polls and focus 




13. Campaign and Interaction 
Strategy 






Social media, virtual 
town halls/website 
created to share 
information, fact 
check and monitor 
elections 
 
14. Speed and consistency of 
campaign communication 
Social media 




Social media, media 





15. Campaign Games Unused  Unused   
16. The permanent Campaign Unused  Unused   
Note: Analysis indicate twelve used and four unused elements 
 
          5.2.2: Comparative Explanation of Application of Model 
As a way of expanding on the summary above, a descriptive comparative explanation of the 
application of the Obama model is presented below. However, as earlier mentioned, all direct 
quotes from respondents are anonymized. As a methodologically triangulated study, evidence is 




1. Political and Technology Consultants  
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
The history of Political Party formation in Nigeria ‘dates back to the colonial era’, with politics 
and campaigning gaining wide appeal in the 1950s following the intensification of nationalist 
movements and calls for independence (Danjibo and Ashindorbe, 2018). Although, pre and 
post-independence political parties and party competition differ, the nationalist spirit and 
foundation of pre-independence politics meant that political mobilization among other things, 
united the country against imperial Britain (Aghara, et al. 2015). However, changes in the 
political system-i.e. changes in the politics and party competition of independent Nigeria and the 
institutional structures of the country-i.e. from the Westminster parliamentary model in 1960 to 
the American presidential system meant that the nature of competition and incentive for 
electioneering changed (Olasupo, Oladeji and Ijeoma, 2015).  
Among other things, Mbufor (2016) is of the view that such changes and the multi-party 
competition for political power inspired the entrance and rise of actors like ‘political consultants, 
image makers and advertisers’ in Nigerian elections. Across Africa for example, there is 
evidence that shows how democratization and media development inspired the recruitment and 
involvement of American and British political consultants since the 1990s (Simenti-Phiri et al., 
2015). Ndlela and Mano (2020:9) suggest that in recent elections in the continent, ‘political 
parties are spending huge sums hiring consultancy companies with expertise in digital 
campaigning and even manipulation of social media content’. 
While the recruitment of political consultants seems to be a longstanding pattern, evidence also 
confirms that like the Obama model, the services of both local and foreign political and 
technology consultants was a general feature of the PDP and APC campaign in 2015. In the 
PDP campaign for example, G2 and J7 indicated respectively, that the international consultants 
that were hired were involved ‘’at the level of developing the general principles and philosophy 
for the campaign’’ in ways that place them ‘’in the decision making structure within Nigerian 
elections campaigns’’.  
G1 also stated that ‘’foreign influence has always been a part of Nigerian campaigns even 
though sometimes it is outside the party main campaign structure’’. According to Baines and 
Jones (2018), foreign influence in election-i.e. the use of overt and covert activities by one 
country to change the tide of elections in another is increasingly becoming prevalent. As a 
system that produces the decision-making organ of government, interested states can choose 
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to influence the outcome of an election in another state to ensure that leaders emerge who align 
with their interest. (ibid).  
In terms of the necessity for such foreign influence in Nigeria, the UK House of Commons report 
suggest that Nigeria became strategic to the US when the country ‘emerged as an oil power’ in 
the 1970s (HC 363, 2018:24). Although, Wylie (2019:148) suggest that apart from America, 
Israelis, Russians, British and French’ were also involved in what he called ‘civic engagement 
projects’-and the ‘unspoken belief shared by all’ that ‘foreign interference in elections does not 
matter if those elections are African’. However, in the global north, the recent case of alleged 
Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election suggest growing dynamics towards 
such interference (Howard et al., 2018).  
That said, on America’s involvement in Nigeria, the understanding is that America’s interest in 
the 2015 elections may not be unconnected with US national energy security (Volman, 2003). 
Rising insecurity in the months leading up to the 2015 elections and the need to protect oil 
investments and interest by routing for the candidate of the All Progressive Congress-a retired 
General could account as one reason for US interest and influence in the elections. Historically, 
Uche (2008) has shown how oil interest and investment in Shell BP pitched the British and her 
allies on the side of one-Nigeria during the separatist and secessionist civil war of 1979. 
Regarding the recruitment of political and technology consultants, G1 indicated that the PDP 
had her ‘’own people who were ICT experts and social media practitioners’’. As he further 
stated, ‘’some were hired, some worked because they are friends of the party and also friends 
of the members of the campaign committee’’. This view was also echoed by G2 who admitted 
that for the PDP campaign, it was ‘’standard practice to hire political consultants, social media 
influencers, social media volunteers because social media was the major battleground’’. As G2 
further stated, recruited consultants who worked for the PDP included ‘’American consultants, 
UK based consultants, Israeli consultants, who provided technical support for the campaign and 
lobby groups who helped to manage the international end of the campaign’’. J11 who wrote 
extensively on the activities of Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria argue that one of the things he 
found about the consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica was that they were ‘’actually sponsored 
or hired to play some role in changing or persuading people through the use of wrong social 
media posting in such a manner that offended some other parties at that time’’.  
Furthermore, ANG2 also suggested that even though the firm was not directly hired by the 
campaign, CA’s work involved hacking of ‘’Buhari’s data and advertising attack of Buhari’’. For 
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ANG1 a former employee of Cambridge Analytica, ‘’an Israeli firm’’ worked on the Nigerian 
election and was ‘’engaged to hack into Buhari’s medical records and credit dealings with 
videos created to intimidate voters and portray Muslims as violent’’. Similarly, ANG3 also 
indicated that ‘’Israeli’’ were contacted for some form of what she calls ‘’opposition research’’ 
with evidence at her disposal showing that they had ‘’some documents that the other candidate 
(i.e. Buhari) had visited hospitals’’. Such information according to ANG3 informed ‘’one or two 
articles that was put out by the local campaign team’’ in addition to ‘’video that used violent 
images that was specifically used to initiate fear on the citizens’’. 
Documentary evidence also reveal that the PDP had engaged both foreign and local 
consultants. For example, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of 
Nigeria report suggest that ‘’the PDP hired Levick Strategic Communication-a UK/US based 
communication firm and engaged the services of a local consultant-Badejo Okusanya who was 
managing director of CMC Connect (a Public Relations firm) to handle the media, publicity and 
image management of the party and its presidential candidate’’ (p.6). A report on Cambridge 
Analytica and SCL Elections involvement in Nigeria confirms the hiring of ‘’Mark Pursey of BTP 
Advisers-a UK based Public Relations and Communications company as well as Jeo Trippi and 
Bell Pottinger’’ who all advice and consulted for the PDP and Goodluck Jonathan (p.34). 
Furthermore, the UK House of Commons report also showed how the PDP recruited ‘’internet 
warriors’’ whose job was to attack rivals online (p.44). The Computational Propaganda 
Research Project report revealed the hiring of an ‘’Israeli intelligence firm-Black Cube-a select 
group of veterans from the Israeli elite intelligence units that specializes in tailored solutions to 
complex business, whose job was to hack into Buhari’s email and dig out dearth’’ (p.223). 
Similarly, in her written testimony to the UK Parliament select committee on Culture, Media and 
Sport, Brittany Kaiser a former staff of Cambridge Analytica indicated that she was involved in 
securing a ‘’contract for the SCL Group’’ in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria (p.7). This is 
particularly interesting, considering that SCL Group has its roots and expertise in Defense 
operations and contracts.  
That said, what the evidence above suggest is that even though, scholars like Johnson (2016) 
speak of the increasing growth of ‘enterprising American campaign specialist’ in international 
political consulting, the plethora of consultants involved in the PDP campaign of 2015 and the 
diversity of services they offered to the party speak rather to increasing diversification and 
internationalization of contemporary political communication consulting with actors and players 




The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Like PDP, the APC also hired local and foreign consultants. J1 indicated for example, that RED 
Media-a PR firm based in Lagos ‘’brought a lot of creativity to the table for Buhari, in that quote 
and unquote, they rebranded Buhari himself’’. Echoing this view, B2, the CEO of Red Media and 
Statecraft suggested that the APC engaged services of ‘’an international agency AKPD-David 
Axelrod’’ who worked alongside his agency. According to B2, RED Media’s work for the APC 
‘’focus on the candidate, how to connect him with the electorate, because the candidate is the 
product, and everything revolves around the candidate’’. As he further stated, RED Media ‘’were 
involved in every detail of the president’s outing, that’s why you saw that I was touring around 
the country with him, you know guiding him on things as regards his outlook that is branding and 
message communication’’. Mogaji (2013) suggest that the design of ‘the corporate identity’ of 
political parties in Nigeria have not been the job of party leaders who sit across tables and 
debate but that of marketing and consulting experts. In 2015, consultancies like RED Media and 
David Axelrod’s AKPD showed again how external actors have increasingly taken the 
responsibility of how political parties and candidates are branded by skills set that dominate the 
marketing world. 
Furthermore, in one instance, J10, thought that the APC had equally ‘’appealed to social media 
influencers’’ who were not necessarily consultants but commanded great ‘’social media 
influence’’. Agina and Ekwevugbe (2017) found for example, that campaign managers now have 
‘huge confidence in celebrity endorsement strategy’ in ways that make it part of a campaign 
strategy and tactic to influence the electorate. As we will later see in the British case study, 
recourse to such celebrity endorsement have increasingly become part of the way politicians 
and celebrities’ partner to mobilize voters. 
That said, the hiring of consultants like David Axelrod who served as a key staffer in the 
Obama’s campaign and administration resonates with Kazeem (2018) argument regarding 
international networking usually engaged by opposition political parties as they seek to 
collaborate with foreign countries and actors for the maintenance of ‘political and security 
conditions free of intimidation and state interference’ during elections in Nigeria.  
However, apart from David Axelrod, J11, J12 and J14 respectively expressed views that 
suggest some form of direct US interference in the elections targeted at benefitting the 
candidate of the APC. In their account, they point to a meeting between former Secretary of 
State John Kerry with 19 governors of northern Nigeria as well as Obama’s speech to Nigerians 
days before the elections as prove (see figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Photoshoot of President Obama’s election address to Nigerians 
 
Source: YouTube 
Perhaps, the address to Nigerians by President Obama affirms G1’s allusion when he said 
foreign influence have always been part of Nigeria’s election. In his book My Transition Hours 
then President Goodluck Jonathan pointed to the two incidence above to show that the US 
clearly took ‘sides in the country’s election’ in 2015 (Jonathan, 2018:67). 
Furthermore, apart from the CEO of RED Media and David Axelrod-AKPD, documentary 
evidence from the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria and the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) revealed that the party ‘’hired Burson-Marsteller, a 
London based Public Relations and Public Affairs firm to handle the Party’s public perception 
and reputation challenges’’ (p.13) as well as a team of ‘’computer and smart IT guys’’ who ‘’set 
up a special unit more like an information centre equipped with computers’’, that served as the 
party’s opposition research hub, mopping up information and posting negative stories against 
the PDP online (p.5). 
Similarly, the UK Department for International Development report suggested that Statecraft-a 
Nigerian marketing firm was ‘’the company that was in charge of Buhari’s social media and 
digital drive’’ (p.43). The House of Commons report also indicated that like the PDP, the APC 
had hired and recruited its own ‘’internet warriors’’ to attack rivals. Interestingly, the report 
confirms the creation of ‘’a James-Carville-Clinton campaign style war room in Lagos’’ from 
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where their very coordinated digital propaganda and online persuasion activities were carried 
out (p. 24-28). 
That said, from a comparative standpoint, the assemblage of consultants in the 2015 
presidential elections cutting across a number of skill set and countries that include America, 
Britain, Israel and Nigeria seem to signal a new era in political communication consulting that 
moves away from both country specific hegemony in knowhow, practices and tactics towards 
new patterns of digitized disinformation and voter de-mobilisation (Wylie 2019:149). As Kaiser 
(2019:74) argue for example, at the heart of the hacking effort to discredit the APC presidential 
candidate was ‘Israeli operatives who successfully passed information to SCL for use’.  
Although, SCL and Cambridge Analytica’s work in Nigeria began in 2007 where they recorded 
success without scrutiny or scandal (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). In 2015 
however, their tactics failed to re-elect or win Goodluck Jonathan a second term. However, as 
we will see in the 2016 US elections, Cambridge Analytica replicated the fear stoking, 
disinformation and voter de-mobilisation tactics, making it in recent times, the first political 
consultancy firm with disinformation and voter de-mobilisation as an ingrained campaign tactic 
across the elections it was involved in. ANG2 even suggest that as institutionally weak 
democracies and unregulated political environments ‘’elections in Nigeria and Kenya were the 
testing ground’’ for such Cambridge Analytica’s tactics. 
Furthermore, as revealed by the British parliamentary report on the inquiry on fake news, the 
Israeli hacking firm was ‘’Black Cube-a corporate intelligence organization of a select group of 
veterans from the Israeli elite intelligence units that specializes in tailored solutions to complex 
business and litigation challenges’’ (DCMSC report, p. 223-229). According to the report, Black 
Cube uses intelligence to provide ‘‘otherwise unobtainable information’’, and it is on the basis of 
such expertise that they were able to hack the now President of Nigeria to ‘’get access to his 
medical records and private emails’’. The report also added that part of CA’s strategy was to 
use videos including ‘’people being dismembered, having their throats cut and bleeding to 
death’’ to portray Muslims as violent (ibid). 
Wylie (2019:148) is of the view, that such CA’s negative ads and scary videos ‘were placed on 
mainstream networks, including Google, and targeted at ‘areas of Nigeria where the population 
leaned pro-Buhari’ exemplifying the same strategy used in the 2016 US presidential election. 
Cadwalladr (2018) also found similar evidence suggesting that Cambridge Analytica was hired 
to provide ‘advertising and marketing services in support of the Goodluck Jonathan campaign’, 
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with events that ‘prefigure what happened’ in the 2016 US presidential election, with ‘many of 
the same characters and some of the same tactics’.  
That said, CA’s widespread involvement across many countries-America, Britain, Columbia, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa and Trinidad and Tobago speak both to the increasing 
relevance, spread and use of the firm’s personalized and microtargeted advertising tactics (see 
Ndlela, 2020). Nevertheless, what is more worrying is the firm’s voter de-mobilisation operation 
as exemplified in Nigeria, and the weaponization of information against the opposition and 
increasing use of dark advertising and disinformation in times of high voter apathy (Cadwalladr, 
2018; Kaiser, 2019). Called voter suppression by some American scholars like Daniels (2020), it 
is a situation where digitization and demographic shifts are combining to incentivize how political 
parties and campaigns are finding new ways to de-mobilize and hinder voters from voting in an 
election. Indeed, the Nigerian example reduces the gap in what we know about CA’s work in the 
global south and offer a lens for comparing CA’s methods in an emerging democracy like 
Nigeria and the tactics the firm deployed in the 2016 US election and 2016 British referendum. 
Taken together, and from the standpoint of Americanization, what this evidence suggest is that 
there was a mix assemblage of consultancies with diversity of skills that served the purpose of 
helping both parties in their search for electoral success in 2015. Importantly, the recruitment of 
such consultancies cuts across many countries and suggest a reduction and complete reliance 
on US based experts and expertise in campaign innovation and consulting (see table 5.6). 
Furthermore, in ways that show the increasing relevance of local, homegrown political 
communication consultancies, RED Media and Statecraft-companies that had consulted for the 
PDP in the 2011 presidential election campaign were the firms that offered consultancy services 
to the APC in 2015-a commercialized shift in clients within two election cycle. RED Media and 
Statecraft list President Macky Sall’s political campaign in Senegal, and Nana Akufo-Addo’s 
political campaign in Ghana in their list of clients (Williams and Jideonwo, 2018). As we will see 
later, the 2015 British election and 2016 US presidential election campaign indicate the 
increasing global diffusion and growth of contemporary political communication consulting that 






Table 5.6: Consultants hired in the 2015 campaign 
S/N Consultants Expertise/Role Country/Nationality Hiring Party 
1. AKPD Message and 
media/message 
UNITED STATES  APC 
2. BTP Advertisers  Communication 
&campaign 
advisers/focus 
messages and ads 
UNITED KINGDOM PDP 
3. Black Cube Intelligence/Kompromat 
and opp research 
ISRAEL CA for the 
PDP 
4. Burson-Marsteller Public Affairs/public 
relations 
UNITED KINGDOM APC 




UNITED KINGDOM PDP 
6. Cambridge Analytica Political consulting/dark 
advertising and voter 
suppression 
UNITED KINGDOM Billionaire for 
the PDP 





8. Joe Trippi Political 
strategist/message and 
messaging 
UNITED STATES PDP 
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10. RED Media Public relations and 
branding/public 
relations, image and 
branding 
NIGERIA  APC 





NIGERIA  APC 
Source: own elaboration 
2. Big data and the single database 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Although, the internet is increasingly making data for psychographic analysis accessible in 
Africa (Jideonwo and Williams, 2018), J5 suggested that ‘’big data use did not play that much 
role’’ since ‘’it is still in the formation stage’’ in Nigeria. As J15 correctly observed, big data 
‘’works with data collected over time and unfortunately we haven’t had a lot of data collected in 
Nigeria at the time so right now what we have is still not actually big data yet’’. Thus, even 
though as stated by G1 and G2 respectively, that ‘’some kind of analysis of data was involved in 
the realm of polling’’ during their campaign, evidence seem to suggest that big data and a single 
database was not used by the PDP.   
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
In contrast to the PDP, the APC seem to standout in its engagement with data inspired voter 
understanding techniques. That said, whilst there is no clear evidence of the use of a single 
database by the party, the campaign seemed to have deployed social media to scale up 




Figure 5.2: APC social media registration drive/data gathering 
 
Source: Facebook 
Thus, comparatively speaking, Nigeria seem to differ from the US in terms of the conscious 
investment in the development of campaign database and digital infrastructure that political 
parties in America are now developing. Perhaps, the long-term impact of such social media 
registration drive in Nigeria could result in data driven sophisticated campaign tactics in the form 
of those used in the Obama model. Nevertheless, the emergence and growth of companies like 
Cambridge Analytica and other data analytics companies and evidence of what was achieved in 
a very short time in the Trump campaign, in terms of how the campaign sub-contracted and built 
its campaign database also indicate the path Nigerian political parties could follow in building 
party campaign data and digital infrastructure (Green and Issenberg, 2016). 
That said, B2 also suggested that the APC campaign voter understanding in 2015 benefited 
from ‘’research of RED Media and Statecraft’’. RED Media and StateCraft are Lagos based 
public relations and governance consultancies that ‘drive agenda, build movements and turn 
audience into fans’ (Kazeem, 2018). According to B2, the firm’s methods revolves around 
research they ‘’have done over time’’ and ‘’updated regularly’’ that focused on ‘’understanding 
the aspiration of youths particularly in the pioneering national projects they led that have 
inspired the way young people think in Nigeria, which include the Future Awards Africa which 
rebranded what it meant to be young and Nigerian, to be young talented hardworking driven 
high achiever’’.  
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B2 who doubles as CEO of RED Media and Statecraft was hired as brand manager and 
communication consultant for the APC presidential campaign. Again, even though big data and 
a single data base was an unused element, local and homegrown companies and consultants 
like RED Media and StateCraft and the expertise they bring to bear in contemporary African 
elections continue to show how globally diversifying the political consultancy market has 
become. Across Africa, Easton et al. (2014) suggest that the increasing growth in the use of 
homegrown and foreign political consultants ‘has been largely related to democratization, 
development of the media and changes in social and economic factors’. 
Furthermore, B2 also suggested that their work for the APC campaign drew from their 
longstanding work on political advocacy that focused on understanding ‘’where the generation is 
going and that is a key science you can’t find anywhere’’. Such insight according to him is what 
he calls ‘’science of human knowledge-psychology of a human being, psychology of a 
demography’’ derived from their ‘’understanding of the generation we have been alongside 
together for 13 years and understanding all of those people who revolve around that 
demography through consensual engagements that helps you understand mind sets’’. That 
said, the methodology described by B2 above even though suggestive of a methodical effort 
toward voter understanding is not indicative of the use of big data analytics or psychographic 
segmentation. What it seems to suggest is that, like the Obama model, managers of the APC 
campaign took cognizance of the need to understand the drivers of political behavior among 
Nigerians and attempted to understand those without the sophisticated use of big data, a single 
database and data-driven analytics. 
Before proceeding to the next element, it necessary to note that a possible explanation for the 
level of application of big data and a single database by the PDP and APC may in part include 
the fact that political party infrastructure and political communication is only recently developing 
in Africa (Mutsvairo and Karam , 2018). However, commentary from recent elections in Senegal 
suggest that such data driven approaches to campaigning were applied in President Macky 
Sall’s campaign (Allison, 2019).  
From the Nigerian and African standpoint, an understanding of the electoral landscape requires 
more examination of the state of digitization. Indeed, with digital divide presumably less among 
young people (on social media for example, 47.81% are on Facebook; 27.13% on Twitter; 
11.68% on Instagram; 11.18% on Pinterest and 1.76% on YouTube) (Statcounter, 2020), with 
‘social media applications like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp and blogs’ now an 
integral part of Africa’s communication landscape, political communication in Africa’s emerging 
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democracies like Nigeria might be moving into a future that shifts away from longstanding socio-
economic and ethno-religious demographic characterization of voters (Ndlela and Mano, 
2020:3). 
3. Predictive Modelling 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
While data enhanced predictive modelling and analytics seem to be gaining ground in some 
sectors in Africa (Rohr et al. 2016; Taylor et al., 2018), evidence indicate that predictive 
modelling was unused in 2015. For the PDP, accounts regarding the use of any form of 
predictive modelling by G1 and G2 only echo that the campaign had people engaged in ‘’some 
kind of data analysis and demographics’’ as well as ‘’conducting polls’’. However, irrespective of 
the intensity of the campaign and the recruitment of local and foreign consultants, data driven 
predictive analytics to voter understanding in the manner deployed in the Obama model was not 
a feature of the PDP campaign. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
In no very significant contrast to the PDP, only J16 stated that one thing he knew much about 
regarding the APC campaign was their ‘’use of empirical statistics and deep-rooted research to 
determine voter interest and voter decision’’. While ‘empirical statistics’ sound complicated, such 
use as he further noted, ‘’was not as empirical and data enabled as you will find in maybe 
2019’’. What this seem to suggest, is that there was an attempt by the handlers of the APC 
campaign to move closer to finding ways of understanding the electorate through data driven 
research. As B2 argued for example, ‘’understanding of the key target audience’’ was a key part 
of their campaign. However, the approach as he further alluded was not powered by ‘’data 
harvesting like in the US’’.  
Furthermore, J18 also thought that even though ‘’analysis of data to understanding voters is key 
to a lot of permutations’’, such effort by the APC was in the realm of ‘’demographic profiling’’. 
Thus, taken together, this result suggests that there was no use of predictive analytics by both 
parties. However, in the 2019 elections, DeepDive Intelligence-a Nigerian based manifesto and 
public policy rating company claimed to have developed a predictive analytic model to help 
political party strategist identify, understand and influence voter behavior. Whilst this is now the 
case for elections in America and Britain, Africa’s emerging democracies like Nigeria may not 




4. Data Mining and Microtargeting 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Although, no interviewee reported the use of data mining in the 2015 campaign. Ndlela 
(2020:31) is of the view that ‘contemporary political campaigns in Africa are enmeshed in data-
rich environments, where data mining firms, PR and other consultancy firms are making in-
roads’. While no evidence of data mining emerged, both political parties had deployed online 
personalized message targeting. For the PDP, G1 stated for example, that ‘’online targeting was 
involved’’ in their campaign as they battled the online space during the election. J5 also 
indicated that a lot of people attested to have gotten ‘’information through Facebook targeted 
marketing’’. According to J15, even though ‘’data may be limited in Nigeria’’, ‘’Facebook offered 
a ready targeting opportunity’’ for the PDP campaign. As Ndlela show, Facebook advertising 
tools ‘have made micro targeting easier, allowing campaigns to target more precisely with 
geographical data and algorithmically created lifestyle profiles’ (ibid). Thus, in the move to reach 
their target audience across Nigeria’s six geo-political zones, microtargeting was deployed by 
the PDP. As J19’s comment below illustrate, Facebook was used ‘’to target people with 
information online, to push out information, play it up, dig up facts and play them up just to get 
the attention of the voters’’. J15 even suggested that microtargeting was the specific area that 
‘’Cambridge Analytica was very good at and they used it to spread videos about Tinubu’’-i.e. the 
national leader of the APC.  
In documentary evidence, the Computational Propaganda research project report suggest that 
‘’16 million Nigerian Facebook users’’ data had been mined by SCL Elections and used to 
spread fear and misinformation. While there is no evidence anywhere to corroborate this, the 
report indicated that SCL Elections ‘’were paid U.S.D 2.8 million to orchestrate a ferocious 
campaign’’ against the APC (p42). Maeve and Khalili (2018) found evidence of intimidating 
videos used by Cambridge Analytica to orchestrate voter de-mobilisation tactics online. That 
said, while the documentary evidence seems to contradict evidence from interviews, social 
media no doubt had afforded the campaign tools for microtargeting and a platform for the 
spread of disinformation. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Microtargeting was equally a key feature of the APC’s campaign. As indicated by J15, Facebook 
also offered the party and campaign team opportunity for ‘’audience profiling’’ that enabled 
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messages to be targeted at individuals and groups. Explaining their work for the APC for 
example, B2 suggested that ‘’targeted messaging and microtargeting’’ for the APC campaign 
can be classified as ‘’micro and macro’’, and entailed ‘’using trend to ensure that your 
information is in the space, some targeting individuals and some targeting demographic blocks’’. 
Gish (2017) suggest that in marketing, micro targeting is the strategy used for targeting small 
section of individuals, while macro approaches are used target larger population.  
Thus, as B2 indicated, for individual targeting, they crafted messages and asked party members 
‘’to share these messages and ensure that people tag their messages to make them viral’’. 
Similarly, since it was important for them to understand how the people will respond, they 
‘’tested the messages before putting them out on air or online and ensured that the videos they 
did are shareable’’. To target demographic blocks, they put out messages and videos that will 
‘’provoke an emotion that will lead to an action which is to share for more people to see’’. In this 
sense, APC’s microtargeting can be said to be unique for its message testing.  
Furthermore, evidence from documentary analysis also reveal that the ‘’APC’s targeted 
messages had significant emotional and psychological appeal in most of their adverts’’ (ACSPN, 
p.5). That said, it is important to note however, that the APC’s micro and macro or individual and 
demographic targeting was not a product of data mining. Thus, in contrast to Obama model, 
even though microtargeting was deployed, no evidence of data mining was attributed to the 
campaign.  
That said, it is also important to highlight the nature and dimension of microtargeted 
disinformation deployed by Cambridge Analytica. As Kasier (2019:270) show, their work for the 
PDP campaign in 2015 also include ‘putting information out through rumors on social media’. 
According to Wylie (2019;149), videos were designed to demonize Muslims, with such content 
and ads targeted at pro-Buhari populations ‘placed on mainstream networks, including Google’-
such that ‘a Nigerian surfing the news would encounter an ordinary-looking clickbait’ that 
redirects them ‘to a black screen with a video box in the middle’.  
Although since independence, Nigeria’s politics has struggled with ‘agenda-setting news and 
hate comments’ (Pate and Ibrahim, 2019). However, such Cambridge Analytica’s hateful 
microtargeting weaved around religion-i.e.one of Nigeria’s major fault line was a potent 
ingredient for electoral violence. As I argued elsewhere, one of the main triggers of violence in 
Nigeria is the ‘politicization and mobilization of identities by political parties and actors in the 
struggle’ for state power (Ijere, 2015a). 
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That said, it is also important to add, that from the standpoint of the three elements above (i.e. 
big data/single database, predictive modelling, and data mining) evidence suggest as we will 
see later that digital divide-i.e. disparities in penetration and access to digital affordances at 
individual, group, and regional levels account as contextual factor that influenced dissimilarity 
and the appropriation and application of these practices in Nigeria. While the three elements 
combine have contributed in moving political communication away from longstanding socio-
economic and geo-demographic factors in developed democracies like America and Britain, 
ethic, religious and primordial sentiments continue to influence campaigning in Nigeria. 
5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media  
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Although, gaps still exist regarding the impact of digital media on democratic development in 
Africa, the attractiveness of social media networks to politicians as tools for enlarging party and 
candidate visibility, as well as voter reach and mobilization has increased in recent elections 
(Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018). According to Ndlela and Mano (2020:3), across Africa for 
example, social media is ‘disrupting well established forms of elite control over the media and 
creating new methods of election campaigning and how citizens interact with political 
messages’. In Nigeria, Dunu (2018) is of the view that social media is reshaping ‘the structures 
and methods of contemporary political communication and engagement’, with the abundant 
media the world now enjoys-i.e. platforms ‘Facebook, Blackberry Messenger, WhatsApp, 
Twitter, Blog, Myspace, YouTube and Instagram’ all moving from the realm of the social into 
‘powerful tools for political communication and useful means of policing election results’ (ibid). 
Table 5.7 shows progressive changes in social media stats in Nigeria between 2011 and 2015. 
Table 5.7: Four-year changes in social media stats 
Internet/platform Year 2011 Year 2015 
Internet Users  28% of population 45.1% of population 
Facebook  76.75% 89.95% 
Twitter 1.99% 6.69% 
Pinterest  Not in use 1.51% 
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Tunblr Not in use 0.61% 
Google 0.05% 0.49% 
YouTube 0.52% 0.13% 
Linkedln 0.09% 0.15 
Largest user group Age 25-34 Age 18-35 
Source: statcounter.com 
According to Bartlett et al. (2015), the 2011 presidential election was the first-time social media 
was deployed for campaign in Nigeria. Scholars like Agbata (2015) and Nwaubani (2015) 
suggest that apart from democratizing the electioneering and communication environment, such 
introduction of social media-a ‘reflection of global trends’ inspired a more transparent election 
process in the country. That said, whilst it can be argued that the 2011 elections signaled the 
beginning of digital politics in Nigeria, the expansion of digital as indicated in table 5.7 above 
suggest that the 2015 presidential election seem to have further advance such practices. In 
2015 for example, among other things, social media served as channel for political news, attack, 
deliberations and debate among party members and as a platform for campaign and 
campaigning (Okeke et al., 2016).  
In the evidence from interviews, J4 suggested for example that for both the PDP and APC, 
social media networks ‘’gave a lot of impetus to their 2015 campaign’’. However, G1 also 
indicated that even though the PDP campaign relied on social media to ‘’influence what 
Nigerians read or saw’’, traditional legacy media particularly ‘’radio and television played a major 
role in some parts of the country particularly in the north’’.  
Nevertheless, as G2 and some respondents suggested, digital media technology became a 
major issue in Nigeria in 2011. According to G2, former President Goodluck Jonathan is the 
‘’first social media-Facebook president that Nigeria would have because in 2011 he conducted 
his campaign majorly on social media and he was able to capture the imagination of a lot of 
young people through Facebook and Blackberry messenger’’. In terms of the different ways that 
social media became significant, respondents agree that social media networks served the PDP 
as a channel for mobilizing and improving citizens awareness and participation in politics. The 
party as G2 puts it ‘’had a very strong social media team’’ mainly because ‘’social media was a 
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major battleground’’ and was basically used as J5 stated for ‘’targeted messaging, advertising, 
location specific advertising, and to share information’’.  
Furthermore, J9 also suggested that social media also ‘’gave credibility to the election’’ by 
enabling party members to ‘’monitor results, the behavior of security men and thugs at the 
polling unit’’. According to Omilusi (2015) ‘political thugs’ youths recruited and armed by 
politicians is one way that desperate political actors prepare for elections in Nigeria. However, 
J7 was also of the opinion that the use of social media in 2015 explains how political 
mobilization was carried out and ‘’gives an insight into the prevailing narrative among the 
political parties’’ and ‘’how they attack each other, as well as the echo chamber that they 
operate from’’. Thus, as significant as social media was for voter enlightenment and 
mobilization, it was equally a medium for attacks and negative campaigning.  
In the audio materials collected, ANG3 even though she seem to question the ethics of 
Cambridge Analytica’s tactics and her partners in Nigeria suggested that violent content and 
digital ads designed to suppress voters in the opposition candidate stronghold was ‘’put out on 
local radio, Facebook and Twitter’’. Thus, reinforcing the view that apart from serving the 
campaign as an instrument for getting out the vote, social media also served as a channel for 
disinformation. 
Similarly, documentary evidence seems to echo the same narrative. For example, in the report 
of the Commonwealth Observer Group, it was revealed that social media had both positive and 
negative impact and served as a source of ‘’instantaneous communication’’, ‘’voter education’’ 
and ‘’misinformation’’ (p.25). The UK House of Commons report on fake news also revealed that 
social media was also used as a platform for attack on political rivals orchestrated by ‘‘internet 
warriors’’ (p.43).  
Furthermore, the DFID report revealed that the PDP created ‘’Google Hangouts’’–a virtual 
community platform where candidates answered questions. According to the report, other use of 
social media networks includes, ‘’to detect and characterize unexpected events quickly as they 
occur, observe elections and transmit collected results’’ (p.44).  
That said, whilst the evidence above give credence to the use of social media networks, 
interestingly however, ‘’WhatsApp’’-a free messaging platform service, and a feature absent in 
the 2008 Obama model social media element was used for sharing short videos. Perhaps, this 
is because WhatsApp didn’t exist in 2008, but played a remote role in the 2012 campaign cycle 
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(Howard, 2018). Elsewhere, recent reports on the 2019 Indian election identifies WhatsApp as 
an emerging political campaign tool (Harris, 2019). Khan (2019) is of the view that the popularity 
of WhatsApp in the global south is because of the group conversation it enables, and the 
increasing number of mobile phone owners in rural areas where digital connectivity is only 
through smart phones. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Evidence on the APC campaign suggest that the party was ahead of the PDP in the use of 
social media. As the opposition party at the time, the party’s main strength as respondents 
alluded was in information dissemination on social media. Relying on strong media presence, 
J10 thought for example that they held ‘’unto certain regions…..and had the northern part of the 
country virtually under the control of their propaganda machinery’’ and in the southern part of 
the country, successfully divided it with the PDP-particularly in the ‘’south-west where you have 
a preponderance of print and electronic media and educated people who used a lot of social 
media’’. According to J12, the party ‘’poured posting, several quotas of postings, jingles, lot of 
carvings, a lot of things in the social media against a particular candidate’’. 
Furthermore, a few things were equally unique about APC’s use of social media platforms. As 
J16 and J14 respectively stated, they used it for ‘’soliciting for financial support online’’ and for 
‘’massive mobilization’’. In J15’s view, a volunteer consultant for the Buhari’s campaign, social 
media enabled people to report ‘’from across the nation and do fact checking’’. As he further 
stated, he created a website called ‘’Factcheckng’’ and ‘’led a personal fact checking project’’ 
where they picked and confirmed things that they ‘’consider lies and injurious to Buhari’s 
campaign and then did some research and some fact finding and then share that information on 
the website’’.  
According to J19, the APC also had ‘’virtual town halls’’ where people connected real time, 
chatting and broadcasting party events and sending feedback on happenings across the 
country. J19 also thought that the APC had ‘’a special unit more like an information centre 
equipped with computers and smart IT guys’’, that served as the party’s opposition research 
hub. In his comments, B1 also affirmed that a lot happened in the social media space for their 
campaign-with the creation of ‘’unbelievably creative content imaginative content on various 
social media platform, producing music videos and posting them using Facebook’’. Such videos 
as B2 suggested were shared between party faithful’s and targeted at ‘’individual and 
demographics blocks’’.  
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Documentary evidence equally demonstrate that the APC was more creative and visible on 
social media. For example, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of 
Nigeria report indicated that the APC ‘’posted more hate messages than the PDP’’ online and 
the party’s vice presidential nominee Yemi Osibanjo ‘’even created a website for the campaign 
https://www.profyemiosinbajo.com’’ (p.11&13). Furthermore, the African Union Election 
Observer Mission report also revealed that apart from serving ‘’as a platform for intense debates 
on electoral and governance issues’’, the party created ‘’Revoda’’, a mobile application which 
enabled a parallel vote count and staged ‘’Google Hangouts’’ where the party’s candidate 
answered questions (p.28). Overall, like the Obama model, this result indicates that, irrespective 
of the debate on digital divide in the global south, digital and social media platforms are also 
increasingly becoming a major tool for campaign, voter mobilization and persuasion in Africa’s 
emerging democracies like Nigeria. 
However, taken together, whilst there continue to be debate and a lack of consensus on the role 
of social media as a tool for deepening democratization in Nigeria (Ugba and Saka, 2019), the 
positive is that social media seemed to have incentivized deliberation and mobilization in the 
2015 election. The negative however is that social media also served as a platform for the 
spread of hate, misinformation and fake news (Dunu, 2018). Thus, like the 2016 US presidential 
election, were the now defunct consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica converted social media 
platforms to channels for spreading ‘political falsehood both about candidates and about 
important campaign issues’, platforms are increasingly becoming drivers of political 
misinformation and voter de-mobilisation (Garrett, 2019). 
6. Digital Fundraising and small donors 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Political finance is variously identified as the incentive for political corruption in many African 
democracies (Eme and Anyadike, 2014). While money usually confers unmerited political 
advantage to political parties and candidates, in Nigeria, the bulk of such campaign fund is 
usually a product of ‘large corporate, single donor funding and private saving’ (ibid). Although, 
money continues to be crucial for electioneering with increasing awareness of the problems 
associated with campaign financing, solutions that both democratizes, regulate practices and 
instill sanctions are only still emerging in Africa (Bryan and Baer, 2005).  
In Nigeria for example, even though the 2015 campaign was significantly the most expensive 
election in Nigeria’s democratic history, political parties relied mostly on ‘membership dues’, the 
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‘investment of political entrepreneurs’, ‘big men and godfather’s’, and some form of government 
support (Bryan and Baer, 2005; Eme and Anyadike, 2014; Olorunmola, 2017). As part of her 
yearlong investigation for example, Cadwalladr (2018) even found that funding of CA and the 
PDP in 2015 was through ‘a rich Nigerian who supported the incumbent President Jonathan’.  
That said, even though the PDP campaign outraised and outspent the APC in the elections in 
what Ukase (2016) refers to as ‘suspicious’ mobilization of campaign funds, no evidence 
indicated that the campaign and its managers had relied on small donors for fundraising. As the 
party in government at the time, perhaps the 22 billion naira raised at President Goodluck 
Jonathan fundraising dinner by friends and business moguls was enough war chest for the 
campaign (ibid). As Ukase argue, even though such fundraising and donations ‘breached the 
maximum limits prescribed by the 2010 Electoral Act’, supervisory institutions like the 
Independent National Electoral Commission repeatedly failed to impose sanctions. In the 
discussion on context in the last section, money emerged as a factor that condition the 
application of innovative campaign practices in Nigeria. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
According to Ukase (2016), the APC also ‘breached the maximum limits encapsulated’ in the 
Electoral Act. However, unlike the PDP, the APC though with minimal success had involved 
Nigerians digitally in raising funds for the campaign. B1 indicated for example, that they had 
‘’citizens who contributed to the campaign that were not party members’’. Citizens who out of 
admiration for the party’s presidential nominee were ‘’contributing their own money, raising 
money online and spending their own money’’.  
It is important to note however, as J15 suggested, that what the APC generated from small 
donors ‘’online was so little that it wouldn’t make any meaning’’ for prosecuting the massively 
expensive 2015 election. Nevertheless, irrespective of amount generated, B1 argue that raising 
money from ordinary Nigerians was unique for the campaign, since it was inspired by ‘’people 
who felt and believe that anything but Jonathan in 2015’’. Thus, making it the first time an 
election campaign in Nigeria will target and mobilize campaign funding from ordinary Nigerians. 
Documentary evidence like the DFID report seem to corroborate that the APC crowdfunded for 
the 2015 elections by ‘’using a mobile platform designed to tap into the social media networks of 
its supporters’’ (p.22). The Westminster cost of politics report specifically identified five platforms 
that the APC deployed: ‘‘an electronic donation platform; dedicated bank accounts; donation of 
a maximum of N100 per time by means of text messages to dedicated numbers; purchase of 
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the party ringtone for which N100 was deducted per time; and the use of scratch cards through 
which supporters could donate between N100 and N1, 500 each’’ (pp.11-12).  
That said, considering that this was the first time in the history of campaign financing that a 
political party will digitally crowdfund, the 2015 campaign witnessed a new dimension and 
method in the mobilization of campaign finance in Nigeria. However, as a country with a history 
of unregulated party and campaign finance practices often highjacked by ‘big men and 
godfathers’ (Bryan and Baer, 2005), who conceive campaign funding as ‘business investment’ 
and disrupt governance to their favor rather than constituents (Eme and Anyadike, 2014), small 
donors can serve as alternative channel that democratize and modernize campaign finance 
mobilization in ways that can both inspire political participation among Nigerians and remedy 
reliance on donors who target government contracts and incentivize political corruption. 
7. Air War: Political Advertising 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
According to Opeibi (2006), ‘political advertising’ gained popularity in Nigeria in the 1990s. 
Historically however, ‘ownership of mass media’ had ‘determine how they are used for political 
communication’ (Olayiwola, 1991). Nevertheless, Africa’s media liberalization of the 90s, the 
third wave of democratization and ‘diffusion of democratic norms and ideas in hitherto 
authoritarian states’ and the advent of new media opened up new frontiers for political 
advertising (Salawu, 2013; Ijere, 2015; Suntai and Targema, 2017). 
In 2015, although deceptive, negative, less issue base, and framed sometimes with music, 
legacy media advertising was integral to the 2015 campaigns (Aririguzoh, 2019; Obot and Batta, 
2012). Ibelema (2008) suggest that the historical relationship between traditional legacy media 
and politics in Nigeria ‘demonstrates the potential as well as the liability of the African press as 
an instrument of democracy’. In 2015 for example, legacy media advertising patterns include 
personality and issue-based advertising, fear/scaremongering ads, as well as attack and 
negative advertising with social media serving as new channels of dissemination (Aririguzoh, 
2015).  
Evidence also suggest that the PDP as the party in government had a good part of its air war 
and campaign advertising in traditional legacy media. What the data did not reveal however, is 
evidence of Obama style voter specific and location targeted advertising.  
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Nevertheless, Aririguzoh (2015) found evidence on both sides of the 2015 political divide of 
what she calls ‘deceptive advertising’ with ‘misinformation, lies, and misrepresentation’. As J12 
and J11 respectively indicated about the PDP’s approach, there was ‘’massive spending on 
adverts in the media both print and electronic’’ including ‘’scary advertorials that portrayed 
Buhari as somebody who will decapitate Nigeria’’ (see example in the link attached 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOpKkgXNb50). According to Esuh and Umanah (2019), 
billing on advertising in the 2015 campaign was the highest in Nigeria’s political history with a 
combine spend of N 7,457,732,849.77 billion or $374,760,44.5 million with the PDP as highest 
spender. 
Furthermore, G1 seem to also affirm that in the PDP campaign, ‘’the mainstream media, the 
traditional media got more into it’’. As J7 suggested, focus was on ‘’media spending like buying 
adverts-TV, digital and online’’. J7 also indicated, as Esuh and Umanah argued above, that the 
PDP as well as the APC ‘’spent over 9 times the limit set by law’’ on advertising.  
For ANG3, the bulk of the scaremongering content and videos designed un-behalf of the PDP 
formed most part of its advertising content. Evidence also point to the negative ads and attacks 
on the national leader of the APC and the party’s presidential nominee on national television as 
examples of the messiness and media bias in the 2015 campaign (see links attached-lion of 
Bourdillon https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJAf1Z6AgbE and the real Buhari 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZafoHEQMoE ). These videos, though below the standard 
required by Nigeria’s advertising regulatory agency i.e. the Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (AMCON) aired on some national television channels. Thus, despite its regulatory 
responsibility, the agency it may seem was entangled in the politics of 2015 and had favored the 
ruling party at the time.  
Furthermore, documentary evidence like the Association of Communication Scholars and 
Professionals of Nigeria report revealed that political advertising in 2015 was on platforms like 
‘’television, social media, radio, newspapers and magazines, billboards and flyers’’. However, 
the report also suggest that the PDP sponsored more personality-based ads than the APC 
(p.1). Similarly, the Commonwealth Observer Group report pointed to ‘’gross abuse of 
political advertising rules’’ on State owned National Television Authority (NTA) with significant 
coverage of campaign activities dedicated only to the PDP (p.24). Indeed, such favoritism of the 
ruling party raises criticism and questions about the nature and extent of agency and 
institutional independence in Nigeria.  
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The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
 Evidence on the use of air war and political advertising by the APC suggest that the party was a 
bit more sophisticated in terms of its use of location specific advertising. As J19 and J5’s 
comments below respectively illustrate for example, the APC ‘’marshalled their political 
messages both on air and online and leveraged on the social media’’ …’’for advertising, location 
specific advertising through adverts, on social media’’. In another comment, J19 thought that the 
party ‘’did it very intelligently and they went down to the whole nooks and cranny using adverts 
on radio, TV and social media to dig out a lot of stories, negative stories and figures about the 
PDP’’. J8 also seem to suggest that the campaign environment was virtually under the control of 
the APC propaganda machinery and the party was ‘’everywhere, social media, TV, radio and 
newspapers’’. Furthermore, B2 also indicated that the APC’s advertising content was both 
individual and demographically targeted, with platforms like Facebook offering more 
opportunities. According to Elliott (2018) ‘Facebook Location Targeting options’ offer advertisers 
‘powerful methods’ for reaching specific users in certain areas.  
That said, in its analysis of political advertising in 2015, the Association of Communication 
Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report indicated that the PDP had more ‘’attack 
advertisement’’, while the APC ‘’had over two-thirds of all the commercials and jingles with over 
67.2% of the ads rated as personality-based and 32.8% as issues-based’’ (p.51). 
Comparatively, the report equally indicate that the APC advertorials were more issue based 
than PDP’s. Nevertheless, the report recognizes television as the more dominant channel of 
political advertising in 2015 and rates the APC as more visible on social media than the PDP. 
The Commonwealth Observer Group report also reveal that political advertising ‘’appeared in 
the style of music videos and wittily drawn cartoon characters’’ that seem to attack other 
candidates (p.19). 
In summary, what this analysis confirm is that air war and political advertising was engaged by 
the two political parties. However, the evidence failed to demonstrate the application of the data 
guided approach of the Obama model. Interestingly, in a political climate where government 
institutions tend to sing the tune of the party in government, it was surprising to find that the 
Independent National Electoral Commission post-election report was bold in its submission that 
the political advertising landscape of 2015 favored the incumbent, since government controlled 
media houses ‘’failed to comply with legal requirements on equitable coverage’’ (p.36). Perhaps, 
the bold conclusion of the electoral commission may in part be because the government in 
power lost the election and the report was published after the handover date of 29th May 2015. 
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8. Ground Game 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
In most of Africa’s plural societies, it is ‘ethnic group membership’, though with low impact on 
‘party preferences’ that usually determine ‘party attachment’ (Norris and Mattes, 2013). Thus, 
identity as the last section of this chapter will further highlight matter to voters, voting and voting 
pattern (ibid). As Fawole (2005) argues on Nigeria, under such political climate and atmosphere, 
the general conception and approach to politics and voter mobilization include the use of ethnic 
rhetoric, ‘intimidation, blackmail, bribery, and occasional use of state terror’ in ways that often 
jettison civil processes of getting-out-the-vote (Ake, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the changing nature of political parties from the ethno-regional parties of pre-and 
early post-independent Nigeria to more nationalistic parties have since inspired changes in party 
institutionalization and campaign strategies (IDEA, 2000). As Paget (2019) and Bob-Milliar 
(2014) suggest, as political parties institutionalize across Africa, ‘rally intensive campaigning’ full 
of high entertainment that cut across national, local, state, regional and ethnic boundaries are 
dwarfing canvassing ‘as a form of campaign contact’ even though political parties have 
continued to recruit local actors for ground game campaigning. 
That said, in 2015, ground canvassers and organizers featured in both Parties strategy. 
However, such ground game canvassing was not the labor-intensive, top-down, bottom-up, tech 
enabled information flowing and data sharing style of the Obama model. Nevertheless, J4 
suggested that one unique feature generated by the enthusiasm of the 2015 campaign was ‘’the 
recruitment of the youths and the younger ones’’. J5 also indicated that the enthusiasm brought 
by the youths to both campaigns was not only visible on social media and online discussions, 
but also in their neighborhood effort at ‘’campaigning for their preferred candidates’’. That said, 
the difference here is that the incentive for such youth participation and engagement in Nigeria 
is usually tied to ‘political opportunities-jobs and contracts as personal rewards for their 
contributions’ during the election (Eneji and Ikeorji, 2018).  
Furthermore, G2 also confirmed that the PDP had recruited youths that anchored the party’s 
‘’neighbour to neighbour campaign’’. Documentary evidence also corroborated this by 
suggesting that the party’s ground troops also served as ‘’agents and were present at polling 
stations across the country’’ (COGR:28). Similarly, the Association of Communication Scholars 
and Professionals of Nigeria report also revealed that the most prominent mobilization arm of 
the PDP’s campaign was the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) and Goodluck 
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Support Group who ‘’carried a lot of youths along who went round campaigning in their 
neighbourhoods’’ (p.121). According to the report, TAN conducted regional rallies in the 
country’s six geo-political zones and ‘’laboured vigorously to rally Nigerians’’ (ibid). 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Like the PDP, APC’s ground game effort revolved around youth mobilization. As B1’s comment 
below illustrate, youth participation in the campaign moved from a group of ‘’people who were 
not just content to be voters even though they were not party members but to volunteers who 
drove the campaign’’. According to B2, commitment to the party’s change message was the 
inspiration for youth volunteers. As B2 indicated, the youths ‘’were ready, armed with our 
messages online in the streets and neighborhoods because they were committed to the change 
message’’. Similarly, J19 and J18 also suggested respectively, that ‘’the APC if I may say was 
smart in engaging the youths in their streets campaigning’’ and in how they ‘’push out 
information to those who were on the streets and neighborhood’’. This finding, though different 
from the Obama model approach, suggest that the APC campaign had some interaction with 
ground troops in their voter mobilization effort in a manner relatively different and more 
sophisticated than the PDP. 
Furthermore, apart from the party’s use of ground troops, the Association of Communication 
Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also indicate that the party partnered with the 
Independent National Electoral Commission ‘‘in voter education initiatives’’ (p.6). Interestingly 
however, the Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group indicated that vulnerable youths 
were equally recruited and used ‘’as political pawns in carrying out election-related violence’’ 
(p.28). Among other things, a possible explanation for this may include, youth unemployment 
and weak democratic values and norms within the political class who usually assign violent 
roles to youths during elections (Oluwaseun, 2013). That said, with decreasing voter turnout in 
successive Nigerian elections, institutionalizing ground game in party campaign tactics in future 
elections can help inspire and increase voter turnout. 
9. Political Opinion Polling 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
With ‘multi-party politics’ now becoming the norm in Africa, Africa’s political domain is 
increasingly experiencing the embedding of public opinion (Mattes, 2012; van de Walle, 2013). 
However, as Wolf, (2009) and Lindberg (2013) argue, the politics remain ‘different’ with such 
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polls used mostly to ‘measure the true distance from the eventual polling day reality’, since most 
elections deviate from ‘free and fair practices’.  
That notwithstanding, evidence suggest that political opinion polling was a cross party strategy 
in 2015. As J16 indicated, part of the responsibility of the consultants hired by both political 
parties was, ‘’to poll for them, and to do expert analysis about their chances’’. However, it is 
important to highlight, that the polling done by both political parties could be classified as 
traditional, considering the absence of any evidence of technology enhanced polling in the 
nature of the Obama model.  
Thus, in the PDP campaign for example, even though G2 expressed doubt about the scientific 
accuracy of polling as a tool for capturing the preferences of Nigerians, he did attest that polls 
were a common feature in the election and part of the people they hired during the campaign 
were ‘’conducting polls’’ for them. Nevertheless, as J4 and J5’s comments below respectively 
illustrate, doubts about accuracy of the polling hinge on the fact that both the PDP and APC 
were conducting the polls to lay ‘’claims about their prospective victory’’ and ‘’to reassure 
themselves’’. Thus, reinforcing Wolf (2009) argument above on the peculiar use of polling in 
African elections. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
According to J7, those recruited as consultants by the APC were paid among other things ‘’for 
work like public opinion polling’’. Similarly, J18 suggest that the party’s message consistency 
was down to their effort at ‘’conducting polls and analysis’’. However, rather than the technology 
enhanced approach of the Obama model, the APC as B2 said relied on ‘’research, from polls, 
from interviews, and focus groups’’. In his account, these tools informed the campaign about the 
psychology of the voter as well as the psychology of the demography the campaign targeted.  
Documentary evidence like the DFID report also indicated that social media offered the 
campaign an equally ‘’valuable supplementary source of insight and information’’ (p.38). Overall, 
result from this element suggest that polling has endured as a campaign tactic for voter 
understanding and forecast of electoral outcome. However, while the polling remains mostly 
traditional, the indication is that it was concern over party and candidate’s acceptability and 





10. Branding Image and Message 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Across many countries in Africa, political parties as well as governments and their agents are 
increasingly using branding, ‘brand messages and images as a strategy in many spheres’ 
(Youde, 2009; Hinson and Tweneboah-Kaduah, 2010; Pier, 2015). Electorally however, even 
though the benefit remains vaguely measured, Downer (2016) argues that a ‘brand-oriented 
party model is now emerging in many democracies. Across Africa, Hinson and Tweneboah-
Kaduah (2010) are of the view that such party branding strategies are ‘evidenced by the 
mushrooming of new international and local advertising agencies’ that now offer consultancy 
services to political parties.  
In 2015, the hiring of international consultancies like US based AKPD, British based BTP 
Advertisers and Cambridge Analytica as well local-homegrown companies like Statecraft and 
RED Media reinforce Hinson and Tweneboah-Kaduah point above.  
That said, Aduradola and Ojukwu, (2015) and Amifor (2015) argue that party display of the 
importance of message in electioneering campaign have been displayed in previous Nigerian 
elections. They point for example, to Nigeria’s Third Republic Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
1993 presidential election campaign that had ‘’Hope 93’’ and ‘’Farewell to poverty’’ and 
Goodluck Jonathan’s 2011 campaign that had  ‘’A breath of Fresh Air’’ as key campaign 
messages respectively.  
In 2015, evidence suggest that there was an understanding among the two political parties on 
the importance of branding, image and messaging. In both campaigns, online and traditional 
media attempts including billboards were used to position and market their candidate as well as 
de-market the opposition.  
However, as the party in government, the PDP was the recipient of blame and had struggled to 
craft and communicate a clear, coherent and consistent message. For example, not only did 
they have multiple slogans and messages that include: Re-elect Goodluck Ebele Jonathan; One 
Good Term Deserves Another; Continue Moving Forward; Vote Continuity; and Forward 
Nigeria, which portrayed a disjointed lack of direction in the choice of party’s campaign 
message. Despite these multiple slogans, the party also failed to make these messages 
resonating and struggled in its branding effort with candidate Goodluck Jonathan whose image 
was tarred with the brush of corruption, weakness and incompetence.  
142 
 
As G2’s comment below illustrate, ’’there seem to have been some kind of consensus, general 
consensus that Nigerians were tired of the PDP-the ruling party and that they want change 
which was the core message and main slogan at that time for the opposition APC’’. G2’s 
comment above, seem to explain why the PDP struggled with branding, image and message 
because the acceptability and marketability of Goodluck Jonathan was at the lowest level of 
recession going into the 2015 election. 
In the documentary evidence, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of 
Nigeria report indicated that the American political consultant Joe Trippi had collaborated with 
the Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign on the party’s ‘‘Forward Nigeria’’ message (p. 5-6). The 
report suggest that the focus of the PDP’s image, branding and messaging effort was in 
presenting ‘’Nigeria’s development as work-in-progress’’, and Goodluck Jonathan as a ‘’master 
builder’’. However, the report further noted that ‘’the image of Muhammadu Buhari received a 
higher level of boosting than that of Goodluck Jonathan’’ irrespective of PDP’s effort at attacking 
Buhari’s personality and credibility (ibid). In the Commonwealth Observer Group report, the use 
of ‘’songs’’ in praise of President Jonathan as well as what they refer to as '’wraps advertising’’ 
to tarnish the image of the opposition candidate was another approach adopted for branding, 
messaging and image making (p.20).  
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Evidence suggest that the APC was more creative in the way the party crafted and marshalled 
political message and branded their candidate. The campaign’s branding, image and messaging 
may have been incentivized by the perceived failure of the party in government and the 
supposed strength of character of the candidate the party fielded. Although, less than a year 
after the expiration of Buhari’s first term and 11 months after taking oath of office for his second, 
Kukah (2020) argue that such character strength and integrity that was presented to Nigerians 
in 2015 was a ‘fabricated integrity and empty morality’.  
That said, in branding, J12 indicated that the campaign carefully presented Buhari as ‘’a near 
perfect man who as Governor of the north-eastern state, chairman of the Petroleum Trust Fund 
(PTF) and Minister for Petroleum resources didn’t steal money’’. Given the search for leaders 
with integrity in Nigeria, such narrative may have resonated with many voters.  
Furthermore, as a former military dictator accused of highhandedness and disregard for the law 
as head of state from 31 December 1983 to 27 August 1985, J14 gives credit to the campaign 
for their creativity in presenting him as ‘’a man more likely to be better based on the messages 
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his party was putting out about him even with all they said he did then’’. In a similar comment, 
J4 thought that the campaign successfully ‘’rebranded Buhari himself with their messages; 
pictorial, graphical, video and audio materials to boost his candidature’’. 
B1 also indicated that in presenting Buhari’s image, the campaign ‘’sold the story of a no-
nonsense candidate, a general who was jailing politicians for 150yrs and was enforcing 
discipline and that skewed their minds’’. B2 thought that Muhammadu Buhari was ‘’a subject 
matter that required a particular kind of presentation and branding based on its essence and 
based on its target audience’’. Thus, as B2 added, the campaign’s approach was carefully 
crafted in order ‘’to threat the subject as a product’’.  
In messaging, the party’s campaign message centred on change. J10 thought for example, that 
the APC may have drawn inspiration from the ‘’performance of the then government to say 
since this government has not performed give us a chance this is what we are going to do and 
many people believed’’. Perceived government failure and the candidate’s branding as honest, 
with a no-nonsense personality and disposition may have endeared the promise of change to 
many Nigerians. Given the hatred for corruption, clarity and consistency of message and 
promise of change may have resonated. That said, B2 also indicated that in crafting messages, 
the campaign was able ‘’to identify what the audience want, what to offer, and then find the 
bridge to communicate in a language that connects’’.  
In the documentary evidence, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of 
Nigeria report suggest that in branding and image ‘’Buhari was presented as a man of 
character’’, who is ‘’disciplined and detest corruption’’ (p.399). Taken together, this result 
suggests that like the Obama model, a carefully branded candidate, a resonating slogan or 
campaign message and a creatively marketed image can make a lot of difference in shaping a 
candidate’s fortune during an election. 
11. Negative Campaigning 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Although, questions remain regarding how to measure negativity in an election campaign. 
Nevertheless, this has increasingly become a campaign strategy (Haselmayer, 2019). In Nigeria 
for example, Nwofe (2016) found the 2015 campaign ‘overtly negative’ and ‘conflict driven’ with 
press partisanship incentivizing the negativity.  
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Evidence also suggest that one of the downsides of the 2015 campaign which may have been 
enabled in part, by the ethnic coloration of the contest was the level of degeneration in negative 
campaigning. Strategies deployed by both parties ranged from negative ads and negative 
imaging of the opposition. As J4 puts it for example, his concern about the campaign was that 
‘’there was a lot of abuse and attacks on both side’’.  
That said, for the PDP, negative campaign had many dimensions. First, was the use of 
misinformation and attack on Buhari’s health. As J1 indicated, the campaign repeatedly 
emphasized ‘’about Buhari being sick and unfit to stand’’. Second, was the ethnic stamp on 
Buhari. As J11 stated, the PDP portrayed Buhari ‘’as somebody who will decapitate Nigeria’’ if 
elected. The negativity and pettiness were also seen in documentaries aired about Buhari (see 
link attached) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZafoHEQMoE) and Bola Ahmed Tinubu 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJAf1Z6AgbE) the national leader of the APC.  
However, as J10 comment below illustrate, the intensity of such negativity and the marketing of 
an opposition candidate’s ‘’negative tendencies and character assassination as a route to get to 
power’’ is nothing unusual. As a party, part of what the PDP had to confront as G2 suggested 
was the ‘’blackmail, to damage the image of the sitting government, attacks, verbal abuse, 
personality attacks, and hate speech campaign on social media’’.  
Corroborating this evidence, ANG1 revealed that part of the negative campaign of the PDP 
were videos made ‘’to intimidate voters by portraying Muslim as violent’’. In the documentary 
evidence, the Commonwealth Observer Group report suggest that they was high level use of 
’’inflammatory language and hate speech featuring throughout the campaign period’’, with 
media houses airing ‘’virulent personal attacks on leading opposition candidates’’ (p.24). As the 
report further indicate, the most provoking being ‘’documentaries broadcast by the television 
station AIT-The real Buhari', and 'The Lion of Bourdillon' (about the former Lagos Governor, 
Bola Tinubu)’’ (ibid). 
The Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also revealed 
that the PDP ‘’disseminated more hate messages and attack advertisements through television 
and radio spots’’ and had branded Buhari as a violent ethnic apologist who ‘’view national 
issues with parochial lenses, even Boko Haram” (p.339). The UK’s House of Commons report 
also identified another feature of the negative campaign engaged by the PDP as ‘’attack on 




The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
The use of negative campaigning also featured in the APC. For example, J8 indicated that ‘’the 
incumbent president at that time (i.e. Goodluck Jonathan) was called all sorts of names on the 
social media and nobody really could stop that’’. B1 also thought that the rhetoric of APC’s 
propaganda and negative campaigning was ‘’powered by ethnicity and religion more than any 
other thing’’. Furthermore, J12 suggested that another dimension of the party’s negative tactic 
was effort targeted at ‘’trying to demonize the then ruling party’’. 
In documentary evidence, reports also suggest that the APC equally utilized negative 
campaigning. For example, in an apparent reference to the insecurity and unemployment in the 
country, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report 
revealed that the APC released an ad that read “Nigerians need jobs, not death’’ as attack on 
the PDP’s performance on national security (p.4). In an ethnic coloration and apparent effort to 
induce antagonism among the Yorubas who constitute one of the major ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, the International Republican Institute report revealed how the APC portrayed Goodluck 
Jonathan as an ethnic bigot who ‘’hates the Yorubas’’ (p.5). The European Union Election 
Observer Mission report also indicated how ‘’negative tactics, inflammatory language, hate 
speech and religious, ethnic and sectional sentiments and appeal’’ shrouded the 2015 election 
campaign (p.20). 
Taken together, this result suggest that the prevailing echo chamber operated by both political 
parties was dominated by negative campaign and hate speeches, irrespective that language 
perceived as ‘’likely to injure religious, ethnic, tribal or sectional feelings” is constitutionally 
barred in the 2010 Electoral Act (2010 Electoral Act:14). That said, it is both worrying and 
disturbing to highlight however, that actors in the Nigerian political firmament seem to play 
consciously and aggressively outside the rules of the game and the heightened and unethical 
deployment of negative campaigning in 2015 reinforces this fact. 
12. Campaign Feedback Strategy 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
In some of the most recent elections in Africa, opposition parties in Botswana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, have turned to 
the ‘courts’ after losing elections (Baulch and Resnick, 2020). Whilst this might imply increasing 
confidence in the judiciary and reliance on the rule of law for settling political disputes, these 
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litigations also suggest that the bulk of these elections are plagued with irregularities that may 
contribute in undermining political parties preparedness to play by constitutional rules of the 
game. Thus, the level of political party interest in the construction of party infrastructure for 
campaign feedback and monitoring strategies is rather shaped by games within the rules. Such 
contextual variation may have influenced the application of this element in the 2015 campaign.  
That said, while the evidence that emerged seem to suggest that both parties have attempted to 
deploy this strategy using social media albeit scantly, both parties had a less institutionalized 
approach to this element in their campaign. As earlier analysis on the big data and single 
database show, this can be explained in part by the paucity of data and absence of intense 
scientific approach to getting out the vote in emerging democracies like Nigeria. 
Thus, in the PDP campaign for example, apart from the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria 
(TAN) and the Goodluck Support Group who as earlier stated anchored the party’s ground 
game effort albeit without evidence of the Obama model empirical mindedness, J9 thought that 
social media enhanced ‘’reporting, the collection of results, online posting of results, and 
reporting the behavior of security men, thugs at the polling unit’’. Although, J9’s comment 
above, might explain why for the first time in Nigeria’s democratic history, the presidential 
candidate of the PDP didn’t have to wait for the usual ritual of final announcement of result by 
the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) before conceding defeat. Nevertheless, 
this is not an indication that the campaign had an app-based, digitally enabled feedback 
strategy with campaign ground troops. 
Similarly, even though documentary evidence like the DFID report suggest that in designing 
how the party understood and responded to the electorate, social media interaction-‘’Twitter 
images/photos or real-time activity on the ground’’ gave the party useful insight in ‘’determining 
what is taking place’’ (p.22). This evidence only suggests a weak application or embedding of 
this element in the party’s 2015 campaign compared to how it was utilized in the Obama model. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
In terms of intention rather than technique, the APC’s get-out-the-vote effort in 2015 can be 
rated highly. According to B2, what the campaign cared about was ‘’ensuring that you put out 
things that will provoke an emotion that will lead to an action among more people’’. However, 
this statement even though indicative of the campaign’s understanding of the need to connect 
with and get people involved, no evidence emerged to suggest that this was designed to 
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function on a platform that provided feedback from those the campaign connected with i.e. 
supporters, ground troops and party agents across the country. 
Furthermore, even though evidence from the DFID report suggest that social media equally 
influenced the APC’s voter engagement, interaction, reaction and response to issues during the 
campaign, such social media driven engagement with supporters seem to be the only channel 
for any bottom-up feedback strategy. Thus, making it different from the Obama model app 
enabled ground troops vs campaign feedback/information flow. 
13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
With less ‘institutional constraints’ to navigate, politicians in developing democracies usually 
draw from a large list of unconventional ‘campaign strategies’ during elections more than their 
counterparts in developed democracies (Borzyskowski and Kuhn, 2020). For example, to 
‘overcome information’ problems during election campaign in many African countries, Stokes 
(2011) and Stokes et al., (2013) suggest that politicians and political parties usually ‘hire local 
agents’ to help with their interaction with voters, with such campaign networks serving as ‘local 
intermediaries’ in providing campaigns with information (Koter, 2013). However, in addition to 
these approaches, digitization seems to be incentivizing mediated approaches to addressing 
such campaign voter information flow and campaign voter interaction.  
Although, unlike the Obama model campaign interaction strategy where data infrastructure, and 
the campaign’s social networking hub-i.e. MyBarackObama.com and technologically 
sophisticated apps facilitated interaction between campaign and ground troops, social media 
tools facilitated such campaign interaction in Nigeria (Table 5.8 shows progressive growth of the 
social media following of both candidates in 2011 and 2015). Campaign interaction in the form 
of sharing information and fact checking, responding to propaganda, citizens monitoring and 
reporting from polling units, retweeting of trending hashtags and elections observation represent 
how both political parties interacted with the electorate through social media.  
Table 5.8: Social media followers of the candidates 
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Example of campaign and interaction strategy reflect in J18’s comment below when he alluded 
that ‘’social media had its impact, at least for the first time we were able to monitor elections and 
report to campaign, share information online between campaigners and push out information to 
those who were on the streets and neighbourhood’’. In the PDP, G2 confirmed that the intensity 
of the campaign and the fact that ‘’social media was a major battle ground’’ meant that every 
known and available campaign methodology was used to reach voters.  
In documentary evidence, the DFID report revealed that Facebook offered the PDP her most 
potent platform for the party’s campaign and interaction strategy. As noted in the report, 
Goodluck Jonathan’s Facebook fan page account ‘’was by some distance the most active page 
and had the most interacted with content’’ (p.46). 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
The creative use of social media by the APC manifested in the party’s campaign and interaction 
strategy. As earlier mentioned for example, B2 stated that social media provided the campaign 
with a platform to share messages with members. J9 also suggested that the party had equally 
used social media to ‘’respond’’ and spread ‘’propaganda’’. In J15’s view, what worked for the 
APC in 2015 was the ‘’use of social media to share information and do fact checking’’. As he 
further mentioned, the campaign had a fact checking project that enabled the party to respond 
and tackle things considered ‘’injurious to the campaign’’. In another response, J15 thought that 
the APC ‘’had virtual town halls where people connected, chatted, and broadcast events’’. 
Similarly, the DFID report also revealed that the APC had also used social media to ‘’track and 
respond quickly to rumours or misinformation, detect and characterise unexpected events 
quickly as they occur’’ (p.46).  
In summary, this result suggest that both the PDP and APC had some inclination of the value of 
campaign interaction and had attempted to craft a strategy that relied on social media. However, 
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as the evidence show, both parties fell short in the area of intensive data exchange, information 
sharing and bottom-up interaction with sympathizers, supporters and volunteers as evident in 
the Obama model. 
14. Speed and consistency of campaign communication  
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
According to Bleck and van de Walle (2019), trends are emerging-i.e. ‘increasing urbanisation, 
innovation in the use of information technology, and a surging number of youth voters’ that are 
altering the pace of contemporary African elections. Thus, like the Obama model, media 
abundance-multiple channels of communication powered by digital technologies incentivized 
both the PDP and APC’s campaign embedding of speed and consistency of campaign 
communication. Apart from targeting, sharing information, online fundraising, attacking each 
other with negative stories and monitoring elections, J16 thought that social media also provided 
both campaigns platforms for ‘’countering each other at the same time’’. Whilst such campaign 
antagonism among opposition parties may not be new in the legacy media, social media seem 
to have enhance the speed with which parties and their supporters engage in such media war. 
In the PDP for example, G2 indicated that because ‘’social media was a major battle ground, it 
became standard practice to hire social media influencers, to hire social media volunteers’’ that 
engaged in what he called ‘’social media shouting match among the various gladiators’’. 
Similar evidence also emerged from the House of Commons report suggesting that online trolls 
‘’young internet warriors” were used to respond, attack rivals, peddle disinformation and 
provocative language (p.57). DFID report also revealed that social media provided the tools to 
‘’track and respond quickly to rumours or misinformation’’ (p.44). 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
In the APC campaign, speed and consistency of campaign communication was also enabled by 
social media. For example, B2 stated that social media had enabled ‘’party members to report 
issues in the localities pre and post-election’’. In another instance, J19 thought that social media 
had enabled ‘’party faithful’s to send feedback across polling centres’’. 
The campaign’s creativity in quick response and consistent communication was also reflected in 
the website they created. As mentioned earlier, J15’s indication of a factchecking website 
created for the campaign standouts out as the campaign’s most creative signature project. As 
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he further indicated, the campaign equally had what he called ‘’the media centre-basically a troll 
farm that gets information out and also look for information to tackle and respond to’’. According 
to him, the approach was such ‘’that campaign spokesperson didn’t have to constantly put out 
press statements because some people were responding appropriately online’’.  
Corroborating this finding, the Commonwealth Observer Group report also revealed that social 
media ‘’has been a source of instantaneous communication’’ for the APC (p.25). The 
Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also showed how 
‘’Adebola Williams, Chief Executive Officer of Statecraft and Red Media, and Social Media 
Consultant to GMB, was tweeting in real time on the political campaign train of GMB’’ (p.148). In 
one example, the report noted that on 21 March 2015 through his Tweeter handle 
@DebolaLagos he tweeted ”#CampaignTrail the streets litter with love as @ThisIsBuhari 
#HajiaSaratu proceeds to the rally grounds #Lafia4GMB”. Similarly, on 23 March 2015 with the 
same handle ‘’@DebolaLagos’’, he tweeted “#CampaignTrail @ThisIsBuhari set to go 
#Owerrri4GMB”. Again on 24 Mar 2015 he tweeted  “#CampaignTrail the supporters in their 
trademark light up as they see @ThisIsBuhari, screaming #change’’ (ibid). 
In summary, what this evidence suggest is that the impact of media abundance seem to equally 
run through the activities of political parties in developing democracies like Nigeria as they try to 
engage and interact with the electorate. However, even though both parties had deployed this 
element, the APC seems to have showed more sophistication in its campaign consistency and 
speed of communication.  
15. Campaign Games  
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
Across most parts of Africa, gamification is increasingly being used to inspire youth participation 
in certain programmes (Adukaite and Cantoni, 2016). In Nigeria for example, such game 
designed approaches are also already in use in driving sales performance (Yusuff et al., 2019). 
However, in the 2015 election, no evidence on the use of gamification was found. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Like the PDP, no evidence was found on the use of gamification by the APC. However, from the 
context of electioneering, and from the standpoint of political participation, considering that 
Nigeria recorded only 43.65% turnout-i.e. 29 million of the 67 million registered voters in the 
2015, gamification can serve as an incentive for remedying the increasing voter apathy 
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particularly among millennials and digital natives who represent the largest group of digitally 
enabled and active mobile telephone users in Nigeria. 
16. The permanent Campaign 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
With the liberalize media now increasingly forming partnership with political actors for campaign 
(Windeck, 2010), Cheeseman (2018) suggest that most of ‘everyday politics in Africa is not 
about solving current problems, but on winning future elections’. Whilst there is no evidence of 
the use of this element by both political parties, Windeck and Cheeseman’s thoughts above 
suggest that political actors concern with elections can involve unconscious embedding of 
ingredients of the permanent campaign in day-to-day governance.  
That said however, in an apparent comparison of the application of this element, J14 thought 
that ‘’in the US, Obama, Bush, Clinton and Trump are all presidents known to engage the 
people severally and not only when the campaign is coming’’. In contrast however, the Nigerian 
polity as his comment below illustrate is such that ‘’it is only when election is coming up that you 
see politicians going out and when they choose to go out, you see them at big events, they just 
go there, speak they don’t take questions or somebody delivers speeches on their behalf’’. 
Thus, apart from highlighting the fact that the permanent campaign was unused, the absence of 
government vs people engagement described by J14 above may have also contributed to 
PDP’s undoing and eventual loss in 2105. Whilst the absence of such state-citizen interaction 
may have implication for democratic consolidation, it also speaks to the absence of relations 
that can deepen democracy, improve governance and accountability. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
The APC’s creative use of social media since taking over government in 2015 may be 
incentivizing the deployment of what Cook (2002) calls ‘permanence of the permanent 
campaign’. This is because after winning the elections, the party has continued to engage with 
Nigerians on social media platforms. As Olukotun (2017) show, evidence emerged suggesting 
that prior to the 2019 elections, the APC had started campaigning for President Buhari’s second 
term in 2017-i.e., two years before the date of the election, thus invoking the possibility of the 
permanent campaign. From the point of view of governance and state-citizens relations, 
perhaps, the permanent campaign can open opportunities for election off-season interaction 
between the government and the governed. 
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Taken together, it is important to note in summary, that the significance of this section hinge on 
the fact that even though a good amount of empirical literature exist with narratives of significant 
changes in campaigning since Obama, no recent work exist that attempts a comparison and 
cross-contextual definition of emerging campaign practices in a developed and developing 
democracy. Thus, what this chapter does, in ways that advances comparative literature is 
testing the Obama model in another context to show empirically and cross-contextually the 
technological dimension and state of contemporary campaign. The possibility of showing the 
manifestation of the Obama model in another context is indeed one of the important 
contributions in this work. 
That said, the key difference to note is that while the Obama model revolves around big data 
infrastructure and analytics, social networking hub and sophisticated apps as an anchor for 
moving campaigning away from traditional and socio-demographic categorization and 
segmentation of voters that characterized previous campaigning to more personalized form, 
social media formed the basic tool, instrument and infrastructure deployed by the PDP and APC 
for campaign, voter engagement and mobilization. Significantly, in getting out the vote, ethnic, 
religious and demographic considerations still matter in Nigeria. 
          5.3: Trajectory of the Manifested 12 Elements 
As the analysis above show, 12 of the 16 elements of the Obama model were deployed in the 
2015 Nigerian presidential election albeit in varying ways when compared with the Obama 
model. For example, while political and technology consultants were recruited by both political 
parties, social media and campaign speed and communication was not used in the same 
degree in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, while digital fundraising and small donors sat at the core of Obama’s campaign 
finance mobilisation, only the APC had deployed this element with minimal success. 
In the same vein, while the Obama model air war and political advertising was data driven and 
location specific, such patterns did not emerge in Nigeria. However, media abundance has also 
inspired huge modification in the channels where such air war now take place. 
Similarly, while apps and technologically sophisticated infrastructure drove the Obama model 
use of campaign feedback strategy and campaign interaction strategy, such efforts were only 
minimally enhanced by social media in Nigeria. 
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Evidence also suggest that both parties fell short in the use of campaign games, the permanent 
campaign, big data and single data base and predictive analytics. What this means is that while 
data powered voter understanding and personalization was at the centre of the Obama model, 
social, demographic, ethnic and religious factors still matter in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, across both campaigns and context, speed and consistency of campaigning was 
enhanced by social media with political party supporters, recruited social media handlers and 
paid consultants playing roles similar with those of recruited party spokesmen in the digital 
public sphere. That said, dissimilarity or differences in the use and deployment of the Obama 
model and a more elaborate cross-case discussion of the trajectory of manifestation of the 
model is presented in the last chapter. 
However, taken together, considering that very scanty systematic study on campaign practices 
exist in Africa, this case study advances understanding of evolving campaign tactics in the 
global south. Thus, giving expression of differences between campaign innovation in advanced 
Western democracies and contemporary Africa. In considering how to characterize and classify 
campaign innovation in sub-Saharan Africa, this case study not only de-Westernizes existing 
literature, but it also advances the existing typology and the subfield of comparative political 
communication. In the next section, empirical material is used to examine whether 
Americanization suffices as theoretical lens for explaining convergence of the 12 elements. 
          5.4: Americanization: Theoretical Implication of the manifested 12 
Elements 
As internet and information communication technology continue to advance, empirical narratives 
seem to echo the fact that common practices in electioneering are still emerging across 
countries despite contextual differences. Drawing from the 12 converged elements above, this 
section seeks to explore theoretical explanation for such similar occurrence in dissimilar context. 
The focus therefore is theory elaboration. Specifically, it involves the process of refining the 
Americanization theory with empirical material in order to specify more carefully whether it does 
offer in contemporary times, a lens or potential for explaining convergence of the 12 elements 
exemplified in Nigeria. 
That said, it is important to highlight again, that the Nigerian and British case studies were 
selected in this work for certain theoretical invocation and suspected similarities that account for 
traces of Americanization. Thus, the guiding theoretical notion of Americanization is assessed in 
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the light of empirical findings. Indeed, this process is important for understanding whether 
convergence in practices in a developing democracy like Nigeria could be attributed to the 
process of Americanization. Thus, through empirical material and a critical realist lens, the 
thesis is subjected to an examination both as a way of testing theory and expanding theoretical 
insight for the explanation of convergence and change in contemporary campaign. 
          5.4.1: Evidence and Theory Elaboration  
As the analysis above show, 12 elements were identified as similar features of campaigning in 
Nigeria and the US. This section will explore this seeming convergence from a theoretical 
perspective regarding how to refer to similar practices in different national context. However, 
before moving to theory elaboration, it is necessary to highlight again, that a deviant element-
i.e., the use of WhatsApp was identified in Nigeria. This is worth mentioning because it goes 
back to the idea of whether American influence i.e. Americanization suffices as a theoretical 
explanation for campaign practices that emerged in another context. 
That said, whilst this effort at theoretical update may be questioned as unnecessary or narrow, 
the comparative take-off point of this study-i.e. the Obama model makes the approach ideal for 
revising Swanson and Mancini’s Americanization thesis. As their thesis argue, among the 
drivers of transnational diffusion of American practices are agents of Americanization-political 
consultants, professional organizations, market driven campaigns, democracy assistance 
program as well as academic and professional programs (Swanson and Mancini, 1996:4-5). In 
the discussion below, evidence is used to explore the depth and impact of these forces in the 
2015 elections as justification for revalidating the Americanization theory. 
The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign 
When talking about how American experts may have influenced what the party did in 2015, G1 
suggested that ‘’foreign influence has always been a part of Nigerian campaigns’’ and ‘’to some 
extent, they wanted to integrate some of what transpired in the Obama style’’. Although the PDP 
campaign as he further noted had their ‘’own people who were ICT experts and social media 
practitioners’’, some ‘’were hired, some worked because they are friends of the party and also 
friends of the members of the campaign committee’’. This standard practice of recruiting 
consultants meant that the party looked beyond US consultants to include ‘’UK based 
consultants, Israeli consultants, who provided technical support for the campaign and lobby 
groups who helped to manage the international end of the campaign’’. Similarly, ANG3 a former 
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employee of Cambridge Analytica also alluded to the involvement of ‘’an Israeli firm’’ that 
worked on the Nigerian elections, while majority of those who responded confirmed that 
Cambridge Analytica a UK based consultancy firm was equally involved in the PDP’s campaign. 
In the documentary evidence, it was also revealed that the PDP had engaged the services of a 
local Nigerian-consultant-Badejo Okusanya of CMC Connect who handled the campaign’s 
media, publicity and image management, as well as Mark Pursey of BTP Advisers-a UK based 
Public Relations and Communications Company and Joe Trippi-a US based political 
communication consultant. The implication of this is that the party’s campaign consultant 
architecture in 2015 was drawn from many countries including Nigeria. 
The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign 
Like the PDP, the APC had also recruited consultants nationally and internationally, i.e. in 
Nigeria, the US and the UK. Commenting on the impact of the foreign consultants on the APC 
campaign, B1 suggested for example, that their job was ‘’setting the principles for the campaign 
rather than the hands-on implementation of the campaign itself’’. Foreign experts he said were 
involved, but ‘’Nigerian actors take the first stage the moment the initial grand plans are drawn’’ 
and ‘’the driving of it, the populating of it, developing the content for it was done by Nigerians’’.  
Furthermore, apart from the recruited international consultants, B1 also indicated that the 
campaign had ‘’many young people who were driving things at various level’’. Pointing to the 
importance of contextual knowledge in an election campaign, B2 argued that campaigning is 
about the environment and many of the foreign experts ‘’don’t understand the people, don’t 
understand the pulse of the masses’’, they bring what he calls ‘’helicopter plans that’s why some 
politicians now hire us’’. When probed further whether Obama’s campaign use of social media 
may have influenced the work of his company, B2 responded by saying ‘’social media is the tool 
we have been using since 2005 actively for marketing even before it became the thing in 
Nigeria’’. That said, while his comment seems to sound like a marketing hype, the fact that B2 
had a central role in the APC campaign makes his comments considerable and reasonable. 
Thus, as seen above, irrespective of the engagement of US political consultants, both campaigns 
had not relied on US experts alone for the expertise, skills, know-how and practices deployed in 
2015. As J18 observe, there ‘’was actually home-grown skill, the knowledge to use social media’’ 
that was deployed in the campaign. J10 and J14 comments below also respectively indicate that 
in terms of the role of foreign consultants, their impact ‘’was minimal’’ and the ‘’influence of 
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American consultants was limited’’. J7 even thought that the main limitation of the foreign experts 
was developing a ‘’strategy that fit into the Nigerian context’’. 
Now, considering that Swanson and Mancini’s Americanization thesis argue that experts-i.e., 
political consultants, professional organizations, market driven campaigns and democracy 
assistance programs etc. are the major drivers of the spread of American inspired campaign 
practices, the evidence above seem to suggest that what transpired in Nigeria cannot be 
completely attributed to the theory’s identified forces. J11 and 15, as well as ANG3 even refer to 
Nigeria and Kenya as ‘’an experiment’’ and ‘test ground’ for Cambridge Analytica’s work in the 
2016 US elections. Comments that suggest the inspiration and flow of campaign insight and 
tactics from the global south. Furthermore, the mixture of recruited consultants assembled by 
both political parties in the 2015 presidential election campaign also suggest less reliance on 
American experts and expertise.  
Thus, even though the 12 converged elements are similar or closely associated with the Obama 
model and manifest forms and patterns of those deployed in the US election, the evidence 
seem to suggest that we may not speak of Americanization as the theoretical incentive and 
driver of convergence.  
Furthermore, the evidence does not also suggest that the manifestation of the 12 elements is a 
function of diffusion, adoption or shopping (Plasser, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). What it 
suggests is that convergence of the 12 elements may be a product of the assemblage of the 
many consultants and experts across different national context and within the Nigerian political 
communication and advertising market. Although, it could be argued that these actors may have 
tapped knowhow from the US. However, the fact that some practices used in the 2015 
presidential election campaign in Nigeria-i.e. Israelis and Cambridge Analytica’s hacking, dark 
advertising and voter de-mobilisation tactics were not used in the Obama model also point to 
how campaign practices now emerge.  
Indeed, evidence also seem to suggest that convergence may not be an import/export influence 
in practices (Norris, 2004). This is because, there was no evidence of a cross-fertilization of 
ideas between the Nigerian consultants and their American counterparts except for the 




That said, the diverse set of foreign nationals i.e. Americans, Britons, Israelis and Nigerians and 
changes in social structures/media technology seem to sit as the inspiration of the practices 
deployed in the 2015 presidential election campaign in Nigeria. Thus, as the debate in the 
theory chapter indicated, it is ’the structure and patterns’ of changes in a society that seem to 
underpin the construction of political developments (Levy, 1965). As Negrine (2008) argue, 
evidence seem to also suggest that it is changes in the nature of technologies of communication 
that explain better the changes in practices adopted and deployed in the 2015 election. Thus, 
like in America, technological change seems to have played an important role in shaping the 
campaign environment in Nigeria.  
Mutsvairo and Karam (2018:17) agree that ‘technological advancement has become the focal 
point for political and economic development’ in Africa. Although this case may be insufficient 
for theoretical generalization. That notwithstanding, the evidence suggest that Americanization 
or outright American influence now seem too simplistic as a theoretical lens for describing global 
campaign convergence in contemporary electioneering. As Frenkel and Shenhav (2003) and 
Berghahn (2010) argue, in an era of cross-national spread of innovation and multi-polarity, it has 
become increasingly ’difficult to discern where new developments in economic and 
technological innovations now instantly circulating the globe originate’.  
As earlier highlighted for example, Cambridge Analytica seem to have tested its dark advertising 
and voter de-mobilisation/disinformation tactics in Kenya and Nigeria (Cadwalladr, 2018, Kaiser, 
2019; Wylie, 2019). Thus, as Negrine and Pathanapossolous (1996) argue practices now seem 
to be taking place in ‘world that has become increasingly internationalised …with a variety of 
sources and common pool resources’ appearing in different context. In the next chapter, the 
2015 British Election will also provide empirical basis for this theory revalidation and elaboration 
process. 
Nevertheless, this section has contributed to the discussion on how campaign practices 
converge in specific national context. Significantly, considering the paucity of research in Africa, 
this section offers some important contribution to scholarly understanding of campaign 
convergence. Importantly, the evidence shows that external influences in contemporary 
campaigning are real and subsist. However, these influences are now trans-national, with 
recruitment of campaign consultants and experts now taking place across many countries (see 
table 5.6 above). 
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Furthermore, even in developing democracies like Nigeria, internal expertise in campaigning 
and campaign consultancy seem to be growing in a path dependent way, such that reliance on 
US evolved practices and experts have continued to wane. That said, this evidence from Nigeria 
does not describe the entire world of political communication.  
However, as Flyvbjerg (2006) observe, a case study research can make specific theoretical 
observation based on evidence the researcher encounters in the case. Thus, the best 
description theoretically perhaps, is that converged elements in Nigeria are rather hybrid 
(Chadwick, 2013), path dependent and a product of the development of internal national 
expertise and trans-national assembling of skills and knowhow. A conclusion that seem to 
support Negrine (2008) ‘professionalization thesis-of improvement of practices derived from 
circumstances or conditions that make it possible for those practices to become established’ 
(p.153). Interestingly for example, RED Media and Statecraft-i.e. indigenous Nigerian 
companies based in Lagos consulted for Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign in 2011 and for 
Muhammadu Buhari’s campaign in 2015. 
That said, recall that in the initial section of this analysis, it was highlighted that SCL Group the 
parent company of CA had secured the 2015 Nigerian election contract. Similarly, analysis also 
showed that Black Cube-i.e. an Israeli company comprising of veterans from Israel’s elite 
intelligence units with specialty that includes ‘cutting-edge analytical skills; harvesting in the 
cyber world and a unique experience of accessing and analyzing information on various 
platforms’ were also involved in the PDP’s campaign (see Black Cube’s website attached-
https://www.blackcube.com/).  
Now, considering that both SCL Group, Cambridge Analytica and Black Cube are British and 
Israeli companies respectively, with roots in defense operation contracts and intelligence, they 
seem to be a new pattern that has emerged in recent electioneering that suggest a relationship 
between defense intelligence tactics and political campaign. Indeed, the 2016 Trump campaign 
in chapter seven provides a better context for understanding such new and emerging pattern.  
That said, the theoretical implication of such defense-intelligence tactics and campaign 
relationship to the theoretical critique of Americanization is that it is a possibility that such 
Cambridge Analytica dark tricks and voter de-mobilisation tactics were out of the playbook of 
defense derived intelligence where Cambridge Analytica’s parent company SCL Group boast 
expertise (see Tatham, 2015). Thus, we could infer that convergence of practices in dissimilar 
context notwithstanding, American forms of political communication might not necessarily be the 
progenitor of practices in other democracies. 
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Thus, there is a sense, from the mixture of competing firms gathered in the 2015 elections-
foreign consultants and consultancies-Israelis; US based AKPD; UK based Cambridge 
Analytica and BTP Advertisers; CMC Connect, RED Media and Statecraft-Nigerian players in 
the industry that suggest increasing internationalization of political communication consulting 
and transition from complete Americanization. Like in Nigeria, evidence of consultancies and 
consultants engaged in the 2015 British Election and the 2016 Donald Trump campaign 
reinforces the global growth, transnational flow, diversification and tactical differences in 
contemporary political communication consultancy. 
Indeed, haven identified Swanson and Mancini’s Americanization thesis ‘black swan’ (Popper, 
1959)-i.e. a clash in empirical observation (Lakatos, 1969), if we invoke Popper’s ‘falsification’ 
reflexivity, in the context that evidence that emerge as it relates to theory does not fit the 
theoretical proposition of Americanization, the case for theory refutation can be made (ibid), 
such that we can also conclude that the thesis is weak or invalid for explaining contemporary 
campaign convergence. This finding I have to say altered my own view and preconceived 
assumptions on the impact of American experts on campaign practices in Nigeria. In the next 
section, contextual factors that emerged from empirical material with influence on the 
application of the Obama model are discussed. 
          5.5: Context and Implication for Model Application in Nigeria  
As indicated in the methodology, this thesis had intended to explore the application of the 
Obama model beyond one national boundary without overlooking national and case specific 
contextual differences and conditions. Thus, the research design had sought to empirically 
identify country specific factors that may shape the application of the sixteen elements in the 
case studies. Although, analysis began with examination of the application of elements and the 
theoretical explanation for convergence, the context within which this happens matter. Political 
environments have formal and informal rules and structures, and therefore, elements of the 
Obama model might manifest differently because of those. 
That said, to achieve the above methodological objective, the implicit (Esser and Hanitzsch, 
2012) and metatheoretical (Wirth and Kolb, 2004) research strategy was adopted i.e., a design 
without contextual variables at the onset. In specific terms, the approach adopted is a design 
that factored the need to empirically identify and explain contextual conditions, variables or 
differences that may condition the application of the Obama model. In doing this, the thesis seek 
to reveal structural or systemic features that can contribute to explaining dissimilarity and the 
application of the model in the case studies.  
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As Swanson and Mancini (1996:248) argue, ‘forms and influence of campaign innovations are 
shaped by local contextual factors’. Negrine (2008:42) also assert that the problem with the idea 
of ‘Americanization’ for example, is that context limits ’full Americanization’. Thus, such 
methodological framing informs this section. As Franzese (2007) observe, in modern 
comparative work, the central tenet in this kind of study is that ’context-structural, cultural, 
institutional, strategic, social, economic, and political matter’. Therefore, this section delivers on 
the methodological promise by discussing contextual factors that shaped the application of the 
Obama model in Nigeria. In doing this, the study realizes the double value design of a 
comparative research and deepens explanation rather than mere description. Five broad 
themes emerged from the analysis as follows: 
          5.5.1: Digital Divide 
Nigeria provides evidence of the consequence of digital divide on electioneering. Like many 
countries around the world, digital transformation seems to have revolutionized the information 
and communication ecosystem in Nigeria. However, with 46.1% internet penetration (Internet 
Live Stats, 2016), the country is further known for disparities in access to digital affordances at 
individual, group, and regional levels. For example, majority of respondents cited internet 
penetration as a barrier to the application of some elements of the Obama model. Thus, even 
though social media contributed in driving practices, tactics and trends, digital inequality-lack of 
access by a significant number of Nigerians influenced the level of application of elements of the 
model.   
In their accounts on internet penetration for example, J5, G2, J1, G1 and J8 comments below 
respectively illustrate that of the country’s over 180 million population, they is a ‘’a high 
population of illiterates’’; ‘’those who do not have access to phones in the rural areas’’; ‘’are not 
even connected’’; or ‘’familiar with the use of social media’’ and ‘’don’t have income to buy data 
too’’. In one instance, J15 argued that ‘’big data works with data collected over time and 
unfortunately we haven’t had a lot collected in Nigeria’’. In the literature, Ragnedda and Glenn 
(2014) suggest that digital divide i.e. unequal access to internet communication technologies 
and resources condition its use in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In the documentary evidence, DFID report found that the northern part of the country for 
example ‘’has less internet availability than the south’’ suggesting an inherent propensity in 
social media towards the south (p.34). Similarly, the Computational Propaganda Research 
Project report equally reveal that in a state like Lagos, ‘’women were less likely to have internet 
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access than men’’ (p.46). Thus, differences in the application of the Obama model seem to be 
in the degree to which internet penetrated and afforded Nigerians access to digital tools. 
Furthermore, the evidence above seems to also suggest multiple levels of digital divide-i.e., 
access, represented in regional disparity in penetration between the northern and southern 
parts of the country, and skill, use/socio-cultural and gender factors. In the literature, digital 
divide is equally considered as multifaceted and multidimensional (Vartanova and Gladkova, 
2019). For example, Compaine (2001:15); Colombo et al. (2015) and Ragnedda and Muschert 
(2013) respectively establish that ‘there is more than one digital divide’ with different aspects 
and dimensions, including gaps between men and women. Indeed, this evidence reinforces 
Ragnedda (2017) and Ragnedda and Ruiu (2017) view of an interrelation between social 
capital-i.e., ‘individual resource’ (Coleman, 1990) and the three levels of digital divide. Mutsvairo 
and Ragnedda (2017) have also found for example, that digital divide ‘reflects on one’s race, 
gender, socio-economic status or geographical location’. Thus, as Jensen et al. (2012) have 
noted, one of the many influences that contributes in conditioning digital politics in Africa and by 
inference the adoption of the Obama model in Nigeria is digital divide. 
          5.5.2: The North-South Divide 
Another dominant theme in the analysis of contextual factors that condition electioneering in 
Nigeria and the application of innovative campaign practices is primordial sentiments and 
loyalties. A system of political competition dominated by politicians and political parties that 
encourage political mobilization on grounds of regional affiliation as well as religious and ethnic 
identity is problematic. Historically, the multi-ethnic configuration of Nigeria and the Muslim north 
vs Christian south divide has been at the heart of some of Nigeria’s worst political challenges 
and violent crises (Ijere, 2015). 
In most multiparty democracies around the world, political parties are usually differentiated by 
ideological and programmatic grounds. However, this is not the case in Nigeria. As Geertz 
(1963) note, in many new states like Nigeria, primordial ties tend ‘to become politicized’, with 
political life framed along the lines of ’regionalisation of nationalism’ (Coleman,1960:56) and 
citizens preferably bonding on ‘assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom’ 
(Geertz, 1963).  
That said, the 2015 election was conducted at the back of 16 years monopoly of the PDP who 
lost the presidential election to the opposition APC. Significantly, this will be the first time in the 
history of Nigeria’s democratic experiment that an incumbent president will lose a presidential 
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election. Analysts had long held the view that it was virtually impossible to defeat an incumbent 
Nigerian president with all the resources at his disposal (Abdullahi, 2017; Adeniyi, 2017).  
However, political dynamics in the 2015 elections proved otherwise. According to Adeniyi 
(2017:3) the logic of rotational presidency which basically centres on ‘geo-politics’ was critical in 
determining voting pattern and outcome. Prior to the campaign, the presidential aspiration of 
Presidential Goodluck Jonathan, an ethnic Ijaw from the minority south-south who became 
president after the demise of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua a Muslim northerner was 
contentious. Thus, geo-ethnic and regional sentiments became crucial in the build up to the 
2015 election (Abdullahi, 2017). As Adeniyi argue, north vs south power sharing agreement has 
its roots in the formative stage of the fourth republic in 1998 and was part of the policy in the 
PDP for ensuring political equity and geo-ethnic balancing. Thus, since 1999 an informal power 
sharing arrangement has applied within the PDP, where presidential power rotates between the 
north and south in what is popularly called zoning system (Auge, 2015). In the literature, 
scholars like Lindemann (2008) and Laws (2012) point to such inclusionary elite bargains as a 
factor that account for political stability in Africa’s post-colonial states. 
In 2015 however, Jonathan’s second term presidential ambition was conceived by northern 
political leaders as a threat to stability. The leaders felt that it was only fair for political power to 
return to the north (Okonta, 2015). Although, Terwase et al. (2016) are of the view that north to 
south power rotation and sharing agreement was truncated in 2011 when President Goodluck 
defied it to contest after the demise of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The decision of 
President Goodluck Jonathan to contest again in 2015 infuriated the north who termed it ‘an 
invitation to lawlessness and anarchy’ and pitched campaign and campaign rhetoric along 
ethno-regional and religious lines (Adedniyi, 2017:21). Nigeria’s complex nature of identity 
politics meant that the north went into the election insisting that the presidency was their turn. 
As president Jonathan himself asserted in his book My Transition Hours, ‘my leadership was 
besieged with contending primordial forces with the ever-present threat of violence and 
formidable modern-day players who were bent on not allowing the sentiments to die a natural 
death’ (p.55). 
Commenting on this theme for example, B1, G1, G2, and J15’s, comments below respectively 
illustrate how people invoked ‘’ethnic, real raw ethnicity for campaign purpose’’, and some 
politicians had to ‘’resort to ethnic and religious sentiments’’, ‘’religion, ethnicity and then 
regional politics’’, in framing the 2015 election as ‘’Fulani men vs Niger Delta men’’, since 
candidates of the two major political parties were from the north and south respectively. 
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In the documentary evidence, the House of Commons report suggest that the campaign was 
characterized ‘’more by low politics than by high minded pledges on policy’’ (p.36). The African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute report also indicate that the two major political 
parties held onto ‘’ethno-regional and religious identities in the campaign process’’ and were 
discussing ‘’trivial issues’’ (pp.12-18). Similarly, the European Union Election Observation 
Mission and African Union Election Observer Mission reports respectively showed how the use 
of ‘’religious, ethnic and sectional sentiments and appeal in the campaign’’ (p.19) mixed with 
‘’religion and geo-political zone influenced the choice of candidate voted for’’ (p.23).  
Indeed, as the election results show, voting was clearly along ethno-religious and regional lines. 
Jonathan secured more than 50 percent of his votes from the south and lost all the north-east 
and north-west states (Adeniyi, 2017). According to Jonathan, ‘since independence in 1960 
there has always been tension between the north and south over who controls political power’ 
(p.55). Some commentators also argue that the north vs south power struggle is an inheritance 
of the British administrative and structural creation of the colonial era (Thurston, 2015). That 
said, the significance of this factor to the 2015 election is that voter mobilization was essentially 
around ethnicity, religion and region, with northerners basically voting for their northern 
candidate likewise the south-south and south-east, with the south-west vs north alliance electing 
the president (Mbah et al., 2019). 
Although, scholars like Nnoli, (1978:12) argue that the potential of primordial loyalties like 
ethnicity as a ‘force for changing the realities of African life is very minimal’, Ezeibe and 
Ikeanyibe (2017) are however of the view that recent time politics in Nigeria shows that ‘political 
elites manipulate and mobilize ties like ethnicity, geopolitical region, and religion to seek and 
retain political power’. Thus, the degree to which candidates and political parties worry about the 
application of innovative campaign practices vary, since emphasis is usually placed on securing 
support from ethnic, regional and religious blocks. Moreover, such primordial affiliations and 
loyalties seems to transform political competition and voting into an expression of solidarity with 
a candidate of one’s religious, regional or ethnic constituency. Indeed, Hamalai et al. (2017:2) 
agree that the 2015 elections elevated to unprecedented heights ’ethno-regional and religious 
polarizations in the country’. Thus, it seems prudent to conclude, that, under such political 
climate, dependence on innovative campaign techniques, tactics and practices is de-
emphasized and can account for dissimilarity in the level of application of the Obama model. 
          5.5.3: Violation of Campaign Finance Regulations 
Violation of campaign finance regulation and gross institutional weakness in the monitoring and 
enforcement of campaign finance laws emerged as another contextual condition that influence 
164 
 
electioneering in Nigeria. Although, constitutional and legal requirements exit that place limit on 
campaign spending, evidence indicate that such constitutional and institutional regulations are 
not adhered to by candidates and political parties. For example, sections 88-93 of the 2010 
Electoral Act sets limits on contribution, funding and candidate/party expenditure (Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN), 2010). However, despite these provisions, politicians and parties 
still flout these laws with impunity (Chikodiri and Olihe, 2016). 
Commenting on this theme, a common view among respondents was that both political parties 
had spent far beyond the threshold approved by the Electoral Commission. As J7’s comment 
below illustrate for example, ‘’the PDP spent over 9 times the limit and the APC spent about 5 
billion naira, everybody is breaking the campaign finance law and there is no consequence and 
this is not part of the narrative when we talk about election integrity and election credibility’’.  
Similarly, G1 and B1 respectively indicated that one concern in the 2015 election was that 
‘’politicians and political parties far outspend the approved limit’’ leading to the ‘’weaponization 
of campaign funding’’. J5 also thought that this phenomenon of excessive and unregulated 
funding is ‘’because of the way Nigeria’s electoral process is’’. As he further indicated, ‘’logistics, 
transport, recharge cards for party representatives at polling unit on election day could cost a 
presidential candidate over 1.2 billion naira’’. Ojo and Onuoha (2018) are of the view that such 
money influence in most instances have turned Nigeria’s election into a contest that is usually 
determine by the ‘highest bidder’. 
In the documentary evidence, the Westminster Cost of Politics report suggest that ‘’the PDP and 
APC expended on the media alone eight times and three times respectively the amount legally 
allowed for running the entire presidential campaign’’ (p.11-13). As the report further indicate, 
one consequence of the huge amount of money spent by both parties was ‘’the emergence of 
rented crowds for parties’ activities’’. The report suggest that ‘’N3, 000 to N8, 000 per head’’ was 
budgeted for such rented crowd because for the political parties and candidates, ‘’the larger the 
crowds at their rallies, the more the public is impressed and the more seriously their candidature 
is perceived’’ (ibid). 
Thus, violation of campaign finance regulation seems to influence the extent to which political 
parties and candidates manipulate election and the electoral system. Adhering to limits on 
campaign spending seem not to have been effective and weak institutions and institutional 
monitoring and enforcement exacerbate this challenge. As Oluwadare (2019) explain, money 
plays ‘illegal role in Nigerian politics’ and political competition is usually commodified. As we will 
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see in the next factor below, violation of campaign regulations afford politicians and political 
parties the financial luxury for manipulating the campaign and electoral process in such a way 
that it can lower the quality of engagement with the electorate and jettison the incorporation and 
application of innovative campaign practices like the Obama model. Overall, the point made is 
that there is evidence suggesting that unregulated campaign finance affects electioneering and 
excessive spending may intensify fraudulent tactics that reduces emphasis on the use of 
innovative campaign practices.  
          5.5.4: Money, Vote Buying and Stomach Infrastructure 
Another theme that emerged in the analysis as a factor that affects application of innovative 
campaign practices like the Obama model is the exchange between politicians and the 
electorate.  Although, this may not be termed political culture since it might imply a generalized 
conclusion on the national political terrain. However, the focus here is on the pattern of political 
behavior that shaped how the two dominant political parties campaigned. 
In the analysis, respondents speak for example of vote buying or what some specifically call 
‘’stomach infrastructure’’ as a strategy deployed by both political parties in their engagement 
with the electorate. By stomach infrastructure, respondents meant the use of and preference for 
inducement, ‘pork barrel’-spending largesse to cronies and hand-outs to the electorate for 
political support (Ojo, 2014). 
In his seminal work on post-independent African politics, Bayart (1993) in The State in Africa: 
The politics of the Belly, Bayart argues that African politics extends the metaphor of eating and 
the belly into a framework of clientelistic relationship between the rulers and the ruled in the 
expenditure of state resources. Similarly, Omilusi (2018) observed that the 2015 election was a 
socio-political paradox, where the electorate seem to have preferred and politicians offered 
‘stomach infrastructure’ over sustainable development policy promises on the campaign trail. 
As evidence suggest, both the PDP and APC applied this strategy in 2015. Their approach 
includes-sharing of money, foodstuff, gratification, and gifts to the electorate ahead of the 
elections. G1 suggested for example, that such practices include ‘’financial mobilization of 
voters from states and local governments across the country for rallies’’. In another example, G2 
indicated that during campaigns ‘’people who come to visit will expect to be fed, expect to be 
given gifts, expect to be given transport fair’’ as a standard practice. Furthermore, J8 also 
suggested that during rallies and political campaigns, ‘’you share money to buy their loyalty on 
voting day’’. This practice as J5 indicated ‘’is what is call stomach infrastructure which is vote 
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buying’’. Thus, money as J5 further stated ‘’plays a big role not just to the candidate but to the 
voters and it is the economy that provides an incentive to collect the money’’. 
Documentary evidence like the Commonwealth Observer Group report also revealed ‘’an 
increasing resort to inducement’’ in the 2015 elections (p.35). The International Republican 
Institute report on the election also revealed how observers noticed ‘’vote buying, including one 
polling unit where it seemed someone was watching how voters voted’’ (p.13). The Westminster 
Cost of Politics report also indicated that there was a ‘’shift of emphasis from the provision of 
public goods to a new concept of stomach infrastructure’’ in the 2105 elections (p.11). 
Thus, the implication and prudent conclusion from such financially induced political climate is 
that the use of innovative campaign practice (s) like the Obama model might be unpopular to 
politicians with the financial war chest to offer stomach infrastructure, thus jettisoning and 
affecting the extent to which the model may have been applied. 
          5.5.5: Media Environment 
The nature of Nigeria’s media environment i.e. degree of media independence and autonomy is 
the fifth theme that appeared in the analysis as a factor with influence on innovative campaign 
practices. Media influence refers to a system where media organizations tend because of 
political manipulation and pressure to favor personalities in government, with such media 
coverage favor in many instance undermining regulations and standards. As Capitant (2011) 
show, across Africa, a new group of media players now exist with roles in ‘democratization’ and 
the ‘electoral process’ that politicians cannot ignore. Indeed, such media influence and the 
impact it had on journalistic ethics and autonomy in the 2015 elections reflected on the nature of 
coverage and amount of airtime given to opposition candidates. 
For example, J10 thought that as the party in government, the ‘’PDP were dominant in the 
mainstream media at that time’’. Nevertheless, this dominance in the traditional legacy media 
arena was not without institutional compromise. As J12 and B1 respectively suggested, ‘’there 
were also pockets of compromise on the part of the agencies’’ in such a way that ‘’they probably 
got entangled in politics’’. B1 cites the case of a subsisting law under a government agency 
known as Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) where all campaign ads are 
expected to get clearance before going on air. As B1 argued, by AMCON’s standard of 
advertising practice in Nigeria, ‘’you cannot get certain videos on mainstream media without 
passing through AMCON’’. However, as he further stated, ‘’because of politics, those system 
that supposed to monitor went to sleep or looked the other way’’ and videos like the lion of 
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bourdillon and the real Buhari got aired on mainstream television even with AMCON existence’’ 
see link to videos attached (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cNZn-WeTuY & 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZafoHEQMoE). These videos targeted the national leader 
of the opposition APC and APC’s presidential standard bearer.  
That said, while media liberalization in Africa seem to have unbundled the continent’s post-
independent state monopolized Soviet media model (Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018), state and 
state actors seem to still exert enormous influence on media outlets and social media (Gumede, 
2016) in semblance of what Oates (2007) refers to as ‘neo-Soviet model of mass media’ or 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) ‘propaganda model’-where ‘money and power allow the 
government and dominant private interest to get their messages across to the public’. 
Documentary evidence equally highlight features of political influence on traditional legacy 
media. For example, the Commonwealth Observer report revealed that ‘’on the state-owned 
National Television Authority (NTA) Campaign advertising carried during news programmes was 
one-sided’’, favoring incumbent President Jonathan (p.22). Similarly, the African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes report also showed that on National Television, i.e. the 
National Television Authority (NTA) ‘’political advertising rules were grossly abused, with almost 
all the coverage devoted to PDP campaigns, to the detriment of other parties’’ (p.21).  
In their report, the African Union Election Observer Mission revealed that national television 
stations ‘’continued to publish sponsored political messages of both the APC and the PDP even 
after the 24-hour deadline’’ (pp.22-30). The Independent National Electoral Commission post-
election report also highlighted that the political advertising climate of the 2015 elections favored 
the incumbent as government-controlled media houses ‘‘failed to comply with legal 
requirements on equitable coverage’’ (p.47).  
Thus, traditional legacy media seem to have been equally central in 2015. However, as the 
evidence indicate, political influence and favored media coverage given to the PDP, as well as 
the biased, one-sided, and partial coverage given to the opposition may have conferred the 
PDP unusual airtime and confidence that reduced the party’s interest and commitment to 
innovative practices. As the analysis in the first section showed, the APC as the opposition party 
at the time seem to have been more methodical in the application of the social media 
component of the Obama model. 
That said, while the literature on political influence on the media in Africa indicate that 
liberalization, commercialization and diversification of the media industry have contributed to 
accountability in state affairs (Tettey, 2001), Mutsviaro and Karam (2018:11) argue that ‘colonial 
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legacy has been critical to media development’ and ‘state intervention leaves the government as 
the lone supplier of bulletins’, with a narrative that usually support incumbents. As they argue, in 
most post-colonial African countries, ‘media politics’ (Zaller, 1999) (cited in Mutsvairo and 
Karam, 2018) ‘a system of politics where individual politicians seek to gain office, and to 
conduct politics while in office, through communication that reaches citizens through the mass 
media’ ‘has always been guarded, with members of the press corps working to actively promote 
the ruling party’ in what Siebert (1956) calls the Soviet media model. 
That said, in the context of contemporary changes in the media and information communication 
technology environment, and the fact that the sample in Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) work 
stop short of including an emerging or developing democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, practices 
and contextual variables that have emerged above apart from updating their modern model of 
campaigning captures the means and ways in which political parties and actors disseminate 
political messages in contemporary Africa.  
Similarly, while recent scholarship emerging from Africa agree on the changing nature of 
campaigning in the continent, these studies fail in itemizing the characteristics and features of 
contemporary campaign in the continent (see Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018; Ndlela and Mano, 
2020). Thus, as the field continue to transition, this chapter and work expands the register of the 
range of practices that now count as elements of political communication. As Fletcher and 
Young (2012) and Semetko and Scammell (2012) argue, reassessing and ‘rethinking theory and 
practice’ are important contemporary research priorities. 
Thus, in this sense, apart from Africanizing the field, this chapter sets the groundwork and 
foundation for updating Swanson and Mancini’s modern model from a cross contextual 
standpoint as well as prevailing contextual conditions that shape practices. While this may be an 
ideal type and not reflective of every practice in contemporary Africa’s electioneering, it makes 
contribution for revealing the technological dimension (s) and state of modern campaign 
practices in Africa and the contextual factors that shape them. Thus, following Hadland (2011), 
the missing contextual variables in Swanson and Mancini’s modern model that have emerged 
above and practices that have also emerge-i.e. microtargeting, web 2.0-digital and social media, 
digital fundraising and small donors, air war-political advertising, ground game, branding, image 
and message etc. expands both the discourse on contextual conditions and practices of 
contemporary political communication. 
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Therefore, what this case study show is that in an increasingly trans-national and globalized 
media world, practices and features of the model of political communication exemplified in the 
US-Obama model also extend to non-Western emerging democracies. As a unit of analysis for 
this comparative work, the manifestation of some of the elements of the Obama model in 
Nigeria foregrounds the expansion of Swanson and Mancini’s modern model of campaigning.  
That said, even though practices are hybrid Chadwick (2013). i.e. reflective of old and new 
media practices, CA’s testing of dark advertising and voter de-mobilisation tactics in Kenya and 
Nigeria theoretically suggest elements of Africanization and transition from an era of complete 
Americanization (Ekdale and Tully, 2019). 
In summary, this section concludes by emphasizing that convergence of the 12 elements i.e., 
political and technology consultants; microtargeting; web 2.0-digital and social media; digital 
fundraising and small donors; air war-political advertising; ground game; political opinion polling; 
branding, image and message; negative campaign; campaign feedback strategy; campaign and 
interaction strategy and speed and consistency of campaign notwithstanding, application of 
these elements is shaped by context. In the same vein, dissimilarity in other elements like big 
data, single data base, predictive modelling and the permanent campaign can equally be 
explained as a function of contextual condition. 
          5.6: Conclusion  
This chapter has done three things. First, the chapter has established that twelve elements of 
the Obama model were deployed in Nigeria though in varying degrees. Thus, indicating a 
direction regarding a typology of practices in contemporary campaign across different context. 
Second, theoretically and from the standpoint of the study’s theoretical framework, the chapter 
has established that Americanization comes short and is inadequate for explaining convergence 
in practices. Convergence was rather path dependent and a product of the development of 
internal national expertise and trans-national assemblage of skills and knowhow. Although, as a 
comparative study, this case is insufficient for a theoretical generalization. The British General 
Election of 2015 will serve as another empirical context for the continuation of a cross-
contextual expansion of this effort.  
Third, the chapter identified five broad empirical themes that emerged as contextual factors with 
influence on dissimilarity in the application of the Obama model. The next chapter will attempt to 
do the same from the standpoint of the 2015 British General election, by examining the 
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application of the Obama model, as well as validity of Americanization as a theoretical lens for 
explaining convergence in practices and the contextual factors that influenced convergence or 
dissimilarity. As a comparative study, the main value of this thesis is the cross-case 
operationalization and typological mapping of practices, the cross-case theoretical commentary 
and generalization on Americanization and modernization theories and exposition of contextual 






















                                              6: Case Study II 
 
 
          6.1: Introduction  
Like the previous, the focus of this chapter is three-fold. First, empirical material is used to 
describe manifestation of the Obama model in the 2015 British election. Second, following 
theoretical framework, empirical material is used to further examine Americanization as a 
theoretical lens for explaining convergence. Third, in line with methodological underpinning, a 
unique British contextual factor that influenced application of the model is discussed to highlight 
dissimilarity. Taken together, the chapter advances effort towards a cross-case typological 
mapping of the technological dimensions of modern campaign and an understanding of 
Americanization theory in contemporary British context. 
          6.2: Manifestation of the Obama Model in the 2015 UK Election 
Held on the 7th of May 2015 to elect 650 members of parliament after a five-year fixed term 
parliament, 3, 971 candidates stood for the elections. Amidst speculation of another hung 
parliament and minority or coalition government (see appendix IV for the socio-economic a 
political context of the campaign), the election ushered in an unpredicted majority for the 
Conservative Party ‘with 331 seats, 232 for Labour, 56 for the SNP, and the Liberal Democrats 
winning 8 seats and losing 49’ (Electoral Commission, 2015; Rose and Shephard, 2016; 
Hawkins et al., 2015). Table 6.1 is a summary of result and vote share. 
Table 6.1: 2015 Election Result 
S/N Party Votes Percentage   Seats 
won 
Gains Losses 
1. Conservative  11, 291, 248 27.7% 331 35 10 
2. Labour 9, 347, 326 31.3% 232 22 48 
3. Lib Dems 2, 415, 888 8.1% 8 0 48 
4. UKIP 3, 862, 805 12.% 1 1 0 
5. Green  1 150, 791  3.8% 1 0 0 
6. Plaid Cymru 181, 694  0.6% 3 0 0 
7. SNP 1, 454, 436 4.9% 56 50 0 
8. Others  275, 919 0.9% 18 0 0 
Curled from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/elections2015/results 
As table 6.1 show, multiparty politics is the norm in Britain. However, governance have 
traditionally been associated with the two major political parties with fluctuating electoral 
fortunes for the Liberal Democrats (Denver and Hands, 2001; Forman and Balwin, 2007). This 
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analysis follows the two-party line (see methodology). Nevertheless, considering that British 
electioneering campaign takes place at two level-i.e. ‘local constituency campaign and national 
campaign-directed by party headquarters’, the analysis below though the subject of the latter, 
will where necessary, draw on the former (Denver and Hands, 2001:71). Put differently, where 
necessary, examples will be drawn from national campaign constituency strategy and 
mobilisation approach for emphasis. This is necessary because in Britain, there is usually an 
integration of constituency campaign in the overall campaign strategy designed by party 
headquarters (ibid). 
That said, to provide clarity on the relevance of empirical material, a meta data is presented 
below as a way of contextualizing data presentation (see Miles et al., 2014). This way, a lens is 
formulated for accessing the appropriateness of empirical material generated for making 
empirical claims and theoretical commentary. 
Table 6.2:   Interviews conducted   














Compliant with R/O 
Refer to table 4.2 for participant incidentals. 
Table 6.3: Audio records  
S/N Participant/Codes Insight 
1.  AB1 Michal Kosinski Relevant  
Refer to table 4.8 for participant incidentals. 
Table 6.4: Documents   
Total number of 
Documents Collected 
 Insight 
           1- 14 
(see methodology) 
    Relevant 
Refer to table 4.11 for title and source. 
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Drawing from the meta data above, this section present findings of the manifestation of the 
Obama model. Where necessary, quotes will be used to provide illustrative insight of the point 
or points being made-with C-representing Conservative Party respondent and L Labour Party 
(see table 6.2).  
          6.2.1: Explanation of Application of Model 
This research was designed to examine the extent to which the Obama model was embedded 
in the 2015 campaign. In discussing the application of the model in the election, focus is on how 
the Conservative and Labour Party applied or adopted the elements. Table 6.5 is a summary of 
findings.  









S/N Obama Campaign 
Elements  
 Conservative Party  Labour Party C/L 
1. Political and Technology 
Consultants (refer to 
chapter 2) 
Local and foreign 
political consultants 
hired as well as CCHQ 
campaign bureaucracy 




Local and foreign 
consultants 
recruited power 
campaign with a 






2. Big data and single 
database 
VoteSource-a central 
database for voter 
identification and 
creation of voters 
models 
Contact Creator and 
Nation Builder- 
central database for 
voter identification 
 
3. Predictive Modelling Data enabled voter 
clusters and predictive 
models on voters likely 
voting position  




4. Data Mining and 
Microtargeting 




Core voter profiling 
and messaging  
 
5. Web 2.0 Digital and Social 
Media 
Deployment of digital 




Organic use of 





6. Digital Fundraising and 
small donors 
Less reliance on digital 
fundraising and small 
donors 
Successful use and 






7. Air War: Political 
Advertising 
Old method theme-





on new unrestricted 
platforms 
 
8. Ground Game  Team2015 and 
RoadTrip2015 data 




less data insight 
 
9. Political Opinion Polling  Polling, market 
research, telephone 
canvassing/survey 









10. Branding Image and 
Message 
Careful branding, 
stage managed image 
and a clear message 
No clear branding, 




11. Negative Campaigning Digital/national press 
enabled negative 
attacks on Labour 
Digitally enabled 
personality/policy 
based attacks on 
the Tories 
 











13. Campaign and Interaction 
Strategy 
Digitally enabled action 
oriented interactive 
tool for voter 
mobilisation 
No evidence of use  
14. Speed and consistency of 
campaign communication 
Gamified/digitally 
enhance response and 
rebuttals 
No evidence of use  
15. Campaign Games Points gaining and 
reward driven online 
activities for voter 
engagement/ 
mobilisation 
No evidence of use   
16. The permanent Campaign Fixed term 
parliament/incumbency 
advantage and party 
leader inspired 
permanent campaign  
No evidence of use   








1. Political and Technology Consultants  
 Conservative Party Campaign 
There is a longstanding recognition in Britain’s political stage of the growing role of ‘political 
consultancy, public relations, lobbying and political PR (Cliff, 1989). Changes in political party 
development have been accompanied by abandonment of internal party bureaucracy advise in 
favour of ‘spin-doctors and moderators of information flows’ whose media politics understanding 
and agenda setting skill is of benefit to parties and party leaders (Yukhanov, 2011). Thus, in an 
out of British election campaign seasons, they are now paid and unpaid political consultants 
who among other things monitor media and political developments, make technical 
recommendations, as well as advice government and Whitehall (Cliff, 1989). In campaigning 
however, the 1945 election stands out as the first, where ‘outside experts’ were used to help 
both the Conservative and Labour party campaign (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001:5).  
For example, the Conservatives had maintained their relationship with S.H. Benson firm started 
in the 1930s, while Herbert Morrison kept close ‘sympathisers from journalism and advertisers’ 
(ibid). Since then and across the two parties, a good number of ‘gentlemen players of the 
electoral game’ have multiplied (Harrop, 2001:62). Home grown political consultants like 
Geoffrey Tucker-Conservative Party, Mark Abrams-Labour, Peter Madelson, Tim Bell, Robert 
Worcester and Alistair Campbell, and their foreign counterparts like Saatchi & Saatchi and 
American recruits have been credited with innovative campaign thinking in Britain (Harrop, 
2001; Hollingsworth, 1997). Evidence exist however, of ’a two-way’ flow of practices between 
Europe and the United States (Cunliffe, 1974) (cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996). 
In recent elections, this tendency of recruiting advisers has been maintained (see Bale, 2012). 
In 2015, evidence from both sides suggest a continuation of this tradition. For example, the 
Conservative Party recruited Lyton Crsoby an Australian and Jim Messina-from the United 
States. Also, in the Tories team were home recruits-Craig Elder and Tom Edmonds, both 
Directors of the Conservative digital campaign. It is important to mention however, that Craig 
and Tom had been part of the Tories campaign in 2010. The responsibility of this team centred 
on finding key voters through interviews, polling, questionnaires and data analytics and targeting 
voters with carefully crafted messages. Apart from these consultants, C1 illustrated how the 
campaign ‘’built an in house team effectively of around 8 to 10 people which included digital 
experts, people from Twitter and Facebook targeting using data, a creative team as well as 
designers, video makers, copyrighters, people who can produce all the content needed in house 
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and then used our digital experts to kind of power these into the right people’’. C1 also stated 
that Jim Messina had given the campaign technical assistance particularly ‘’in terms of data 
profiling’’. 
Writing about their role in the Tories campaign, Elder and Edmonds (2015) reiterated how their 
work in the campaign was focused on ‘using digital to speak to the people’. Byrne (2015:13) 
also found that the Conservative Party drew insight from Facebook’s Head of Public Policy Rishi 
Saha-‘an ex-Conservative Party digital strategist who worked on the party’s 2010 election 
campaign’. Similarly, Bale and Webb (2015), Cowley and Kavanagh (2015), Mullen (2015) and 
Scammell (2015) point to the services of Jim Messina, and longstanding Australian strategist 
Lyton Crosby-40/40 seat targeting strategy of defending 40 seats and targeting 40, as evidence 
of the continuous impact of political consultants in British politics. 
Furthermore, apart from the experts recruited, the 2015 Conservative Party post-election review 
report pointed to the role of CCHQ (Conservative Campaign Headquarters) professional 
structure of campaigning which include Area Campaign Directors (ACDs), Regional Campaign 
Directors, Field Directors, Voluntary Party Managers and Field Campaigners as central to the 
party’s mobilisation effort in 2015 (see Conservative Party Review, p.32). In the Electoral 
Commission’s report on campaign spending in 2015, the commission indicates that 
‘consultancies, intermediary agencies and staff costs’ rank among the highest spend area for 
the party (Electoral Commission campaign spending report p. 28 & 32). This trend apart from 
reinforcing the use of political consultants also highlight the changing nature, diversity and 
intersection of skill now deployed in modern election campaign. 
Labour Party Campaign 
The electoral misfortune of 1983 imparted on Labour the need to fully professionalise. Thus, 
subsequent campaign saw ‘the extensive use and reliance on communication professionals’ 
(Shaw, 1999: 222). More recently however, the party’s interaction with, and engagement of 
political consultants both local and foreign can be traceable to the months leading into the 2010 
General elections. According to Hines (2012) prior to the 2010 general elections campaign, 
Matthew McGregor and David Axelrod had established campaign strategy cooperation with Iain 
McNicol-former General Secretary of the Labour Party and David Muir-former director of political 
strategy under Prime Minister Gordon Brown. 
Commenting on the role of political consultants in Labour’s campaign, L1 indicated that the 
party had recruited David Axelrod and Matthew McGregor to help. As his comments below 
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suggest, ‘’Axelrod was involved with the party’s message making’’. Similarly, L3 argued that 
Axelrod role was mostly spent ‘’preparing for the debates’’. In recent elections, the leaders’ 
debate is among some of the new innovation in Britain. That said, according to Beckett (2016), 
the role of the consultants revolved around digital communication, voter mobilisation and 
fundraising. Nevertheless, L1 suggested that Labour’s effort in recruiting political consultants 
and digital experts was limited by money and emphasis was rather on the four thousand 
doorstep conversation.  
Another interesting component of consulting in Labour’s 2015 campaign is what Wheeler (2015) 
calls ‘celebrity politics’. Wheeler cites Russel Brand-Hollywood actor published interview with Ed 
Miliband days into the election as an example. According to Byrne (2015:37), both on ‘YouTube-
1.4 million views and over 500, 000 on Facebook within days’, the video was the most watched 
campaign clip (see figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1: Russel Brand interviewing Ed Miliband 
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDZm9_uKtyo&t=15s.  
Although, considering Labour’s performance in the election, we can question the impact of 
celebrity engagement in the overall success of the campaign. However, taken together, what 
this evidence suggest is that, from the post-war era one-man squad-wife and single journalist 
campaign of Clement Attlee, British election campaign now include a diverse set of consultants, 
with a new appeal that includes celebrities and technologically oriented staffers.  
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2. Big data and the single database 
Conservative Party Campaign  
Although, less is still known about the role of big data in British national electoral context, 
political parties in Britain have always engaged with data like canvassing returns during 
campaign. However, increased changes in technology and telephone penetration seem to have 
inspired the accumulation of more digital, centrally stored and organized political data (Cowley 
and Kavanagh, 2015). Denver and Hands (2001) point to these changes and the possibility of 
accessing electronic versions of the electoral register, returns on canvassing and knocking-up 
campaign as one of the drivers of improvement in the traditional model of campaigning.  
Since the 1992 and 1997 elections for example, databases have been path of both the 
Conservative and Labour party’s campaign architecture (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001). Advances in 
data enabled segmentation has equally inspired shifts from traditional geographic and 
demographic methods of voter identification and classification towards attitudinally based 
segments (Smith and Hirst, 2001). As Denver and Hands notes, these electronic and computer 
powered databases have facilitated new approaches to campaigning like ‘direct targeted mail, 
leaflet and customized letters targeting to specific individuals’ (p.78).  
In 2015, big data and a single database were a feature of the Tories campaign. Access to data 
like the 2011 census data, data from Mosaic, party canvassing returns from the party’s 
Team2015 ground game canvassing, party polling data, over 1. 5 million digitally harvested 
emails, and the electoral register data enabled CCHQ to harmonise a centrally held data 
software called Merlin that they latter codename VoteSource. According to Anstead (2017) the 
freely available census data that sub-divides British population into ‘181, 408 output area’s and 
Mosaic data-a post code-based database that divides the UK populace into ‘67 categories was 
available to both the Tories and Labour.  
As C1 noted, the central database enhanced the campaign’s ‘’data mining and analysis’’. 
Although, C1 also stated that adhering to UK data protection regulation (i.e. DPA), constrained 
the campaign’s use of unethical approaches of data driven campaigning.  Nevertheless, the 
central database as well as the insight it provided enabled the Tories targeted campaign in 
2015. Respondents from both sides, L1, L2 and C1 all noted that the Tories campaign had been 
effective and efficient on the basis of data analytics. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) argue that 
the party’s database insight was valuable in ensuring that campaign spending was effectively 
tailored. Furthermore, the Conservative Party post-election report also indicated that without 
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VoteSource, ‘the highly sophisticated targeting of the 40/40 seats would not have been possible’ 
(see CPR, p. 40). 
Labour Party Campaign 
Evidence of Labour’s investment in a database had emerged in the 1997 election with the highly 
celebrated Excalibur (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001; Harriman, 2001). However, in 2015, even 
though the party seem to have been deficient in the use of big data driven approaches, it had a 
central database called Contact Creator and Nation Builder software (Anstead, 2017). L3 was of 
the view that financial constraints as well campaign emphasis on ground game partly informed 
the party’s failing in maximizing the centralized database. As L3 stated, ‘’the Conservative party 
did much more with data mining and analysis and those sort of things because they had much 
more money to play with’’. Similarly, in what seem like apparent regret over Labour’ tactics, L1 
was of the view that ‘’in terms of investment in the tactics, the Conservative Party had a very 
good set of data and they knew exactly which message to send to which voter’’. Cowley and 
Kavanagh (2015) found for example that Labour had opted for segmented data, with emphasis 
‘on groups like students’ (p.267). 
In the Information Commissioner’s report on the election, the perspective is that centrally held 
database like the ones used by both parties in 2015 makes them ‘data controllers’, since it 
‘provides a function that enables political parties to match contact information with data on 
social media platforms (see Information Commissioner Democracy Disruption Report, p.28). 
Overall, what this evidence suggest is that from the class base, demographic and 
geodemographic voter categorization and segmentation of previous elections, British political 
parties seem to be moving towards data driven forms of voter identification, interaction and 
mobilization.  
3. Predictive Modelling 
Conservative Party Campaign 
Historically, socio-political and geodemographic factors (i.e. class, age, sex, education, etc.) 
have been the pillars of voter identification in British elections (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Leonard 
and Mortimore, 2001, Pulzer, 1967). According to Denver and Garnett (2014) this model was 
dominant in the era of stable political parties, party support and membership. In the 1964 
election for example, Denver and Garnett showed how turnout and levels of party support were 
correlated with a variety of social factors.  
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Leonard and Mortimore (2001:188-189) suggest that fluctuations and changes in voter 
allegiance and greater voter volatility explained in part, by disaffection from mainstream parties 
(Denver and Garnett, 2014), and the arrival of a new generation of voters-‘post-materialist 
voters-floating voters, liberals, abstainers, lukewarm supporters and genuine floaters’ have led 
to new patterns of voter identification and targeting. Similarly, Smith and Hirst (2001) argue that 
developments in segmentation have also inspired movement away from longstanding traditional 
geographic and demographic approaches towards more ‘psychological and attitudinal’ 
approaches. According to Bartle (2001) these new patterns of voter identification occasioned by 
a changing electorate have inspired political parties use of short-term issues in political 
communication, with a range of new characteristics now forming the knowledge political parties 
rely on to target voters. Farrell (1997), and Ward and Gibson (1998) are of the view that this 
new insight have led political communication into an era of campaign innovation like targeting. 
In recent elections, (Bartle, 2001) point to decline in party attachment and alignment, the rise of 
the Liberals, UKIP, the Greens and national parties (i.e. Scottish and Welsh), as the motivation 
for turning attention away from longstanding aligned voter models of campaigning to issue-voter 
model. According to Smith and Hirst (2001) the Tories attempted psychological and attitudinal 
voter segmentation in 1992 for the purpose of political marketing. Indeed, evidence from the 
2015 election suggest that this is now the case. Like Farrell (1997) argue, they seem to be a 
move towards data driven insight political marketing in British elections. For example, the Tories 
prided themselves in predictive insight for reaching out to voters during the elections.  As C1 
stated for example, the campaign’s work in ‘’data profiling that has been successful for Obama’’ 
and the ability to know ‘’exactly what message to send to who at what time was important’’. 
Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) suggest that the party’s investment in voter insight enabled them 
to identify a group of what they call ‘steady Tories (11% of the electorate); disaffected Tories 
(14% of the electorate); anxious aspirationals (18% of the electorate); and in-play centre (11% 
of the electorate) (p.59). Furthermore, Cowley and Kavanagh also illustrated how canvassing 
returns yielded data that placed voters ‘on a scale of 1-10 depending on the likelihood of him or 
her voting Conservative (p.261). With such data, the party created groups and segments of 
voters that include-‘former Conservatives’ who have become UKIP leaning, ‘Labour voters who 
preferred David Cameron as leader and/or prefer the Conservatives on the economy’, 
Conservatives who were least likely to vote and most Liberal Democrats’. According to Cowley 
and Kavanagh, for each of these voter models, the party created ‘distinctive messages’ that 
were delivered to them on the phone, social media, direct mail and their doorstep (ibid). Moore 
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and Ramsay (2015:36) point to the Tories data predictive power as reason for the campaign’s 
highly targeted ‘multiple voter contact operations’.  
Labour Party Campaign: 
Attempt at Labour party’s use of psychographic segmentation is traceable to the early 1970s 
with their so call ‘Jack (New Labour), ‘Old Fred’ (old style Labour) ‘floating left’ voter 
segmentation models (Rosenbaum, 1997 cited in Smith and Hirst, 2001). However, there is no 
evidence suggesting that the party’s voter identification in 2015 was guided by data driven 
prediction. For example, L2 was of the view that party’s effort at voter identification and 
segmentation was ‘’not attitude, the modelling that was done was traditional’’. My understanding 
of traditional here would mean that Labour stock with issue, demographic and geographic 
segmentation. As stated earlier, Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) found for example that Labour 
had used more segmented voter models with emphasis more ‘on groups like students’ (p.267). 
Although, like the Tories, Labour had access to data through the party’s Contact Creator and 
Nation Builder software. Nonetheless, what the evidence suggest at best is that the party was 
more focus on targeting a number of segmented groups. In interviews with respondents for 
example, none reported that Labour’s five million doorstep conversation was built on predictive 
models. That said, even though much of the post-election commentary suggest that Labour had 
won the ground war, there is no evidence that such ground game was guided by psychologically 
predicted or attitudinally based models.  
4. Data Mining and Microtargeting 
Conservative Party Campaign 
Targeting and marginal seat campaigning is nothing new in British elections (Kavanagh, 1997). 
Historically, such targeting has been defined by demography and geography. Although, this 
model remains dominant in British campaign, the introduction of market research, segmentation 
and changing voter characteristics have inspired a move away from such approaches (Bartle 
and Griffiths, 2001). According to (Kavanagh, 1995:20), the electoral value of targeting arises 
from the notion that ‘crucial voters and those who are weakly attached or not attached to a 
party’ are important for shifting election results. Thus, as voters change, identifying these 
influenceable characteristics and targeting them has become an important task for political 
parties. Interestingly, what has changed in the context of the 2015 election is that with increased 
availability of data and high computing power, such targeting is becoming more personalized. 
Thus, personalized voter insight enabled by political parties database and data mining now 
182 
 
means campaigns can now specifically target individuals through channels like telephone, 
targeted direct mails, and tailored digital advertising. 
In 2015 for example, the Tories approach to targeting was two-fold. First, the party targeted 
specific constituencies in Crosby’s 40/40 strategy (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Second, 
specific set of voters were targeted through data powered insight that enabled more precise and 
personalized messaging. For example, C1 stated that ‘’data modelling, data mining and 
microtargeting, as well as the usual party polling’’ enabled the campaign’s ‘’paid digital 
advertising to target small groups of swing voters in the seats that were going to decide the 
elections’’. According to him, ‘’that was a better and more targeted way to talk to voters and 
that’s why the analysis was important’’.  
Moore and Ramsay (2015:35) and Garland and Terry (2015:18) suggest that the Tories high 
microtargeting on platforms like ‘Facebook’ partly explains the reason for gaining ‘3 seat seats 
in Wales and a 1% increase in their vote share’. In an apparent illustration of the campaign’s 
data mining and microtargeting capabilities, Elder and Edmond (2015) writes, ‘we knew when to 
reach a 40-year-old mum of two in Derby North’ by knowing when ‘ likely to reach her on 
Facebook, in the evening, when the kids have gone to bed’. Although, C1 made reference to the 
Data Protection Act as a constraint to what the campaign was able to do with data, 
nevertheless, all respondents were in praise of the Tories creativity in data mining and 
microtargeting.  
Labour Party Campaign 
According to Fielding (2015:56) Labour’s approach to microtargeting in 2015 reflect in the 
party’s preference of a ‘core vote strategy’ i.e. focusing on ‘issues of concern to the poorest 
voters and failing to indicate it understood middle-class aspiration and ambition’. Although, L3 
acknowledged Labour understanding that ‘’political communication is shifting towards 
personality profiling as a particular approach’’. However, he argues that no such intensive 
method was deployed. L1 for example was rather full of praise for the Tories use of ‘’Facebook 
ads in particular to reach sections of the electorate with messages which were framed and 
tailored according to those individuals’ preferences and demographics’’. Similarly, Labour’s 
post-election review also conceded that the Tories data-enabled targeting was a lesson to learn 
from (Beckett, 2016). 
Although, Mullen (2015) observes that Labour also targeted marginal seats with an extensively 
organized ground game troops, using it centralized database i.e. Contact Creator and Nation 
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Builder. Nevertheless, the party seem to have come short in its use of the emerging data-driven 
approach to targeting. Evidence exist however, including a fine of £140, 000 from the ICO for 
unethical data use in the party’s development of Promote-i.e. its database in the 2017 snap 
election that suggest that the party had used this approach (Williams, 2018). Perhaps, the party 
has learned and is catching up albeit unethically.  
That said, it is important to emphasize again, that even though the Tories and Labour differ in 
their use of data mining and microtargeting, targeting has been a longstanding strategy in 
Britain. What can be said about modern British elections is that a combination of increased data 
availability and technological advancement is contributing to dwarf longstanding targeting 
approaches that were principally based on socio-economic and geodemographic consideration. 
As Scammell (1995:270-271) notes, Britain seem to have entered era of ‘rational electioneering’ 
distinguished by political marketing that is reliant on ‘increasingly acute and precise commercial 
techniques to discover voters motivation and desires coupled with a more specialized and 
discipline approach to communication’. The Electoral Commission echo this perspective, and 
point to advertising that was user specific, i.e. ‘based on information about people’s interest and 
voting intensions’ as a feature of the 2015 elections (see Electoral Commission report on the 
Administration of 2015 GE p.66). Thus, it is fair to conclude therefore, that digitization and the 
emergence of new voter clusters and digitally enabled personality traits identification tools have 
only amplified the use of targeting in Britain. 
5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media  
Conservative Party Campaign 
Although, they are endless debates on the impact of digital tools on political mobilization and 
election outcome (Margetts, 2006; Howard, 2005; Wring and Horrocks, 2006). Modern western 
politics is experiencing transformation thanks to the ‘framing qualities of new media’ (Axford, 
2006:1). Apart from reawakening the two-step flow, (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948) and personalizing 
candidate voter relationship (Scher, 2016), such transformation include the emergence of a 
‘citizens initiated campaigns’ (CIC) model of campaigning that is altering longstanding 
professionally supervised models through increasing devolution of campaign task to the 
grassroots (Rachel, 2015).  
As the fastest rapidly expanding platform for information sharing and propagation (Kaplan and 
Haenlein, 2010), digital and social media seem to be increasing the ‘repertoire of modes and 
channels of political participation, communication, information creation, diffusion of political 
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messages and political recruitment’ (Jensen et al., 2012:5). Although less is still known 
regarding the likely contribution of digital in delivering electoral payoffs, these tools have 
increasingly become attractive (Baranuik, 2016; Corbett and Edwards, 2016). Lilleker et al. 
(2015) and Chadwick and Stanyer (2011) point to digital and social media influence as part of 
the driver of new communities and design in British politics.  
In Britain for example, internet penetration and membership of platforms like Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram and Linkedln as at May 2015 runs into of millions (see table 6.6). 





Penetration   
YouTube 


















60% 63% 23% 16% 14% 
Curled: https://www.ons.gov.uk  
The Office of National Statistics also report that about 78% (39.3million) adults had either used 
the internet daily or almost daily. These figures and statistics are excellent example of the range 
of British public’s engagement in the digital public sphere.  
Regarding electioneering campaign, claims about digital power began in 2010 but date back to 
1997 with increased emphasis on the possibilities of digital for communicating and organizing 
(Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010; Newman, 2010). Since then, they seem to have been 
competitive and progressive rise in the use of digital by all political parties and party leaders 
(Rothwell, 2015).  
For the Tories, the election of David Cameron as leader in December 2005 signalled a new 
approach to communication with the launch of WebCameron website that opened-up ‘informal 
conversation and online conservative activism’ (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011:229). By 2015, 
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digital had become an integral part of the party’s campaign communication, advertising and 
voter mobilization channel. However, the uniqueness of its usage was in the party’s ability to 
identify and engage voters digitally (Ross, 2015).  As Ross notes, this process of online 
targeting, made it easy to ‘send Tory ads to voters in the 100 key marginal seats’ (p.117). 
Furthermore, with ‘over 1.3 million’ people following David Cameron’s on Twitter and ‘nearly a 
million likes on Facebook’ as well as the party’s’ ‘200,000 followers on Twitter and half a million 
likes on Facebook’, the party had a large community of people to engage and mobilize digitally 
(CPRR, 2016:12&34). According to Ross (2015), the Tories cyber war started around October 
2013 with ‘tried advertisement on Facebook, Twitter, Google as well as videos on YouTube and 
display advertising on newspaper websites’ (p.110). As C1 stated, ‘’one of the most important 
thing we did was we recognized very early the need to try the best we can to awaken the 
attitude of the people through social media’’.  
As a marketing expert who worked on the Tories campaign in 2010 as deputy head of branding, 
it is not surprising how creative the Tories digital was in 2015. For example, C1 indicated that 
the campaign created a website call ‘’ShareTheFact’’s-an interactive platform accessible to 
supporters, where activists were armed with CCHQ approved messages, and could share 
content and canvassing activities as well as move content to Facebook, Twitter and other 
platforms. Similarly, VoteSource i.e. the party’s central database, even though it crashed on 
polling day provided insight for the party’s ground game troops, i.e. Team2015 and 
RoadTrip2015. According to Wallace (2015), the insight VoteSource offered made it the driver 
of both the Tories air war, ground game and microtargeting. Since then, ShareTheFacts has 
remain in use and is now a prominent part of the Tories website design.  
Furthermore, social media was equally instrumental to the party’s well-coordinated digital 
advertising and microtargeting. Praising the party’s digital for example, L1 stated that ‘’the 
Conservative Party used Facebook ads in particular-targeted Facebook ads to reach sections of 
the electorate with messages which were framed and tailored according to those individuals’ 
preferences and demographics’’. Evidence of the party’s use of digital also cuts across a 
number of campaign activities. As figures 6.2-6.7 show, the party’s use of digital include for: 
updating followers and documenting David Cameron’s campaign, fundraising, conveying 
campaign promises and policy decisions and for attacking the opposition with negative online 






Figure 6.2: Campaign Information 
 
Curled from: Twitter 
 
Figure 6.3: Campaigning 
 




Figure 6.4: Conveying policy 
 
Curled from: Twitter  
Figure 6.5: Attack on Labour  
 
Curled from: Twitter  
Figure 6.6: Scaremongering/attack on Ed/Labour v SNP Coalition 
 
Curled from: https://t.co/q8qzEPM4OF  
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Figure 6.7: Attack on Alex Salmond 
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JeYlBRvUe  
In terms of voter contact and reach, the campaign claimed to have reached over 17 million in a 
week through digital (Elder and Edmonds, 2015; Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Although these 
figures can be debated, figure 6.8 from integrity search UK provides a breakdown of the party’s 
digital engagement during the campaign. 
Figure 6.8: Digital engagement summary 
 
Curled from: integritysearch.co.uk 
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Evidence of the Tories reliance and investment in digital also reflect in money spent. As Fisher 
(2015) observes, the level of use of digital in 2015 can be seen in ‘terms of expenditure’. Thus, 
Hawkins (2015) revealed that the Tories spent over £100,000 monthly and £3,000 weekly in 
individual constituencies to boost mobilization (see figure 6.9). 
Figure 6.9: Monthly summary of digital expenditure 
 
Curled from: bbc.co.uk 
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Although, critics of the use of digital in the election suggest a ‘familiar and unimaginative’ use of 
available channels that fail to match notions of a ‘conversational democracy’ (Wring and Ward, 
2015). Nonetheless, evidence suggest that the Tories were at the forefront of making 2015 an 
internet election. 
Labour Party Campaign 
Although Labour’s digital fundraising in 2015 attracted commendation from commentators 
(Cookson, 2015). Nevertheless, the party’s digital campaign has been said to be organic (Coley 
and Kavanagh, 2015). Wring and Ward (2015:234) suggest for example, that the party’s digital 
strategy ‘tended towards a more grassroots, core audience approach’ and this may be partly 
explained by the lack of investment in analytics and digital (BBC News Online, 2015).  
The evidence here seems to echo the same narrative. For example, L1 pointed to financial 
constraints and Brewer’s Green lack of appreciation of the significance of digital as the reason 
for the nature of investment. As his comments below explained, ‘’the Conservative had money 
than anyone else, the Conservative Party is traditionally better funded than the Labour Party 
and in 2015 we were particularly short of money from big individual donors’’. As he further 
stated, ‘’our digital people were telling us we were left behind on Facebook and needed to do 
more. I think that the campaign leadership decided at the time that wasn’t the best use of money 
and I think the party leadership was wrong and the Conservative Party was right’’.  
In another comment that seem to suggest a less intense and thinly coordinated digital strategy, 
L3 stated that even though digital was an integrated part of the party’s campaign, ‘’it was 
organic, we had a very modest strategy on social and it involved supporters sharing content and 
we set an objective of 5 million conversation’’. Fletcher (2015) found evidence of Labour’s digital 
campaigning in conveying ‘imagery of the campaign’, fundraising as well as promoting negative 
attacks on the Tories (see figure 6.10-6.12). Similarly, Bell (2015) also found that social media 
enhanced the party’s advertising and use of ‘negative tweets, viral YouTube clips and memes’. 
That said, it is surprising that with David Axelrod in the team, Labour failed in designing an 
integrated digital strategy. One will imagine that as a key staffer in Obama’s campaign, Axelrod 




Figure 6.10: Labour’s subtle combination of attack and fundraising  
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be  
Figure 6.11: Attack on David Cameron and the Conservative party
 




Figure 6.12: Attack on the Tories regarding the NHS  
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be  
 
That said, as earlier highlighted, Labour equally benefitted from celebrity advertising on Russel 
Brand’s YouTube page following his interview with Ed Miliband (see figure 6.1). The party also 
benefitted from individually inspired online support like #Milifandom (figure 6.13) that procured 
Ed Miliband some much needed positive depiction considering the intense negative coverage 








Figure 6.13: Milifandom online support 
 
Curled from: bbc.co.uk 
This diverse mix of digital notwithstanding, it is also surprising that even though the party had a 
central database and had hired David Axelrod, Labour’s entire digital still fell short of depth and 
intensity in precision microtargeting, thus calling into question the Americanization thesis. For 
instance, the party’s post-election autopsy provided a less commendable assessment of its’ 
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digital capacity in 2015. In the report, even though Beckett (2016: 29-31) agree that the party 
‘have new capabilities in digital’, she recommended the party ‘develop and promote the 
possibilities of social media for communicating with the public at large’. This recommendation 
suggest that her committee may have been unimpressed with Labour’s digital in 2015. 
Nevertheless, with a significant investment of over £ 1.2 million on digital in the 2017 snap 
elections, the party may be catching up (Waterson, 2017).  
That said, taking together, what this evidence suggest is that digital provided a diverse set of 
channels for political party and candidate vs voter interaction and engagement far beyond what 
traditional UK news media had offered in the past. Furthermore, the Electoral Commission’s 
report of over £ 1.3 million total spending on digital advertising in 2015 also point to changing 
patterns in British campaign communication and shifts in campaign reliance on party election 
broadcast time. 
6. Digital Fundraising and small donors 
Conservative Party Campaign 
One of the consequences associated with the decline of party membership and party loyalty in 
Britain is decline of political finance (Pattie and Johnston, 2016). Thus, as a response to the 
changing fortune, ‘cross-class appeals to wider groups of the electorate’ have become popular 
(ibid). Although, such appeal falls under the Electoral Commission’s ‘permissible sources’ that 
include individuals in the electoral register, UK registered companies, and trade unions, as well 
as direct payments and subsidies, etc., (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981; 2008), more recently, political 
parties are also taking advantage of technological affordances to improve campaign finance 
through crowdfunding from small donors (Mason, 2015). 
Nonetheless, as the ‘business and tax cut friendly’ party with ‘firm beliefs in property’, the bulk of 
the Tories campaign finance contribution in 2015 came from sources like the ‘leaders club’; and 
big individual donors-‘leaders group’, ‘cash donations in excess of £7,500, making the party to 
maintain its ‘wealthy party status’ (Fisher, 2015:144; Mason, 2015; Lindsay and Harrington, 
1979, Ross, 2015). However, the party equally made reasonable effort to fundraise online 
(Mason, 2015). As C1 stated, the digital campaign team had ‘’learnt ways of how to do 
fundraising online through emails, ads and the party’s website’’ (figure 6.14). That said, the 
deployment of digital fundraising and small donors notwithstanding, this source of campaign 
finance did not give the Tories their wealthy party status and financial war chest for the 2015 
elections. Wealthy individual donors continue to be important in the party’s fundraising. 
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Figure 6.14: Conservative Party online donation platform  
 
Curled from: https://www.conservative.com  
Labour Party Campaign: 
On the other hand, even though Labour continues to rely on donations from unions for most part 
of its campaign finance mobilisation, the party was more successful in digital fundraising and 
receipt of small donations in 2015. According to Mason (2015) and Mullen (2015) through 
specific digital approaches that allowed people to donate £5, £10 or £20, the party raised over 
£3million from thousands of small donors in what they both refer to as a semblance of the 
Obama model. As L1 stated for example, ‘’social media played a significant part in terms of 
using it to raise money from supporters’’. L2 even suggested that the campaign had ‘’digital 
operations in like separate sections of the office and the primary function was to raise money’’. 
Perhaps as a political party that doesn’t in recent times enjoy the sort of financial support the 
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Tories gets, except for the Tony Blair years (Grant, 2005), Labour’s financial position going into 
the 2015 election may have inspired the party’s focus on digital fundraising from small donors. 
In its report to the Electoral Commission on donations in election, the party cited ‘online 
supporters’, as permissible sources (BBC Online News, 2015). Moore and Ramsay (2015:35-
36), and Jackson (2015) suggest that such donations apart from thousands of those that were 
small and made online came through response to ‘letters and phone calls’ and were basically 
driven by digital advertising. Jackson for instance attest to haven received such online pitching 
to donate to Labour (see figure 6.15). 
Figure 6.15: Labour’s subtle combination of attack and fundraising  
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be  
 
In validating the use of such fundraising technique, the Electoral Commission stated that it 
issued a factsheet to political parties on how to apply PPERA (Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000) and RPA (Representation of the People Act 1983) rules on such 
donations (Electoral Commission report on campaign spending 2015:67). Although, the 
Commission did express concern over how to check permissibility on donations collected by 
political parties through ‘crowdfunding websites’ (p.67), what technology seem to have done to 
campaign finance mobilization in Britain is to expand the means through which such donations 
are made or collected. Perhaps, as Pinto Duschinsky (2016) observe, a more rigorous inclusion 
of such small donor led digital fundraising will not only democratize party financing in Britain, but 
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also reawaken the spirit and passion of the mass party model (Katz and Mair, 1995) by 
mobilizing broad segments of the excluded electorate to save both parties the criticism that has 
trailed the current system as well as allegations over peerage sale. 
  
7. Air War: Political Advertising 
Conservative Party Campaign: 
Longstanding ban on political advertising in Britain means that British air wars- i.e. ‘the battle for 
media supremacy, or battle to persuade voters through the national press’ differ considerably 
from the US because they are waged in the context of Party Election Broadcast (PEBs) that 
constrain political parties to buy US style TV political advertising spots (Ross, 2015:54). For 
example, 2015 elections arrangement for such broadcasts (including production guidelines, 
content, and frequency were set by the Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the BBC (White 
and Gay, 2015).  
Nevertheless, political ads are part of British campaign even though they are criticisms that such 
election season media led wars ‘at best trivialises political debate’ (Scammell, 1995:20). That 
said, what is unique and important to mention is that apart from evidence of such deployment in 
2015, digitization seem to be diversifying the channels and means through which British parties 
now wage such wars. For example, Riley-smith (2016) found evidence of such digital 
advertising on YouTube, with attacks on Labour’s record on the economy, Ed Milibands 
credentials, the danger of Labour SNP coalition, as well as the danger the Tories pose to the 
NHS. 
That notwithstanding however, traditional media has remained influential-with instances 
described by Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) as a ‘hostile print media coverage of Labour (see 
figure 6.16 and 6.17) and complains that the BBC served as a ‘right wing echo chamber’ (Ross, 
2015:85) during the campaign. Tunney (2007) is of the view that such press versus Labour 
antagonism has been perennial in British politics, except in the relatively friendlier-living with the 







Figure 6.16: Stoking coalition fears 
 
Curled from: The Guardian 
Figure 6.17: The Sun save our bacon 
 
Curled from: The Sun  
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However, apart from the print media led attacks on Miliband and the SNP, evidence also 
suggest that the Tories air war was framed along many themes and disseminated across many 
channels. Emphasis for example, were on narratives like past Labour government’s economic 
mismanagement and the threat of Labour SNP coalition, as well attacks on Ed Miliband’s 
credentials as potential Prime Minister (see figure 6.18 and 6.19). 
Figure 6.18: Conservative YouTube ad attack on Ed Miliband 
 
Curled from: https://yutu.be/2oklYp-ac04  
Figure 6.19: Ad Attack on Ed Miliband 
 
Curled from: https://yutu.be/2oklYp-ac04  
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On digital platforms like-YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, there was also creativity in making air 
war content even though the themes remain the same. For example, the Tories produced a 
YouTube ad with a bell jar clock that a sledgehammer descended to shatter to discredit 
Labour’s record on handling the economy (figure 6.20). 
Figure 6.20: Depicting Labour’s return as dangerous for the economy 
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrqG6CbmZjw&feature=youtu.be  
Such content, and the possibility of sharing them online on platforms like Facebook and 
YouTube where the Tories had over 37 thousand followers would have particularly reached a 
significant number of the electorate in ways that can compete with traditional media. Roper 
(2016) found evidence of similar patterns of advertising on Google, with such advertising either 
‘matched, saturated or peer-to-peer’ targeted.  
According to C1, 2015 ‘’was the first time in UK politics that a party has spent considerable part 
of its budget on digital advertising’’, ‘’the most prominent being the use of paid digital advertising 
to target small groups of swing voters in the seats that were going to decide the elections’’. In 
what may seem like a confirmation of C1’s comments above, the Electoral Commission reported 
that political parties and campaigners in the 2015 election had ‘advertised on social media 
such as Facebook and YouTube, or placed adverts in relation to the election on websites’ 
(p.66). In comparison to Labour, perhaps, the creatively of the ‘pod’-i.e. the Tories 
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campaign war room in digital advertising may have been enabled by the Party’s large 
campaign war chest.  
Labour Party Campaign: 
Although Labour struggled to counter the Tories air war on issues like the party’s role in the 
deficit and Ed Miliband’s leadership credential as future Prime Minister, the party equally utilised 
political advertising with themes revolving around the NHS and inequality as well as attempt to 
defend Ed Miliband’s personality as future Prime Minister in a documentary called A Portrait.  
Figure 6.21: Attack on the Tories handling of NHS  
 






Figure 6.22: Labour’s YouTube Ads 
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc 
Figure 6.23: Documentary on Ed Miliband 
 
Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc  
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According to Ross (2015), in the party’s ‘bashing-the-rich policy of abolishing non-domicile tax 
status’,-‘a policy that allows wealthy people to claim non-domiciled status to reduce their tax 
liability’ (Roper 2016), Labour highlighted its stance on inequality and attempted to shift the 
debate. Nevertheless, Ross, Roper and Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) criticised the party for 
lack of discipline and consistency in the framing and dissemination of such air war content. 
Perhaps, Labour’s campaign budget constrain may have been a limitation. Similarly, Moore and 
Ramsey, (2015:39) also highlighted that Labour equally ‘struggle for coverage of its economic 
proposals in the press throughout the campaign’. 
That said, all respondents were celebratory of the opportunity that digital political advertising 
provided. As L3’s comment below illustrate, ‘’I think the ability to buy digital adverts has really 
changed the rules’’  ‘’The truth was that prior to 2015 advertising was only largely limited to direct 
mail and to out of phone poster campaigns and the increasing use of phone calls in order for you, 
you know to generate media interesting stories’’. ‘’In 2015 that definitely changed with online 
advertising self-advertising’’. As he further stated, the two were ‘’definitely the distinct thing about 
the election campaign’’. Similarly, L2 stated that ‘’we advertise on YouTube, Google adverts and 
digital advertising was central to our campaigning and a lot of money was spent on paid digital 
advertising as well as using social media organically’’. 
Walsh (2015), and Arthurs and Little (2015) also found evidence of Labour’s political advertising 
on social media and YouTube. However, Ross (2015) is of the view that Labour’s campaign war 
room ‘top desk’ messiness at Brewer’s Green, including the lack of a well-structured campaign 
leadership and consistency on campaign programmes and inconsistency in air war content-that 
include the much touted EdStone meant that the party failed to make sustained impact despite 
the opportunities that digital tools provided. 
Interestingly however, the 2015 Electoral Commission’s campaign spending report 
highlighted that ‘spending on campaign broadcasts fell from £1.5m or by 4.8% in 2010 to 
£806,000 in 2015’, in what seem like an indication ‘of a move away from traditional 
campaigning techniques’ to more targeted online approaches (Campaign Spending Report 
p.27-28). Less reliance and shift away from PEBs seem to be one significant change in recent 
British political advertising. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) assert that by offering opportunities 
that differ from previous campaign posters and party broadcast, the rise of digitally enabled 





8. Ground Game 
Conservative Party Campaign 
Although emphasis is not on the impact of ground game or canvassing on the electoral outcome 
of 2015, Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, (2008) assert that ‘party mobilization efforts can 
increase the willingness of voters to turn out and vote’. Between 1989 and 1992, Whitely and 
Seyd (1998) identified decline in ground game-‘fight for voters on the door step’ in Britain (Ross, 
2015:89). However, this pattern of grass-root mobilization, ‘developed in the mid-Victorian era of 
small electorate’ was a feature of the 2015 election (Norris, 1997). 
For the Tories, C1 affirmed that ‘’ground game-people knocking on doors in constituencies and 
making canvass returns’’ was integral to the party’s 2015 campaign. However, Ross (2015) and 
Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) are of the view that co-chairman Grant Shapps was central in 
recruiting Team2015-a group of canvassers and ground game troops that invaded the party’s 
100 target seats. Ranging over a 100,000, these ground troops ‘were sent around the country in 
buses to key seats (Mullen, 2015; Ross, 2015a). 
Wallace (2015) also point to Team2015 and RoadTrip2015-a group of ground game ‘activist 
who campaigned in target seats’ as central to the Tories data driven campaign. According to 
Wallace, a very critical role played by these ground game troops was the survey that returned 
canvassing data to CCQH. Such survey data that ranked an elector on the basis of their 
likelihood to support the Tories on a scale of 1-10 provided insight to the kind of ‘targeted 
communication’ that CCQH put out. In the party’s post-election review report for example, the 
Tories had hailed the work done by Team2015 and RoadTrip2015 (CPR, 2016:33). Perhaps, 
the data driven insight and microtargeted campaign may have been successful because of the 
quality of data supplied by ground game army. 
Labour Party Campaign 
According to Bale (2015) Labour’s approach to the 2015 campaign was their imaginative 
strategy that ‘its boot on the ground would trump the Conservatives’ cash in the bank’. That 
said, in terms of voters contacted through the party’s ground game, Fielding (2015) argue that it 
could be rated more successful than the Tory’s. Bale also found significant difference between 
the Tories and Labour’s ground game, with Labour more desirous on knocking on doors.  
For example, L3 stated that  ‘’we set an objective of 5 million conversation and campaign 
interaction and that was still affected in part by social activity and if you then look at it, I think 
actually it was quite successful’’. Perhaps, L3’s perspective of a successful ground game might 
205 
 
not be the view of party leaders at Brewer’s Green, if we consider the outcome of the election. 
With such expansive and extraordinary reach of ‘five million conversation’, success one would 
imagine should have been measured by the number of seats won. For example, Ross (2015) 
criticism of Labour’s ground game is that even though the party’s canvassers had a script to 
return data, such script was too general to produce any reasonable insight. In that regard, L2’s 
comment of canvassing being a ‘’conventional campaign methodology’’ may in part explain 
Ross’s criticism and the approach party leaders had adopted with ground game. As Mullen 
(2015) notes, ‘with a target of 106 marginal seats, and an army of 300 paid activist’, as well as 
those supplied ‘by the unions’ (Ross, 2015), one would think that Labour’s ground game would 
have displayed the creativity of Obama’s campaign ground army since David Axelrod was 
supervising.  
That notwithstanding however, if Whitely and Seyd (1998) found a ‘de-energization’-decline in 
election activism three decades ago, Labour’s five thousand doorstep conversation is a positive 
re-energization of ground game activism in British politics. Furthermore, with the Electoral 
Commission report indicating spending on transportation and accommodation for canvassers 
(Electoral Commission report on the administration of the 2015 GE, p.68; and Campaign 
spending report p.27), modern British elections seem to have continued to be marketed at the 
door steps of the electorate with data returns by canvassers now influencing the nature of 
interaction, communication and targeting that campaigns design, in a description that fits 
Issenberg, (2013:44) explanation of modern campaigning as ‘a ‘tying together’ of the ‘online and 
offline world’.  
9. Political Opinion Polling 
Conservative Party Campaign 
The need for ‘accurate information about the views’ of the electorate for an effective campaign 
and election strategy is the incentive for political opinion polling in Britain (Kavanagh, 1995:110). 
Kavanagh suggest however, that the first prove of polling expertise in Britain was ‘Gallup’s 
prediction of West Fulham by-election’ in 1938 and its subsequent prediction of Labour’s victory 
in the 1945 election. Subsequently, the use of political opinion polling has indicated political 
parties consciousness of the need for an informed management of the electorate.  
Three types of such polling have been identified to have been commissioned by both the Tories 
and Labour. Panel of voters’ survey/polling-that help them ‘collect data to formulate long term 
strategy’; short term surveys-that provide understanding to reaction to ‘issues, themes, 
206 
 
personalities and broadcast’; and medium term surveys that ‘deal with reaction to slogans, 
policies and party’s political communication’ (ibid). The last two according to Kavanagh help 
campaigns to monitor their operations, while the first is ‘used to help formulate electoral 
strategy’. Such drive by the Tories in Kavanagh view, was the inspiration for the commissioning 
of the British Market Research Bureau (BMRB) between 1964-65, with the work serving as the 
foundation for David Butler and Donald Stokes seminal work on political change in Britain.  
Since then, the party seem to have remain consistent in its use of private polling. In 2015 for 
example, Ross (2015a) found that Lyton Crosby’s political polling and focus groups were 
‘essential to honing the national messages which would deliver the party victory’. Cowley and 
Kavanagh (2015) also suggest that the party’s message of ‘Conservative competence versus 
Labour’s chaos was a product of market research and polling, with such polling conducted in 
over ’80 marginal seats with samples of up to 1,000 voters each’ (p.63). 
Apart from helping the party to craft messaging, C1 stated that ‘’the usual party polling was 
essential to the issues’’ they chose to emphasize like voters’ preference of who should be Prime 
Minister. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015), Ross (2015b) and Wallace (2015) all point to such 
internal Tory polls, focus groups, telephone conversation and canvass return data as the 
bedrock of the Tories 2015 targeted campaign.  
Labour Party Campaign: 
Historically, Labour was the first to commission polling with the employment of Mark Abrams in 
1956 and the subsequent engagement of MORI in the 1974 and 1986 elections (Kavanagh, 
1995). The tradition seems to have endured. In 2015 for example, L2 suggested that ‘’private 
opinion polling that we did midway through the campaign’’, was important in providing ‘’all of that 
information that was used for messaging’’ 
However, Ross (2015b) argue that even though the party’s polling showed at some point that 
Ed Miliband was ahead of Prime Minister David Cameron ‘when it came to being trusted to help 
families with the cost of their everyday lives’, Labour did not take advantage of such insight to 
maintain consistency in messaging. Similarly, Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) are of the view that 
even though the party’s polling had showed Labour was ahead ‘on the side of the ordinary 
people’, the party’s greatest curse was being behind on the ‘right approach on the economy’ 
(p.76). L3 however suggested that ‘’the electoral polling didn’t tell us things similar’’ to the polls 
we did on the phone and through our door canvassing’’. Perhaps, Labour was a victim of the 
shy Tory problem in 2015 or was too confident of the two-horse race narrative. For example, the 
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party’s post-election report criticized the approach of restricting marginal polling to ‘target seats’, 
and for depriving the campaign of ‘additional information about Scotland or the Liberal 
Democrats’ (Becktte, 2015:17).  
That said, although polls have repeatedly failed to correctly predict election outcome, campaign 
spending in Britain continue to cover subheads like ‘market research including the use of 
phone banks’ (Campaign spending report 2015:27). Thus, as Butler and King (1965:71) 
asserted, what this suggest is that the use of political opinion polling and market surveys have 
‘remain a permanent feature’ of British political life. 
 
10. Branding, Image and Message 
Conservative Party Campaign 
There is a long history of ‘soundbites and spin doctors’ in British politics (Jones, 1996:219). 
However, in an era of profound changes in class-political relations, branding, image and a 
resonating message have increasingly become important for political parties and campaign 
(Ross, 2015b). As Butler and Stokes (1974) observe, party image in Britain change with the 
‘cycle of power, and such changes are an important feature of the popular attitudes on which 
alteration of governments rest’ (p.350).  
For the Conservatives, since the days of Margaret Thatcher, campaign communication has 
been ‘framed consciously as a branding exercise with focus since then, on ‘economic 
management and commitment to improving public services’ (Scammell, 1995: 240). The 
success of such effort has been a debate though, considering that 2015 was only the first time 
since 1992 that the Tories would win a majority in a general election. 
Nevertheless, in 2015, the Tories maintained their ‘life’s better with the Conservatives-don’t let 
Labour ruin it’ narrative, with branding specifically around competent leadership (Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015). C1 was of the view for example, that how the electorate saw both the ‘’Prime 
Minister’s image and the party’s image was important’’. Similarly, image toning-including 
photographs, speeches and appearance in the debate was equally carefully crafted (Bale and 
Webb, 2015; Moore and Ramsay, 2015). Wahl-Jorgensen (2015) argue that the Prime 
Minister’s kitchen interview before the election represent a perfect example of such carefully 
planned branding. 
In message, the campaign emphasized themes like the economy-and the party’s long-term 
plan, Conservative competence versus Labour’s chaos, SNP v Labour coalition threat as well as 
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portraying Ed Miliband as a potentially weak Prime Minister (Bale and Webb, 2015). Such 
messages as C1 stated were ‘’definitely tested before there were release’’. However, it is 
important to note that such message testing strategy is nothing new to the Tories. Woodward 
(1995) argue that the Conservative Party poster message of ‘You Can’t Trust Labour’ in the 
1992 election campaign was also tested among supporters and focus groups. 
Cowley and Kavanagh (2015), Mullen (2015), and Ross (2015) all point to party’s canvass 
returns, polling and focus groups as the ingredients for both the test and design of such 
messages. Cowley and Kavanagh also observed for example, that 60% of the Tories ‘press 
releases’ during the campaign had focus on the SNP and Nicola Sturgeon (p.172). Such 
consistency in message content as well as party and candidate adoption of the messages was 
praised by Wring and Ward (2015) for focusing on promoting the issues the Tories wanted. 
Labour Party Campaign 
As a party that has struggled in the past to rebrand from the ‘extremist, divided, lack of 
economic credibility image’ (Scammell, 1995:243), 2015 was a difficult election for the Ed 
Miliband brand. From reference to a ‘Marxist upbringing’, to brother stabber, and save our 
bacon (figure 6.17) as well as the weak leader picture painted by both the Tories and their press 
friends (Bale and Webb, 2015; Ross, 2015a), Fielding (2015:67) argues that the Ed Miliband 
brand failed in convincing voters of possessing ‘the skills necessary to be Prime Minister’ and 
for managing ‘the economy’. Such struggle with branding may have inspired the making of the 
documentary captioned-A Portrait (see link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-
zHc&feature=youtu.be) as well as Ed’s appearance in the celebrity interview with Russel Brand 
(see link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDZm9_uKtyo&t=15s and figure 6.1). 
In image and message, even though as L1 and L3’s comment below suggest, ‘’message 
making was important for us’’ with ‘’David Axelrod offering the making of the many versus few 
type argument’’, Labour’s inconsistency in message and reluctance to ‘confront, concede or 
convince’ account for its main criticism from commentators (see Cowley and Kavanagh, 
2015:74). Nevertheless, Labour emphasis on the NHS, inequality-i.e. the non-dom tax may 
have also resonated with some voters (Fielding, 2015:66). 
Furthermore, the party’s post-election report also indicted the campaign for failing in ‘creating a 
cohesive, consistent narrative and communicating this clearly and simply as well as for failing to 
have a consistent vision and political narrative, combined with a consistent and persistent 
approach to repetition and rebuttal’ (see Learning the Lessons Report p.9-11, 26). Similarly, 
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Moor and Ramsay (2015:57) and Scammel (2015) respectively criticizes Labour for not being as 
single-minded as the Tories and for lacking ‘emotional connection with voters and clear political 
branding’.  
That said, in an era of design and staged managed politics, where message and popular 
images of party leaders have been an ‘important source of transcient conversions’ (Butler and 
Stokes, 1975) as well as inspirational factor in vote choice (Bittner 2011), perhaps, David 
Cameron may have had more electoral value than Ed Miliband and Labour’s failure in branding, 
image and message was the Tories gain.  
11. Negative Campaigning 
Conservative Party Campaign 
The hallmark of successful campaigns has been their ‘ability to expose the weakness of the 
opposition’ (Woodward, 1995:23). From Macmillan’s ‘Don’t let Labour Ruin it in 1959 to 
Margaret Thatcher’s Labour isn’t working in 1979, negative campaigning or ‘knocking copy’ is 
an ‘old tactic of adversary politics’ in Britain (Kavanagh, 1995:158). Although, press partisanship 
in driving such negative campaign tactics have been longstanding. What seems different in 
2015, is ‘media obesity’-i.e. ‘limitless digital sources of news where this tactic was deployed 
(Moore and Ramsey, 2015:6). 
As C1’s comment below suggest, ‘’negative campaigning yes, I mean you do a poster to attack 
the opposition quite a bit of the time’’. As the evidence suggest, such attack focused on 
Labour’s credibility in handling the economy and drive towards more taxation and borrowing. As 
stated earlier, there were also personal attacks on Ed Miliband that was both press-enabled and 
digitally propagated. Trevisan and Reilly (2015) suggest that such negative campaigning and 
attack on Ed Miliband and Labour is similar to ‘US style attack ads’. However, in a critical 
indictment and direct implication of the press, Barnett (2015) and Greenslade (2015) point 
particularly to national newspapers negative coverage, ‘propaganda’ and attacks on Ed Miliband 
and the Labour Party as the reason for the 2015 defeat (table 6.7 shows press share 
endorsement in selected national newspapers). 
Table 6.7: Press share endorsements  
National Daily Daily circulation 
Figure  
% share of 
circulation  
Party support  
Sun  1, 809, 240 26. 6 % Conservative  
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Daily Mail 1, 657, 867 24. 4 % Conservative  
Mirror 868, 992 12. 8 % Labour  
Daily Telegraph  486, 262 7.2 % Conservative  
Express  432, 076 6. 4 % UKIP 
Daily Star  417, 538 6. 1 % No preference  
The Times  397,171 5. 8 % Conservative  
i 280, 074 4. 1 % Liberal Democrat 
Financial Times  210, 481 3. 1 % Conservative  
Guardian  178, 758 2. 6 %  Labour  
Independent  60, 438 0. 9 % Liberal Democrat 
Curled from: https://whorunsbritain.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2015/11/19/press-affiliation-and-the-
2015-general-election/ 
As table 6.7 show, national press seems to have been more favorable to the Conservatives and 
could have been culpable in the negative campaigning unleashed on Ed Miliband and Labour. 
As Deacon and Wring (2015:307) observe, the ‘Conservatives were able to harness and use the 
bulk of the print media for their own campaigning purpose’ and for demolishing the credibility of 
the opposition.  
Labour Party Campaign 
Although Labour equally deployed negative campaigning, evidence suggest that the party 
struggled to match the Tories organized and coordinated attacks. Perhaps, the party’s baggage 
of past record in government had in more stronger ways supplied the Tories the ammunition for 
a more sustained negative campaign. On Labour’s part however, the campaign focused on 
David Cameron as ‘elitist and more concerned about his rich friends than the poor’, and 
emphasis on equality as well as the future of the NHS under a Tory government (Moore and 
Ramsay, 2015:49). L2 suggested that ‘’attacking specific policies of the Conservatives and 
showing what was wrong with them’’ was a strategy adopted by the campaign. Similarly, L3 
stated that part of the party’s negative campaign ‘’was a focus on the Lib Dems on trying to 






Figure 6.24: Labour’s negative attack on the Lib Dems 
 
Curled from: @UKLabour 
Digitally, Tweets like #sameoldTories appeared on Labour’s Tweeter handle as well as videos 
on YouTube (see link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc) that attacked the 
Tories history ‘as the party of unrepentant Thatcherites’. Hills (2015) suggest that online support 
for Ed Miliband like the popular Milifandom was one way of ‘challenging the extremely negative 
Miliband representations produced in Murdoch-owned newspapers’.  
Although, press bias and newspaper partisanship have a long history in British politics 
(Seymore-Ure, 2001). However, some analysts compared the attack on Ed Miliband to the 1992 
election campaign attack on Neil Kinnock (Beckett 2015; Freedman, 2015). According to 
Seymore-Ure, dimensions of press partisanship in British politics reflect differently as political 
party versus press relationship and alignment, or government versus press antagonism and 
tension (ibid). Although digitization and the web has contributed in altering the British media 
architecture and landscape with growing online readers, national print media continues to 
exhibit wide influence (Gavin, 2007; Wring and Deacon, 2010). In the 1992 general elections for 
example, sentiments on the role of print media in British politics rose significantly during and 
after the campaign with the then famous Sun headline ‘It’s The Sun Wot Won It’ (Curtrice and 
Semetko, 1994). As an essential link that provides and allow for political parties and voter 
interaction, analysts suggest that recent shifts toward Tory leaning press partisanship impacted 
the 2015 elections (Beckett, 2015; Norris, 1997; 2001). Thus, like 1992, 2015 reinforced the 
view that British press contributes in shaping electoral outcome (Defty, 2015; Freedman, 2015; 
Gaber, 2015; Mance, 2015). 
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12. Campaign Feedback Strategy 
Conservative Party Campaign 
They were disproportionate use of campaign feedback strategy in the 2015 elections. However, 
what is important to mention is that digitization now offers contemporary campaign a more 
mediated ‘two-way communication channel between political parties and canvassers (Ward and 
Gibson, 1998). For the Tories, ‘’ShareTheFacts’’s-an interactive platform accessible to 
supporters and VoteSource-the party’s central database provided such feedback strategy by 
promoting information gathering for CCHQ, information dissemination from CCHQ to ground 
game troops as well as feedback in the form of data supply to CCHQ by canvassers. As C1’ 
comment below suggest, ‘’we had a feedback strategy, feedback from anyone on the field and 
our digital platform made this possible’’. Apart from serving the campaign for instant rebuttals, 
ShareTheFacts offered Team2015 and RoadTrip2015 who formed the bulk of the Tories ground 
game army a platform for returning data to CCHQ. As stated earlier, the two-way flow of 
information is one unique feature of the Tories campaign in 2015 that may have accorded them 
some advantage.  
Labour Party Campaign 
Although Labour had a central database i.e. Nation Builder/Contact Creator, with L1 suggesting 
that the party was equally conscious about ‘’trying to make a grass root activist base campaign’’. 
However, no evidence of a digital campaign strategy for enhancing campaign feedback was 
found. Again, even though the party’s canvassing and ground game troops have been 
celebrated as successful, L 3 suggest that they were ‘’very mixed report’’ on the update that was 
returned. What this suggest is that they seem to have been little coordination at Brewer’s Green 
in the use of digital for the party’s feedback strategy. Again, one would expect that having David 
Axelrod in the team would have afforded the campaign the knowhow of maximizing the open 
field competitive digital public sphere to create a well-coordinated campaign feedback strategy. 
This lack of coordination is probably more evident in the party’s post-election report where 
Beckett (2016) recommended among other things that the party ‘should try to ensure we 
maintain a two-way channel of communication and feedback of what campaigners are hearing 
on the doorstep as a major part of political intelligence’ (The labour party learning the lessons 
report p.31). From the evidence above, it seems that the opportunities offered by digital for 




13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy 
Conservative Party Campaign 
The use of digital in creating a platform for campaign interaction reinforces the Tories creativity 
in 2015. Again, at the centre of this strategy was SharetheFacts. As C1’s comment below 
suggest, ‘’we came up with a platform which is called sharethefacts- a campaigning platform for 
galvanizing of supporters and giving them actions to take in the campaign and other interactive 
platforms and interactive tools’’. Furthermore, the party’s post-election review report seem to 
also suggest that they were also webinars that were conducted regularly to keep canvassers not 
only aware of decisions at the Pod, but to also train volunteers and canvassers on how to use 
VoteSource (CPR, 2016:34). Jackson (2015) praised the Tories for using digital to inspire a new 
gamified interaction between the party and supporters. Similarly, Elder and Edmonds (2015) 
also point to the campaign’s interactive tax calculator –a digital platform where the electorate 
entered their salary to calculate their tax and see how much they ‘were saving’ as one way the 
campaign interacted with people ‘beyond core supporters’ and had conversation on the issues 
they were most interested in. 
Labour Party Campaign 
For the Labour Party, even though there were digital platforms like Nation Builder and Contact 
Creator and as L1 stated effort ‘’to reach out to supporters and activist to get them to do more 
campaigning’’, there is no evidence of a party designed campaign interaction strategy. As L2 
stated, what ‘’was important for the campaign was ‘’understanding what issues would move 
voters and where we were getting our best response and I think it was that that was more 
important than any anecdotal feedback from the doors steps’’. The Electoral Commission also 
reported spending on hustings-meeting where election candidates answer questions from 
audience as well as local non-party campaign events like press conferences, media events and 
rallies that suggest alternative platforms for campaign interaction. That notwithstanding, it is 
empirically weak to conclude that Labour had relied on such events for the party’s campaign 
interaction strategy (see Electoral commission report on the administration of the 2015 GE p.70; 
Campaign spending report p.36). 
14. Speed and consistency of campaign communication  
Conservative Party Campaign 
The culture of news spinning and instant rebuttals in British elections is not new (Moran, 2001). 
However, technology seem to now facilitate the speed of such campaign tactic. For example, 
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Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) and Ross (2015a) found that Twitter enabled the Tories to rebut 
‘negative media stories, circulate statements to the press and stir up trouble for the opposition’ 
during the campaign. As C1 statement here shows, the Tory campaign had thought of ‘’ways to 
sort of inspire our support group to take part, respond to issues on time with counters facts and 
so we came up with a platform which is called sharethefacts’’. As we will see below, the Tories 
carefully used technology to gamify this tactic, with volunteers and supporters receiving rewards 
for task completed to enhance the campaign’s digital operations. 
Labour Party Campaign 
There is no evidence of campaign speed and consistency in the Labour party. As stated earlier, 
a very clear sign that this was missing in the party’s campaign architecture was Beckett (2016) 
report recommendation that the party should ensure maintenance of  a ‘two-way channel of 
communication and feedback of what campaigners are hearing on the doorstep as a major part 
of political intelligence’ (The labour party learning the lessons report p.31). Scammell (2015) 
criticizes the party for its’ failing in ‘modern campaign wisdom of news management and instant 
rebuttals’. Perhaps Labour’s pre-election weaknesses had forced it to put up with Neil Kinnock’s 
1992 general election order of ordeal. Again, this is surprising considering that the party had 
David Axelrod in its campaign ranks. That said, even though legacy media was Tory dominated, 
the absence of a centrally coordinated counter-attack platform can count as another weak point 
in Labour’s 2015 campaign. 
15. Campaign Games  
Conservative Party Campaign 
Evidence suggest that only the Tories had used gamification in 2015. As C1’s comment below 
shows, ‘’we came up with a platform which is called sharethefacts so is a campaigning platform 
as an app on your phone we set up for our supporters and every time you share they share any 
piece of  content on that platform or something got retweeted online then they got points then 
they had a lead table and the more points you got the more you move up the lead table so we 
sort of using gamification to help people share the content they wanted to share’’ . 
Moore and Ramsay (2015:26) also found similar evidence (see UK 2015 Elections: Setting the 
Agenda report p.26), with Jackson (2015) suggesting that the strategy of gamifying participation 
was ‘designed to encourage interaction with their campaign’. Elder and Edmonds (2015) also 
asserted that they made online canvassers genuine and vital part of their team by creating ‘a 
leaderboard and prizes-posters signed by George Osborne and books signed by Boris etc.’ That 
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said, in an era of decreasing political participation and engagement with a highly technologically 
savvy millennial generation, perhaps, gamification has the potential to inspire a new era of mass 
participation in elections.  
Labour Party Campaign 
Apart from attempts like stopping disillusioned Lib Dems members from returning to the party as 
highlighted in figure 6.24, there is no evidence of the use of gamification by Labour.  
16. The permanent Campaign 
Conservative Party Campaign 
According to Scammell (1995), the lunch of the Blue Book or War Book by CCO in the days of 
Margaret Thatcher far ahead of the 1987 election represent the earliest sign of the permanent 
campaign in Britain. More recently like in 1987, such long term plan like ‘opinion polling that took 
place in target seats prior to 2015’ and the leader’s tour in target seats that generated media 
coverage for the Prime Minster in regional media seem to account for ingredients of the 
permanent campaign (Fisher, 2015:148). Furthermore, apart from incumbency that seem to 
have procured the Tories opportunity for the permanent campaign, C1’s comment below equally 
suggests that the plan to win the 2015 election started early. As he stated, ‘’so one of the most 
important thing we did was we recognized very early the need to try the best we can to awaken 
the social media attitude of the people’’. Ross (2015:109) also found that it was in ‘October 
2013, around the time of the Conservative Party conference in Manchester that Elder launched 
a test campaign to gather the empirical data that Crosby required in order to know how big a 
role digital campaigning would play’.  
Furthermore, Beckett’s report seem to also suggest that the ‘fixed-term parliament’ and certainty 
of election timetable gave the Tories the momentum for campaigning that started ‘3 years 
before election day, with direct mail such as personal letters from David Cameron to carefully 
selected individual voters whose details and interests were held on a central data base’ (Labour 
party learning the lessons report p.6). Among other things, Garland and Terry (2015:5) argue 
that part of the electoral benefit of the fixed-term parliament was making ‘the Prime Minister’s 
visit to the Palace purely for show’. Cambell and Lee (2015) are of the view that ‘the reality of 
the permanent campaign was more visible online with online posters appearing nearly daily, 




Labour Party Campaign 
For Labour, even though the fixed term parliament conferred similar opportunity to the party, 
there is no evidence of the permanent campaign in the party’s approach. As Roberts (2015) 
argue, Ed Miliband and his team ‘left a vacuum at the heart of the official parliamentary 
opposition and ceded the narrative to the Conservative from 2010 to May 2015. 
In conclusion, this section has tested the application of the Obama model in the 2015 elections-
with evidence showing convergence in all 16 elements and different level of application between 
the Conservatives and Labour. For example, while the Conservative party had deployed all 
sixteen elements, Labour fell short in using campaign and interaction strategy, speed and 
consistency of campaign communication, gamification and the permanent campaign. That said, 
the key difference is that while the Obama model was applied in an unregulated data 
environment, British political parties are compelled to comply with data protection regulations in 
their design of data-driven campaign practices. Nevertheless, like the United States, 
campaigning in Britain seem to be moving away from longstanding traditional, socio-economic 
and geodemographic categorization and segmentation of voters that characterized previous 
elections to more data driven, personalized and microtargeted forms-with media abundance and 
new opportunities for digital advertising trumping Political Party Broadcasts (PPBs) and Party 
Election Broadcasts (PEBs). 
          6.3: Theory and Convergence: The two-way flow, path dependence and 
constrains of Americanization in the 2015 British Election 
First, it is important to emphasize that the methodological impetus for this case study hinged on 
the fact that agents of Americanization (i.e. campaign consultants) were hired by both the 
Conservative and Labour Party in 2015. Thus, representing an instance in which something 
similar may have happened. That said, whilst it is true that British political campaigns have 
historically been inspired by events and interaction across the Atlantic, evidence point to 
alternative theoretical explanation-i.e. the two-way flow and path dependence as explanation for 
convergence-even though practices deployed in 2015 bear semblance with the Obama model. 
Interestingly however, this is surprising, considering the role of agents of Americanization in the 
elections. That notwithstanding, Collier (1993) is of the view that the goal of comparative work is 
in part to find and demonstrate evidence of parallel manifestation of theory. In this sense, this 
account as one of the main contributions of this study. 
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That said, British legal context i.e. the Data Protection Act (1998) had limited complete 
Americanization in 2015. As Kavanagh (1992:71) has argued, such institutional constrains ‘limit 
the opportunity for innovation’,-in this case US type innovation of data driven campaigning. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that methodologies for measuring influence and 
‘knowledge uptake’ across varied context differ and include-i.e. evaluation reports, theory based 
methods, contribution analysis, process tracing, social network analysis, participatory methods 
and case studies (Tsui and Lucas, 2013). The judgement made here is the subject of empirical 
material derived from the case study approach. The judgement though descriptive, is guided by 
the study’s critical realist stance and the weaving of the analysis with the rich history of British 
electioneering (see Bhaskar, 1988; George and Bennett, 2005; von Mises, 2005).  
That said, the empirical evidence that emerged on the two-way flow seem to echo some 
theoretical position highlighted earlier in the theory chapter. Previous research has established 
for example that instances of the two-way flow in British political communication are 
longstanding. As Cunliffe (1974) (cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996) argue, 
evidence of ‘a two-way traffic in fads, reforms, inventions and theories shared between the 
United States and Europe’ exist that shows the manner in which practices flow across the globe 
today. The Clinton campaign of 1992 is one of such examples of the two-way flow. In that 
campaign, Philp Gould-a British political consultant and former advertising executive was hired 
by the Democratic Party as a consultant (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001). 
Evidence here seem to support such arguments. For example, Barack Obama’s campaign of 
2012 had the imprint of Matthew McGregor-a British political consultant from East Anglia who 
was responsible and credited for the success of Obama’s digital rapid response (Hines, 2012; 
Wright, 2013). Speaking about Matthew’s role, both Teddy Goff-digital director of Obama 
campaign and David Axelrod respectfully said ‘he was one of the unsung heroes of the 
campaign whose finger prints were on every video, every e-mail and everything we did on 
Twitter’-‘Matthew has got that edge to him’. The introduction of Britain’s RomneyShambles-one 
of Barack Obama’s convention speech standing ovation moment into the American mainstream 
and digital media is credited to Matthew (see link 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yTq2EIbTHg).  
Indeed, this view was similarly echoed by L1. As his stated, ‘’we had David Axelrod from the 
Obama campaign who was Obama chief strategist. He came over-he wasn’t in the sort of data 
metrics heavily-he was more about message making-the big message and we also had Matthew 
McGregor who worked on the digital side of things for the Obama campaign’’. That said, what this 
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comment suggest is that the Obama model was not without the contribution, skill and knowhow 
from Britain. In this sense, attributing convergence in 2015 as a complete product of American 
inspiration and influence undermines the contribution made from this side of the Atlantic as well 
as the interconnectedness of home-grown skills and knowhow in contemporary British campaign. 
Furthermore, Matthew McGregor’s role in the Obama campaign also point to his contribution in 
the evolution of the Obama model and reinforces Plasser (2000) argument about the role of 
consultants from other countries like Britain in the global exchange of political communication 
practices. 
Regarding path dependence, evidence seem to support Kreiss (2016) argument that 
‘campaigns are in large part the outcome of party network processes that unfold over time, 
including the work of people and organizations that build infrastructure, staffers who cross fields 
and organizations that emerge after campaigns’ (p.18). For example, the campaign team of both 
the Conservative Party-Craig Elder-former advertising and communication director at 
McDonalds, Coca-Cola, BBC etc.; Tom Edmonds-former sales director head of IT/media; 
Lynton Crosby-the Wizard of OZ, and Labour-Greg Beales-former special adviser to Prime 
Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown; Tom Baldwin-former Times Journalist; and Matthew 
McGregor-Barack Obama’s campaign respectively point to individuals who come with a 
sustained background in other sectors. Such background and knowledge one would naturally 
think can inspire both creativity in design and use of tactics that align with the Obama model. 
For example, Craig and Tom who both seem to have had reputable careers in the IT, marketing 
and communication industry were part of the Tories campaign in 2010.  
Similarly, Lyton Crosby had work for the Tories since 2005. Thus, it is likely that the drive 
towards improvement from previous campaigns came from within as a response to changing 
electioneering tactics and improved understanding of emerging tools. As C1 stated about the 
Tories, ‘’we built an in house team effectively of around 8 to 10 people which included digital 
experts, so people from Twitter and Facebook targeting using data, we built a creative team as 
well as designers, video makers, copyrighters, people who can produce all the content we 
needed in house and then used our digital experts to kind of power these into apps to the right 
people’’. 
In the Labour party, L3 also stated that ‘’the Labour party has built up a digital capability really 
between 2010 and 2015 and which it had really invested in’’. In his words, ‘’I think there is sense 
that when you are building election campaign you are typically working off the model of the last 
election and so I mean most of the things that were significant about the planning that went into 
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2015 are things that sort of lessons that were learnt form 2010 not like we copied literally from 
them’’. L2 also thought that ‘’the Obama campaign probably the 2008 campaign sets a kind of 
new standard for campaigning and a new standard for the use of online campaigning, 
fundraising online, gathering data online and people signing up to support and being 
communicated with by email and all that sort of thing and this was done by an in-house Labour 
team’’.  
The comments of L3 and L2 above seem to support Arthur (1994) argument that it is ‘increasing 
returns’ (a situation where increasing benefits accrue to a product) and ‘path dependence’ 
(events in the early stages of a phenomenon’s development) that inspires their adoption and 
further development as more experience about them is gained. As C1 stated, ‘’I think the most 
important thing about the Obama campaign was it made British politicians realize what you 
could achieve with the internet. So in the 2015 elections we and our business partner Craig 
Elder had worked in the 2010 election campaign for the Conservatives and I think politicians 
paid lips service really to digital they sort of thought it was important but they didn’t really believe 
it in their hearts so I think what the Obama campaign did was sort of show everyone the 
potential of digital and so that meant that when we sort of go to the people in the party to pitch 
about the importance of it, finally they believed it and they could see it with their own eyes and 
that meant that it was easier for me to recruit a team and it was also easier for me to get a 
budget it was easier for them to put their faith in digital as a campaigning tool because they 
have seen it done previously and I think that’s the importance’’.  
That said, following Collier and Collier (1991) and Pierson (2000), the argument the evidence 
above invoke is that ’mechanisms of reproduction’, ‘positive feedback’, ‘relative benefit’ and 
increasing returns for innovating seem to have acted as the source of inspiration towards the 
Obama model. Thus, making path dependence argument more appropriate for explaining the 
source and pattern of change in practices produced and deployed in the 2015 elections.  
However, although it could be argued that the two Americans-i.e. Jim Messina and David Axelrod 
would have made contributions to both the Tories and Labour Party’s campaign respectively, their 
contributions and Labour’s digital campaign weakness in particular raises questions on attempts 
to attribute convergence in practices to complete Americanization. Similarly, discussing their role 
as critical to both parties campaign without recourse to the contribution of Lynton Crosby and 
home grown recruited digital technologists and advertising consultants  on both sides of the 
campaign will mean empirical blindness that shouldn’t be made only for the purpose of arguing in 
favour of Americanization. Thus, it will be both empirically and theoretically weak to conclude that 
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since Jim Messina and David Axelrod had contributed to data profiling and message making 
respectively, then the emergence and use of elements of the Obama model in the 2015 elections 
suggest Americanization. Again, such conclusion can only be made if we ignore the rich and long 
history of British electioneering campaign that has been highlighted in the analysis above and the 
mixture of national and international talents assembled for the 2015 campaign by both political 
parties. As C1 stated, ‘’we did work with Jim Messina who worked on the Obama campaign and 
so they were brought in and another agency to help out and so they sort of helped us with some 
of sort of techniques particularly in terms of the data profiling that has been so successful for 
Obama’’. Similarly, L3’s comment below seem to suggest that David Axelrod contribution was 
only in the area of message making. As he stated ‘’I mean David Axelrod came over and worked 
on the Labour campaign and I think probably there was also a sort of subtle influence I think 
Obama won in 2008 and 2012 but in 2012 Obama had won on a many versus few type argument 
which was our message and I think that was the basis of the Labour campaign in 2015’’.  
Indeed, Cowley and Kavanagh (2015:89) found that ‘within the core Labour team, there was 
doubts about Axelrod’s utility and the value-for-money that his appointment represented’. 
According to Cowley and Kavanagh, insiders in the campaign had described him as ‘comfort 
blanket for Douglas Alexander and a very expensive process story’, with one senior member of 
the Labour campaign team claiming they had ‘no idea what he did’,-with his role surrounding 
issues like ‘draft of speeches and debate preparations’-and his main celebrated contribution being 
in ‘forcing Labour to compose a narrative or overall story of Britain only succeed when working 
families succeed’.  
Such contribution as well as Jim Messina’s to the Conservative Party in the area of data profiling 
is not enough to conclude that both Parties strategy was a function of transfer of practices or 
Americanization. Furthermore, differences in the use of digital advertising, gamification and data 
driven targeting between the Conservative and Labour Party equally suggest that the two ‘agents 
of Americanization’ operated at different levels of the insight even though both were an integral 
part of Obama’s campaign.  
That said, although this is not a claim that the Americanization thesis has exhausted its 
explanatory capacities and theoretical relevance. Nevertheless, it is fair however to conclude that 
practices in the 2015 election rather than Americanization had many causal paths and was more 
a function of path-dependence and internal party awakening in traditional British electioneering. 
As Scammell (1995:293) argue, ‘there is a native British history of campaigning’ and the 
contextual background highlighted in each of the elements discussed above suggest that such 
native British campaign history was brought to bear in 2015 with nothing significantly new, except 
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for digital advertising, gamification and data driven insight of voter identification, targeting and 
mobilization. 
Lastly, even though we choose to argue that the introduction of digital advertising, gamification 
and data driven voter mobilization is a consequence of Americanization, Britain’s data regulatory 
framework i.e. The Data Protection Act (DPA) of 1998 represent an institutional contextual 
constraint that inhibits the complete adoption of US style data driven practices in the United 
Kingdom. As will be highlighted below, data protection regulation account for one of the main 
contextual difference and challenge identified by all respondents as a constraint in the application 
of the data driven component of the Obama model. As L1’s comment suggest for example, ‘’you 
can’t do exactly the same thing because data protection laws are different, issues about data 
protection in particular means you can’t mine data in the same way that the Obama campaign 
did-that is limiting’’. Thus, as Norris (1997:211) argue, differences in context seem to continue the 
restriction of ‘wholesale importation of American campaigning’ into Britain. 
          6.4: Context and Model Application 
As highlighted in the methodology, this study had intended to explore the application of the 
Obama model in the two case studies without overlooking specific national conditions that may 
shape the model’s application. Thus, the research design had sort to empirically identify such 
country specific factors that may limit or influence the application of the elements in both case 
studies. Methodologically, the advantage of such approach is that it allows empirical material to 
point researcher to factors and conditions that may have influenced, inhibited or limited 
application of the model in both countries. 
That said, as stated above, evidence point to data protection regulation as a factor that 
conditioned deployment of the data driven component of the Obama model. Nevertheless, it is 
important to mention however, that in line with the Representation of People Regulation Act 
2001, all British political parties are usually entitled to the electoral register (i.e. name and 
address), and ‘marked register’ (i.e. list of voters in previous elections) and these data sources 
as well as canvassing returns (i.e. doorstep, email, and telephone/surveys) constitute the bulk of 
data available for use during campaign in British elections (see Information Commissioner 
Democracy Disruption Report p, 12-14).  
However, whilst the political parties have access and can use these data during campaign, the 
Data Protection Regulation expect them as data controllers to use such data with consent as 
well as within the legitimate interest of the data controller (see 1998 Data Protection Principles 
schedule 2&3). In this sense, every British political party is a data controller with responsibilities. 
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However, such responsibilities I should mention are not enshrined anywhere in the US-thus the 
difference. As a legislation, DPA mandates data controllers (i.e. person who determines the 
purpose and manner of processing of personal data) like a political party to register with the 
Information Commissioner Office. Again, this is not the case in America. According to Robert 
(2013), by the standard of the legislation, such data processing must be fair and lawful and used 
for the specified lawful purpose with failure to do so regarded as a criminal offence.  
Interestingly, this transparency and responsibility question is absent in the US campaign 
context, and this suggest an obvious limitation in the use of data driven campaigning in Britain. 
As L3’s comment below suggest, ‘’they definitely were legal constraints although GDPR was not 
in force, the 1998 Data Protection Act was and many of the things which are codified into GDPR 
are anyway already prohibited under the 1998 Act and I don’t think though I can’t speak for 
other parties but from the perspective of the Labour Party I don’t think our system was as 
sufficiently sophisticated nor are we doing very much paid targeting of people that we will run 
against the limit of what we were allowed to do and what the regulation says. So I think we were 
well within in terms of what we were doing, we were well within the bounds of what was legally 
acceptable’’. Similarly, C1 suggested that even though ‘’the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) recently came up in the UK, ‘’we had our eyes on the laws for example on the 1998 
Data Protection Act’’. 
Furthermore, in the Tories post-election review report for example, there is evidence that CCHQ 
had a ‘Compliance Department’ that communicated regulations and ensured that ‘Associations 
keep to the law’. There is also for example, an instance in the report where staffers thought that 
compliance with the ‘Data Protection Act is being used as an excuse to prevent the legitimate 
use of data by others’ as well as instances where ‘branch officers are not allowed the details of 
their members’ (CPRR p.36). Such administrative and legal constraint suggest limitation that 
may have influenced dissimilarity in how the data driven component of the Obama model was 
deployed. 
Similarly, to ensure ‘integrity of the regulatory controls’ and data protection compliance, 
compliance with Political Parties Election and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA), and 
Representation of People Act 1983 (RPA), the Electoral Commission produced and issued a 
‘factsheet’ to explain how campaigners should apply the rules in the use of data (see Electoral 
Commission Report on the Administration of the 2015 GE p.67). Thus, as this evidence 
suggest, such clear regulation and guideline and the implication of non-compliance by political 
parties is not only an institutional example of differences in British and US data legislation, but 
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also a contextual factor that limits the application of US type unregulated data driven model of 
campaigning in Britain. 
          6.5: Context and innovative Data-driven Campaign in British Politics: 
Secondary Literature and Reflection on the limitation of Data Set 
As indicated in chapter four, the methodological approach for exploring the British context and 
its effect on innovative data-driven campaign practices was designed in a way that such 
contextual factors and conditions emerged solely from the empirical material collected in this 
study. That said, while it is understandable that such design and approach may run into 
problems of under-reporting mostly when sample size and time frame for data collection is 
limited, methodological approaches like participant observation and a much more ‘larger sample 
and longitudinal’ approach could have generated more data, interpretation and ‘richer 
understanding of the social’ and institutional context of the country (see Kawulich, 2005; 
Jackson, 2018). Thus, given this limitation and the fact that the analytic theme discussed above 
as a contextual factor fall short of capturing broader discussion in the literature, this section 
reflect on the limitation of the data set utilized by matching the evidence discussed in section 6.4 
above with broader discussion from secondary literature on the contextual dynamics of digital 
politics in the United Kingdom. This way, the study addresses the methodological limitation and 
expand discussion on factors that influence dissimilarity.  
Analysis and Limitation of the Data set  
By the nature of the study’s design, interpretation and discussion of contextual factors and 
conditions that shape the uptake and deployment of innovative data-driven campaign practices 
in the UK emerged solely from the empirical materials collected and was fully represented in the 
data set (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Thus, analysis relied solely on data collected to 
develop the category of theme discussed in section 6.4. However, while the contextual factor 
discussed is fully represented in the data collected, the discussion does not wholly and explicitly 
capture the huge body of work on British electoral context and its impact on innovative data 
driven campaign practices. Recall that as indicated in section 4.4:3, cultural and racial barriers 
to penetrating the American and British field-site limited access to interview wish list. 
Nevertheless, since data collected was sufficient to illustrate theory, this have not diminished 
the relevance of the findings and empirical claims (see Starks and Trinidad 2007; Saunders et 
al. 2018). However, as a way of addressing the limitation of the data set utilized in this chapter, 
this section draws on secondary literature to add to the discussion on the British context and its 
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impact on digital politics. Three contextual factors are further discussed below as a way of 
enhancing the analysis. 
Resources Constraints  
As indicated earlier, the contextual factor discussed as influential in the application of the 
Obama model in the United Kingdom emerged solely from empirical evidence. However, the 
body of work that exist on the penetration of digital politics and adoption of US-style data-driven 
innovation in British campaign suggest that other contextual factors are also at play. As Anstead 
and Chadwick (2009) show, the ‘broader resources available to political actors heavily condition 
their ability to make effective use of the internet for campaigning’. As they argue, a good data-
driven campaign in Britain does not ‘offset other communication, institutional and strategic 
weakness’. For example, Anstead (2017) indicate that the infrastructure for incentivizing data-
driven campaign like the ‘UK electoral register is a relatively imprecise document with little 
standardization’. Similarly, Anstead also found that the role of polls in gathering data for 
innovative data-driven campaigning is a complex and expensive process. Thus, disparity in data 
availability bears consequence on what both big and small political parties in Britain can do in 
terms of microtargeting.  
Furthermore, Anstead and Chadwick (2009) also argue that ‘campaign finance is another area 
where pre-existing institutions have an impact on internet-based campaign strategies’ in the UK. 
According to them, ‘the centralize nature of British parties offers far fewer opportunities for 
individuals to donate’. Anstead (2017) also argue that ‘the level of resources expended in UK 
electoral politics’ is different from the ‘largesse of the US system’. For example, Pattie and 
Johnston (2016) suggest that while some local parties in Britain are resource rich, many are not, 
since a ‘vast majority of political donations in Britain are given to the national headquarters of a 
party’. In their work, Pattie and Johnson show for example, how ‘only half of all Conservative 
and fewer than one in six Labour and Liberal Democrat constituency parties had an annual 
turnover in 2010 exceeding £25,000. Such limited resources and level of campaign finance 
mobilisation as well as spending caps imposed by the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883 
and the Political Parties Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA) impinge on 
technologically innovative and expansive methods and design in British election campaign that 
can be similar or equated to the US model. 
Thus, as Fisher and Denver (2009) argue, human and financial resources affect how effectively 
British campaigns are conducted. Since technologically innovative and digitally driven campaign 
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practices evolve as technology changes, political parties in Britain only adopt according to the 
level of resources available to them (ibid). Johnston and Pattie (2014) also suggest that issues 
regarding the recruitment of ‘local party workers and raising substantial funds to spend on 
campaigning have been central to party strategies’ in British elections. Gibson et al. (2003) 
found evidence for example, that political parties with the ‘greatest amount of resources’ tend to 
develop and deploy more creative and innovative data-driven campaign practices. According to 
Jackson and Lilleker (2009), the ‘fairly narrow’ coverage of digital tools in British politics reflect 
what they call ‘resource based-issues’. Thus, it could be said as Murdock (2018:359) argued, 
that ‘raw materials and resources’ and chains of labour’ are contributory contextual factors that 
shape the uptake and flow of political communication in modern British elections. 
Data-driven voter identification Infrastructure 
As stated earlier, trends in how British political parties-i.e. Labour and the Conservative Party 
use and deploy innovative data-driven campaign tools mirror patterns from across the Atlantic 
(Jackson, 2007). However, such approach to campaigning seem to be limited by the ingredients 
and infrastructure that drive and power the design of such innovative campaign practices. Whilst 
these ingredients and infrastructure for voter understanding and mobilisation have increasingly 
become part of the architecture of British political parties, the scale seem to focus more on party 
members only (ibid). According to Anstead (2017), one of such barriers is the ‘lack of an 
electoral register that identifies voters by partisan preference’. Anstead also suggest that ‘the 
lack of a national register of email addresses and mobile phone numbers means that campaigns 
are rarely, if ever, reaching an undecided voter through the web’. For example, Jackson (2007) 
found that ‘members-only email lists’ is what Labour and the Conservative party ‘relied on to 
direct volunteer help’. Similarly, Anstead and Chadwick (2009) also indicate that in the UK, 
‘volunteer activists are hardly in abundant supply like in the US’. And in situations where they 
are available, ‘age range of most of the activists include 80year olds’ who can be classified as 
digital immigrants-thus, limiting the use of mediated tools for data gathering and digital 
campaign innovation. In this regard, the ecosystem that facilitate the design of data-driven 
campaign approaches are far less sophisticated than in the US (Ward and Vedel, 2006).  
As Ward and Vedel (2006) argue, because of this ecosystem, ‘many parties in the UK only host 
elaborate ICT campaign infrastructure at their headquarters’-with ‘branch level access and use 
of new ICTs’ only patchy’. In other words, ‘political and social realities frame the use of 
technologies’ in British elections in ways different to the US (ibid). Nevertheless, this is not to 
say that similar data-driven developments and pattern are not emerging in the British campaign 
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landscape. Jackson (2007) is of the view that enhancing the deployment of digitally driven 
campaign practices in the UK would require political parties to ‘possess the will to overcome the 
problems of creating an open architecture of participation’. As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) 
argue, the point to note is that even though they have been attempt to maximize digital potential 
in the UK, ‘television and old-style direct-marketing, and its benefits for targeting undecided 
voters in key marginals’ continue to shape ‘the adoption of internet campaigning’. 
Institutions, Party and Political Organisation 
According to Anstead and Chadwick (2009) ‘existing institutions can act as catalysts or anti-
catalysts’ of digital politics. Gallagher (2015) suggest for example that institutional context like 
the British first-past-the-post electoral system inspires a different methodology of voter 
mobilization and targeting during elections. Karp et al. (2008) also suggest that parties in the 
United Kingdom seem ‘to adopt a mobilization strategy by focusing their efforts on the most 
committed voter’. As Petts (2015) argue, where people live in Britain make them more important 
voters-such that political parties usually seem to concentrate in targeting voters in those areas 
to ensure electoral success. Similarly, Anstead (2017) is of the view that larger political parties 
in the UK usually make decisions about ‘seats to target and then which voters to target within 
those seats’. In other words, ‘system-level characteristics’ contribute in shaping the uptake of 
digital tools for canvassing and voter mobilization (see Karp et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, Anstead (2017) also suggest that the British electoral system is a prominent factor 
that ‘forces UK parties to focus their energies on certain would-be voters in a narrow number of 
seats’. Thus, because ‘British political parties are comparatively integrated and hierarchical, 
national headquarters exert close control over the whole party’-such that the lines of campaign 
communication during elections ‘are more vertically oriented, more firmly drawn and based in 
long-established formal structures with accompanying bureaucracies (see Anstead and 
Chadwick, 2009). As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) argue, ‘the internet’s technological 
affordances for creating loose horizontal networks have fewer affinities with this set of 
arrangements’.  Thus, because of what they term ‘routinized institutional traits’ of British political 
parties-that usually involve less ‘pressure to continually rebuild from scratch’, innovative data 
driven campaigning in the UK follow a unique and different pattern to the American-Obama 
model. 
That said, while these patterns of systemic, institutional and organizational features differ from 
America’s-with scholars like Gibson et al. (2016) suggesting that the US is ‘significantly more 
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advanced’, they do not completely restrict the adoption of American-style data-driven innovation 
in British campaign. Nevertheless, what this section further highlight is that differences in 
political system, institutions and organisation bears consequence to how data-driven campaign 
practices are applied and adopted by political parties and campaigns in the UK. Thus, whilst it 
can also be said that technology is reshaping campaigning in the UK, contextual factors seem to 
be mediating input and outcome and de-incentivizing wholesome adoption of US-style 
innovation.  
Therefore, in thinking about digital politics in the UK, it is important to take into account those 
elements of the institutional and organizational environment that influence the utility of new 
technology and emerging campaign tactics. Thus, while the contextual factors highlighted above 
seem to provide additional explanation for national differences and dissimilarity between the UK 
and US, they also provide further hypothesis that can be further tested against the index of 
factors that de-incentivize or inhibit the complete adoption of US-style data-driven innovation in 
British election campaign. 
          6.6: Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has discussed application of the Obama model in 2015, showing 
historical background and how Labour and the Tories applied elements of the model. The 
chapter also discussed alternative theoretical explanation for convergence as well as a context 
specific factor that limited the application of the model in the UK. Drawing from empirical 
literature and as a way of addressing the limitation on the data set utilized for the analysis, the 
chapter also added to the discussion on the British context and its impact on digital politics. 
Taken together, what the evidence suggest is that to understand how campaign practices are 
deployed, used and integrated in British elections, a historical trajectory and a modern context 
are especially important for explaining the diffusion of evolving transnational features and 
characteristics of contemporary political communication. The next chapter will explore the 2016 
Trump campaign-a search for deviant elements as a way of explaining any advancement away 
from the data driven component of the Obama model. This is important considering the 
conversation around Facebook and Cambridge Analytica as well as investigation of the Trump’s 
campaign. Thus, President Trump’s campaign is critical for understanding the modernization of 





                                        7: Case Study III 
          7.1: Introduction 
From the context of the 2016 Trump campaign, this chapter seek to further advance the 
typology of data driven practices that emerged in case study I & II as well as the explanatory 
scope of Swanson and Mancini’s modernization thesis. Focus therefore is on three things. First, 
evidence is used to describe innovative advancement in data driven campaign practice (s). 
Second, evidence that expands the explanatory scope of modernization thesis is provided. 
Third, US unique contextual feature that drive innovation in US political communication 
landscape is highlighted as well as the role of the Kremlin in the 2016 campaign. This way, the 
chapter adds both to the typological theorizing and theory testing in the previous case studies. 
          7.2: Modernization and Innovative Advancement in Data-driven Practice (s): 
From Political Characteristics to Emotional Characterization 
On the 8 of November 2016, the United States of America voted to elect Donald Trump the 45th 
President-with an Electoral College majority of 306 to defeat Hilary Clinton with 232 irrespective 
of the 3 million more majority vote for Clinton (see table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Popular vote share 
Presidential 
Candidate  
     Political 
Party 
Vote Share Percentage Electoral 
College 
















Source: AP-After 99.7% of voting districts 
 
Arising from the unexpected and surprise election, commentators and scholars across diverse 
background have produced multiple and divergent set of explanation on the outcome (see 
appendix V for the commentary). 
Now, before discussion evidence of modernization or advancement in data-driven practice (s) 
and the implication of such advancement for theory, it is necessary to mention however, that the 
main focus here is on how the Trump campaign sit in the context of the Obama model’s data 
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driven practices. Thus, the discussion below focused primarily on changes in data driven 
practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. As stated in the methodology, emphasis on President 
Trump’s campaign hinge on the increasing conversation on the campaign’s use of 
psychographics and the revelatory potential of the use of such practice for theory expansion. 
Thus, rather than an analysis of similarity and continuity in practices, the campaign serves as a 
longitudinal lens for providing insight into data driven innovative changes that emerged in the 
2016 election cycle. Nevertheless, where evidence that support similarity, continuity or 
differences emerge, such evidence will be highlighted in the analysis both as a way of 
signposting broader changes in the socio-political and technological context and analytic 
exhaustion of empirical material collected. 
Table 7.2: Changes in internet and technology trends in the US 




























2012 Technological Changes  
Big data 
Predictive modelling/analytics 
Experiment informed programs (EIPs) that 
enabled microtargeting on social media, 
mybarackobama.com app and targeted TV 
ad buying 




(i) The Facebook Pixel  
(a) Measure cross-device conversion 
and understand how cross-device 
ads help influence conversion  
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(b) Optimised delivery that ensures that 
ads are shown to the people most 
likely to take action 
(c) Dynamic advertising that help 
automatically show website visitors 
ads on other websites 
(ii) Facebook Offline Conversion for 
measuring how much your 
Facebook ads lead to real-world 
outcomes 
(iii) Facebook for Business-
Automatic targeting of ads to 
people who are most likely to 
find the ads relevant with further 
target audience like Core 
Audience, Custom Audience, 
and Lookalike Audiences. 
Source: Own elaboration of data from Pew Research Center 
As table 7.2 show, the broader technological context within which the 2016 campaign occurred 
indicate growth in internet and technological tools. Thus, in presenting evidence of how these 
changes impacted on data driven practices, the discussion draws on the meta in table 7.3-7.6 
for interpretive claims and generalization. Where quotes are used, respondents are depicted as 
T, while participants in audio records are coded as AM. 
 Table 7.3: Interviews conducted 















              
   
 
                             Consistent with R/O 
Refer to table 4.3 for participant incidentals. 
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Table 7.4: Audio records  













             
                     
 
                               Relevant 
Refer to table 4.9 for participant incidentals. 
Table 7.5:  Documents  
Total number of 
Documents Collected  
                Insight 
 
        1- 22 
(see methodology) 
 
                   Relevant  
 
Refer to table 4.12 for title and source. 
Table 7.6: Newspapers 
 Newspaper Articles Collected              Insight 
       1- 22 
(see methodology) 
             Relevant  
Refer to table 4.13 for title and authors. 
Drawing from the meta data above, the analysis below will focus on innovative data driven 
techniques in the 2016 Trump campaign and the reputability of Swanson and Mancini’s 
modernization thesis as an explanatory theoretical lens for such innovation.  
Analytically, this approach is guided by ‘deviant case analysis’ (Wicks, 2012)-where critical 
observation is imposed on data as a way of identifying innovative data-driven practice (s) that 
differ significantly from Obama’s. In signposting such innovation, the analysis draws from Fang 
(1997), Li and Bernoff (2011) and William and Delli-Carpini (2011) framework for evaluating 
politically relevant media and technology. Methodologically, such approach towards identifying 
deviant elements is conducive for generating new elements, variables, hypothesis or typology 
(George and Bennett, 2005). Thus, what Trump’s campaign offer is a context for identifying 
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innovative data-driven campaign practices that differ in significance from Obama’s voter 
predictive modelling and the theoretical implication of such innovation. That said, this specific 
focus meets both the methodological and theoretical underpinning of the research design and 
the difference in analytical approach between cases hinge on the fact that Trump’s campaign is 
used mainly to test modernization. 
That said, the main difference as the evidence suggest is that unlike the Obama model, Trump’s 
campaign access to unsolicited Facebook data that has been the subject of investigations and a 
fine, and the five factor personality model and behavioural dynamics voter profiling methodology 
of Cambridge Analytica and Strategic Communications Laboratories (SCL Group) produced 
psychographic, psychological and personality insight that moved data-driven predictive voter 
modelling away from the identification of political characteristics of voters in the Obama model 
to identification of the psychographic, psychological and emotional characteristics of voters. 
Although in the early 90s scholars like Kleinman (1987), Worcester (1991) and Wring (1997) 
suggest that there was a move towards ‘psychographic forms’ of voter segmentation ‘designed 
to explore voters’ more deep-seated values and attitudes’ in the United Kingdom and America. 
What is not clear is whether political parties in both countries continued the exploration and 
deployment of psychographic and psychometric approaches to voter understanding and 
targeting. 
According to Wells (1975), psychographic insight on a population comprise of different 
approaches, depending on the ‘investigator’s objective’ and can ‘embrace a wide range of 
content including activities, interests, opinions, needs, values, attitudes and personality traits’, 
with possible variables taken from either ‘objective questionnaires’, ‘standardized attitude scales 
or personality inventories’ to enhance ‘good description of consumers’. Thus, at the centre of 
psychographics is data. Shoshana (2015) is of the view that such data powered psychographic 
methodology and architecture is producing ‘new markets of behavioural prediction and 
modification’ that is already embedded in society. 
Furthermore, scholars like Akoka et al. (2017) argue that big data driven methodology is already 
at its ‘maturity level’ as a technological application that ‘help organisations to gain richer insight 
on consumer behaviour’. Defined by ‘volume, variety, velocity and veracity’, the methodology 
has continued to generate ethical concerns, questions and arguments (Herschel and Miori, 
2017). Nevertheless, the International Data Corporation predicted that between 2014 and 2019, 
a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 23.1% with total global annual spending on the 
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methodology was expected to reach $48.6 billion (IDC, 2019). Cambridge Analytica’s work in 
the 2016 Trump campaign gives an insight into this methodology (see table 7.7). 
Table 7.7: Cambridge Analytica’s Data-driven blue-print for Trump’s Campaign 
      Big Data Patterns Media Platforms Microtargeting  
(i) Behavioural Data: Turning data 
to personality and emotional 
voter profiles 
(ii) Intensive Survey research 
(iii) Performance-optimising 
algorithms 
(iv) Right-wing web algorithmic 
profiling  
(i) Google-persuasion search 
advertising 
(ii) Snapchat advertising 
(iii) Twitter-conversational ads 
(iv) Facebook-audience profiling 
advertising 
(v) YouTube-mastheads or digital 
billboard 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
          7.2.1: Cambridge Analytica: Blue-Print for Trump’s Campaign 
As table 7.7 indicate, at the core of Cambridge Analytica’s role in the 2016 Trump campaign is 
data-driven emotionalization of voter profiling and the use of advances in the broader 
technological context for microtargeting. The now defunct company and affiliate of Strategic 
Communications Laboratories (SCL Group)-a defense contractor with expertise in behavioural 
dynamics and Target Audience Analysis (TAA) prides itself in the use of a methodology that 
builds ‘consent amongst organic populations’ aimed at ‘reinforcing or changing attitudes and 
behavior’ in conflict situations (Tatham, 2008; 2016) (see also appendix V). 
Information on the company’s website had suggested that it specializes in the provision of data 
analytics and behavioral communications for political campaigns, issue groups and commercial 
enterprises, using cutting-edge technology and pioneering data science. As ‘spaces’ and 
‘artefacts’ for claims and ‘expression of social processes and interest by social actors, the 
website offered a lens into the role of CA as an actor and provider of a methodology for 
campaigning (Pauwels, 2005; Singh and Point, 2006). 
Regarding the methodology, AM2 suggest that ‘’modern algorithm with a great capacity to infer 
our intimate traits, target underlying motivations, emotions and manipulate people and the way 
in which they behave’’ exit. According to him, the first stage in the use of such methodology in 
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politics is to ‘’understand the psychology of political profile of a given voter’’. T7 thought that ‘’the 
idea with Cambridge Analytica is that apart from demographics they knew, they had some kind 
of detail portraits of who voters are’’. In the literature, scholars point to increasing efficacy in big 
data as a source for inferring psychological traits and behaviour (Konsiski et al., 2013; Kosinski, 
2014; Matz et al., 2017), as well as the growth and use of these practices for behavioural 
advertising and targeting (Aguirre, 2014; Edith, 2014; Chang-Dae, 2017; Steven, 2018). 
As evidence suggest, CA’s methodology of psychological voter profiling revolves around the 
OCEAN (i.e. Openness; Conscientiousness; Extraversion; Agreeableness; Neuroticism) five 
factor personality model. In using the methodology, the firm ranks people on their probability of 
falling into any of the five personality categories. Just to mention however, before the shutdown 
of CA’s website, I had taken the five-factor standard personality test and was surprise at the 
near accuracy of the profile of my self-concept they created. Scholars like Funda et al. (2008) 
assert that the O.C.E.A.N personality model is a veritable approach for creating specific crowd 
models-where personality traits can be associated with certain behaviour. Laroslav (2017) argue 
for example, that through simple digital footprints and advanced deep machine learning 
methods, it is possible to create psycho-demographic profiles of individuals based on the five 
factor OCEAN personality model.  
That said, on the potency of CA’s methodology, AM2 also thought that ‘’digital footprint can 
predict future behaviour or psychological traits with very accurate models’’. He points to Trump’s 
campaign ability to bring ‘’people into politics that traditionally were not interested and 
disengaged with politics’’ as the advantage. AM6 also indicated that ‘’SCL Group use data 
driven strategies to understand people’s psyche’’. 
On the entrance and deployment of such personality profiling methodology in the campaign, 
Kaiser (2019:148) and Pybus (2019) point to the link between the illegally-obtained Facebook 
data used by CA through Facebook’s ‘Friends Application Programming Interface API’ that 
allowed ‘companies such as SCL Group and Global Science Research to install apps that 
harvested Facebook data. 
According to T6, a combination of the Facebook’s data, data from data brokers and OCEAN 
personality modelling gave Trump’s campaign ‘’the sophistication of the targeting and the 
volume of the messaging both in terms of messages sent out and also in terms of the overall 
scale of the effort’’. AM1 also suggested that ‘’data drove content production’’ in a way that 
enabled the campaign ‘’to be able to find people and give them content that matters’’. 
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Grassegger and Krogerus (2017) argue that through the OCEAN personality model and CA’s 
illegally obtained Facebook data, CA was able to co-opt voter models in developing specific 
targeted ads. Davies (2018) also found that through such ‘psychological profiles’ of voters, team 
Trump was able to match individuals ‘traits with existing voter data-sets’. 
Similarly, through signed legal contract papers deposited by Christopher Wylie with the UK 
House of Commons DCMS inquiry committee, Cadwalladr (2018) found that CA’s success at 
personality profiling is traceable to the Global Science Research (GSR) OCEAN personality 
model designed by Cambridge University scholars Aleksandr Kogan and Michal Kosinski whose 
ground-breaking work: Computer-based personality judgements are more accurate than those 
made by humans was instrumental to the development of psychometrics (Youyou et al., 2015). 
Kaiser (2019) and Wylie (2019) argue that such OCEAN personality profiling enabled CA’s ‘five-
step approach’ of audience segmentation; algorithm design; algorithmic online tracking; 
message testing-through ‘persuasion ‘measurement/brand lift studies’; and microtargeting-that 
involved the use of tested ads and ‘more-well-received speeches in online ad’s (p.223 & 229). 
In the UK Parliament’s inquiry report on fake news for example, it was found that within the 
framework of President Trump’s campaign, ‘Project Alamo staff and Facebook staff’ all worked 
together with Cambridge Analytica datasets’ to target specific states and specific voters’ (p.40). 
That said, three things are important to highlight. Firstly, there is an existing methodology for 
psychological and personality profiling made possible by (i) the quiz app-thisisyourdigitallife 
owned by Global Science Research (GSR)’ that sold data to Cambridge Analytica (fake news 
report, p.39; Kaiser, 2019:149); (ii) Steve Bannon’s desire for a ‘cultural war’ and Robert 
Mercer’s money (Wylie 2019:67); (iii) GSR Cambridge University researchers-Aleksandr Kogan 
and Michal Kosinski ‘personality test’ and the over ‘87 million Facebook users’ harvested data 
(Badshah, 2018; Glendinning, 2018); as well as (iv) CA’s initial message testing in Virginia prior 
to the presidential elections where they tested tailored ‘message to match psychometric tests’ 
and its Ripon platform used to segment voters based on ‘psychometric and behavioural factors’ 
and (v) data bought from ‘data brokers such as Experian, Acxiom, evangelical churches and 
media companies’ in the unregulated US data market (Wylie 2019:71/166).  
Secondly, Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group), Robert Mercer, Cambridge 
Analytica and Facebook were all involved in both how CA’s psychological profiling method was 
developed and how it gained entrance into the 2016 campaign. Frenkel et al. (2018) even 
suggest that it was Facebook’s failure to stop or cry-out after spotting unusual Kremlin style 
activity of over ‘3,000 ads’ that reached ‘close to 126 million people’ on its platform that 
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facilitated Russia’s disinformation and disruption campaign. Discussion of Russia’s role in the 
election is presented after the next section.  
Thirdly, according to Cadwalladr (2017), with over ‘5,000 separate pieces of data on 220 million 
American voters’, such data was used ‘to understand people’s deepest emotions’ and to create 
profiles used to target them ‘with political messages without their consent’ (Cadwalladr, 2019), 
in what Kaiser (2019:149) calls ‘psychological microtartegting’. In creating such ads, Cadwalladr 
(2016) suggest that the Trump campaign team was ‘using 40-50,000 different variants of ads 
every day that were continuously measuring responses, adapting and evolving based on that 
response’. Comparatively, the fact that Trump’s campaign was able to experiment with so many 
variations of adverts on Facebook qualitatively differ from the Obama model ‘experiment 
informed programs’ (EIPs). 
Cadwalladr (2016) and Glendining (2018) also found that CA was also able to track profiled 
voters online, and through their Facebook likes and web-based algorithmic tracking directed 
them to ‘fake news sites’-i.e. through ‘persuasion search advertising’ (Lewis and Hider, 2018) 
designed to misinform and de-mobilise voters. According to T6, this methodology formed part of 
‘’CA’s playbook kind of negative campaigning not only about the candidate but in what they did 
to decrease the turnout for their opponent’’. As T6 further stated, the ‘’detrimental effect on 
democracy as a whole is that trying to figure out how do you convince people not to vote is a 
really worrying tactics’’. Adams (2018), Davies (2018) as well as Lewis and Hider (2018) found 
that such online propaganda material and content was ‘viewed billions of times’, with its version 
of paid advertising and targeting popping up on ‘Facebook and Instagram’, ‘Google, Snapchat, 
Twitter and YouTube’ and along ‘congressional district’ lines, ‘interest’, ‘demographics or any 
combination of those’.  
In Cadwalladr’s (2017) opinion, CA’s methodology is the ‘latest understanding in science about 
how people work, enabled by technological platforms like Twitter, Google and Facebook built to 
bring us together’ now powering ‘the manipulation of information at a very individual level’. 
Hinsliff (2018), Moore (2018) and Rawnsley (2018) argue that the methodology of data-
enhanced people understanding, and its application now span across many sectors in 
contemporary public life. 
That said, it does appear that without SCL Group, GSR OCEAN Personality modelling research 
and the harvesting of Facebook data by GSR, the psychometric profiling and behavioural 
microtargeting deployed in the campaign may not have been possible (Harris, 2018). As Pybus 
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(2019) argue, the development of the psychological profiling approach advanced by CA made it 
possible to microtarget ‘American voters by personality type’. In the opinion of UK 
parliamentarians, blame for GSR/Cambridge Analytica data breach goes to Facebook because 
of its ‘policies’ and preference for choosing profit over data security’ (p.26 and 40).  
However, in the United Kingdom, commendation have been given to the authorities specifically 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for the response to the data breach. For example, 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) on 25th October 2018 imposed a £500,000 fine on 
Facebook-under the UK Data Protection Act 1998 ‘for lack of transparency and security issues 
relating to the harvesting of data’ and its usage in a political campaign (DCMS fake new report, 
p. 21). Similarly, SCL Elections Ltd was fined £15,000 for failing to comply with an enforcement 
notice issued by the ICO in May 2018 relating to one American (i.e. David Carroll-interviewee in 
this study) Subject Access Request on CA’s use of his data in the 2016 elections. According to 
the ICO, the fine was for breach of ‘section 47 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998’. The 
significance of the fine and the standard set by the ICO is that people wherever they live can 
sue if their data is unfairly ‘processed by a UK company’ (DCMS fake new report, p.22). 
Furthermore, insider account by AM4 on the psychological profiling method suggest that CA 
was able to ‘’develop a psychometric inventory’’ of voters for the campaign. As AM3 stated for 
example, the methodology hinge on identifying the ‘’mental vulnerabilities in voters and working 
to exploit them by targeting information designed to activate some of the worst characteristics in 
people such as neuroticism, paranoia and racism biases’’. AM1 suggested that such 
behavioural understanding was the gamechanger for the Trump campaign. A he puts it, with 
data, they understood and identified ‘’people in America that were hurting, people in America 
that felt left behind, people that felt that their infrastructure was crumbling, people that wanted 
change, people that were sick of the status-quo’’. This way, rather than the Obama model 
approach of political profiling or understanding of peoples’ political affiliation, leaning and voting 
history, Trump’s campaign identified people based on emotional and personality traits and had 
messages ‘’that resonate with them’’. As AM1 further stated, such messages were done ‘’for 
raising money, for getting people to show up to vote’’, meaning that ‘’messages are shown to 
people as it relates to them and make them feel emotional’’. 
For T4, Trump’s ‘’campaign was about maximizing the frustration of the voter’’ and ‘’any 
candidate who came in and was able to whether it was true or not about who they were to see 
that and maximise it were the one who was going to be able to win in the end and Trump’s 
campaign did so’’. As T4 argued, such maximization of the psychology of disaffection in 
238 
 
attacking the establishment informed campaign messages like ‘’drain the swamp and MAGA’’ in 
Trump’s political marketing.  
AM6 also suggested that the psychological profiling of voters was used to ‘’target those whose 
mind we thought we could change’’. According to AM6, the models developed revealed that the 
‘’persuadables were everywhere-Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Florida’’. Thus, 
through the methodology, they identified ‘’persuadables to target in the right precinct’’ in such a 
way that ‘’those states would turn red instead of blue’’. In her book, Kaiser (2019:92) refers to 
persuadable as those who were identified by psychographic and algorithms as ‘people and 
individuals that could be convinced not to vote’, and those considered ‘swing voters’. As she 
claims, such psychographic and algorithmic profiling informed ‘the types of disinformation that 
they sent those people in order to change their minds’, suggesting that even the campaign’s 
voter de-mobilisation tactics was equally guided by psychological profiling. That said, such 
Trump campaign style voter de-mobilisation operations were not a feature of the Obama model. 
As Smith (2018) argue, ‘Trump’s political viability is predicated upon animating the voters he 
needs and exhausting those he does not’. Smith (2016) argue that such campaign coordinated 
de-mobilisation of voters-‘white liberals, millennial women and black American’ deviates from 
popular campaign practice of persuasion and conversion aimed at getting-out the vote. Another 
clear difference between the Obama model. 
Furthermore, AM5 suggested that ’’Donald Trump turned over 20 counties that went for 
President Obama in 2012 to Donald Trump in the 2016 election because of the messages that 
connected with people in those areas’’. On this claim, T2 tend to hold the same view when he 
said ‘’analytics obviously had a huge impact on how people received information, considering 
how focused their messages were’’. As AM5 stated, ‘’we thought in our modelling that the 2016 
electorate had the tendency of resembling the loosely 2014 electorate in some of the key 
states’’. Such modelling in her view, enabled ‘’Donald Trump tap into the anger of the job loser 
and manage the expectation on empathy and connectedness’’ by identifying what she calls ‘’the 
Trump undercover voter’’-‘’like the union household who voted Democrats for years’’. 
McCormack (2016) and Tett (2016) suggest that such voter profiling method and psychographic 
microtargeting may have been critical to Trump winning the Electoral College and ultimately the 
presidency since it enabled the campaign to identify and target voters who ‘flipped’. 
Similarly, Silberberg (2019) argues that such personality type insight and modelling enabled ‘the 
Trump campaign designed 6.1 million specifically targeted Facebook ads, using the information 
Cambridge Analytica scraped from Facebook-ads targeted at people, families, groups and 
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subgroups in rural communities’. Wylie (2019:119) also suggest that the ‘neural network 
algorithm that would help them make predictions’ in the campaign was built through the search 
for patterns and a ‘qualitative observation’ that ‘unpack the perception of given population’ with 
both advertising guided by these models and algorithms prioritising ‘topics for personalisation’ 
on the basis of an individual’s online engagement (see figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1: Photoshoot of CA personality model ads 
 
Source: Emma Briant-Senior Researcher ‘The Great Hack’ 
Luntz (2016) found that in most battleground states, such personality profiling and algorithmic 
prioritization of messaging and advertising informed team Trump campaign activities. Dalton 
(2016) also suggest that the entrance of such personality level insight in modern elections 
represent a ‘gold standard’ for understanding political behaviour. According to T5, ‘’the 
malicious election manipulation and exploitation cabal certainly used Google and Facebook 
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various services’’. However, he was also of the view that he didn’t think that ‘’those two 
companies specifically are necessary for it to have happened’’, because as he argued, ‘’any 
other behemoths of advertising which could have hypothetically come into existence without 
Google or Facebook in alternative reality could have been utilised the same way’’. 
That said, what this evidence suggest is that CA’s psychological and personality profiling 
method seem to have moved the ingredients of microtargeting away from political 
characteristics to emotional characterization. Such shift from political characteristics to 
personality and emotional/psychological features of a voter represent advancement in practice 
away from the Obama model predictive modelling microtargeting. 
Thus, it could be said that first, in view of SCL Group’s expertise, the unsolicited Facebook data 
and the OCEAN model, evidence is not short regarding innovative advancement in data driven 
practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. Second, even though focus is not on analysis of 
evidence of the effectiveness of CA’s methodology, it could also be argued that the 
psychological models and insight produced by CA made its messaging strategy more effective. 
For example, US professor of Media Design at Parsons School of Design in New York who 
featured prominently in the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) nominated 
documentary-The Great Hack-designated T1 here was of the view that his data profile accessed 
from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office as a result of his litigation with CA was a 
‘’surprise’’ to him, in a way that confirmed both CA’s involvement and success. The Great Hack 
documentary available on Netflix provides the most publicly available indication of the use of 
psychological profiling in the 2016 campaign. 
Documents released by Brittany Kaiser-ex Cambridge Analytica employee as captured by 
Cadwalladr (2020) and commentary from Kaye (2016) and Albright (2016) also suggest that 
apart from President Trump’s campaign, CA was equally involved in the primary campaign of 
Ted Cruz and Ben Carson as well as John Bolton’s Super PAC. AM6 affirmed that CA ‘’was 
paid to undertake work’’ for these three. Such work as she argued involved ‘’psychographic 
messaging meant to resonate with your psyche and engage you depending on whether you are 
open, conscientious, extroverted, agreeable or neurotic’’. Such widespread involvement of CA 
lends further credence to the prominence of its methodology. As Cadwalladr (2020) argue, 
‘Facebook and CA data scandal was only part of a much bigger global operation of a firm that 
worked with governments, intelligence agencies, commercial companies and political 
campaigns to manipulate and influence people’. That said, given that CA’s work began outside 
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the US, this opens the possibility of electioneering experience (s) flowing from elsewhere to the 
US, in ways that interrogates the continuing relevance and validity of the Americanization thesis. 
          7.2.2: Money and Plutocrats: Robert Mercer’s Model 
According to Detrow (2018), at the heart of CA’s data driven innovation was Robert Mercer’s 
‘goal of giving conservatives big data tools to compete with the Democrats’. For example, Ted 
Cruz’s victory in the Iowa caucuses was credited to CA’s psychological profiling (ibid). However, 
with Cruz crashing out after the Indiana primary, Trump became CA’s client courtesy of Robert 
Mercer-a ‘Cruz-aligned super PACs major donor’ (Detrow, 2016). According to Moore (2018), 
activities like those of Robert Mercer or what he calls ‘new election hackers-individual plutocrats’ 
is ‘what is coming next’ in the world of politics (p.4). 
T5 suggest that Trump’s campaign data driven infrastructure was a product of ‘’obfuscation, 
corruption and enough money’’. As he further stated, ‘’if tons of laundered dirty money from all 
over the planet is allowed to fund an endless stream of lies, it’s going to be pervasive to a 
percentage of the population for many varying reasons and if no one stop it or is blackmailed 
into inaction, it keeps going’’. Vogel and Parti (2015) found that Robert Mercer’s huge 
investment in CA in support of conservative candidates follows model like those of billionaires 
‘liberal hedge funders Tom Steyer’ and conservative industrialists Charles and David Koch who 
throw money where their interest lie. As Vogel and Parti show, ‘Federal Election Commission 
filings’ indicated that ‘nearly 93 percent of the $ 2.6 million’ Cambridge Analytica ‘received in 
traceable federal payments came from committees to which Robert Mercer donated generously-
i.e. Cruz’s leadership PAC; Ending Spending Action Fund; John Bolton’s super PAC; pop-up 
super PAC created to boost 2014 Republican senate candidates-GOP Sens. Tom Colton of 
Arkansa and Thom Tillis of North Carolina etc., with the Mercers combined donation to these 
groups totalling over $3.3 million’. 
According to Cadwalladr (2017) and Wylie (2019), such Mercer’s led investment also flowed into 
Global Science Research (GSR) and CA with money in the region of ‘$ 20 million’ from Robert 
Mercer who was President Trump’s ‘single highest donor with $13.5 million’ inspiring CA’s 
consolidation of data-driven campaign architecture. In his book Mindf*ck: Cambridge Analytica 
and the plot to break America, Wylie (2019) even though he repeatedly does no cite or produce 
any evidence, point to ‘Mercer’s investment’ as key to funding SCL and CA (p.85). Although 
elsewhere, Wylie seem to suggest that ‘what Cambridge Analytica eventually became 
depended in large part on the academic research published at the University’ of Cambridge 
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(p.95). Such conflicting account of his role and the origin and use of psychometrics in the 
campaign as well as his failure to provide links to any documents makes his account appear 
more like a personal marketing story.  
Nevertheless, Vogel (2015) suggest that Robert Mercer and daughter Rebekah Mercer have 
lately ‘emerged among the leading financiers of conservative causes and candidates’ in 
America. The family’s investment in CA and their well-known interest and donations to the 
campaign of conservative Republican politicians make them in his view central figures both in 
the rise and expansion of CA and the election of President Trump. As Kaiser (2019:2&102) 
show, CA’s ‘Republican’ only ‘client base and outreach’ and the ‘marriage between’ Robert 
Mercer’s ‘love for data science and his political motivations’ foregrounds such conclusion.  
Cadwalladr (2018) and Wylie (2019) point to Steve Banon-friend and benefactor of the Mercer’s 
who was ‘installed’ in CA’s board and later as Trump’s campaign manager and Chief Strategist 
as pointer to the relationship between Robert Mercer, CA and President Trump. Vogel (2015) 
argue that such Mercer-kind ‘unlimited political’ investment across candidates, campaigns and 
firms like CA is the incentive of US Supreme Court 2010 Citizens United judgement that allowed 
for near unlimited campaign financing by individual actors. For Cadwalladr, (2017) Mercer’s 
‘personal beliefs’ and billions sat at the heart of what she calls ‘propaganda network’ that gave 
birth to Cambridge Analytica. Here, Wylie (2019:92) seem to agree with Cadwalladr when he 
suggested that even though CA was created as a business, ‘the firm’s sole purpose was to 
cannibalise the Republican Party and remould American culture’. Thus-making Robert Mercer 
‘the power-house that made everything at Cambridge-and, eventually Trumpworld happen’ 
(Kaiser, 2019:189). 
Issenberg (2015) also suggest that Mercer’s political project and financial investment in CA 
makes it ‘a Republican Company’ and ‘an ingenious cog in the GOP party machinery’. As a 
foreign consultancy firm, Issenberg equally point to the company’s ‘psychographic profiles’ of 
US voters-a new ingredient for campaign microtargeting as CA’s exported product in modern 
electioneering. For Moore (2018) Mercer’s patronage network or what he calls the ‘Mercer’s 
model-pop-up party machinery’ (p.60) made possible by investment in ‘digital media’ (i.e. 
Breitbart news and its shaping of the ’digital media ecosystem’ (p.50)) led by ‘Steve Bannon’ 
(Wylie 2019:59) as well as investment in professional data-driven campaigning (i.e. Cambridge 
Analytica) (p.41) sit both at the heart of his anti-establishment libertarian political agenda and 
distortion of ‘the public sphere’ and ‘democratic accountability’ (p.60).  
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For example, Benkler et al. (2018) found a ‘right wing web, ‘right wing media network’ and what 
they call ‘mammon’s algorithm-marketing of manipulation’- that distort truth as one defining 
characteristic of the 2016 election (p.4;11&13). As they argue, such contemporary eco-system-
i.e. ’technological process, social media, algorithmic news curation, bots, artificial intelligence 
and big data is creating echo chambers that reinforced our biases’. Comparatively speaking, 
there is no evidence that such centrist or leftist web and media network was available to 
Obama. Thus, another difference between both campaigns. That said, ‘the critical change’ for 
Benkler and colleagues is that ‘in 2016 the party of Ronald Reagan and the two presidents Bush 
was defeated by the party of Donald Trump, Breitbart and billionaire Robert Mercer’ (p.7). 
          7.2.3: Evidence and the Literature 
Although they are still questions about the efficacy of psychographics, what the evidence 
suggest however, is that data driven innovation embedded in personality profiling, 
emotionalization and psychographic microtargeting that differ from practices of the Obama 
model emerged in 2016 (see Allen and Abbruzzese, 2018; Armstrong, 2018, Benkler et al., 
2018). As T7 suggest, what makes the Trump campaign different is that ‘’they play our negative 
emotions, they try to figure out what makes you afraid, how do I campaign to you so that you 
are voting out of fear or you are voting out of anger’’.  
Similarly, even though AM1 ague that data driven psychographics or ‘’secret targeting online is 
not enough and cannot in itself win the presidency’’, he indicated that ‘’translating data to 
context, taking data to understand who is on the other end listening and be able to break that 
down and translate it into consumable content that millions of people can absorb’’ was critical to 
the success of the campaign. As director of digital, perhaps, this is only but a subtle way of 
owning up to the use of psychographic microtargeting. This is because, in the same 
presentation, AM1 had indicated that ‘’emotion and feeling, audience understanding, 
humanizing the audience by pointing them into the right direction through content’’ was integral 
to the campaign. Such emotionalization or what he calls ‘’audience understanding’’ and 
humanization of the audience as well as the over ‘’150,000 data enabled created content’’ 
differs qualitatively from the Obama model voter characterization microtargeting. 
That said, what this implies for the research objective on the 2016 Trump campaign is support 
for innovation and advancement in data-driven practice. However, the key difference as 
highlighted earlier is that data-enabled behavioural and psychological profiling, personality type 
and algorithms of personalization formed an inherent part of political mobilization, persuasion 
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and manipulation in 2016-in ways that differ from the Obama model data led predictive 
modelling, voter scoring and microtargeting. Beckett (2016) is of the view that moving 
microtargeting to the realm of ‘particular personality types’ represent the most significant 
brilliance of the Trump’s campaign in its use of data mining and analytics. 
Thus, such practices provide a reasonable benchmark for making the case for advancement in 
data driven innovation. Trump’s campaign therefore have moved data-driven campaign 
practices from what people are (i.e. political characteristics-party leaning, affiliation, positioning 
and support for a candidate) to what people feel (psychology, emotions-anxious, angry, fearful, 
disillusioned and frustrated) (see Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2019).  
Put differently, while the Obama’s campaign data driven approach had relied on big data to 
identify the political characteristics of voters, Trump’s campaign seem to have made 
psychological, emotional and personality type the basis of such identification. According to 
Russon (2017) Trump’s campaign represent a significant success in the politics of data driven 
behavioural understanding. Albright (2016), Ahmar (2016) and Dalton (2016) suggest that whilst 
the Obama campaign had set up the precedent as a ‘coming out party for big data’ analytics, 
Trump’s campaign is a bigger signal that we have entered an entirely different season of data-
driven election campaign that makes Obama model strategies ‘look old school’ (ibid). Thus, as 
Kreiss (2016) argue, the uptake of emotionally centred methodology gave ‘broader exposure to 
the particular mix of racial resentment, conservative identity, populist rhetoric and economic 
anxiousness that marked the 2016 campaign’. 
Therefore, whilst it can be argued that data driven personalization was piloted and implemented 
in the Obama model, a combination of military grade insight and Robert Mercer’s conservative 
alt-right libertarian financing or what Kaiser (2019:190) calls the ‘mercerization of the Trump 
effort’, combined with privately harvested Facebook data ushered in personality, emotional and 
psychological profiling of voters and individual identity based microtargeting popularly called 
psychographics, psyops or psychometrics. As both volunteer in Obama’s campaign and an ex 
SCL staff, Kaiser (2019:24) argue that while Obama ‘segmented its audience, separating them 
according to the issues they cared about, the states which they lived, and whether they were 
male or female’, CA led Trump campaign as she puts it ‘went far beyond traditional 
demographics’. Indeed, with a methodology that involves understanding ‘people’s complex 
personalities’ and devising ‘ways to trigger their behaviour’ with ‘messages that had been 
carefully crafted for them’ (p.25), Issenberg (2015), argue that CA’s segmentation of the 
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American voter ‘by individual psychological characteristics amounts to the most audacious new 
analytical innovation’ in recent American politics. 
Across the Atlantic, fines imposed on Facebook by the US Federal Trade Commission and the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission for the unsolicited sharing of data belonging to 87 
million Facebook users with Cambridge Analytica and its deceptive misrepresentation of the 
EU-US Privacy Shield Framework provide validation to the evidence above (see Fair, 2019; 
Bose and Heavey, 2019). The EU-US privacy Shield Framework was designed to ensure 
compliance with data protection/transfer requirement between both sides (Official Journal of the 
European Union, 2016). In the $5 billion and $100 million fine respectively imposed on 
Facebook by US Federal Trade Commission and the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
for example, Facebook is accused of misuse of user data with Cambridge Analytica bothering 
on violation of sections of the US Securities Act of 1933 and Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (US Securities and Exchange Commission 2019-140).  
Similarly, because the processing of such Facebook data took place in the United Kingdom, the 
Office of the Information Commissioner in the UK suggested that had SCL Group still existed in 
its original form, the company would have been issued ‘with a substantial fine for very serious 
breaches of principle one (i.e. fair, lawful, collection and use) of the Data Protection Act 1998 for 
unfairly processing peoples personal data for political purposes’ in the 2016 campaign (ICO, 
2018:35).  
Taken together, this evidence reinforces the continuous historical, progressive transition and 
modernization of US election since the Electoral College election years of 1800 (Williams, 
1992). That said, although Facebook was fined for breaching data consent rules which 
benefited Trump, it is worth pointing out that Obama used similar methods for gathering 
campaign data in 2012. At the time however, harvesting Facebook data via third party apps may 
not have been illegal and all such data harvesting was done on US soil. 
          7.2.4: The RNC, Project Alamo and the Trump Campaign 
Another interesting component of the 2016 Trump campaign is the collaboration of Trump’s 
independent campaign infrastructure-i.e. Project Alamo with the Republican National Committee 
(RNC) campaign infrastructure in cultivating what Pierce (2016) calls the ‘universe of millions of 
fervent Trump supporters’. Following the Republican Party’s post-election review Growth and 
Opportunity project commissioned in 2012, weakness in the party’s ‘voter contact’ infrastructure 
was identified as a shortcoming. Thus, authors of the report recommended among other things, 
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an improve ‘culture of data learning across all campaign and party functions’ as a way of 
catching up with the DNC technology and analytics model of 2012 (Barbour et al., 2012). 
Lambrecht (2017) suggest that inspired by such recommendation, the RNC ‘invested heavily in 
data and digital technology’ and ‘provided the Trump campaign with massive database that 
included details on millions of voters’ attitudes, buying habits and personal information available 
from public sources, combined with information the party had gleaned from contacts over the 
years’. According to Allison et al. (2016) and Green and Issenberg (2016), a combination of 
such party campaign infrastructure and candidate Trump investment enabled the campaign to 
excel in building an audience through the collaboration of Jared Kushner and Brad Parscale led 
Project Alamo-and its battleground optimizer path to victory model (that focused on online voter 
de-mobilisation of ‘idealistic white liberals, young women, and African Americans’ and targeted 
mobilization of white rural American vote’.  
As a Republican Party outsider, such candidate and party v campaign data-sharing partnership, 
given the initial bluff by the RNC on President Trump’s campaign seem to be the first of its kind 
in recent US campaign history. Whereas, the Obama model was embedded in the DNC 
campaign set-up and infrastructure, Trump’s campaign differs in this regard. Chotiner (2016) 
suggest that historically, all Republican Party nominees since McCain in 2008 have had their 
loyalist planted in the RNC. However, in 2016, Trump never did this and showed no desire to 
direct the affairs of the RNC for electoral advantage. In this sense, team Trump approach at 
building data-driven campaign infrastructure and innovation can account as something new in 
modern US election campaign. 
Furthermore, Lapowski (2016) and Sumner (2018) also suggest that another reason why 
President Trump’s campaign look different from Obama’s is that it started out with an outsider 
arm anchored by family confidant Brad Parscale and son in-law Jared Kushner whose initial 
focus was on creating Project Alamo with over ‘4,000 to 5,000 data points’ that drove the 
campaign’s Facebook adverting, digital fundraising and voter de-mobilisation (Green and 
Issenberg, 2016).  As Kaiser (2019) argue, advancement in the ‘accuracy of Facebook 
advertising tools’; ‘Twitter-conventional ads’ tool; ‘Snapchat-Webview ads/direct response’ tool 
meant that team Trump ‘took advantage of even newer innovations’ in 2016 (p.157&194). 
According to Lapowski (2016), Winston (2016) and Kaiser (2019) through the personality 
profiles and new tools like Facebook’s ‘custom audience list’-that enable list matching with data 
collected; ‘audience targeting option’-which allow targeted ads on active Facebook users; 
247 
 
‘lookalike audiences’-that enhance the identification of ‘common qualities’ among a target 
population, and ‘brand lift’-that enables measuring ad effectiveness, Project Alamo was able to 
power the individualized microtargeting of nearly 200 million voters-with a total spend on 
Facebook ads in the region of $85 million (Glaser, 2017). Bradshaw (2016), Smith (2016), 
Martinez (2018) and Sumner (2018) also indicated that such platform tools enabled the 
campaign’s digital ads voter de-mobilisation operations coordinated by both Project Alamo and 
Cambridge Analytica through a grand plan that involved ‘spreading fear’ and depressing 
‘Clinton’s vote total’ by keeping ‘marginal voters trembling at home’. 
That said, the concern for American democracy in the context of practices described above is 
that data driven methods and technology now seem to be incentivizing voter de-mobilisation 
and the spread of disinformation and social division in ways that invoke the fears expressed by 
James Maddison in Federalist No.10. For example, Maddison had written about his fear of the 
power of ‘faction-a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, 
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the 
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community’ (Cooke, 
1961). According to Haidt and Rose-Stockwell (2019), caution against such Maddisonian fear 
reflect in the constitutional design of checks and balances that encourage deliberation on 
national issues. As Cooke (1961) show, Maddison was also encouraged that apart from 
constitutional instruments, US landmass could serve as deterrent to widespread factional 
partisanship, since he thought it would be difficult to spread the incentive of factional rhetoric 
across the vast US landmass. 
However as recent events suggest, technological advancement seem to have trumped 
landmass by making the speed and spread of disinformation and extreme online ideological 
bubble content geometric. In this sense, US democracy seem to be in the Maddison nightmare 
era, where rising polarization and factions fixated in ideological echo chambers are 
algorithmically created and maintained. While as T7 argue for example, ‘’voter suppression has 
a long-term effect on democratic institutions by making people cynical about the process so that 
they stay home’’, only time will unveil where this trend and era leads democracy. Thus, with 
increasing ethical debate regarding best practices for conducting digital campaign (see Baldwin-
Philippi et al., 2019), it is difficult to say whether CA and SCL Group psychological profiling and 
voter de-mobilisation tactics is a blowback for democracy and a backsliding for democratic 
deliberation in the digital public sphere. 
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A democratic blowback or backsliding could include the ‘undermining of institutions’, the 
‘disabling’ of ‘opposition’ through digitally enabled disinformation and ‘collapse of the basic 
tenets of deliberation’ and the replacement of the democratic norm of self–determined 
democratic decision making of the voter during elections with algorithmic and algorithmically 
sorted motivation (Vaidhyanathan, 2018). Under the current political communication 
environment, Luo and Prezworski (2019) suggest that all of the above seem to be happening 
without legally amounting to ‘unconstitutional or undemocratic steps’. Miller and Vaccari (2020) 
even suggest that the current digital ecosystem is hurting democracy.  
That said, the danger in the Madisonian sense is that AI enabled tools can give advantage to 
handlers to impose their ‘interest on others, even in opposition to the good of the state as a 
whole’ through digitally propagated ‘untruths and distortion aimed at inflating the positives of 
one party and undermining the credibility of the other’ (Grayling, 2018:85). The agency of 
algorithms and these new forms of electioneering seem to put pressure on the reliability and 
credibility of the democratic process. 
Although the broader impact and consequence are still unclear, emerging evidence suggest that 
these practices undermine democratic participation through voter de-mobilisation (Tenove et. 
al., 2017). Thus, like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and Moore (2018) argue, rather than with guns 
like in Chile in 1973 and Argentina, Brazil, Ghana and Nigeria during the cold war, the 
undemocratic behaviour of platforms, the intensification of digitally driven partisan polarization, 
and the algorithmization of politics and voter manipulation seem to constitute new ways for 
breaking democracies.  
          7.3: Modernization: Advancement in Practice and Implication for Theory 
From the evidence in the previous sections, they seem to be no doubt that Cambridge 
Analytica’s involvement in Trump’s campaign goes beyond Facebook data and the research by 
Aleksandr Kogan, Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell at Cambridge University. Evidence 
suggest that military-grade psychological profiling insight crafted by Strategic Communication 
Laboratories (SCL Group) for creating ‘psychological effects’ that hinge on making impression 
on ‘mindset, thoughts, processes, attitudes and behaviours’ were part of the methodology 
(Mazeikis, 2016:3). Drawing from this evidence, this section revisit and expand the explanatory 
scope of modernization theory by showing the source and inspiration of Trump’s campaign data 
driven innovative practice (s) or modernization. 
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Theoretically, they are wide consensus among theories and theorist of change (s) in political 
communication that modernization theoretically explain better the origin and evolution of change 
in modern campaign practices. However, even though evidence from Trump’s campaign 
reinforces that thesis, what it further reveals, and significantly so is that the origin and evolution 
of such change differ from the existing theoretical models/explanation. Thus, providing empirical 
ground for expanding the explanatory scope of the modernization thesis.  
That said, apart from the explanatory weakness of Swanson and Mancini’s modernization thesis 
regarding how ‘steadily increasing social complexity’ explain change (s) in recent political 
communication practices, they seem to be a general shortage of empirical analysis on 
innovation in contemporary election campaign. Nevertheless, Kreiss (2016) and Padgett and 
Powell (2012) point to the source and process through which innovation arise as a product of 
network folding or recombination-i.e. the transportation of ‘social relations from one domain into 
another’ through biographies that cross domains or through strategically place people who 
reconfigure networks across domains’ to inspire and incentivize innovation. As Kreiss show for 
example, such migration of technologists from Howard Dean and Wesley Clark campaign in 
2004 who founded companies and diffused those across the Democratic Party network 
contributed in forging the innovation in the Obama model. Kreiss also suggest that ‘field 
crossing’ or ‘inter-field knowledge’ from the technology industry and previous campaign path 
dependent roadmaps provide the theoretical explanation for recent change (s) or innovation in 
US election campaign.  
Now, regarding the evidence of where Trump’s campaign sits in the theoretical explanation of 
how the campaign innovated, this section begins by providing some insight into the corporate, 
organizational and personnel structure and specialization of Strategic Communication 
Laboratories (SCL Group)-i.e. the parent company of Cambridge Analytica. This is important not 
only as background information, but as a foundation to the theory expansion and elaboration 
argument this section make. 
Established in 1993, Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) have been in the 
business of defence, political communication and humanitarian projects worldwide-with the 
company’s core area of operation and competence situated in ‘military contracts and 
psychological warfare’ (Kaiser, 2019; Wylie, 2019). As Kaiser (2019:97) suggest, the company’s 
methodology was inspired by work from the ‘Behavioral Dynamics Institute’ that looked ‘at the 
ways in which human behavior could be understood and then influenced through 
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communication’. Such insight according to Kaiser is the foundation of the firm’s consultancy ‘in 
the defense industry’ (p.97). 
Similarly, Wylie (2019) also suggest that the global rise in online radicalization was the incentive for 
SCL Group methodology which it designed to ‘identify and combat extremism online’, thus, making 
the company ‘an essential partner with governments’ in the fight against terror (Kaiser 2019:98). 
According to Wylie and Kaiser, the methodology ‘supplied ‘the UK Ministry of Defense and NATO 
armies with expertise in information operations’ or psyops. AM6 even suggest that there is evidence 
at her disposal of ‘’contracts that the company had with NATO to identify young people in the UK 
who were vulnerable to being recruited into ISIS and to run counter-propaganda communications to 
keep them at home safe with their families instead of sneaking themselves into Syria’’.  
T5 argued that ‘’SCL and Cambridge Analytica used military psyops warfare on innocent 
civilians’’ and ‘’committed acts of war which their own people have admitted were gleaned from 
Nazi propaganda tactics against Western democracies-the United States, the United Kingdom 
and many others’’.  In her written testimony to the US Senate Committee on Intelligence, Emma 
Briant also suggested that such SCL Group methodology listed by Tatham (2008; 2015) to 
include AB-Target Audience Analysis, AB-MOE Measurement Analysis, Social and Cultural 
Intelligence, Key Leader Engagement, Quick Looks and Standard Polling deployed in various 
operations for governments and military clients have been used for US Defense Agencies, 
British Defense Agencies and NATO. For example, General Andrew Mackay who led the 
2007/2008 British Army 52 Brigade operations in Helmand Province Afghanistan sit in the 
advisory panel of SCL Group (Tatham, 2008) (see also figure 7.2 for an illustrative structural 











Figure 7.2: Illustrative chart of SCL Group Corporate Structure 
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As the organogram above suggest, court documents and judgement delivered at the Royal 
Courts of Justice London-Case Numbers-CR-2018-006683; CR-2018-006687; CR-2018-
006713; CR-2018-006709; CR-2018-006701; and CR-2018-006696 also reveal that all the other 
companies i.e. SCL Defence, SCL Elections and Cambridge Analytica were trading subsidiaries 
of Strategic Communication Laboratories  (see The Royal Court of Justice (2019) Neutral 
Citation Case Number: (2019)EWHC 954 (Ch) p.2).  
Although they may have been some technical legal differences between Strategic 
Communication Laboratories and Cambridge Analytica for administrative and electoral 
compliance purpose in order to meet, fulfil or get around foreign agents restrictions in the US, 
since CA was only created for political business (House of Common Disinformation and Fake 
          SCL Defence  




News Report 2019; Wylie, 2019). However, under the signed exclusive service provision 
agreement, all Cambridge Analytica’s businesses were handled by Strategic Communication 
Laboratories-with SCL’s ‘personnel’ servicing ‘the actual delivery and work on behalf of 
Cambridge Analytica’ (Wylie, 2019: 93). Wylie also suggest that because of Mercer’s ‘90 
percent ownership of Cambridge Analytica’ and SCL ‘10 per cent’ stake, CA ‘was bestowed the 
IP rights to SCL’s work-creating a bizarre situation where the subsidiary actually owned the core 
assets of its parent’. However, on the 3rd of May 2018, following an order of the High Court, 
Vincent John Green and Mark Newman-insolvency practitioners at Crowe Clark Whitehill LLP 
were appointed independent Joint Administrators of the Companies under an order of the High 
Court. 
That said, regarding the utilization of the methodology within the defense community, Rowland 
and Tatham (2008) and Tatham (2008) argue that strategic communication as a ‘means of 
changing behavior’ and the centrality of ‘influence as a tool for achieving military objectives’ was 
at the heart of the success recorded in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. Tatham (2008) also 
suggest that the methodology formed the basis of training delivered by SCL Group to NATO 
officials in their bid to ‘promote and sustain particular types of behavior’ through behavioral 
dynamics and target audience analysis (TAA) in peace keeping operations.  
In the UK Parliament Disinformation and Fake News Interim Report for example, evidence 
emerged suggesting that SCL Group had specifically provided psychological operations training 
for UK Ministry of Defense staff as well as carrying out psychological operation in Helmand 
Afghanistan. Thus, pointing very clearly to SCL Group as a ‘company that operates in the 
government and defense space’ (Disinformation and Fake News Report p. 226-296).  
On using the methodology in the military, Tunnicliffe and Tatham (2017) found that ‘interaction 
media’ have the ‘potential for exerting influence when accompanied by robust target audience 
analysis (TAA) for information operations’. According to Tatham (2015) the lesson in 
Afghanistan ‘is that understanding the audience is not a nice thing to have but an imperative 
prerequisite for success’. In one of their major study Mackay and Tatham (2011) had called for a 
rethinking of military strategies by the West arguing that ‘understanding people and their 
behavior will be decisive in future conflicts’ and the ‘ability to change behavior will be a defining 
factor in resolving armed dispute’. Richards (2015) also suggest that SCL Group style 
methodology or what he calls information operations or psyops ‘offers the greatest potency for 
military information operations at this very point in history’.  
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In his comments on what was different about the Trump’s campaign for example, T1 stated that 
it was the ‘’internationalization and militarization of the voter mobilization industry’’ that came to 
him as a surprise. Perhaps, what T1 is alluding to here as Pybus (2019) show is the importation 
of military refine tactics and defense intelligence-i.e. ’psyops’ into modern politics. According to 
Cadwalladr (2018), in US military doctrine and warfare, ‘information operations’ or psyops rank 
‘alongside land, sea, air and space as the five-dimensional battle space’.  
Furthermore, Watt (2018) also found evidence that in the UK for example, SCL Group was 
granted UK Ministry of Defense ‘List X’ status, thus giving the firm ‘access to secret documents’ 
in a collaborative project with the Ministry of Defense codenamed ‘Project Duco-that analyzed 
how people would interact with certain government messages’ and ‘how target audience 
analysis could be used by the British Government’ (ibid). Wylie (2019:5) also suggest that apart 
from working for the UK Ministry of Defense, SCL Group had also supplied ‘NATO armies with 
expertise in information operations’ as a way of tackling ‘radicalization online’ through data, 
algorithms and ‘targeted narratives online’. 
That said, however, they are skeptics and skepticism among commentators and political 
scientists regarding the effectiveness of data-driven militarized psychological profiling methods. 
Nevertheless, a huge body of empirical work also exist that point to the efficacy of these 
approaches as instruments for psychological understanding and mass persuasion (see Kosinski 
et al., 2016; Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014; Mondak et al., 2010, Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell, 
2015). Similarly, defense and military scholarship also suggest that these approaches have 
been deployed in the fight against terror in some of the world’s trouble spots (Tatham, 2008; 
Tunnicliffe and Tatham, 2017; Richards, 2015). Thus, as Shoshana (2015) argue, SCL Group 
style methodology seems enmeshed in contemporary society through data ‘extraction, 
personalization, customization, behavioral prediction and modification’ (ibid).  
In conclusion, what this evidence suggest is that the entrance of a military grade 
contractor/consultant in the 2016 Trump campaign had inspired innovation and modernization. 
As Wylie (2019:39) show, SCL Group ‘worked primarily for militaries, conducting psychological 
and influence operations around the world, such as jihadist recruitment mitigation in Pakistan, 
combatant disarmament and demobilization in South Sudan, and counter-narcotics and counter-
human trafficking operations in Latin America’. Indeed, the entrance of ‘psyops’ (Issenberg, 
2015) from the ‘military service’ (Vogel, 2015) into Trump’s campaign is unique in the existing 
operational mechanics and theoretical construct of modern campaign innovation and sit clearly 
outside known models. 
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From the standpoint of theory, what this suggest is that as a theoretical lens for explaining 
changes or innovation in data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign, modernization as a 
theory continue to suffice. However, what this case study adds to the thesis is that the 2016 
Trump campaign is a theoretical outlier that sit outside the existing theoretical norm of how 
campaigns innovate. First, for relying less on party provided campaign infrastructure. Second, 
for importing into modern electioneering campaign military-grade people profiling and 
psychological insight. This finding no doubt carries theoretical implication, since it reveals how 
SCL Group designed military style behavioural and psychological profiling methods were taken 
out and deployed in an election campaign. In this sense, the data driven innovation in the 2016 
Trump’s campaign sit outside the explanation of Swanson and Mancini’s modernization thesis 
as well as outside existing theoretical explanations.  
Thus, from the standpoint of the modernization theory, considering that Swanson and Mancini’s 
thesis conveys little explanatory potency in explaining the data driven innovation in Trump’s 
campaign, the evidence above advances the explanatory scope of the theory. Thus, the 
introduction of military designed psychological profiling and information operation technique and 
their adaption and adoption for political persuasion expands understanding of current innovation 
channel (s) or modernization in recent US election campaign. As T1 stated, such 
‘’internationalization’’ and ‘’militarization’’ i.e. mixture of SCL Group led defence military 
contracting with the political communication industry is both empirically and theoretically new.  
Indeed, with a ‘span of twenty-five years’ worth of experience, ‘defence/political 
projects’/contracts worldwide and election consultancy deals ‘in countries across the globe’-i.e. 
in both developed and emerging democracies, including clients like the ‘U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, NATO, CIA, FBI and the State Department’, SCL model seem both 
international and militaristic (Kaiser, 2019:7;10;26). The company’s ‘methodology and how it 
applies it makes it a different political consultancy firm in the world’ (p.48). Indeed, Issenberg 
(2015) considers SCL Group and CA led ‘psychological profiles’ on Americans as their most 
important exported ingredient and product of contemporary election campaign. Again, the 
involvement of CA and SCL Group both British companies in the 2016 Trump campaign 
reduces the scope of the Americanization thesis and reinforces consistency of the two-way flow. 
Indeed, CA and SCL Group involvement in the Trump campaign shows how UK based political 
communication and consultancy firm and campaign insight and practices continue to emerge 




          7.4: Contemporary Active Measures: Russia and the 2016 Election 
Apart from modernization in data-driven campaign practices, discussion of the 2016 Trump 
campaign would be incomplete without highlighting the role of the Kremlin. 
For example, T5, T6 and AM1 had all identified Russia as a relevant actor in the 2016 US 
presidential election. While T5 suggest that it is the first time in recent US electioneering history 
that they would be an ‘’overlap’’ of a presidential campaign in the US with a foreign government 
that were doing ‘’similar things to get a candidate elected’’, T6 thought that ‘’it was the first time 
that you had a foreign power playing in a big way in the US election system’’-i.e. ‘’the Russia 
Internet Research Agency’’ with ‘’their hack and dump strategy’’.  
On the other hand, AM1 comment on Russia sounded more like a defence for Trump’s 
campaign. As he argued, ‘’America’s meltdown on the campaigns use of data and their believe 
that foreign actors and the stuff were involve is crazy’’. Such commentary in my view may not be 
unconnected with AM1’s role as data and digital director of the 2016 Trump campaign. 
That said, documentary evidence points to practices that bear semblance to longstanding 
Kremlin style ‘active measures’. For example, in reports across a broad spectrum of US 
National Security Agencies, they are wide consensus regarding the role Russia played in the 
election of President Trump-in what can be called new active measures (i.e. ‘operations 
conducted by Russian security services to influence international affairs’ (Muller, 2019; ODNI, 
2017).  
Historically, active measures are Soviet-era tactics of engagement with the West (Abram, 2016). 
Today however, Russian active measures come in the form of Kremlin crafted information 
warfare design to upset the existing balance of power (Muller, 2019). According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2019), contemporary Russian global engagement is not only an 
effort toward destabilizing ‘the global order by undermining Western institutions’, but a way of 
restoring ‘its place on the world stage’ in a bid to ‘overcoming perceived humiliation after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union’. 
In the past, examples of active measures include Russian framed stories of FBI and CIA’s 
involvement in the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy; crediting the 1979 attack 
on Mecca to the United States and Israel as well as lies regarding the creation of the aids virus 
as a biological weapon. As the evidence in this work suggest, modern day efforts seem to bear 
semblance with those and follow past patterns under the control and supervision of the Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) (ODNI, 2017).  
In their background assessment of Russian interference in the elections for example, reports 
coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
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and the National Security Agency (NSA) all seem to agree that ‘Russian efforts to influence the 
2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding 
desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order-with a significant escalation in 
directness’ targeted at (a) ‘undermining public faith in US democratic process’; (b) ‘denigrating 
Secretary Clinton to harm her electability and potential presidency’ and (c) ‘covert digital effort 
that shows preference/help for the election of President Trump’ (ONDI, 2017a:17). 
According to the Robert Muller’s report, Russian influence in the election seem to have 
emanated from the Russian based Internet Research Agency (IRA) and was designed to sow 
‘discord in the US political system’ (p.14). As both the Muller and US Senate Committee report 
on Foreign Relations show, the IRA’s strategy comprised of many tactics. First, through 
‘politology’-IRA coordinated classes that teach IRA staff ‘Russian position on latest news’ and a 
‘foreign desk’ dedicated to US election, they coordinated the spread of disinformation as a way 
of meddling in the election. Second, through the use of IRA staff and bots, they converted their 
understanding in the ‘nuances of American social polemics on tax issues, LGBT rights, the gun 
debate to incite America, by setting American citizens against the government to provoke unrest 
and discontent’ (see CFRUSS, 2018:45). 
Furthermore, the report also points to evidence of IRA coordinated ‘buying of political 
advertisement on social media in the names of US persons and entities as well as contact with 
individuals associated with the Trump’s campaign’ (p.14). On social media for example, DiResta 
et al. (2018: 34) found IRA related content on Facebook-reaching over 126 million and 1.4 
million Americans on Twitter respectively, as well as over 3,519 IRA posted ads (videos and 
images) on Facebook and Instagram and 73 different IRA-affiliated pages’. 
The report also suggest that ‘doxing’ and cyber espionage-‘the infiltration, stealing and leaking 
of secret or incriminating information for public consumption’ was carried out on the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) emails by groups like COZY BEAR-also known as APT29 (i.e. a 
Russian hacker group believed to be associated with Russian intelligence) and FANCY BEAR 
(APT28) (i.e. a cyber-espionage group classified as advanced persistent threat) released by 
Wikileaks (Farrante, 2018). 
In another report from the Office of US Inspector General, a number of President Trump’s 
associates (i.e. George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael Flynn) (see 
figure 7.3) who have all pleaded or found guilty were said to have had some contact with 
Russia. This is not to say however, that there is established evidence of collusion between 




Figure 7.3: Convicted Trump Associates 
 
Source: Fox News 
However, as the report show, George Papadopoulos-Trump’s campaign foreign policy adviser 
for example, ‘suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia 
that it could assist the election process with the anonymous release of information during the 
campaign that would be damaging to Mrs Clinton and President Obama’, with such Trump vs 
Russian collaboration predicated on deals that included commitment to making Ukraine a non-
campaign issue (see Office of the Inspector General Review of Fisa Applications, 2019: ii, 80, 
94, 95). On his part, President Trump has repeatedly criticized these investigations, calling them 
‘’witch hunt’’ motivated by Christopher Steel’s DNC paid opposition research (Glasser, 2019).  
d’Acona (2017) is of the view that such presidential narrative reinforces the fact that we are in a 
post-truth era where political actors evoke feelings rather that facts. That said, President 
Trump’s claim notwithstanding, the Inspector General’s report seem to be very clear about the 
‘serious threat to US national security’ that Russian involvement in the 2016 election pose (see 
Office of the Inspector General Review of Fisa Application 2019: viii). The report concludes that 
‘political bias’ or ‘improper motivation’ had not influenced decision to open investigation into the 
Trump’s campaign as a ‘sensitive investigation matter’ even though there was a ‘desperate and 
passionate’ effort by Christopher Steele for Donald Trump not to be elected (OIG, 2019:102).  
Furthermore, as the investigations across many agencies and institutions of US government 
have shown, a number of the members of Russian intelligence community-Viktor Borisovich 
Netyksho; Boris Alekseyevich Antonov; Dmitriy Sergeyevich Badin; Ivan Sergeyevich Yermakov 
and 8 others were tried and found guilty by the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia in case number: 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ, for conspiring ‘to hack into the computer of US 
persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 elections and to defraud the 
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United States and advance narratives that further erode social cohesion’ (18 U.S.C: 25; 46; 
ODNI, 2017). The US Senate report also concluded that on the 2016 election, ‘a hostile foreign 
power reached down to the states and local level to touch voter data, by employing 
sophisticated cyber tools and capabilities and helped Mosco to potentially build detailed 
knowledge’ of how US election work (US Senate Hearing on Russian Interference, 2017: 1).  
In the literature, Moore (2018:87) suggest that as a product of the KGB (i.e. Russia’s secret 
service) ‘conspirational perspective on international relations’ would have been engrained in 
President Putin’s thinking and approach to Russia vs Western engagement. Thus, like the ‘cold 
war’ era, strategies of propaganda, disinformation, demoralization and enemy weakening seem 
to constitute the new ways of fighting the West today. As Moore show, the digital era war tactics 
begins by ‘identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities, opening and widening existing political 
wounds and social fissures, highlighting hypocrisies, and accentuating partisanship’(p.80), with 
digital tools and platforms-Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube providing both the incentive and 
enabling environment as ‘virtual battlegrounds’ for such cold war era active measures. Wylie 
(2019) even suggested that a link existed between CA and the Kremlin. He points for example 
to insider CA documents that show consultancy deals between CA and Russian based Lukoil 
that focused on ‘developing new hacking capacity in concert with former Russian intelligence 
officers’ that was used to spread ‘online disinformation targeting social media networks’ in the 
United States (p.152). 
Although they are still questions regarding the extent of Russian interference in the 2016 US 
presidential elections, the long term implication of such hybrid ‘active measures’ is that apart 
from delegitimizing democracy and the democratic process, it could be used to create puppets 
of the Kremlin in many democracies (Chertoff, 2018; Silberberg, 2019; Wigell, 2019). In this 
sense, digitally robust and national anti-propaganda strategies, ‘active defence’ and ‘hacking 
back’ measure-(i.e. chasing down and destroying stolen information) (Chertoff, 2018:188-190) 
are now critically needed in much of the advanced democratic world to secure both elections 
and democracy.  
In conclusion, it could be said therefore, that apart from modernization or innovation in data 
driven campaign practices-enabled by CA and SCL Group’s psychological profiling of American 
voters, the 2016 election of President Trump can also be perceived as a digitally influenced, 




          7.5: Contextual Incentive for Innovation in US Political Communication 
Although from what we now know, much of Cambridge Analytica’s data mining took place in the 
UK rather than in the US where there is no legal restriction on the gathering, processing and 
use of individuals’ data. As T6 suggested for example, the ‘’US have a very different overall 
structure and expectation of personal privacy’’. T1 also thought that ‘’the US is an unprotected 
data environment with only California as an exception where legislation is now under 
consideration’’. According to T1, one difference between the Obama and Trump campaign data 
collection is that apart from data purchase from brokers, much of the data collected and used by 
the Obama campaign ‘’was all collected in the US and all in the context of consent, that is 
consenting to data sharing for political purpose, for political campaigning’’. Mortazavi and Salah 
(2015) suggest that the economic and policing incentive that the near unregulated US data 
environment incentivize allows for increasing data analytics both at private and public 
institutions. 
Thus, as T6 and T1 argue above, the legal framework for managing data privacy in the US differ 
significantly from what is obtainable in Europe. According to Strandburg (2014), modern US 
foundation of privacy law was laid in 1973 with the five Fair Information Practice Principles. 
However, Benjamin (2002) argues that the birth of a privacy framework takes its roots from 
Brandeis and Warren’s Right to Privacy classic written in 1890. Built on that foundation, 
Strandburg is of the view that modern US privacy tort were concerned with individualized harms 
of emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation arising out of ’intrusion upon seclusion’ 
or ‘public disclosure of private facts’.  
However, the development of computers and the volume of data now generated, stored and 
used raised fears of misuse, unfairness and lack of transparency distinct from the concerns of 
emotional distress and reputation that were at the heart of initial US privacy torts (ibid). As a 
result, Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) which is the mainstay of US data privacy law 
were developed. Subsequent legislations like the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, the 
Privacy Act of 1974 that regulates data use by government agencies and laws like the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, Video Privacy 
Protection Act and Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act were all based on the FIPPs (ibid). 
According to Strandburg, these legislations were an attempt to cope with the scale of data 
collection by substituting transparency and consent for the individualized fact-specific approach 
of privacy torts. 
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That notwithstanding, T1 is of the view that ‘’the US has no data protection laws or regulations 
or an effective regulator and can be characterised as a wild-feast lawless data market’’. T1’s 
argument is that ‘’in contrast to the trans-Atlantic market-the United Kingdom and EU’’, request 
for access to data by a data subject in the US ‘’is entirely at the discretion of the company’’. 
Perhaps, T1 is not far from the truth, since the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS) only 
consider it more appropriate to deter organizations and institutions from inappropriate practices, 
rather than being forced by regulations to adopt specific practices (see HEW Publication No. OS 
7374). For example, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the US 
Department of Commerce, ’because of the broad collection and range of uses of big data, 
consent for collection is much less likely to be sufficient and should be augmented with technical 
and legal controls to provide auditability and accountability for use’(NIST, P.7). In this sense, T5 
argues that essentially, these ‘’are privacy regulations that could apply’’, so that the ‘’data 
environment is enough to instil some sanity and privacy and ethical consideration in data 
processing’’. 
Comparatively however, in Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
(GDPR) and the 1980 OECD principles addresses issues that include: ‘collection limitation’-for 
‘limits to the collection of personal data’; ‘data quality principle’ that seem to address the 
concern that data collected should be ‘relevant to the purpose for which they are to be used’, 
and a ‘purpose specification principle’ that suggest that purpose should be specified in advance 
and ’subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes’ (see European Data Protection 
Supervisor Opinion 4/2015 Report Hardesty 2015; OECD, 1980). 
Although they are existing institutional and legal frameworks like the EU-US Privacy Shield 
Framework and the US Securities Act 1933 and US Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that 
was violated by Facebook in the processing and use of peoples’ data for political purposes in 
the 2016 Trump campaign. Nevertheless, such framework is still considered weak in terms of 
how it protects data subject privacy, data acquisition and data processing, thus creating 
incentive for the data analytics market in the United States. Basically, it is such free and nearly 
unregulated data analytics market that incentivize innovation in data-driven marketing 
strategies, psychometrics and microtargeting. 
That said, as questions and debate regarding the ethics of digital campaigning continue, the US 
might need to achieve parity with the European Union Area in data protection standards if it 
seek to address concern over data driven microtargeting campaign tactics. Such regulative 
parity might begin with a debate as to whether notice and consent and the logic of harmless use 
of data suffices as potent legal instruments for privacy and personal information protection. 
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          7.6: Conclusion  
In line with the methodological objective and theoretical underpinning, this chapter has shown 
evidence of innovative data-driven practice (s) in the 2016 Trump campaign and the implication 
of such innovation for theory. The chapter also identified a contextual factor that seem to inspire 
innovation in data-driven campaign practices in the US. That said, what the 2016 Trump 
campaign significantly reveal is that emotionally laden, politically motivated 
personality/psychological profiling is possible and such methodology and tactic was in use in 
2016 in ways that seem to have advanced the methodology of personalization and 
microtargeting crafted and first deployed in the Obama model. A move away from the predictive 
characterization of voters in the Obama model to emotional, personality and psychological 
profiling of voters in the Trump’s campaign is a significant shift in longstanding practices of 
segmentation and personalization of political communication. 
In the next chapter, a cross-contextual mapping of converged practices that define the emerging 
technological typology of campaigning and a theoretical commentary on the implication of 
findings on the Americanization and Modernization theses will be provided. The next chapter will 
also highlight contextual factors that shaped the adoption and application of the Obama model 
in case study I & II. Taken together, these three outputs in chapter eight sit as the three main 














          8: Concluding Discussion: Learning from the Cases and the 
Three Level Update 
     8:1: Introduction 
This thesis was designed to achieve three things. First, to operationalize the Obama model-i.e. 
the extent to which features of the model as set out in chapter two were deployed in Nigeria and 
the United Kingdom. Second, to test theory-i.e. Americanization and modernization, and third, to 
reveal context-i.e. how country specific factors shape the manifestation of the Obama model. As 
the main contribution of this thesis, this chapter follows the goals of the study by highlighting the 
cross-case manifestation of the Obama model and empirical evidence that reduces and expand 
the scope of the Americanization and modernization theories respectively. The chapter also 
highlight contextual factors that impeded convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the 
United Kingdom as well as US specific incentive for innovation in data driven campaign 
practices. The chapter concludes by highlighting limits of the Obama model and areas of further 
research. 
     8:2: First Level: The Obama Model 
This section provides a cross-case commentary on similarity and differences in the 
manifestation of the Obama model in the case studies. As indicated in the introduction, this work 
began with the Obama model as an analytical framework for exploring the emergence of 
technologically innovative campaign practices. Thus, the Obama model is used as an exemplar 
for providing detail on emerging technologically innovative campaign practices by finding 
patterns of similarity in empirical materials from the case studies. This way, ‘a logical structure 
of possibilities was created before studying cases’ (George and Bennett, 2005:235), with each 
case study serving as a building block for operationalizing the Obama model and the mapping 
of the technological dimension (s) and state of modern election campaign. Thus, what is 
highlighted below is a form generalization on the manifestation of the Obama model in the case 
studies and identification of what George and Bennett call ‘empty cells’ (p.233)-i.e. elements of 
the model that have not occurred in the case studies (see also Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014). 
Table 8.1: The Obama Model: Operationalization and Trump Campaign  





Active use Active use   Active 
use   
Active use   
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Big Data and 
single 
database 
Unused  Unused Active 
use 
Active use  
Predictive 
Modelling 
Unused Unused Active 
use 

















Active use  Active use Active 
use 





Unused Used with 
minimal 
impact 




Active use Active use Active 
use 
Active use  





Used  Used  Active 
use 




Used Active use Active 
use 
Active use  
Negative 
campaigning 
Active use Active use Active 
use 




Used  Used  Active 
use 




Used  Used  Active 
use 










Unused  Unused  Used Unused  
The permanent 
campaign 
Unused Unused Used Unused  
Deviant 
Element 
WhatsApp    Psychographics  
Source: Own elaboration-Nigeria J-Nigeria Jonathan’s campaign; Nigeria B-Nigeria Buhari’s campaign; 
UK C-United Kingdom Conservative Party campaign; UK L- Labour Party campaign; Trump’s campaign. 
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1.  Political and Technology Consultants  
Since Larry Sabato’s (1981) publishing of the ‘rise of political consultants’, evidence from this 
work also indicate that they has been tremendous increase in both the hiring of consultants and 
the diversification and growth of skills now offered to political parties and candidates during 
elections. However, what is unique and important to point out about this era is that American 
political consultants no longer monopolize or dominate the political communication consultancy 
market and field. As evidence from the 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign, British 
2015 general election and the 2016 Trump campaign show, the field has become more 
internationalized and diverse, with knowhow and skills designed and developed for other 
sectors including for military operations now imported into electioneering-symptomatic of 
Bernays (1947) engineering of consent. As Lees-Marshment (2009) argue, they are now an 
increased development of a new generation of home-grown political consultants in many 
countries who now compete with American consultants. Although as recent events in the 2015 
elections in Nigeria and the 2016 US presidential election show, Cambridge Analytica’s voter 
de-mobilisation tactics indicate some level of unethical and questionable roles of contemporary 
political consultants and consultancies. 
Nevertheless, across the three countries-i.e. the US, UK and Nigeria, evidence point to the 
continuous reliance and use of what Blumler (2019) call as ‘consultancy-led model’ of political 
communication. As Issenberg (2015) argue for example, CA’s involvement in Nigeria, the UK 
and US suggest a border crossing political consultancy that is transnational in approach and 
cross-sectoral in business with almost the same methodology and practices applied everywhere 
it goes and everywhere it was hired. That said, while the hiring of consultants has continued as 
a longstanding component of modern campaign, it is the entrance of new skill sets-technologists 
and data scientists, the internationalization of the trade and diminishing US dominance in the 
global political communication consultancy market that is remarkable. 
2. Big data and the single database 
Historically, political parties and campaigns have always used data and information to make 
judgement about strategy. However, in this era of big data and growing technological 
advancement, more and more organizations now have and are developing the capacity to 
accumulate, store and convert data into insight that guide decision making. In political 
communication, what evidence from this work indicate is that political parties in America and 
Britain are far ahead of those in developing democracies like Nigeria in the development of this 
new kind of campaign infrastructure that is embedded in databases and big data analysis of 
voters identity and personality traits. However, Ndlela (2020) is of the view that there is 
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possibility that modern African elections are equally now enmeshed in data driven 
microtargeting campaign tactics. That said, as political parties increasingly leverage on these 
data enabled insight, it is important to think about a global or transnational regulation and ethical 
framework. For example, recent evidence from Cadwalladr (2020) suggest that over 68 
countries have been under the manipulative influence of Cambridge Analytica’s voter 
manipulation tactics. Such regulation or ethical framework can save democracy from the rising 
disinformation and voter manipulation. Taken together, this finding brings to light the advantage 
of the most similar and different sampling of cases for this study. 
3. Predictive Modelling 
From the standpoint of voter understanding and mobilization, evidence from the two advanced 
democracies (i.e. America and the United Kingdom) suggest that predictive modelling is 
inspiring a significant shift in how campaigns identify and mobilise voters and likely supporters. 
Similarly, data inspired predictive modelling seem to be equally reshaping the entire landscape 
of American and British political marketing and advertising. While this is incentivizing less 
emphasis on demographic segmentation and mobilization in both countries, a large part of 
political mobilization in Nigeria is still shaped by regional, ethno-religious and socio-
demographic factors and historical sentiments and differences in the country. 
4. Data Mining and Microtargeting 
In America and the UK, data mining now constitute one of the instruments used by 
contemporary campaigns for unmasking citizens deep-seated political sentiments, online 
activism and platform visibility. While it may have perpetually shifted and altered how campaigns 
make judgement on voters and how to contact and persuade such voters, there is no evidence 
that such data mining approaches are now in use in Nigeria. At best, what political parties in 
democracies like Nigeria leverage on are digital tools like Facebook audience profiling the have 
incentivized the use of location microtargeting.  
However, in Britain and America, data mining and microtargeting have change the way 
campaigns identify, contact and persuade voters. As evidence from both countries indicate, 
campaigns now have the capacity to know which individual or group of voters are likely to 
support them and the kinds of message (s) they will receive that will resonate with their views 
and interest. Thus, with such insight, campaigns can now effectively target the right voters with 
the right or resonating message both to persuade them to vote and to discourage them from 




Nevertheless, taken together and from the standpoint of contemporary practices in the 
personalization of political communication, three elements (i.e. big data and a single data base, 
predictive modelling and data mining/microtargeting and psychographics (i.e. the innovative 
practice deployed in President Trump’s 2016 campaign data driven approach to voter 
understanding and mobilization) have contributed in moving modern political communication 
away from longstanding socio-economic and geo-demographic segmentation that guided 
previous approaches to voter mobilization to more personalized, emotional, psychological and 
personality based forms of voter identification, mobilization, persuasion, de-mobilisation and 
even manipulation. 
That said, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide commentary on whether less emphasis 
on demographics in the politics of some western countries and the new approach of audience 
identification and mobilization is an incentive for democracy and democratic participation. 
Nevertheless, as Hersh (2015:22) argue, despite the potential of shift in helping politicians and 
political parties to expand the pool of electorate to include more people with diverse interest and 
a clearer perception of voters ‘persuadability’ that these tools provide, reliance on these 
strategies can (a) distort the perception of politicians by reducing the ‘portion of the electorate 
that a politician needs to care about’ (p.207) and (b) ‘distort voters behavior, alter the 
experience of voters, by limiting their exposure to alternative political viewpoints (p.208) in ways 
that may affect voters temperament for objective political debate (Sunstein, 2007). Thus, what 
can be said however is that in an era of rising political apathy, perhaps, a more positive form of 
microtargeting should rather be encouraged-i.e. responsible microtargeting or personalization of 
political communication that can inspire political and electoral participation. 
5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media  
Across all three countries, social media has increased the diversity and abundance of media 
now available to political actors and politicians. That said, these digital tools and platforms may 
have also altered the dynamics and balance of power between traditional legacy mainstream 
media in the arena of political communication. In Nigeria like the rest of Africa for example, 
politics have been penetrated by social media-a deliverance from the once state 
owned/government controlled Soviet-style media model (Ndlela and Mano, 2020). Although 
digital divide challenges exist, the media abundance and ubiquity incentivize by mobile 
telephony or what Nyamnjoh and de Bruijn (2009) call ‘new talking drum of Africa’ seem to have 
reshaped, democratize and change the media and political communication landscape. 
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In America and the UK, ‘just like TV, social media is becoming a primary medium of 
communication’ (Vaidhyanathan, 2018:2). The negative however, is that apart from incentivizing 
politics, social media platforms have equally become avenues for the fragmentation of the 
public, channels of voter de-mobilisation, the spread of ethno-nationalism and an incentive for 
the rise of authoritarianism (ibid). Whether or not we can continue to point to social media 
undermining of authoritarianism in the Arab Spring as its ‘unequivocal democratic merit’ 
(Habermas, 2005) is now a question for debate. 
However, taken together, what the evidence suggest is that social media has inspired a shift 
across all three countries in the nature of campaign messaging away from traditional 
gatekeepers and the two-step flow to more mediated, direct and personal/personalized forms of 
political communication in ways that can inspire the participation of millennials in modern day 
politics and revive old patterns of mass parties. Nevertheless, scholars like Miller and Vaccari 
(2020) are of the view that practices that now dominate the digital public sphere i.e. surveillance 
capitalism, data-driven analytics, personalization, disinformation, online hate, intimidation and 
algorithmic manipulation are hurting democracy in ways that were not imagined by some of the 
early visionary theorists of digital politics. Thus, in their view, digitization and social media also 
bear significant consequences for the health of liberal democracy as we know it (ibid). 
6. Digital Fundraising and small donors 
Whilst digital fundraising and small donors seem to be democratizing campaign finance 
mobilization in the US and Britain, there is still minimal impact in Nigeria. Evidence seem to 
suggest that across all three context, big donors and wealthy individuals or what Johnson 
(2017) calls ‘dark money’ continue to flood elections in ways that raises questions on the 
integrity of modern-day elections in advanced and developing democracies. What is also 
important to highlight is that although digitally sourced donations from small donors have 
contributed in reshaping campaign finance mobilization, in America and the UK for example, it is 
the amount of money that campaigns are able to assemble for electioneering that tend to shape 
investment in and deployment of innovative data-driven campaign practices. That said, in 
Nigeria where political finance mobilization seem to account for much of the political corruption, 
perhaps, political parties institutionalization of this approach to campaign fundraising and 
financing can offer short term solutions to political corruption.  
7. Air War: Political Advertising  
Apart from traditional media spaces, digitization is diversifying the terrain for disseminating 
political ads through platforms, search engines and even celebrities. While evidence from the 
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three countries suggest that digital political advertising may have reduced the cost of producing 
and disseminating political information, an ethical framework for such digital campaigning might 
be necessary, given the rising challenge of disinformation and the need to find a balance 
between online mobilization and polarization. In the UK for example, even though they are 
regulations on political advertising in traditional legacy media, they are less or no such broad-
based regulation that currently exists to police and checkmate digital political advertising and 
dark practices.  
That notwithstanding, across all cases, digitization seems to have completely altered the 
political advertising landscape. In Nigeria for example, while they are no evidence of a big data 
guided approach to dissemination of political ads, digital platforms like Facebook location 
specific advertising seem to be inspiring sophistication in Nigeria’s political advertising. In the 
United Kingdom, while traditional media remained influential, digitization has also diversified 
channels of such air wars in ways that have significantly reduced reliance on party election 
broadcast (PEBs). 
 
8. Ground Game 
According to Blumler (2019), patterns of contemporary ground game campaign like those 
deployed in the Obama model and the Tories in 2015 can be referred to as ‘a movement-led 
model’ of campaigning. However, from the point of view of comparison, while technology and a 
huge recruitment of ground troops were at the heart of the ground game tactics in America and 
Britain, investment in such technologically enabled apps and mass recruitment/masses guided 
coordinated approach to getting out the vote is only at the elementary stage in Nigeria. What we 
find in Nigeria is a less institutionalized, less labour-intensive, less information sharing ground 
game tactics, with political parties only drawing from the enthusiasm of youths who most times 
are motivated by monetary gains, jobs or promise of political appointments. In the United 
Kingdom however, Labour’s five thousand doorstep conversation point to a remarkable re-
energization of ground game activism that suggest that modern British elections have continued 
to be marketed at the doorsteps of the electorate with data returns by canvassers increasingly 
influencing the nature of messaging and targeting. 
9. Political Opinion Polling 
Political opinion polling has remained a regular tool for campaigns even in a developing 
democracy like Nigeria. However, what is different in Nigeria is that such political opinion polling 
remain mostly traditional and are conducted by political parties mainly to lay claim of electoral 
victory rather than for design of election or get-out-the-vote strategies. Conversely, in America 
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and Britain, technological and digital approaches to such political opinion polling seem to have 
overtaken traditional polling methods, with such polling increasingly becoming essential for 
design of national messages for campaign success and electoral victory. 
10. Branding, Image and Message 
Although it is beyond the scope of this work to comment on the political implication and electoral 
impact of branding, image and message. However, reliance on branding, candidate brand 
management and image are now a key component of contemporary campaigns. Similarly, 
campaign messages have also risen high in the list of priority of things campaigns consider key 
and want to get right through message testing as they plan for electoral victory. Across the three 
case studies for example, evidence indicates that the dissemination of political messaging has 
increasingly gone online, with technology and social networking sites acting as incentivizing 
vehicles for message testing and avenues for dissemination. Although questions about 
message precision remain, nevertheless, consumer-based marketing approaches are now part 
of modern campaign strategy. In both Nigeria and the United Kingdom for example, the range of 
responsibility that political consultants have include the design of such messages, with clarity 
and consistency in message and messaging increasingly becoming important sources of voter 
inspiration and mobilization. 
11. Negative Campaigning 
This element of campaigning-also social media driven featured in all two case studies. However, 
in Britain and Nigeria more than in America, they were more profound use of what Blumler 
(2019) calls ‘journalistic interventionism’-tabloid aligned attack on politicians in ways that 
reinforced the partisan nature of British tabloid newspapers. In Nigeria for example, such 
negative campaign tactics come mostly with intense ethnic coloration and personality attacks 
with media houses as accomplices. Furthermore, a new dimension that also emerged was 
Cambridge Analytica-Israeli experts Blackcube led hacking of Buhari’s medical records and the 
scaremongering videos that portrayed Buhari as a Muslim who will decapitate Nigeria. Indeed, 
such negativity strikes deeply into the heart of Nigeria’s major fault line and could be a recipe for 
violence. Historically, ethno-religious and regional rivalry has contributed to most of Nigeria’s 
pre- and post-election violence. In the United Kingdom, such negative campaigning is mainly 
designed to demolish the credibility of the opposition. However, even though digitization has 
contributed in altering the architecture for the dissemination of negativity during campaigns, the 
party that controls a bigger share of traditional press support tend to enjoy a better and more 
favorable and friendlier coverage. 
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12. Campaign Feedback Strategy 
Again, across all case studies, social media seem to have inspired the use of this element as a 
campaign tactic. However, in Nigeria where party electoral strategy focused less on formal rules 
of victory, they are lesser institutionalization of this strategy in the overall campaign approach of 
the PDP and APC. Conversely, in America and the UK, campaigning is increasingly becoming a 
two-way mediated process incentivized by digitization such that canvassers and campaign 
headquarters constantly share information to enhance targeting and voter mobilization. 
13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy 
While they were more levels of technological sophistication involved in the deployment of this 
element in America and Britain, the growth of social media is the incentive for such campaign 
information flows in Nigeria. That said, even though this strategy was deployed in the United 
Kingdom and Nigeria, the evidence that emerged in Nigeria does not indicate a bottom-up 
campaign strategy like the pattern incentivized by ground-war troops, apps and new technology 
in the Obama model. Increasingly however, campaigns in both advanced democracies are 
consciously designing and creating interaction platforms that seek to gather information and 
attract people beyond traditional supporters. 
14. Speed and consistency of campaign communication  
In ways that seem to be competing or replacing longstanding strategy of campaigns reliance on 
spoke-persons, digitization, volunteers and ground game army are contributing to reshaping and 
changing the speed at which political parties and candidates attack, counter each other and 
respond to issues during election campaigns. In all three cases, the new media arena and 
environment seem to have made campaigning in modern elections a round-the-clock affair, with 
attacks and rebuttals from all parties spreading in the digital public sphere. 
15. Campaign Games  
On this element, only America and the UK produced evidence of the deployment of gamification 
as campaign strategy. However, while the Obama campaign had deployed this strategy for 
fundraising, voter mobilization and election turnout, the Tories only used gamification to design 
and encourage participation in sharing campaign content and materials. That said, from the 
standpoint of political participation, this element hold potential to inspire millennials to get active 
in politics. Creatively gamified campaign platforms can be an incentive and inspiration for tech 
loving millennials who connect with a candidate and their policies to campaign from their homes. 
In an era of rising voter apathy, gamification has the potential to drive mass participation. 
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16. The permanent Campaign 
Although patterns vary between Britain and the US, political campaigns have increasingly 
become continuous and permanent for incumbents. Conversely, for opposition parties for 
example, both the Labour Party and APC respectively didn’t engage in any form of permanent 
campaign. However, even though features of the permanent campaign are emerging under the 
current APC led government in Nigeria, they are no clear signs or evidence that the PDP (i.e. 
the party in government) had engaged similar patterns in the 2015 election campaign. In the 
UK, evidence of online posters appearing nearly daily even outside of election periods and the 
fix term parliament privileges that the governing party had enjoyed are suggestive of the 
permanent campaign. That said, in table 8.2 below, a cross-contextual trajectory of change is 
highlighted as a way of signposting the old, revised and new technologically innovative aspects 
and dimensions of modern election campaign. 
Table 8.2: Trajectory of Change in Practices 
Old Practices Revised Practices 
(by technology) 
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Source: Own elaboration  
Now as earlier indicated, given that from the point of view of Swanson and Mancini’s ‘modern 
model of campaigning’, they failed to specify in detail what the modern model of campaigning’ 
constitutes both from a technological perspective and in terms of key and specific political 
communication technologies, techniques and practices that were available and utilized in 1996, 
table 8.2 above provides an update. As table 8.1 indicates, a cross-case synthesis and pattern-
matching of empirical evidence from the two case studies with the predicted elements (i.e. 16 
elements of the Obama model) establishes both the underlying uniformity in practices and 
differences (see Glasser and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2003; Emmel, 2013). In this sense, the Obama 
model provides details on the technological dimension and state of modern election campaign. 
That said, some of what has emerged in table 8.1 above also reflect in much of the wider 
discussion in the literature on contemporary campaign practices (see for example, Newman, 
2016; Davies, 2019; Mullen, forthcoming). However, where differences in the application and 
manifestation of the Obama model emerged, such differences are conditioned by context and 
country specific factors. For example, while campaigns in America and Britain have entered a 
‘radically transformed historical moment’ (Pybus, 2019) and an era where technology-data 
driven approaches built on big data, machine learning, algorithms, predictive behaviour and 
psychographics now ‘form the new instrument of persuasion’ (ibid), such practices remain in 
their formative stages in Nigeria.  
Nevertheless, taken together, the analytically equivalent elements even though ‘hybrid’ 
(Chadwick, 2013) and with different levels of manifestation across the three countries, they 
conceptually offer empirically grounded validity to the Obama model. That said, whilst it is 
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agreeable that continuous expansion of this model is imperative as the technological 
environment continues to change, from the standpoint of Swanson and Mancini modern model 
of campaigning, comparative theory building, progress or contribution to knowledge, the Obama 
model rescues the field from comparative knowledge stagnation on the technological 
dimensions and state of modern campaign. The Obama model also offer a typological lens that 
can guide comparative work in other countries in ways that can further expand and explain the 
state of the field (see Feller and Stern, 2007). Thus, as a way of complementing Swanson and 
Mancini’s ‘modern model of campaigning’ and its failure to adequately detail the technological 
dimension of changes in campaigning in 1996, the Obama model reveals and provide details of 
the sequence of technologically driven forms of innovation now appearing and manifesting in 
contemporary campaigns. 
 
     8:3: Second Level: Theory 
This section offers an enhanced commentary on the Americanization and Modernization 
theories based on evidence from the case studies. 
Americanization 
On the basis of the evidence from the two case studies, the central claim that this work makes 
on Americanization is that the theory is inappropriate, insufficient and not well-suited as a 
theoretical lens for capturing, labelling and explaining the manifestation and convergence of the 
Obama model in the two case studies. As we saw in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, what the 
evidence suggest is an increasing internationalization of political communication consulting that 
show how globally diversifying contemporary political communication consultancy, consultants 
and innovation have become. 
In the 2015 election in Nigeria for example, a conglomeration of political consultants and 
consultancies from America, Britain, Israel and emerging local actors and homegrown talents all 
assembled, competed and contributed in shaping the practices deployed in the campaigns. 
Furthermore, contextual factors-digital divide, ethno-religious and regional sentiments, and the 
penchant for political actors to compromise the electoral system undermined the emergence of 
common patterns on all elements of the Obama model. Similarly, Cambridge Analytica’s testing 
of dark advertising and voter suppression tactics in Kenya and Nigeria also theoretically suggest 
elements of Africanization and transition from an era of complete Americanization. Thus, in an 
increasingly globalized and trans-national media world, practices of the model of political 
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communication exemplified in the US-Obama model are not extending to non-Western 
democracies like Nigeria completely on the wheels of Americanization. 
In the UK, while there is a longstanding history of American influence in British elections, such 
influence has increasingly become mutual and reciprocal in recent times. For example, both in 
2012 and in 2016, British consultants and consultancy company (i.e. Cambridge Analytica) were 
actively involved in American elections (see Hines, 2012). Thus, as the evidence from the 2015 
British General elections show, even though they were American political consultants who were 
hired and had worked for both Labour and the Conservative Parties respectively, the Australian-
Lynton Crosby and homegrown actors and professionals in the political consultancy market 
were part of the network process of the innovative practices deployed in the campaign. Thus, in 
both case studies, rather than complete reliance on American consultants, ‘positive feedback’ 
on technology (Pierson, 2000) and ‘field crossing’ (Kreiss, 2016:12) contributed to inspire the 
reproduction of the Obama model. In this sense, the longstanding US dominance and 
hegemony in the trade and export of skill/knowhow is diminishing and convergence in the 
manifestation of the Obama model couldn’t be solely explained as a function of Americanization. 
As Berghahn (2010) argue, new developments in economic and technological innovation that 
now ‘instantly circulate the globe’ cannot be completely ascribed to America and American 
agents. For example, the involvement of SCL Group and Cambridge Analytica both British 
companies in the 2016 Trump campaign reduces the scope of the Americanization thesis and 
reinforces consistency of the to-way flow (Cunliffe, 1974) (cited in Negrine and 
Pathanapossolous, 1996). 
Contextually, the British legal context-i.e. the 1998 Data Protection Act also constrained the full 
deployment of US kind data driven campaign practices in 2015. For example, UK data 
protection regulation and the Electoral Commission’s guidelines for fair and lawful use of 
individuals’ data by data controllers like political parties exemplifies contextual differences that 
limits complete Americanization. As Norris (1997:211) argue, differences in context seem to 
continue the restriction of ‘wholesale importation of American campaigning’ into Britain. Elteren 
(2006) also argue that such contextual limitation means that the cultural exchange that takes 
place is not of ’transmission’ but a negotiated exchange where innovation is picked, chosen and 
converted to fit local context. Thus, as Negrine and Pathanapossolous (1996) argue, rather than 
theoretically paying attention only to how practices have been transferred from the US to other 
countries, emphasis should be on ‘broader patterns of practices being adopted from a variety of 




Regarding modernization, whilst technology and technological changes continue to sit at the 
heart of modern campaign innovation, evidence from the 2016 Trump campaign indicate that 
the market place of contemporary campaign innovation is expanding and changing from the 
existing theoretical norm, with new actors-rich oligarchs, sponsored research and military grade 
hearts and minds winning tactics now contributing to inspire innovative practices. Thus, whilst 
this work support the wide consensus among theories and theorist of change (s) in political 
communication that modernization can suffice as a general explanation for changes, new 
patterns and source of such innovation exemplified in the 2016 Trump campaign differ 
significantly from previous models of campaign changes and innovation. The dynamics of 
innovation exemplified in the 2016 Trump campaign challenges existing theoretical explanation 
on patterns of innovation in US political communication. 
For example, evidence suggest that military-grade psychological profiling insight crafted by 
Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) for creating ‘psychological effects’ that 
hinge on making impression on ‘mindset, thoughts, processes, attitudes and behaviours’ were 
part of Cambridge Analytica’s methodology (Mazeikis, 2016:3). Indeed, the introduction of such 
military designed psychological and personality profiling and information operation techniques 
and their adoption for political persuasion and mobilization expand understanding of innovation 
and modernization channels in contemporary US election campaign. SCL Group and 
Cambridge Analytica’s methodology of psychological, emotional and personality profiling and 
how it is applied both for voter mobilization and de-mobilisation is an entirely new world in the 
political communication landscape. Similarly, shifts from political characterization of voters in the 
Obama model to personality, emotional and psychological characterization of voters in the 2016 
Trump is a significant advancement in personalization of political communication. 
That said, although, the theoretical generalization made here does not necessarily mean that 
we discard the modernization theory as an explanatory lens for explaining changes in 
contemporary campaigns. Rather, what this thesis does, drawing from Kriess (2016) and 
Padgett and Powell (2012) network folding or recombination explanation of innovation is a 
theoretical expansion of the explanatory scope and lens of the theory. Thus, what this work 
adds from the point of view of contribution to knowledge is that it provides a theoretical update 
to the explanatory scope of both theories, by subjecting the theories to a test and revision and 
empirically challenging the knowledge they previously provide, thus, adding both understanding 
and a new and revised thinking on Americanization and Modernization regarding how 
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technology now drive innovation and convergence in the modern political communication 
landscape (see Whetten, 1989; Bendassolli, 2013). George and Bennett (2005:109) are of the 
view that contribution can be made to theories by strengthening or reducing ‘support for a 
theory’, narrowing or extending ‘the scope conditions of a theory’, or determining ‘which or two 
more theories best explains a case, type or general phenomenon’. 
     8:4: Third Level: Context and Barriers to Convergence  
According to Swanson and Mancini, factors that militated against the convergence process of 
their modern model of campaigning in the countries studied include: ‘the electoral system; the 
structure of party competition; the regulation of campaigning; national political culture; and the 
nature of the media system’ (see Swanson and Mancini, 1996:249).  
Whilst these five factors clearly remain relevant and important to any explanation of change, the 
focus in this thesis is a discussion of the technological dimension of factors that sustain 
difference and divergence in the uptake and application of the Obama model. Thus, the 
methodological design ensured that such country specific factors that emerged are empirically 
identified to add understanding to the contemporary contextual conditions that shape and 
influence the uptake and manifestation of innovative campaign practices exemplified by the 
Obama model.  
As Gurevitch and Blumler (1990) argue, it is context that either ‘differently promote or constrain’ 
political communication practices within countries. Thus, in Nigeria for example, digital divide, 
religion, ethnicity, disregard for campaign finance regulations and stomach infrastructure 
emerged as constrains to the application of the Obama model. Given the Eurocentric nature of 
the field, the Nigerian case study provides a unique perspective that helps to Africanize the field. 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, data protection regulation (i.e. the 1998 Data Protection Act) 
and the transparency responsibility it imposed on political parties as data controllers limit and 
conditioned the uptake and application of the technologically innovative campaign practices 
exemplified in the Obama model. Furthermore, with the 2018 European wide General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) now in force, the use of such innovative data driven political 
communication practices may have also become more constrained. Thus, as Elteren (2006) 
argue, discussion of the influence of American consultants on British elections that fails to 
account for ’local reworking’ of practices can be rejected. Furthermore, Cambridge Analytica’s 
(a British consultancy) involvement in the 2016 Trump campaign also speak of continuous 
mutuality in spread of data driven campaign innovation. 
277 
 
Conversely, in the United States, evidence suggest that US data regulation framework and legal 
environment for managing citizens data privacy is one incentive for the uptake of data driven 
and technologically innovative campaign practices. While such difference between the American 
and British data market is unique in its sense, it is such contextual differences that inhibit 
uniform adoption of US type practices in the UK. 
That said, taken together and from the point of view of contribution to knowledge, even though 
variations in contextual conditions may have created variations in the manifestation of the 
Obama model, the revelation of such contextual variations-a product of empirical discovery 
adds a socio-cultural, institutional and technological dimension to the discuss on context as a 
factor that condition political communication and more importantly, the application of the 
technologically driven political communication practices exemplified in the Obama model. 
      8:5: Context, Obama Model and Further Research 
The contextual landscape of the three case studies in this work opens doors to deeper reflection 
and further research. First, as a continuous way of uncovering the technological state of the field 
in both established and developing democracies, researchers are invited to test the Obama 
model and the Trump’s campaign data driven practice (i.e. old, revised, new and new-new see 
table 8.1 & 8.2) in future elections. Second, in the US where automated bots and deepfakes 
now seem to account for emerging tactics that seems to dwarf or highlight the limitation of the 
Obama model, research is needed to explore whether new practices are emerging that can also 
serve as update to the Obama model (see Choudhury, 2019). Both ways, research can continue 
to drive ‘conceptual, theoretical and characteristic understanding’ as well as discovery of 
practices and new ‘trends’ in the field (see Ijere, 2020). 
Furthermore, considering that the consequences of digital campaign for electoral outcome 
remain largely unknown in all three countries, the impact of data driven quantification of political 
support on contemporary political behavior is also worth researching. Such research can 
produce diverse set of explanation in the context of behavioral microtargeting and digital echo 
chambers and give us tools for mapping ethical frameworks for digital political advertising. 
Furthermore, in Nigeria, questions of direct US involvement in the country’s election and what 
impact this have or may have had on electoral outcome can form an important aspect of future 
research. Further comparative work is also necessary to explore the use of big data/single data 
base, data mining and predictive modelling, gamification and the permanent campaign in 
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Nigeria’s future elections.  On the use of WhatsApp in Nigeria, research is also needed to 
explore how the app’s end-to-end encrypted messaging could be serving as a platform for fake 
news and disinformation. Research is also needed to examine the electoral advantage 
unregulated campaign financing accord Nigerian political parties and how such campaign 
financing undermines the electoral system and process. 
In the United Kingdom, research is needed to explore the impact of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) on data driven campaign practices and digital fundraising practices of UK 
charities in order to explain what changes the institutional context of GDPR have inspired on 
data driven campaigning and fundraising. In the wake of current global events, research can 
also examine UK citizens perspective, the privacy implication and overall consequence (s) of 
COVID 19 contact tracing apps and how the information and data collected is used. Success in 
the use of such apps can be balanced with individual privacy. 
In the United Kingdom and United States where evidence is increasingly emerging on attempted 
Russian interference in the democratic space, electoral system and national security 
architecture, comparative work is necessary and critical for understanding new forms of ‘active 
measures’ in order to form a collaborative response in defense of liberal democracy. With 
increasing growth in technology and artificial intelligence that will continue to transform lives and 
society, research that examines the democratic and national security implications of artificial 
intelligence in a globe that includes actors like Russia is both important and critical. Given 
America’s involvement in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria, such research can also 
compare patterns of electoral interference in advanced and developing democracies. 
Lastly, in the United States, considering that this work focused mainly on differences between 
the Obama and Trump’s data driven campaign approaches, further comparative work that 
places both campaign side-by-side for full exploration of continuity, similarity and change is still 
necessary. Such research can shine more light on the impact of rising ideological and identity 
politics-i.e. right-wing and left-wing rhetoric on US political parties, US media organisations, 
democratic institutions and political communication. The missing cells in Trump’s campaign (see 
table 8.1 above) offer very important imperative for such comparison. Indeed, such research 
can also compare and analyse the way the media (i.e. traditional and digital) reflected and 
communicated dynamics of racial and ethnic identity in the 2016 US presidential election 




     8.6: Conclusion 
To produce an empirical picture of the register and state of contemporary political 
communication practices, this thesis has used the Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012 as a 
historical case of importance and point of departure to set out an advanced schema for 
understanding old, revised and new technological changes and dimension of the ‘modern model 
of campaigning’ (see table 8.1 & 8.2 ). From the point of view of trajectories of change, and as 
table 8.2 indicate, the technologically innovative practices that emerged in the Obama campaign 
place it as the most advanced to date. Thus, this thesis has added clarification to Swanson and 
Mancini’s ‘modern model’ of campaigning, regarding the technological state, dimensions and 
innovative data driven patterns, trends and practices that now inform contemporary election 
campaign. Taken together, the thesis has operationalized the Obama model and has also 
provided a theoretical update to the explanatory scope of Americanization and Modernization as 
well as additional understanding to contemporary contextual technological dynamics that shape 
the uptake and convergence of data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices in 
the case studies. 
Thus, as evidence from the two established democracies indicate, innovative campaign 
practices that are data-driven, predictive, personality based, emotionally engaging, 
psychologically focused and technologically intense are now the norm. However, the uptake of 
such innovative practices is context dependent. Significantly however, while such practices 
remain in their formative stage in Nigeria, in the United States and United Kingdom, these data-
driven and technologically innovative campaign practices are intensively and speedily moving 
political communication further away from longstanding socio-economic and geo-demographic 
segmentation and targeting that characterized past campaign practices to more personality-
based, emotional and psychological forms of voter persuasion, mobilization and de-mobilisation. 
Furthermore, the thesis has also shown that theoretically, Americanization is inadequate for 
explaining the convergence of such practices across our case studies as network actors that 
now inspire such innovation and practices continue to spring up in other countries. Similarly, 
additional explanation to the theoretical path of innovation or modernization in recent US 
political communication landscape was provided. Here, evidence suggests that actors that 
inspired creativity and innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign differ significantly from existing 
known models.  
Nevertheless, because comparison of the Obama and Trump campaign centered only on data-
driven campaign practices and its theoretical implication, the use of psychographics in Trump’s 
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campaign (see table 8.1 & 8. 2 above) is not enough to claim that Trump’s campaign has now 
dwarfed Obama’s. A more comprehensive comparison of both campaigns is needed to establish 
that. Lastly, contextual conditions that impeded the use of Obama model or the development of 
common pattern in practices in the case studies and a contextual incentive for such innovation 
in the US have been highlighted.  
In doing these three things, this thesis goes beyond Swanson and Mancini’s modern model of 
campaigning, by offering a comparative insight on old, revised and new technological registers, 
techniques and practices of contemporary campaign and political communication, a theoretical 
explanation for the emergence and convergence of such techniques and practices, and factors 
that shape and condition their use and uptake in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as well as 
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                                                              APPENDIX I 
   The Socio-Political and Economic Setting of the 2008 and 2012 Elections 
In defining political communication Swanson (2004) admonish that it is important not to 
underestimate the importance of the socio-economic and political context where political 
messages are framed. Moser and Scheiner (2012) also emphasize the need to understand 
context, since electoral system and practices alone do not shape outcome. Thus, this section 
briefly highlights the socio-political and economic setting/context that pervaded the 2008 and 
2012 presidential election campaign. This is necessary for understanding factors that may have 
shaped campaign rhetoric and dynamics. 
According to economic sociologists, economic situations and social-political action are linked 
(Ballarino and Regini, 2008). As Eichenberg et al. (2006) and Esser and Stromback (2012) note, 
a country’s socio-political and economic situation or context during an election can serve as 
‘situational triggers’ that drive election dynamics, debate, blame game and campaign strategies 
which is of fundamental importance in determining candidates and political party electoral 
fortunes.  
Gomez and Wilson (2008) also argue that the ‘politics of blame’ even though ‘acrimonious, 
messy, and fraught with uncertainty’ is essential for a functioning democracy. If the electorate is 
to act as ‘rational god of vengeance and reward’ (Key, 1963) (cited in Gomez and Wilson, 
2008), ‘blame attribution for social, political and economic outcomes are necessary for political 
choice’. How this happens according to Costa (2012) stem from the fact that political campaigns 
‘function as a filter to mediate the impact of events’. Thus, by echoing the impact of relevant 
events (social, political and economic) campaigns help ‘voters to form or update’ candidate or 
political party preference (ibid). Thus, events matter, and how they are communicated during 
campaigns can reinforce their effects. Although, there is relatively low evidence on the impact of 
socio-political and economic events as factors that drive shifts in electoral preferences during 
campaigns, Cambell (2000), Stimson (2004) and Graff (2011) are of the view that pre-election 
events matter and can explain voter preference. 
In the 2008 US presidential elections campaign, pre-election events contributed in shaping the 
political climate of the campaigns. For instance, after the 29th of August 2005 ‘Hurricane Katrina’ 
storm that left the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama with widespread devastation, 
the door of political and institutional blame games was opened over the poor response given to 
the places and people affected by the natural disaster (Gomez and Wilson, 2008). Racial 
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interpretations were even given to the poor management of ‘Hurricane Katrina’ disaster, even 
though, disaster management is a responsibility constitutionally shared by the three tiers of 
government (Schneider, 1995; Tesler and Sears, 2010). According to Gomez and Wilson, the 
declining low rating of President Bush Republican Party caused by the poor handling of 
Hurricane Katrina contributed in shaping the 2006 November Midterm elections and the defeat 
the party suffered in 2008.  
The war in Iraq equally contributed in shaping the 2008 election campaign discourse. According 
to Howard (2007) the Democrats ran their campaign emphasizing they were against the war, 
while Republican candidate, Senator John McCain tried to show how he favored the war 
strategy under President Bush. The arguments for and against, and the national disaffection 
against the war, ran into the presidential elections campaigns and perhaps was an advantage to 
the Democrats. Paul (2008) and Eichenberg et al. (2006) also suggest that the electoral 
fortunes of the GOP in the November 2006 Midterm elections can also be related to the war in 
Iraq and the voter discontent it generated.   
The economy was also a major issue in 2008.  According to Michael (2009) the economy was 
the most important single issue the Democrats may have benefited from during campaign, since 
it fitted ‘nicely with the change message’. The economic crisis-the government’s seizure of 
Fannie and Freddie Mac, the collapse of Wall Street, Wall Street giant Lehman Brothers, and 
the Dow Jones all brought into the campaign a conversation around economic depression 
(Costa, 2012). The fast decline of the automobile and manufacturing industry, the general slow-
down of the economy-banking and corporate failures (Michael, 2008) meant that both Barack 
Obama and John McCain struggled with policy position regarding developments in Wall Street 
and Washington (Timiraos, 2008). 
Kenski et al. (2010) argue that the 2008 financial crisis were framed as an indictment of the 
Bush presidency that incentivized the argument for a new leadership. In 2012 however, a frail 
economy, deficit and debt as well as concerns over Obamacare and the GOP reclaim of 
majority in Congress, made scaring voters about Romney a main campaign strategy (Edmonds, 
2013; Johnson, 2017; Paul, 2012). 
Furthermore, Race, religion and gender issues equally contributed in shaping the campaigns. 
Obama’s nomination and presidential campaign fascinated many in America on the prospect of 
a first African American President. Given Obama’s racial background and questions regarding 
his birth and citizenship, the rhetoric was whether his life exemplified the fulfilment of the 
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American dream or whether his political ambition was an impossible one because of race 
(Cunnigen and Bruce, 2010).  
In America, attitude and debate about race, have featured prominently in the country’s politics 
for decades, and not even the civil right movements and legislations that followed had erase the 
long history (Telser and Sears, 2010; Bafumi and Herron, 2012; Wingfield and Feagin, 2013). 
From Shirley Chisholm, the first African American to bid for nomination in America’s modern-day 
political party, to Jesse Jackson, observers feared of a ‘Bradley effect’ in the 2008 presidential 
vote because of the history of racial division (Cunnigen and Bruce, 2010; Morrison, 2008). As a 
concept, ‘Bradley effect’ originated from the black mayor of Los Angeles-Tom Bradley electoral 
loss of 1982 after polls put him ahead for the California Governorship election up to voting day 
(Morrison, 2008). Conceptually, it is the idea that American voters lie to pollsters about black 
candidates and don’t vote for them when in the voting booth (ibid). 
However, these racial questions notwithstanding, Obama himself thought that America should 
be in a new era where race mattered less. His racial-neutrality stand echoed at the 2004 widely 
celebrated DNC convention address tried to push and put race behind (Morrison, 2008). In the 
speech, Obama is quoted to have said that ‘there is not a black America and white America and 
Latino America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America’ (excerpts from Obama 
2004 Democratic Convention Speech). This post racial America rhetoric was also emphasized 
in his memoir The Audacity of Hope: Thought on Reclaiming the American Dream (Tesler and 
Sears, 2010). Although, the politically correct race-neutral position adopted by Obama and his 
subsequent election had led commentators to suggest a post-racial era for the country (Verney, 
2011), recent rise in racial polarization suggest that such commentary may have been an error 
of judgment (see Steven, 2011; Klein, 2020). 
As Klein (2006) argue, it was Obama’s ‘transcendence of racial stereotypes’ that ‘captured the 
American’s public’s imagination and his consensus building nature’ that ‘positioned him for the 
presidency’. As such, 2008 and 2012 was nothing but post-racial as they were division between 
‘racial conservatives and ‘racial liberals’ making vote choice ‘radicalized’ (Wingfield and Feagin, 
2013). According to Newman (2016) the campaign was just a unique, strong ‘movement of 
popular support’ with a momentum that ‘swept voters off their feet with an emotional high’. Thus, 
even though they was a ‘persistence of racially unequal discourse’ during the campaign, 
Obama’s ‘uncanny ability to make America feel non-racist, non-threatened, yet appropriately 
multicultural and progressive as well as the campaign’s grassroots foundation’ centered on new 
media made him the first United States President of African parentage (Kim, 2010). 
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Furthermore, religion and gender also played a role. However, as noted by Kim (2010), in 
dealing with the religion question, Obama was apt in distancing himself from inflammatory 
religious comments of his long-time pastor Jeremiah Wright and was able to manage their 
relationship during the campaigns. Gender issues were visible, not just because Obama 
primaries for the DNC nomination was against Hilary Clinton. Hilary Clinton failed bid and the 
nomination of Sarah Palin as vice presidential candidate contributed in shaping the electoral 
context and contest (Barnes and Shear, 2008; Tesler and Sears, 2010; Brox and Cassels, 
2012). Kenski et al. (2010) are of the view that Sarah Palin’s nomination energized the 
conservative base of the Republican Party and boosted Senator John McCain’s poll rating after 
the convention.  
Another factor that tend to shape US electoral landscape is what Anstead and Chadwick (2009) 
refer to as ‘institutional political environment’. That is, the pluralistic nature of US politics that 
necessitates the building of campaign networks and ‘lines of communication across all levels of 
the party; weak political party membership that makes them ‘heavily campaign focus’ with 
candidates seeking office always needing to develop campaign structure; the uncertainty and 
risk of the primary election and the rising cost of politics which generally inspires innovation for 
quick money; and the rising role of political consultants and the strategies they develop. As the 
next section below will show, some of these factors are embedded in the Obama model sixteen-
elements. 
That said, taken together, it can be said that Barack Obama’s election was indeed a product of 
many factors. Thus, apart from the campaign’s creative use of new technologies and grass root 
mobilizing, the socio-political and economic context (i.e. an unpopular Republican president, an 
unpopular war, and a slumping economy) 2008 and 2012 probably may have been just 
politically good years for the Democratic Party (Cambell, 2010; Newman, 2016).  
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                                                              APPENDIX II 
 
            Ontology and Epistemology: Trends and Debate in the Field  
Generally, ontological and epistemological stance-positivism, interpretivist and critical 
approaches are the subject of debate in many fields (Keat and Urry, 1982; Lee, 1991; Giddens, 
1995; Walsham, 2006). In comparative political communication, there is also the debate, as to 
whether there is real correspondence between ontology-‘the science and theory of being’ and 
epistemology-’the theory of knowledge’ and research methodology (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). 
Heckscher (1957) (cited in Westerstahl, 1968) argue that this is important, since ‘comparison is 
not a self-sustained separate subject, but part of the general method of political science’. 
However, scholars like Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004) (Cited in Hantrais, 
2014) argue that finding a balance between ontology, epistemology and method is rarely 
achieved. As Hantrais (2014) observe, reaching consensus over ontological and 
epistemological position in comparative research is difficult, partly because of increasing 
’epistemological and methodological pluralism’ (Bryant and Pribanic-Smith, 2010). As Hall 
(2000) argue, scholars even suggest that the best way to define the field is by ‘reference to its 
use of a particular comparative method’. Thus, ontological and epistemological positions are by 
preference unstated but reflect in the methodological approach (es) of empirical work in the 
field. Among comparative researchers, the argument is that more attention has been given to 
methodological than ontological issues, with a substantial gap opened between ontology and 
methodology (ibid).  In Henneberg (2008) view, the ontological and epistemological ’knowledge 
stagnation’ is also evident in political marketing research.  
That said, historically, the political communication research community seem to have adopted 
different positions regarding ontology and epistemology because of the interdisciplinary nature, 
competing theories, approaches, agenda and conceptions in the field (Nimmo and Swanson, 
1990; Hall, 2000). In ontology, the debate is ’whether the objects of any analysis is a socially 
determined existence’ (Anderson and Baym, 2004). Here, foundationalist think that the real 
world constitutes of ’material objects that display discernible boundaries and exist within 
relatively stable and observable patterns of relationships’. While anti-foundationalist argue that 
‘objects of inquiry make their appearance within localized patterns of human practice, language 
and discourse’ (ibid).  
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Epistemologically, the debate on the one hand is between foundationalist who conceive 
‘knowledge as the correspondence between mental impression and the true shape of the 
independently existent actual’ (Anderson and Byam, 2004) and anti-foundationalist who 
perceive ’knowledge as simultaneously enabled and constrained within social achievement’ 
(ibid) .These dominant philosophical views as much as shaping researcher’s world view and 
stance, are also contributory factors to the methodological tools researchers chose to use in 
advancing scholarship in the field. 
According to Ryfe (2001) Bryant and Pribanic-Smith (2010) and Karpf et al. (2015), early 
philosophical climate of research in the field of communication was influenced by positivism and 
functionalism, with quantitative traditions-measurement, experimentation, and survey defining 
research, with only a few qualitatively designed studies. This philosophical and methodological 
orientation is traceable to the training of early scholars in the field who following behaviourism 
drew from social psychology-where ‘attitudes, opinions, experiment and survey methods 
dominated’; political science-with emphasis on ‘politics as process’ and ‘quantification’, and 
mass communication-where research and methodological emphasis was on media ‘effects’ and 
’influence’ (Ryfe, 2001). In Ryfe’s view, it was this ‘theoretical and methodological commitments 
of early research’ tradition that shaped scholarship in the field. 
However, rapid changes in the technological, information communication and media 
environment (Bryant and Miron, 2007; Karpf et al., 2015) and the fact that scientific studies now 
cover ’aspects of life not previously considered topics of scientific investigation’ is incentivising 
‘epistemological and methodological pluralism’ (Bryant and Pribanic-Smith, 2010) with scholars 
borrowing freely from other scientific fields and traditions (Bryant and Miron, 2007), thus making 
way for ‘qualitative-critical and cultural’ methodological innovative approaches (Bryant and 
Pribanic-Smith, 2010; Karpf et al., 2015). As Bennett and Iyengar (2008) argue, the 
methodological innovation has followed the evolution of the field, leading to the incorporation of 
a ‘critical tradition’ or the development of a ‘critical wing of political communication and media 
studies’ and a ’British critical cultural studies tradition’ (ibid). Fuchs and Linchuan (2018) are of 
the view that the domination of US and Eurocentric scholarship as well as ‘theory development 
slow down’ calls for a new epistemological turn and the return of critical communication 
scholarship and a postcolonial perspective (Shome, 2016).  
Thus, as the changes endure and the field evolve, Bryant and Miron (2007) Bennett and Iyengar 
(2008) Jones (2013) and Karpf et al. (2015) emphasise the need for a new research approach, 
not necessarily because they reject traditional positivist quantitative approaches. For them, even 
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though positivist quantitative approaches have helped advance the field, theories as they argue 
have generally not kept pace with socio-political and technological advances, thus affecting the 
ability of political communication researchers to ‘understand our objects of analysis’ in today’s 
rapidly changing political, social, and technological world (Karpf et al., 2015). This study is in 
part inspired by such thinking. 
Indeed, Karpf, Kreiss, Nielsen and Powers’s view is that to develop new theoretical 
understanding under this rapidly changing environment, qualitative tools are necessary, first 
because qualitative research in the field ‘would contribute much to scholarly understanding of 
contemporary processes of political communication’ and give rise to new theories in an era of 
rapid political communication changes. As Bennett and Iyengar (2008) argue, if the ‘grand 
theoretical foundations in the field arose’ at the time where ‘shared social structures and mass 
communication technologies were glimmer in the eyes of visionary theorists’, then today’s ’third 
age’ (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) require new theoretical perspectives to guide research. 
Similarly, Rogers (2013:154) is also of the view that thinking of ‘new methods in the study of 
social networks’ is important in a post-demographic era. Thus, Ryfe (2001) admonishes that 
political communication continue to expand its vision by enlarging ’the range of data that counts 
as registers of political communication’ as the field continues its ‘transition following exogenous 
shock’ (Chadwick, 2012:43).  
Although, there is still debate in the field as to whether old positivist traditions are still relevant in 
advancing scholarship in the ‘third age’ (see Jones, 2013). Anderson and Baym (2004) argue 
that even though there is still a desire to ‘reaffirm foundational roots in the literature’, the need to 
rethink the media (Hardy, 2012), the increasing hybridization of information communication and 
technological domains is opening up new avenues of how we speak of the world-thus creating 
an ontological and epistemological fragmentation that is serving to legitimizes critical 
approaches (Swanson and Nimmo, 1992).  
As Jones (2013) argue, there is now a shift in ontological and epistemological positioning, with 
critical approaches opening up new lens for studying citizenship and practices in an increasingly 
proliferated ‘politically relevant media’. For Jones, the problematics of quantitative positivist 
‘normal science’ in the field is that it tends to ’ignore broad swaths of human experience that are 
central to meaning making’.  Hall (2000) and Savigny (2007) suggest that such shift in 
ontological and epistemological positioning implies that the bulk of scholarship in the field now 
sit within the inductive, interpretivist and critical realist stance-the view that ‘the social world is 
reproduced and transformed in daily life (Bhaskar,1989: 4 cited in Bryman 2001:430). 
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Critical realist ontology and epistemology is rooted in the presumption that reality exists 
independently of the knowledge that can be gained (Bhaskar, 1989; Gray, 2009; Yin, 2014) and 
the world is merely socially constructed, subjectively interpreted or determined by the concepts 
people hold about it (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Hartwig, 2007; Edwards et al., 2014). 
This study aligns with such critical realist orientation where social reality forms the basis for 
construction of knowledge and the interpretive philosophical notion that sees the world as 
socially made (Byrne, 2009b; Harvey, 200; Wedeen, 2010; Schwandt and Gates, 2013). In 
taking this research stance, the study does so from the comparative case study methodology 
and theoretical standpoint to elucidate beyond a ‘specific instance’ the features and 
characteristics of an empirical case (i.e. the Obama Model) using specific cases selected for the 
study (see Byrne, 2009a:1; Harvey, 2009). Frazer and Lacey (1994) support ontological and 
epistemological flexibility. In their view research stance can possess a critical realist lens at the 
ontological level yet intrepretivist at the epistemological level. 
Furthermore, considering theoretical imperative (see Brennen, 2013; O’Mahoney and Vincent, 
2014); methodological tools for data collection (semi-structured interviews, audio records, 
documents and newspapers) (see King et al., 1996) and the fact that, first, the study is ‘dealing 
with things that are both real and constructed’ (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014:155), and secondly, 
the fact that the intention is not measurement, but to present through qualitative data, a ‘thick 
description’ of the object of analysis (Gray, 2009:33), the study’s ontological and 
epistemological stance follows Crotty (1998) and Denzin and Ryan (2007) suggestion that a 
researcher’s world view, theoretical stance and methodology should define the research 
process. The sections that follow below describes this process and research design. 
 
                 The Goals Comparative Research in the Field 
In setting out the research strategy for this work, this study begins first, by explaining why the 
comparative perspective is essential for answering the central research question. In the 
remainder of this section, it defines the comparative goal of the study, highlighting first, what the 
study is comparing as a way of informing and rationalising why the comparative approach is the 
preferred method. 
That said, change, being a problem of comparison over time, is inherently comparative (Chaffee 
and Chu, 1992). However, as a subject of empirical inquiry, it is changes in the global 
communication landscape, as well as developments in information technology that has 
progressively driven political communication into the ’third age’-i.e. from the era of ‘relatively 
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strong and stable political institutions and beliefs; ‘professionalized’ parties and a ‘mobile 
electorate’; and ‘media abundance’ (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) and probably now, into the 
’fourth age’ of increasing ‘digitization’ (Stromback, 2008). Scholars have equally pointed to 
advancement in the field from its’ ’infancy’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975; Nimmo and Sanders, 
1981) into ’late adolescence’ (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990) and ‘maturity’ (Gurevitch and 
Blumler, 2004).  
Thus, as Pfetsch and Esser (2004:5) argue, epochal or progressive changes in world ‘media 
system, caused by the changes in information technology and communication infrastructure and 
diffusion of news, belong to the driving force behind comparative research’. For Gurevitch and 
Blumler (2004:327), ‘the increasing homogenization of political communication across 
previously more diverse societies, polities and cultures’ have increased interest in the field. 
Chan (2017:252) point to ‘advancement in ICTs, the convergence of research culture, 
internationalization of education and research, and the formation of comparative scholarly 
networks’ as incentive for such comparative scholarship. 
For Mancini and Hallin (2012) ‘globalization’ and ‘research questions linked to the increasingly 
globalized circulation of cultural products’ and the ‘internationalization of scholarly community’ 
has played a role in expanding comparative research by pushing its frontiers, with comparisons 
sometimes focusing on ’contrasting spatial units, usually comparing nation-states---, local 
communities, media markets, or global regions’ (Norris, 2009) in an effort to counteract ‘naïve 
universalism’ and to provide secure grounds for generalizations (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990). 
Under this rapidly changing conditions and the increasing ‘globalization of media markets’ 
(Voltmer, 2012b), Semetko and Scammell (2012) and Fletcher and Young (2012) are of the 
view that there is need for a reassessment of contemporary research priorities, ‘rethinking of 
theory and practice’ and a new inspiration for scholarship. Again, from the standpoint of theory, 
this study is inspired by such thinking. 
Thus, in the new and current changing context, the incentive for this study follow these 
theoretical pathways, and changes as well as the ‘border-transgressing’ nature of contemporary 
information, communication, technology and media arena (see Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Negrine, 2008; Issenberg, 2012; Nielsen, 
2012; Canel and Voltmer, 2014; Kriess, 2016; Maarek, 2016); the marketing revolution in 
politics and emergence of a new model of political communication (i.e. the ‘Obama Model’ as 
set out in chapter two) (see Issenberg, 2012; Mullen, forthcoming; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; 
Kreiss, 2016; Newman, 2016); changes and common pattern in practices taking place in 
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different countries (see Elebash, 1984; Semetko et al.,1991; Swanson and Mancini,1996; 
Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004; Negrine, 2008; De Bruijn et al., 2009; 
Louw, 2011; Obijiofor, 2011; Akinfemisoye, 2013; Maarek, 2016); and the need to 
‘contextualize’ or ‘decontextualize’ i.e. to identify and place changes outside of their original 
context or milieu of origin in order to explain whether they are cross-contextually common, 
global or country distinctive (Canel and Voltmer, 2014; Blumler, 2012; Mancini and Hallin, 
2012). As the forebearers in the field above have argued, these developments provide 
distinctive opportunities to test and update practices, test theories and expand the boundaries of 
knowledge on contemporary contextual conditions and contemporary political communication-
which is the focus of this work. 
Thus, inspired by the factors above, and following changes and trends as exemplified in the 
political communication practices deployed in the Obama Model defined in chapter two, the 
study first, examines whether or not elements of the model as defined constitute to date the 
most advance form of political communication in the extent that they have been applied 
elsewhere. Considering the knowledge gap that exit on contemporary features and practices of 
political communication, answering this question provides the empirical foundation and material 
that sets in motion an update process for Swanson and Mancini (1996) modern model of 
political communication through a cross-case comparison of converging practices. 
That said, whilst the conceptual explanation of what constitutes Swanson and Mancini’s modern 
model of campaigning (i.e. ‘the personalization of politics; expanding reliance on technical 
experts and professional advisors; growing detachment of political parties from citizens, 
development of autonomous structures of communication; and casting citizens in the role of 
spectator’ (p.249) remains relevant for understanding contemporary political communication, the 
pattern of practices and techniques, particularly on new and emerging forms of personalized 
campaigning, the dominant domain of technical experts and professionals, how political parties 
continue to navigate the growing detachment of citizens and harness new structures of 
communications to mobilize spectator citizens are changing, innovating and diffusing. Thus, at 
the first level of update, the Obama model is used as an innovative exemplar to comparatively 
test, validate and update such changes and innovation in traditional forms of political 
communication and emerging news practices that are both data driven and seem to bypass 
traditional gatekeepers and how they diffuse globally. This way, their modern model is 
expanded by using the Obama model to comparatively interrogate and reveal the sequence of 
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sophisticated forms of innovation now appearing and manifesting in contemporary campaigns in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
Secondly, following from the above, a theoretical understanding of such global diffusion is 
explored within the context of our case studies-i.e. Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This is 
necessary, as such global diffusion if any, invites us to interrogate how such innovative and 
emerging new practices exemplified by the Obama model come to surface and converge in 
other countries. Thus, at the first level of theory, Americanization is questioned regarding 
whether it provides ‘suitable theoretical description’ for the emergence and convergence of the 
Obama model in our case studies. This way, a contemporary theoretical update of the 
explanatory scope of the theory is provided. At the second theoretical level-i.e. modernization, 
while Swanson and Mancini ‘hypothesize that increasing functional differentiation within society 
leads to growing numbers of subsystem of all kinds that develop to satisfy the specialized 
demands of particular groups and sectors’ (p.253), such explanation does not adequately 
capture and describe contemporary dynamics in how these modernized ‘subsystem’ now 
develop in recent elections as well as their origin and incentive (s). Thus, the 2016 presidential 
election campaign of Donald Trump is used to explore and explain recent political 
communication innovation or modernization in the US, as a way of advancing theoretical 
understanding of modernization. This way, the work provides contemporary theoretical update 
to the explanatory scope of both theories. 
Thirdly, with a research design that methodological looks beyond the contextual factors (i.e. 
‘nature of the electoral system; structure of party competition; regulation of campaign activities; 
national political culture; and national media system’) (p.249), identified in their modern model 
as impediment to convergence and the development of a common model, the work updates and 
add to the understanding of contemporary context and how such context shape and influence 
the uptake and convergence of the emerging innovation exemplified by the Obama model in 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This way, the research design provides an empirically window 
for the work to reveal and add to contemporary contextual dynamics that shape convergence in 
global campaign, particularly, convergence of the Obama model, with the Nigerian case study 
providing a unique perspective of an emerging democracy in the global south. 
Furthermore, considering that the central research question formulated above would be 
answered particularly or perhaps uniquely by comparison, the study relies on the principle and 
method of comparison, first across space, to examine (using elements of the Obama model) 
whether those have been applied or exported to the two case studies selected-i.e. the 2015 
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Nigerian presidential election and the 2015 British General Elections respectively. This way, the 
study seeks to advance understanding of global trends, converging practices and explain 
similarities as well as contextual differences (see rationale for country sampling below). 
Theoretically, since the set of basic parameters for comparison or comparative variables are 
constructed from an American campaign, the Americanization thesis (Swanson and Mancini, 
1996) is tested against empirical material as a way of exploring the drivers and incentive of such 
contemporary convergence in practices. 
Secondly, from the standpoint of comparison across time, the study uses empirical material to 
examine whether there is an advancement away from the data driven practices of the ‘Obama 
Model’ within the context of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential election campaign (see Blumler 
et al., 1992; Pfetsch and Esser, 2008. In doing so, the study draws on time as the dimension by 
means of which differences in data driven practices of political communication in the 2008/2012 
and 2016 election cycle are highlighted, first to explore, in the context of Cambridge Analytica’s 
involvement whether data-driven practices deployed in the Trump’s campaign differ in any 
significance from Obama’s and can contribute to an update of the practices and model that 
emerge in the Obama’s campaign, Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Secondly, and from the 
standpoint of Swanson and Mancini’s modernization thesis, how we may theorize such 
innovation if any. Thus, Trump’s campaign serves as a case that can produce explanation with 
theoretical implication.  
That said, emphasis on Trump’s campaign follows Rosengren et al., (1992) and Gerring (2007) 
who suggest that events (i.e. like the investigation on Cambridge and the Trump campaign 
across both sides of the Atlantic and the increasing conversation on the use of psychographics 
in the 2016 Trump campaign) can serve as benchmark for comparison. In this sense, the Trump 
campaign rather than serve as a case for exploring continuity and change is used an instrument 
of discovery that can advance the emerging model and Swanson and Mancini’s modernization 
thesis (see Molnar, 1967). 
Following from the two goals above, the study hopes to empirically identify country specific 
factors that shape or condition the application of the innovative elements and practices of the 
Obama campaign in the two countries. In the end, the goal is to empirically define the 
contemporary model of political communication across varied context, as a way of discovering 
transnational trends and similarities and explaining changes that can serve as an update of 
Swanson and Mancini’s modern model while highlighting contextual differences that shape 
convergence (Pfetsch and Esser, 2004; Mancini and Hallin, 2012). This way, as Gurevitch and 
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Blumler, (2004) admonish, the study realizes the ’double value’ design of a comparative study 
and deepens explanation rather than mere description. 
Theoretically, scholars have theorised a number of valuable frameworks to guide comparative 
inquiry. Examples include; Blumler and Gurevitch’s (1995) Pfetsch and Esser’s, (2012) ‘political 
communication systems’; Adoni et al. (2006) Pfetsch (2004) and Voltmer’s (2008, 2012a) 
‘political communication culture’ ‘cultures’ and subcultures’; Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) ‘media 
system’; Picard and Rossi’s (2012) ‘media markets’; Kim’s (2012) ‘communication culture’; 
Hanitzsch’s (2007) ’journalism culture’ and Benson’s (2005) ‘journalistic fields’ etc.  
In this study however, Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) Americanization and modernization 
framework suffice. Although, criticised for its claim on American domination and hegemony, with 
scholars like Maarek (2016) preferring concepts like ‘professionalization’ and ‘specialization’ as 
an explanation for the global evolution and convergence of political communication. The thesis 
however, serves in this study, as a working framework for exploring an explanation of the 
possible adaption of American inspired campaign strategies in other democracies as well as the 
theoretical path to the entrance of innovative campaign practices in recent US elections. 
Thus, despite its conceptual flaws, the framework serves here as a theoretical lens for exploring 
and explaining recent changes in political communication practices. Again, this is because the 
United States has long been perceived as the pacesetter for innovation in campaign practices 
and the Obama campaign is a product of the US political environment (see Negrine and 
Papathananassopoulos, 1996; Swanson and Mancicni, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002 and 
Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Thus, the relevance of the framework in this study, is the theoretical 
wheels it provides for driving explanation. 
As earlier highlighted however, in applying the framework, the study seeks to update their 
model, by using its basic ideas, thereby expanding the definition of the contemporary typology 
of political communication. To do this, the study moves away from their ’major elements 
associated with modernized or Americanized campaigning’ (see pp.14, 15, 16, 17) and 
‘contextual influences’ (see also pp. 17-20) and following Rosengren et al. (1992) sets out a 
framework based on elements of the Obama campaign for the study’s comparative analysis. 
This way, the sixteen elements of the ‘Obama Model’ defined in chapter two, serve as the set of 
basic parameters, ‘pattern variables’ (Nimmo and Swanson, 1990:34) or ‘empirical categories’ 
(Gideon, 1955) for comparison. Although, context-political, media, journalistic norms/values, 
style and character of the political campaign/election news coverage etc. matter (Stromback and 
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Kaid, 2008), the strategy adopted for exploring and unearthing any such contextual conditions 
and factors in the case studies is Esser and Hanitzsch, ‘implicit’ (2012) or Wirth and Kolb (2004) 
metatheoretical design, where the study takes off without any initial identification of contextual 
variables. As Esser and Hanitzsch argue, the methodological value of such strategy is that it will 
‘facilitates the optimal adaptation of research question to theoretical background’, since an 
explanation of similarities and differences between cases can then point to and enable the 
identification of contextual factors and conditions. 
The approach though a comparison of processes within structures (Rosengren et al., 1992), 
follows the argument that rather than for example, compare the status quo (say, for example, 
Swanson and Mancini’s (1996) ‘modern model’ and their contextual factors), it is important to 
rather consider the rapid changes in the conditions of contemporary political communication and 
factor a design that can enable explanation of contemporary practices and contextual conditions 
in ways that provide a unique understanding of this era of increasing ‘glocalization and 
transnationality’, ‘proliferation of global mobile communication’, and the ‘emergence of big fluidic 
data across borders’ (Chan and Lee, 2017:9; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
            The Comparative Method: General Principles 
This section briefly explains the general principles, theories and methodologies of comparative 
research. 
The comparative method is variously praised as a prominent approach in the quest for 
knowledge. In Beniger (1992) view for example, all social science research is comparative and 
so too is all analysis. As Peters (1998) (cited in Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012) note, since the real 
world cannot be subjected to experimentation, comparison can act as a substitute for scientific 
experiment. 
However, what constitute the term comparative is still considerably debatable. As a definition, 
Edelstein (1982:14) (cited in Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012) refers to it as ‘a study that compares 
two or more nations with respect to some activity’. For Blumler, McLeod and Rosengren 
(1992:7) research is comparative ‘when the comparisons are made across two or more 
geographically or historically (spatially or temporally) defined systems, the phenomena of 
scholarly interest which are embedded in a set of interrelations that are relatively coherent, 
patterned, comprehensive, distinct, and bounded’.   
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In the field of communication and media studies, Esser and Hanitzsch (2012:5), are of the view 
that comparative studies are understood as research ‘contrasting different macro-level units 
(like world regions, countries, sub-national regions, social milieus, language areas, cultural 
thickenings) at one point or more points in time’. Such comparison as they argue would involve 
‘a minimum of two macro-level units’, and ‘at least one subject of investigation relevant to 
communication research’ (ibid). Thus, this study by their estimation, meets the standard of a 
comparative work. 
Methodologically, as an approach, it follows the principle that ‘every observation is without 
significance if it is not compared with other observation’ (Esser and Pfetsch 2004:7). Thus, it 
affords research the lens for observing patterns for theory building, helps research to overcome 
‘space and time bound limitations on the generalizability of theories, assumptions and 
propositions’ and enable the exploration and revelation of the consequences of contextual 
differences (Blumler at al., 1992). In practical sense, its goal entails-describing differences and 
similarities; identifying functional equivalents; establishing typologies; explaining differences and 
similarities; and making predictions (Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012). Esser and Hanitzsch also 
point to six areas where comparative research can prove its superiority: (1) its relevance for 
‘establishing the generality of findings and the validity of interpretations’ (2) its prevention of 
over generalization (3) its calibration of scope of conclusion (4) its contextualization of 
understanding (5) its ability to foster global scholarship and networks, where the world is treated 
as a ‘global research laboratory’ and (6) its ability to offer a wealth of practical knowledge and 
experience. In this regard, this work in using the comparative method intend to establish a 
typology from the three countries while contextualising understanding and making theoretical 
generalizations. 
In the literature however, principles of comparative analysis vary. To compare, Blumler et al. 
(1992) propose four principles, where- (1) nations serve as objects of analysis (2) nations are 
treated as context-where context serve both as conditions for replicating findings and are the 
focus of comparison (3) nation is treated as unit of analysis and point of interest to the 
researcher (4) national communication system and practices examined as subsystem of an 
emergent global one. For Rosengren et al. (1992) the first principle in a comparative inquiry is to 
identify a set of basic parameters for comparison, before assessing relationships in order to 
compare similarities and differences either over space or time. The first task being theoretical, 
the second empirical and the third representing the essence of comparison (ibid). For them, 
comparative studies may be based over time or space, or both. This study follows their first 
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principle and is based on both space and time, in order to arrive at a ‘deeper understanding of 
results’ (ibid).  
Furthermore, according to Ragin and David (1983) and Ragin (1989) comparison can be 
variable-base and quantitatively oriented (i.e. identifying ‘relevant variables and their 
relationship before choosing a ‘sample of observational units’) or case-base with qualitative 
strategies (i.e. ‘starting with an interest in specific historical processes and structures’)-where 
quantitative tools are deployed with many cases and few variables to study relationships among 
variables or qualitative tools are used with many variables and few cases to study 
commonalities. For them, the ‘theoretical goals and practical strengths’ of case study design or 
what they termed ‘qualitative historical method’ differ fundamentally from those of quantitative 
statistical strategies of comparison even though a combination of both is possible. The former 
they argue produce ‘broad generalization about systemic relations’ and the latter ‘historically 
contextualized knowledge and consequences of historical diversity’. This study follows the latter 
approach. 
That said, in political communication scholarship, these principles usually take the form of 
comparison of a minimum of two political systems, nation states, regional entities, political 
subsystems, or parts of subsystems-local areas of communication, elite or media cultures, 
national political systems and practice with at least one object of investigation relevant to the 
field. According to Chan and Lee (2017:1) its epistemological and methodological advantages 
lies in the fact that it delimits the ‘generality and specificity of communication theories’ and 
enable research to ‘identify the influence of socio-political and cultural context in shaping media 
and communication phenomena’. 
            Comparative Case Study Design: General Principles 
The aim of this section is to describe the general principles and approaches that guide case 
study design.  
According to Ragin (2007) the goals of comparative analysis are assumed to be the same as 
those of variable oriented analysis: (i.e. assessing the relative merit of theory). However, one of 
the common debates of comparative research is the selection of countries to be studied. In most 
international comparisons, comparativists select cases for a variety of reasons-usually relying 
on questions of convenience (data accessibility etc.) rather than theoretical ideas (Wirth and 
Kolb, 2004).  
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As a guiding principle, Przeworski and Tuene (1970) suggest two logics (the most similar 
systems and the most different system designs). For Collier and Mahoney (1996) defining 
selection of cases can depend on research question. Patton (1990) and Palys (2008) also 
suggest a typical and critical case sampling logic. That is, selecting a case because it 
exemplifies a dimension of interest for the research in anticipation that it might allow theory to 
be tested.  Ellis (1973) and Conge (1996) also make a similar point. For them, country selection 
can be because a case is ‘crucial’, is ‘prototype’ or ‘exemplar’-where case selection represent 
the direction of the research, since obscure case selection will not be helpful in answering 
research question. 
In the same vein, Rosengren et al. (1992) are of the view that case selection can be guided by 
key conceptual considerations, dimensions and levels vital to the theoretical problem in 
question. For Ragin (1989), cases can also be selected on the bases of a combination of 
variables as in the quantitative approach and as a configuration of set membership or 
combination of aspects and conditions. Berg-Schlosser (1997) also suggest and show how a 
most similar system and most different system can be chosen and analysed complementarily to 
improve research result. 
Scholars are also of the view that case study design can be guided by pragmatic concerns (for 
example if they are understudied; are of novelty; have easily available data to support the 
research and are of particular interest to a researcher, and account for recent events that 
require empirical analysis or are of historical importance (see Eckstein, 1985; Hodgkin, 1976; 
Liu, 1988). Pragmatic reasons like the definitional and conceptual fitness of a case (Moghadam, 
1995) case independence (Kautsky, 1975) the need for theoretical or empirical replication and 
extension (O’Kane, 1995, Yin, 2014) can equally inform case selection-where cases are 
constructed to provide ‘test of prevailing explanations and ideas’ (Hakim, 1994:62). Selection 
strategy could also be based on the attribute of a case (Gerring, 2007) where an event in the 
particular case is the criterion that guides its selection-with the intention that such a case is 
potentially likely to reveal the ‘reputability of a theory’ (ibid). Thus, contextual condition of the 
object of research can shape design and country selection (Ragin, 1989). In Hancke (2009:68) 
view, case (s) can be critically selected, where-case and theory have a relationship, with theory 
providing the ‘relevant universe of cases’ for selection as an ’illustrative portraits of social 
entities or patterns’ (Hakim, 1994:61). 
According to Bryman (1988) since qualitative research follows a theoretical, rather than 
statistical logic, qualitative comparative cases should be formulated in terms of their 
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generalizability to theoretical propositions rather than population or universe (i.e. rather than on 
the basis of a worldwide sample).  As Mason (1996) observe, theoretically guided sampling is 
‘constructing a sample which is meaningful theoretically because it builds in certain 
characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test theory and explanation’ (p.93). In this 
sense, cases are selected on the basis of their relevance to research question and the study’s 
theoretical position and the explanatory account the study intends to develop. 
          The Value of Methodological Triangulation 
In the literature, the process of triangulation is characterized by the combination of two or more 
theories, data sources or methods in the study of a single concept (Thurmond, 2001). The aim 
usually, is to provide confirmation and completeness of data by overcoming biases inherent in a 
single method (Foster, 1997). In most fields, the need to use multiple sources of information in 
any study is highly rated. Prominent in its advantage is the development of what Yin (2014) calls 
converging line of inquiry. As a method, it aims to enhance validity and confidence in findings 
(Coyle and Williams, 2000), whilst drawing from the principle that the intersection of different 
points can be used to calculate the precise location of an object (Yardley, 2009 cited in Yin 
(2014). In making a case for triangulation, Berger (2000) Newcomb (1999) and Hancke (2009) 
for example suggest that interview as research data source (s) should be verified and 
corroborated with other research resources in other to strengthen research findings through the 
use of different sources of evidence. 
According to Denzin (1970) triangulation can either involve data, investigator, theory or 
methodological triangulation. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) refers to data triangulation as the 
collection of data over different times or from different sources. For Mckernan (1991:188) 
triangulation can be ‘conceptual/theoretical’, of ‘information and data collected’ or ‘researcher or 
investigator triangulation’ or ‘methodological triangulation’. In Denzin’s view, since research 
methods serve as an instrument for revealing a phenomena’s uniqueness, multiple methods, 
‘ought to be the norm in order to exhume this richness’ (p.26). The logic here is that the more 
rigorous the evaluation, through the use of either ‘multiple investigators, data, methods or 
theories, the more the observation and results can be made reliable (Mckernan, 1991). As 
Cohen and Manion (1994) and Briggs and Coleman (2007) argue, comparing two or more 
sources of evidence helps to strengthen accuracy of information regarding a phenomenon and 
affords richness in explanation, since inference is drawn from more than one standpoint. 
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That said, in this study, the use of triangulation is data centred (Cowman, 1993), and the aim 
was to subject research question to different ways of answering it, by corroborating the 
interviews with audio records,  documents and newspapers, in such a way that the ‘subjective 
understanding’ (Hancke, 2009) made from them are validated, reliable and replicable (Oakley, 
1999). The guiding principle here being a careful attempt at corroborating the interview data with 
alternative public data sources-audio record, documentary evidence and newspapers in order to 
measure the same object of analysis from multiple data sources. Indeed, this provided richness 
and diverse information on the object of the research, robust findings and multiple empirical lens 
for cross checking findings. 
Methodologically, the virtue and value of such triangulation in this work is that the weakness in 
one data source (s) was compensated by another in ways that enhanced more comprehensive 
understanding of the object of study (see Hanitzsch and Esser, 2012). Furthermore, the value is 
also in the fact that it increased the rigour of the study’s analysis and enhanced the 
development of in-depth understanding of the object of analysis (Brennen, 2013). Ontologically 
and epistemologically, this approach at triangulation is also in conformity with the study’s 
research stance of a subjective and socially constructed nature of the world (Willig, 2001). The 
advantage for a comparative research as this, is that the use of the four methods offered 
additional source of information for interpreting findings and validating data (see Warwick and 
Osherson, 1973). 
             Lenses for Methodological Equivalence  
One of the challenges of a comparative study is the problem of equivalence. According to 
Smelser (1976) Ragin (1989) Landman (2000) and Chan (2017), the validity of the comparative 
method hinges on whether comparability or equivalence is maintained across socio-cultural 
systems and context. This section highlights briefly, the contextual, socio-cultural and systemic 
meeting point that serve as guide and validate equivalence within the context of three case 
studies.  
In this study, equivalence is contextualised, with measurement indicators and the comparability 
of the three contexts taken into consideration. First, is the contextually shared assumption 
concerning the object of the study (i.e., the Obama Model). This assumption, which follow 
context-specific knowledge, is that the operationalised framework (i.e., elements of the study’s 
operationalised model) resonates in recent political communication practices in the Nigeria, 
Britain and America. Thus, as earlier highlighted in the case selection justification section 
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above, case studies had aimed at obtaining a representative, typical and systematic country 
sample. This method of ensuring functional equivalence is guided by the assumption that the 
object of analysis relates to political circumstance in the three case studies (see Rossler, 2012; 
Wirth and Kolb, 2012), with the ‘glocalization (i.e. the local diffusion of a global phenomenon) 
and transnationalization’ of new technologies (Chan and Lee, 2017:9) serving as the ‘cultural 
meeting point’ (Wang and Huang, 2017). This framework for establishing equivalence point to 
existence of similar experience but does not at the same time rule out differences (ibid). As 
Middleton (2014) (cited in Dutton et al., 2017) note, there is a growing centrality of ‘mobile’ in the 
day-to-day life of residents of both developed and developing nations. Thus, judgement on 
equivalence is therefore based on this albeit, fairly assume knowledge of the three contexts. 
Second, since data collection source (s) for the study includes interviews, audio records, 
documents and newspapers with the elements of the operationalised model guiding 
measurement in Nigeria and Britain, and the factoring of the operationalized model into the 
interview research questions (see figures 4 and 5 above) as well as the structural coding 
deployed in the analysis of empirical materials collected (see figures 14-16 above), this 
approach ensured that data gathering and analytic technique across the two case studies were 
consistent. In the Trump’s campaign, even though the analytic technique differed, data 
collection tools were also consistent with those used in Nigeria and Britain save for the 
newspapers used to strengthen interpretation. However, because the documentary sources 
were selected based on their relevance to the case study, there was the challenge of variation 
in terms of achieving numerical equivalence across cases (i.e. in terms of number of documents 
collected and used in each of the three case studies). 
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                                                 APPENDIX III 
 
Socio-political and Economic Context of the 2015 General Elections: Defining 
Issues 
 
As highlighted in chapter three, a link exists between economic situation of a country and social-
political action (see Ballarino and Regini, 2008). Scholars argue that a country’s socio-political 
and economic situation during an election can drive election dynamics, shape debates and 
blame game which is of fundamental importance in determining candidates and political party 
electoral fortunes (Eichenberg et al., 2006). Key events according to Esser and Stromback 
(2012a) can serve as ’situational triggers for the strategic priming and framing’ of campaign 
messages. Political campaigns therefore ’function as a filter to mediate the impact of events’ 
and echo those during campaigns to help voters form opinion (Costa 2012). Following Swanson 
(2004), Moser and Scheiner (2012) admonition of the need to consider socio-economic and 
political context where campaign and political messages are framed since they contribute in 
shaping both practices and outcome, this section highlights briefly, the socio-political and 
economic setting prevalent in Nigeria in 2015, as a way of identifying factors that may have 
shaped the politics, campaign rhetoric, messages and dynamics. 
The Emergence of an Opposition Coalition 
Opposition groups have always existed in Africa even under single party and military regimes 
that dominated post-independent African politics (Olukoshi, 1998). However, the emergence of 
the All Progressive Congress (APC) in February 2013 from a merger of four political parties 
altered the 2015 contest by weakening the 16 years hegemony of the Peoples’ Democratic 
Party (PDP). In a country where ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages tend to militate against 
the creation of formidable opposition, the quest for power by a set of political elites and the 
prevailing socio-political situation in the country at the time, may have occasioned the formation 
and consolidation of the APC (Oyugi, 2006). Although, with very blurred lines of ideological 
differences in comparison with the PDP, the formation of the APC influenced to a large extent 
the context and contest of the 2015 elections through the emergence of a cross-regional 
alignment of a set of politicians and elites who were united against incumbent President 
Goodluck Jonathan (Abdullahi, 2018).  
In the literature on ethno-politics, scholars like Dominika (2013) point to the relevance of shared 
ethnic identity between political actors and the electorate as a mechanism for electoral 
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mobilisation. According to Owen and Usman (2015) the elite alignment, defection of five PDP 
Governors, 37 House of Representative members to the APC, including the Speaker of the 
House of Representative and 11 Senators and the eventual victory of the APC in the 2015 
presidential elections demonstrates the electoral value of a national coalition. As Abdullahi 
(2018:287) argue, the ‘decampees’ from the PDP ‘supplied the blood that gave life’ to the newly 
formed APC turning it into a formidable opposition and national party. For Jideonwo and 
Williams (2018:113), Muhammadu Buhari ‘needed the APC to have been created for him to 
win’, having unsuccessfully attempted to be president on three occasions on the platform of a 
relatively unknown regional political party the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC).  
Insecurity  
Insecurity-Boko Haram insurgency in the north east, and communal clashes between farmers 
and herders in north central Nigeria was a dominant pre-election issue. The influence of the 
security crisis was so strong that it provided reasons for the federal government to postpone the 
elections for six weeks (Orji, 2014). Significantly, the insecurity and the BringBackOurGirls 
campaign whose hashtag trended globally as a result of the kidnap of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok, 
Bornu State had damaging effect on the government’s reputation (Hamalai et al., 2017). The 
inability to solve the Boko Haram problem became a sentiment that resonated with many 
Nigerians and exploited by the opposition who sold Jonathan to the public as ‘unfit, uncaring 
and inept’ (Adeniyi, 2017:111). For Jonathan and his party the PDP, convincing Nigerians 
during the campaign that he was the man to be trusted with the nation’s security became a 
herculean task (Abdullahi, 2018). As analysts like Adeniyi (2017) and Ewi (2015) argue, Buhari’s 
victory was handed him by Jonathan’s unpopularity occasioned by the nation’s insecurity 
challenges and the way Jonathan’s administration responded to it.  
Furthermore, according to Ayanda and Udunayo (2015) the national security situation affected 
voter turnout with less than 30 million of the registered 67 million voters electing the president. 
Ibrahim et al. (2015) argue that the reduction in the number of voters was due to fear and 
insecurity. As the figures show, turnout in the elections was the lowest since the presidential 
election of 1979. For example, 67,422,005 Nigerians registered to vote, and only 29,432,083 
voted (ibid). Africa’s electoral outcomes it is argued are in part, affected by ‘fear of violence and 
voter intimidation’ that usually diminish voter turnout (Mac-Ikemenjima, 2017). 
The candidates, scandals and the economy 
As important as the factors highlighted above were, candidates mattered in the 2015 elections 
(Jideonwo and Williams, 2017). For the APC and its coalition of regional elites, Muhammadu 
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Buhari represented a better symbol of change, irrespective of his previous leadership record as 
a military head of state from 1983-1985. He represented the candidate of the moment and was 
presented as an incorruptible retired general who will guarantee security and prosperity (ibid).  
Arguments on economic growth and development statistics were also a factor in the election 
debate. For the ruling PDP, the economy was at its best and was the largest in Africa having 
grown consistently between 6-7% from 2008 to 2014 (Owen and Usman, 2015). According to 
the PDP, claims that the economy was struggling was a direct distortion of facts targeted at 
hitting a political goal (Omokri, 2017). Nevertheless, despite the impressive economic growth 
statistics, poverty, inequality and youth unemployment remained a key feature of the 2015 
socio-economic landscape and these indicators were at the back of high oil revenue and the 
APC kept pointing at these (Owen and Usman, 2015). 
On corruption claims, the opposition had pointed to President Jonathan’s mismanagement of 
fuel subsidy funds, the revelation of a former Central Bank Governor that USD 48.9 billion of oil 
receipts could not be accounted for, as well as a presidential pardon granted a former governor 
who jumped bail in the United Kingdom having been held for money laundering as proves that 
the president condones corruption.  
In his response, the president’s claim was that ‘corruption was as old as independent Nigeria’ 
and every successive government has fought corruption including his (Jonathan, 2018:7).  
According to Adeniyi (2017) the president’s response and disposition on these issues gave 
room for an unfavourable interpretation of his stand on corruption and contributed to his 
unpopularity. As Brian et al. (2014) notes, voters usually make electoral choices based on a 
retrospective assessment of incumbents and perceive malfeasance by incumbents usually 
provoke voters to punish tainted incumbents electorally. Owen and Usman (2015) argue that 
this was the case with President Jonathan in 2015, as scandals and governance failure 
provided the opposition with ‘sufficient ammunition’ and ‘turned the tide of public opinion 
against’ his government. 
As Swanson and Mancini (1996:3-4) argue, election campaigns ‘are complicated subjects to 
study and what happens within them usually reflect the coming together of opportunity, 
circumstance, tradition, personality, political culture’ and several other factors. Thus, Like the 
2015 presidential election in Nigeria, every election has its own complexity and the section 
above reinforces this argument by pointing to the fact that socio-political and economic context 
or what Esser and Stromback (2012a) calls ‘situational triggers’ continue to matter. Thus, as 
historic as the defeat of the PDP and the victory of opposition APC was, a combination of 
factors may account for the outcome. That said, this study is not concerned with the impact of 
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campaign practices on electoral outcome. It seeks however, to specifically identify campaign 
practice (s) prevalent in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria, within the context of the 
study’s operationalized model (i.e. Obama Campaign elements 1-16) and how we may theorize 
such similarity and convergence.  
In this regard, focus is on two major political parties, even though fourteen political parties and 
presidential candidates contested the 2015 elections. (see figure 1 below). Thus, the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC) and their presidential 
candidates (i.e. Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari respectively, are the 
focus of this case study. As highlighted in the methodology, these campaigns serve a specific 
theoretical purpose and have been selected in part on the basis of theory and represent 
instances in which something similar might have happen in a different context.  
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                                                  APPENDIX IV  
  Political Communication in Britain and the 2015 Socio-Economic and Political 
Context  
 
Developments in British political communication have followed the trajectory chronicled by Jay 
Blumler and Denis Kavanagh (1999) in their three ages of political communication-where in the 
first age, political communication ‘was subordinate to relatively strong and stable political 
institutions and beliefs; a second, of shifting party loyalties-where television was the dominant 
medium of political communication, and the third age of media abundance-where a proliferation 
of channels of communication now dominate-with intensified professionalizing, increase 
competitive pressures and anti-elitist populist practices’. In the literature however, a number of 
scholars trace this stages and historical chronology in Britain from 1945 to 1997, where 
elements like spin and spin doctors, political consultancy, the permanent campaign, canvassing, 
targeting, branding, opinion polling, advertising, negative attacks and trends towards 
‘presidentialization’ etc. became popular (see Bartle and Griffiths, 2001; Denver and Garnett, 
2014; Jones, 1996; Mughan, 2000; Norris, 1997; 2001). 
Although, since then, sustained changes have taken place in the national context-constituency 
campaigning, election administration and voting (Norris, 1997). Until recently, however, they 
have equally been continuity in the ‘evolutionary adaptability of British institutions, history, 
parliamentary sovereignty, nature of the state, as well as the underlying cohesion of the society 
and degree of political agreement on fundamental issues’ (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994; Forman 
and Baldwin, 2007; Denver and Garnett, 2014). Nevertheless, Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue 
that the consequences of the election-Brexit referendum and the cultural backlash that has 
followed has signalled a new era in British politics. That said, the empirical account intended in 
this chapter is not a detailed historical analysis of epochal changes and events in British 
electioneering, but rather, focus is on campaign practices deployed by the two main political 
parties (i.e. Conservative and Labour) and how we may theorize convergence in practices in the 
2015 General Elections. Although, where necessary, through within-case analysis, reference 
was made to past elections and historical trajectory of campaign practices, as a way of weaving 
into the analysis the rich historical background of British campaigns (see George and Bennett, 
2005). Such historical background as George and Bennnet (2005) and von Mises (2005:198) 
argue provides additional ‘standards of value’ that both support and enhance interpretation and 
judgement made in the analysis. The contextual background and the insight this generates, 
enable both a historical and in-depth understanding of the manifestation of the model in the 
case study (see Mills et al., 2010). This way, the case tells both how the Obama model is 
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deployed in the 2015 British context as well as the historical pathway of how the model 
emerged. 
That said, the 2015 General Election came at the back of the 2010 election that ended New 
Labour’s 16-year prominence in British politics (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Fought on a 
number of issues-the economy, the NHS, immigration, foreign policy, education, party leaders, 
defence, and permutations on Labour v SNP coalition (Jackson and Thorsen, 2015; Moore, 
2015; Scammell, 2015), recent post-election events, particularly-the in/out referendum on 
Britain’s European Union membership and the controversy that has trailed the result suggest 
that it remains one of Britain’s defining elections (Rose and Shephard, 2016). The number of 
issues that dominated notwithstanding, the economy, taxation and Labour’s role in the deficit 
and the 2008 economic crisis were topical (Deacon et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015; Salter, 2015). 
Butler and Stoke (1974) suggest that the state of the economy as the responsibility of any 
governing party in Britain has been the basis of dialogue between British political parties and the 
electorate, with the ‘decline and ‘recovery’ of both Labour and the Conservative Party in the 50s, 
60s, and 70s traceable to their responsibility to the state of the economy (p.369).  
Furthermore, commentators point to press partisanship and negative attacks-similar to those 
lunched on Neil Kinnock in the 1992 general election (Mullen 2015), money-the Tories war 
chest-an overwhelming 41% share of the entire amount spent by all political parties as factors 
that may have influenced the outcome. (Beckett, 2016; Electoral Commission campaign 
spending report, 2016). Although, British campaign rules (i.e. the Corrupt and Illegal Practices 
Prevention Act 1883; Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA), and the Political Parties 
Election and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA)) constrain excessive campaign spending (Castle, 
2015; Law Library of Congress, 2019). Norris (1997) found a ‘relationship between level of 
campaign spending in a constituency and a party’s local vote’ share (p.203). In the Labour 
Party’s post-election autopsy report for example, Margaret Beckett and her team conceded that 
the party’s financial position, as well as the ‘two against one’ dynamic; fixed term parliament; 
cultural and economic backlash and the rise of challenger parties like UKIP; and failure to frame 
a clear political message and narrative was a challenge in competing with the Tories central 
operation and digital campaign (see Beckett, 2016). 
Further commentary on the election also suggest that decreasing youth participation and 
increase in turnout of 65+ (78% v 43%) who predominantly voted Conservative, partly 
contributed to the outcome (Hawkins et al., 2015; Sloam, 2015). Historically, Butler and Stokes 
(1974) argue that the ‘generational effect’ (p.204), growing affluence, weakening of class 
alignment, and decline of politics as a zero-sum game represent some of Britain’s most 
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remarkable electoral changes. Sloam (2015) has shown that among all the 15 member states of 
the European Union, United Kingdom’s youth elections turnout has been ‘lowest in 2001, 2005 
and 2010’. According to Norris and Inglehart (2019:56), such generational election ‘turnout gap 
has grown over time’ in many Western democracies. 
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                                                        APPENDIX V  
The Socio-political and Economic Context of Trump’s America 
Commentators and scholars across diverse background have produced multiple and divergent 
set of explanations on the 2016 US presidential election (see Edge, 2017; Fuchs, 2018, Lilleker 
et al., 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Oliver and Rahn, 2016 etc.). Fuchs (2018:6, 44) for 
example point to President Trump’s emphasis on ‘racial proletarianism’ as his pathway to 
electoral victory-where a well-crafted distraction of attention from ‘complex societal and political-
economic causes of crises is employed by constructing scapegoats and preaching nationalism 
and law-and-order politics’.  
That said, there is need to highlight however, that in modern politics of some Western 
democracies, Trump’s America is not alone in pushing the narrative highlighted by Fuchs. In 
Europe for example Viktor Orban’s-Hungary; Heinz Christia Strache-Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPO); Marine Le Pen-France National Front; Geert Wilders-Netherland’s Party for Freedom 
and Nigel Farage’s UK Independent Party (UKIP) all provide examples that explain the rise of 
right-wing authoritarian politics- where politicians take advantage of ‘insecurities and resulting 
fears to subvert class struggles and antagonism by advancing nationalist struggles’ (ibid). This 
nationalist political framing apart from helping to elect Trump has produced and increase 
electoral fortunes in France-Jean-Marine Le Pen-National Front; Netherlands-Lijst Pim Fortuyn; 
Heinz-Christian Strache Austrain Freedom Party (FPOe); Hungarian Viktor Orban Fidesz Party 
and Italy Matteo Salvini Northern League fortunes progressively since 2000-2017, where among 
other things,-integration of ethnic minorities, immigration, border control, Islamic related 
terrorism etc. have dominated as the ‘most heated political issues’ (Norris and Inglehart, 
2019:50). Thus, like in the countries mentioned above, Fuchs argument on Trump’s campaign 
approach is that the ‘mythology of unity and identity’ is the political instrument deployed to 
present ‘a common instinctual fate between the bourgeois and the proletarianised groups’ 
(p.25).  
Nevertheless, it is my view however, that such nationalist and populist framing alone cannot be 
blamed for incentivising the anti-establishment rhetoric that helped get Donald Trump elected. 
As Springer (2016) argue, the global political economy-‘structural adjustment, fiscal austerity 
and free trade, augmented by direct military force, a marriage of the ‘invisible hand’ or the free 
market with the ‘visible fist’ of US military and its allies have served in feeding the current US 
political climate. Thus, as Springer notes, in discussing factors that contributed to Donald 
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Trump’s election, they should be an appreciation of the capacity of neoliberalism to ‘promote 
inequality, exacerbate poverty, license authoritarianism and advance a litany of social ‘ills that 
reinforces anti-establishment’ rhetoric like those framed by Donald Trump.  Timcke (2017) for 
example argue that because of the central place of the US and its allies in the international 
political economy’, they cannot be exculpated from the consequences of the crisis. For Fuchs 
(2018), it is the economic crisis of capitalism that has turned into a highly dangerous political 
crises in Europe and the world system, where nationalism and the friend/enemy logic are rapidly 
spreading and expanding’ in modern political discourse (p.63). Nevertheless, the populist wind 
as Norris (2016) argue have equally been seen in ‘post-industrial knowledge societies’ like 
Sweden and Denmark where the negative consequence of globalization is less. 
Perhaps, it might be fair to add, that the market as the arguments above suggest may not be 
working for everyone, even though they have been ‘spectacular economic growth in most part of 
the capitalist core’ (Basu, 2018:10).  As Basu show, global electoral upset like the election of 
Donald Trump is an indication of how ‘economic crisis has morphed into a political crisis, with 
authoritarian populist figures marshalling people’s anger and fear into nationalist projects’ (p.1). 
Nevertheless, such critique of market base neoliberal economics does not suggest that the left 
has a functional and all-fit solution. At best, the debate by leftist have remained ‘confined to 
questions of inequality and redistribution’, without concrete proposals of how to create or 
reconstruct ‘socialist productive economies’ (see Desai, 2019). However, Basu’s concern is that 
the media rather than present the economic crisis narrative, have been caught up in an ‘acute 
amnesia’ preferring to stick with its root in the dynamics of free market capitalism and ‘devotion 
to a narrative of swollen public sector and immigration’.  
Furthermore, scholars have also suggested and pointed to some long-term structural 
transformations in the US political system that benefited Trump and disadvantaged Hilary 
Clinton. For example, Frank (2016) suggest that elitist changes in the form of support of the 
professional class instead of the working class in the Democratic Party is one of such socio-
political transformation. On the Republican side, Kabaservice (2016) argues that the decline of 
moderates in the GOP have also embolden voices like Trump’s, even though they are 
governance challenges that have accompanied the party’s presidential election victory.  
For Norris (2016) and Norris and Ingelhart (2019)  growing economic and social exclusion sit at 
the heart of the recent rise in populism, with ‘losers from globalisation’, the ‘forgotten American’-
providing the ‘strongest support for authoritarian and populist values’ that have incentivise 
voices like President Trump’s (p.132). Perhaps, as Andrew Carnegie (1889) wrote, ‘the problem 
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of our age is that of proper administration of wealth’. Thus, as Nye (2019) suggest, ‘policy elites 
who support globalization and an open economy may have to pay more attention to issues of 
economic inequality as well as to adjusted assistance for those disrupted by economic change’.  
That said, whilst populist political narrative continues to grow, institutions of liberal democracy 
seem to have mitigated and limited manifestations of authoritarian tendencies in many of the 
countries highlighted above. Thus, the critical views on populism notwithstanding, Stavrakakis 
(2018) admonish that we consider in our reading of populism that ‘its inclusionary form can be a 
corrective’ for democracies that are losing their egalitarian and participatory component.  
Furthermore, Trump’s victory according to Norris and Inglehart (2019) is also rooted in cultural 
changes that is metamorphosing into ‘cultural grievances’ and the exploitation of ‘cultural wedge 
issues-race, gender, religion and nation’ in ways that resonated strongly with the electorate 
because of the generational contrast in cultural attitude (p.332 & 349). In their view, President 
Trump’s election ‘can best be explained as cultural backlash’. Norris (2016) even suggest that 
’by giving voice to, and amplifying fears of cultural change’, Trump and the Republicans opened 
the way for populism in the US.  As Fuchs note, recourse to such rhetoric apart from the 
electoral advantage it conferred the GOP, amount to a classic distraction from the class conflict 
that continue to shape modern capitalism. For Zizek (2017:3), such rhetoric as events in large 
parts of Western politics suggest is a surprise shift to humanitarian issues and refugees-a literal 
repression, and replacement of class struggles with ‘liberal-cultural topics of intolerance and 
solidarity’. Perhaps, ‘the fundamental source’ of modern ‘conflict’ as predicted by Huntington 
(1993) is now along ‘cultural’ lines. 
On culture, Oliver and Rahn (2016) point to ‘ideological shifts, party polarization and rightist 
evolution in the Republican Party that began with President Richard Nixon’s appeal to southern 
conservatives’ as the electoral ingredient that came to favour Trump. Historically, Neumann 
(1957) has shown for example, how anxiety in groups who feel disenfranchised and 
economically threatened tend to more likely support authoritarian and right-wing perspectives. 
Thus, Trump as Mutz (2018) and Klein (2020) suggest, may have capitalised on the rise of 
identity politics and the politics of ‘marginalised groups’ as well as the decline in social status of 
white America to advance the politics of resentment, alienation and distributional challenges 
during the campaign. Fuchs (2018) argue for example that Breitbart-news, articles and Stephen 
Bannon all served as suppliers of such ‘coherent, incoherent and intolerant world view’ to the 
Trump campaign to help get him elected. As Fuchs pointed out, readership of Breitbart for 
example increased from 7.4 million to 15.8 million between 2014 and September 2016. 
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Boczkowski and Papacharissi (2018), Block and Negrine (2018), Norris and Inglehart (2019), 
Oliver and Rahn (2016) all point to such rising polarization and partisanship in the media, social 
media troll farms and bots, the impact of disinformation, Trump’s news making ability-i.e. 
‘populist spectacles that sell as news and attract audiences’ and the rise in conspiracy theories 
as factors that may have influenced the election.  
Furthermore, in what may sound like a racial interpretation of the election of President Trump, 
Norris (2016) also suggest that Trump’s victory can also be interpreted as a backlash reaction to 
the election and re-election of the first African American president to the White House and 
public anger against the deep state-with such rhetoric resonating with ’older and non-college 
educated white men who felt threatened by ‘liberal cultural currents’. 
In other commentaries, the death of ‘old politics’-‘radicalization of anti-intellectualism’ (Kayam, 
2018); crisis of confidence and legitimacy in US government or what Short (2016) calls ‘politics 
of de-legitimacy’; candidate and party issue position-i.e. the political power of identity, identity 
partisan alignment, race, immigration and religion (Sides et al., 2019); money, press coverage, 
rating boosting screen dominance in both less partisan and right-wing media, and political 
communication practice/strategy-the use of ‘anti-intellectual rhetoric’ (Beckett, 2016; Kayam, 
2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019); ‘Trump’s personal brilliant use of social media to control the 
news agenda’ (Nye, 2019); his celebrity appeal, the fan feeling he created, the mood of the 
electorate and his reflection of the American voter ‘ideological narcissism’ (Negra, 2016; 
Richards, 2016; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019); Hillary Clinton’s emails controversy, Wikileaks and 
James Comey’s unprecedented and controversial statement in the final days of the campaign 
(Edge, 2017); institutional rules-i.e. the Electoral College; ‘deindustrialization’ and declining 
wages as well as the Democratic Party’s campaign failure to invest sufficiently in ‘Blue Wall of 
Rust Belt states’ (Short, 2016; Norris and Inglehart (2019: 21), where according to Norris and 
Inglehart, a mere 77,744 switch in votes in the States of Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania 
would have made Hillary Clinton president are other factors that may have contributed to the 
election of Donald J. Trump. 
That said, as stated in the methodology, emphasis on President Trump’s data driven campaign 
practices hinge on the increasing conversation on the campaign’s use of psychographics and its 
revelatory potential for theory expansion. Thus, rather than an analysis of similarity and 
continuity in practices, the campaign serves a s a longitudinal lens for providing insight into data 
driven campaign changes that emerged in the 2016 election cycle. That said, as a way of 
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highlighting Cambridge Analytica’s role highlighted in chapter seven, figures AV1-AV12 below 
offers a picture into Cambridge Analytica’s methodology and activities. 
Photoshoots from Cambridge Analytica’s Website 
Figure AV.1: Cambridge Analytica 2016 Website page 
 






Figure AV.2: Website details about Cambridge Analytica 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
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Figure AV.3: Cambridge Analytica services 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
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Figure AV.4: Cambridge Analytica services 
 






Figure AV.5: Cambridge Analytica services 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
Figure AV.6: Cambridge Analytica’s methodology 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
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Figure AV.7: The OCEAN Personality trait methods 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
 
Figure AV.8: Cambridge Analytica’s tools 
 






Figure AV.9: Cambridge Analytica’s Trump campaign 
 





Figure AV.10: Cambridge Analytica’s Cruz campaign 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
Figure AV.11: Cambridge Analytica’s Ben Carson’s campaign 
 
Source: Cambridge Analytica’s website 
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Figure AV.12: Cambridge Analytica’s work for John Bolton’s super-pac 
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